Money and 'self' : towards a social psychology of money and its usage by Sonnenberg, Stefanie
  
MONEY AND 'SELF' : TOWARDS A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF MONEY AND ITS USAGE 
 
Stefanie Sonnenberg 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
 
  
2003 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                                                           
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14192      
 
 
 
 
This item is protected by original copyright 
 
 
ProQuest Number: 10166242
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10166242
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
M o n e y  a n d  ‘Se l f ’ :
T o w a r d s  a  So c ia l  P sy c h o l o g y  o f  M o n e y  a n d  Its  U sa g e
by 
Stefanie Sonnenberg
A thesis submitted in confoimity with the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
School of Psychology 
University of St. Andrews
July, 2003
T'AÆ 6& 0
DECLARATION
I, Stefanie Sonnenberg, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 90.000 
words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work earned out by me 
and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.
D ate ....................  Signature of candidate
I was admitted as a research student in September, 1999 and as a candidate for the 
degi'ee of Doctor of Pliilosophy in August 2000; the higher study for which this is a 
record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 1999 and 2003.
D ate ....................  Signature of candidate
I hereby certify that the candidate has ftilfilled the conditions of the Resolution and 
Regulations appropriate for the degi ee of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St 
Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that 
degiee.
D ate ....................  Signature of supervisor
hi submitting this thesis to the University o f St Andrews I understand that I am giving 
permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the 
University Libraiy for the time being in force, subject to any copyiight vested in the 
work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and abstract will be 
published, and tliat a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide 
libraiy or research worker.
D ate ....................  Signature of candidate
F o r  m y  p a r e n t s
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s
Daft as it may soimd, this thesis has been a really ‘big thing’ for me. Somehow I seem 
to have wrestled it -  and myself for that matter -  all the way tlii'ough. Yet, whilst 
struggling at times, I have been astounded by the kindness and support that so many 
people have so generously given. Without these people, this thesis would never have 
been written.
First of all, ‘thanlc you’ to everybody who participated in this research. I am 
particularly gmtefiil to all those who took part in the interviews, for offering their time 
as well as giving me many things to ponder. I would also like to aclaiowledge David 
Glover of Windfall Films who provided the materials for one of the studies and Carole 
Burgoyne of Exeter University for facilitating one of the experiments.
I am greatly indebted to my supeiwisor Steve Reicher for his invaluable intellectual 
guidance tluoughout the years, hi taking me on as his student, Steve has opened up a 
path for me that I had always regarded as closed and which, without his 
encouragement, I would never have dared to tread. For that I am deeply gi'ateful.
Many people here in St. Andrews have been tremendously supportive. I would 
especially like to thank Mohammed Alshagawi, Mike Burt, Libby Eaton, Eva Loth, 
Sarah Marshall-Piscini, Grant Muir, Marie-Camien Neipp-Lopez, Rahel Noser, 
Samantha O’Reilly, Rachael Powell and Denis Sindic — all of whom, in their own 
ways, contributed to the completion of this thesis.
A very special ‘thanlc you’ to my dear friends Mark Gant and Natasha Hood whose 
constant love and support never cease to amaze me. Without Mark’s presence and 
practical help during the last few weeks of writing, I simply would have been lost.
My greatest debt is to Vaughan, for putting up with my prolonged absence, always 
being there for me and for making all my ‘sti uggles’ seem worthwhile.
Tliis research was made possible by ESRC grant no. R00429934500
111
A b s t r a c t
This thesis contends that the subjective meanings and value attached to money 
may, in part, be a fonction of identity-related nomis and values. This proposed 
relationship between identity issues and monetary attitudes/behaviour is explored 
across a series of methodologically diverse studies. It is argued that psychological 
approaches to money, despite their efforts to the contrary, frequently concur with 
traditional economic models of human behavioiu in so far as they rest on similarly 
static, de-contextualised notions of the self. The research described here aims to 
substitute these implicit assumptions about the nature of selfliood with a social 
psychological account of the ‘self and thus with an explicit focus on subjective 
identification processes. In doing so, the present approach draws on the Social Identity 
tradition.
First,--findings from an exploratoiy interview study illustrate a) that identity 
concerns are central for people’s imderstandings of money, h) that the relationship i 
between money and selfliood is dilemmatic. and c) that money meanings and usage 
relate to identity across different levels of abstractions (i.e. personal, social, human). 
Second, a series of experimental studies (based on predictions derived from the Social 
Identity model of the self) shows that attitudes towards money can vary as a function of 
both social identity salience and the comparative context in which a given identity is 
salient. The association between social identification, specific identity contents and 
monetary attitudes is also addressed. Finally, an exploration of the relationship between 
identity concerns and decision-making processes within a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type 
setting indicates that identity and the social laiowledge derived from it play a cmcial 
role, not only with regard to how people attempt to meet their goals in this context but 
also in terms of how these goals are defined. The broader implication of these findings 
with regard to ‘rational choice’ models of human agency are discussed.
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P r e v i e w
“The problem o f the place o f money in our lives is continually new 
and every day exposes each one o f us to the discrepancy between 
what we are and what we wish to be.” (Jacob Needleman)
This thesis is about money. What is money worth to us? How much do we value 
money? Is our understanding of money related to oiu sense of identity?
The significance of these kinds of question is twofold: Firstly, they allow us to explore 
money not simply as an economic fact, but also as a social and psychological 
phenomenon. Secondly, they enable us to critically examine some of the notions 
fundamental to the social sciences, such as ‘utility’, ‘value’ or ‘rationality’, hi posing 
these questions, we eventually hope to open up a path towards a clearer understanding 
not only of economic beliefs and behaviour as such, but also of how our theories about 
this behaviour shape the socio-economic realities in which we live.
The C urrent Issue
The studies reported here are intended as a first tentative step towards building a 
social psychology of money and money usage. This is not to say that similar 
endeavours have not yet been embarked upon. In fact, one could argue that a 
considerable amount of work earned out within economic psychology -  a field of 
research that has managed to establish itself as a fairly independent interdisciplinary 
subject dining the past 25 years or so -  has in one way or another been devoted 
towai'ds achieving similar ends. However, it is the contention of this thesis that 
previous attempts to breathe some psychological realism into ‘Homo Economicus’, the 
denizen of the monetary world according to economic theory, have tended to 
concentrate on the psychological at the expense of the 50cz'a/-psychological. hi doing 
so, and albeit unwittingly, economic psychology has embraced certain facets of the 
veiy idea it originally set out to challenge, namely the conception of the person as 
‘rational actor’. By focussing on a specific domain of research within economic 
psychology -  attitudes towards money -  one of the theoretical tasks of this thesis will 
be to substantiate this claim.
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But what, one may ask, has money got to do with conceptions of personliood? Why 
should notions of human agency be at all relevant within the context of studying 
people’s attitudes towards money? One answer to this question lies in the central role 
that is ascribed to money in Rational Choice models of human action, especially those 
utilised by economics. Rational Choice accounts of human behaviour, in conjunction 
with the associated twin motivations of ‘self-interest’ and ‘utility maximisation’, are 
ubiquitous tluoughout the social sciences. However, the reliance on rational decision­
making theories in economics in particular has led to the treatment of money -  or 
monetaiy rewards to be precise -  as a measure of ‘utility’, hi other words, money and 
‘utility’ are frequently regarded as being synonymous. As Ringmax (1996) puts it:
“In fact, in economic theory preferences are [...] translated into one unit -  money -  
which serves as a substitute for all substantive goals [...]. Economic gain and 
nothing else is what moves an economic actor.” (p. 39)
Within this kind of framework, then, money is seen as fundamental to people’s 
preferences or ‘interests’ and, consequently, to human agency as such. This use of 
money as an explanatory principle is the reason why any approach to the subject (even 
from a psychological perspective) must -  in one way or another -  impinge on the 
model of rational action advanced by orthodox economics. Even though this 
comiection may not be addiessed explicitly, psychological findings concerned with 
money will always be pertinent to the depiction of individuals as ‘rational actors’.
hi recent years, the social sciences have been witnessing a growing concern with 
this particular notion of human agency. A number of dissident voices have been 
emerging from disciplines as diverse as geography (e.g. Barnes & Sheppard, 1992; 
Miller, 1992), history (e.g. Ringniar, 1996), political science (e.g. Mansbridge, 1990), 
philosophy (e.g. Taylor, 1985), sociology (e.g. Etzioni, 1988; Lie, 1997; Zafirovski, 
1999a; 1999b; 2000) and even from within economics itself (e.g. Sen, 1990), wliicli 
strongly oppose the application of Rational Choice models to all human behaviour. 
Amongst these writers of an unorthodox persuasion, several have alluded to the 
importance of a sense of se lf  or identity for human action, especially for rational action. 
It is these writers who are of particular relevance in the present context. For example, 
Ringmar (1996) contends that the actual possibility of a rational utility calculus is 
contingent upon identity as “it only is as someone that we can have an interest in some­
thing'" (p. 3, emphases in original). Accordingly, he claims that rational acts -
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conceptualised as calculations of utility gains and losses -  remain meaningless unless 
they can be attached to a certain kind of person. Identity, in other words, provides the 
pre-condition for rational choice since “without this ‘someone’ there would simply not 
be anyone around for whom something could, or could not, be an interest” (Ringmar, 
1996, p. 3). Ringmar therefore calls for a shift of focus within the social sciences, away 
from the customaiy preoccupation with people’s ‘interests’ to an emphasis on their 
identities.
This, then, brings us to the argmnent that lies at the core of this thesis. We start 
from the premise that a sense of ‘se lf or ‘identity’ is fimdamental to our beliefs and 
actions and propose that this includes oiu* economic attitudes and behaviours. The 
practical task of this thesis will therefore lie in ascertaining whether or not identity is of 
significance in the context o f people’s understandings of / attitudes towards money. 
Again, this is not to suggest that economic psychologists have, until now, disregarded 
identity issues entirely.* However, in so far as identity and its relationship to money 
have been addressed, this has tended to occur either at the level of sociological gioup 
membership (e.g. gender, -social class, nationality or ethnic gioup) or by reference to 
‘personality’ variables. As a result of the fonner approach, the identity dimensions 
considered to be of importance have not only been imposed a priori but have also been 
treated as objective atfributes of the person. It therefore remains unexplored whether — 
and if so in what sense -  these identities are subjectively meaningful to people as 
regards the role of money in their lives. A common underlying tlnead, which runs 
tlu'ough much economic psychological research on money, concerns the supposed 
primacy of sociological group membership over processes of subjective identification. 
Consequently, a certain version of the ‘self has become naturalised, namely its 
depiction as a unitary and de-contextualised entity. It is precisely relating to this 
version of selfliood that an implicit concurrence, as hinted at above, between 
psychological approaches and tiaditional economic models of human behaviour can be 
found.
The present argument for an identity-based approach to money, on the other hand, is 
based on a notion of selfliood as variable and context-dependent. Hence, the studies 
presented here entail a process-oriented approach to identity, with a particular focus on 
people’s subjective understandings of their identities. In the course of this argument, a
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particular strand of social psychological theorising -  the Social Identity tradition -  will 
be drawn on as the theoretical foundation for some of the more specific research 
hypotheses put foiivard here. In doing so, it is suggested that the Social Identity model 
of the ‘self can provide a usefiil starting point for bringing together the great diversity 
of economic psychological findings concerning money within one theoretical whole.
O rganisation  o f the T hesis
The next chapter. Chanter L develops the rationale for tliis thesis sketched above by 
demarcating the theoretical context out of which the argument for a focus on the ‘self 
in the study of monetary attitudes has arisen. First, a brief excursion into economic 
theory, with its particular conceptualisations of both money and himian agency, offers 
a glimpse of the historical circumstances that provided economic psychology with its 
hnpetus and also sets the stage for a general review of the economic psychological 
literature on money. Following on from that, the notion regarding the nature of 
selfliood implicit in botli Rational Choice models and economic psychological research 
is examined. This critical examination then leads to the introduction of the Social 
Identity model of the ‘se lf as an alternative account to these previously implicit and 
unchallenged assmnptions about the nature of identity, hi doing so, a more detailed 
case for the inclusion of social psychological theory -  and, as such, of identity 
processes -  in the study of economic phenomena in general, and the concept o f money 
in particular, is presented. The chapter concludes with an outline of the specific 
research questions that lie at the heart of the empirical work presented in the thesis 
(Chapters II to VI).
Chapter II is concerned with the question of whether or not, on an experiential level, 
notions of identity are pertinent for people’s understandings of money. Following 
Dittniar and Drury’s (2000) call for a greater emphasis on qualitative methods in 
economic psychological research, an exploratory inteiwiew study is presented wliicli 
tackles the subjective meanings ascribed to money and their relationship to people’s 
definitions of themselves.
In Chapters III to V we aim to relate our understanding of social identity processes to 
the subjectively perceived value of money. To this end, a series of specific research 
hypotheses derived fiom the Social Identity tradition are examined in two experimental 
studies (Chapter HI and Chapter V) and one survey study (Chapter IV). The puipose of
4
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these studies is to explore the relevance of the Social Identity conception of the ‘se lf - 
and, accordingly, its variability -  in the context of measiuing attitudes towards money. 
The last empirical chapter. Chanter VL is concerned with the relationship between 
identity issues and the decision-maldng processes / behaviours occurring in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-type setting. As the particular Prisoner’s Dilenmia in question 
involved relatively large amounts of money, players’ choices had substantial financial 
consequences; in comparison to the options that are typically available in the 
traditional laboratoiy-based ‘games’, with their rather small token sums, players’ 
choices in this particular context were of considerably gieater significance. A thematic 
analysis of the dialogues between various teams of players in this modified Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game (originally broadcast as part of a television show called “Trust Me”) is 
presented, which illustrates the crucial role played by identity, and the social 
knowledge derived from it, not only with regard to how people attempt to meet their 
goals but also in terms of goal-definition.
Finally, Chanter VII draws together the various findings that were gathered during the 
empirical stages of this venture. The shortcomings of these findings as well as their 
broader implications -  especially with regard to Rational Choice conceptions of human 
agency -  are discussed and some suggestions for future enquiries are put forward.
Chapter I
I. In t r o d u c t io n
Tliis chapter sets out to make the case for a greater emphasis on social 
psychological theory and, more specifically, on the notion of ‘identity’ in the study of 
people’s subjective understandings of and attitudes towards money, hi order to fully 
appreciate the context in which this argument has been conceived, we first consider 
how money has been conceptualised and dealt with in economic theoiy. This leads to a 
consideration of the model of human nature or agency traditionally espoused by 
economics and of the role ascribed to money within that model. Next, some social 
science critiques of the economic definition of money are examined. A number of 
psychological approaches to money are then considered, hi doing so, paificular 
emphasis will be placed on studies concerned with people’s attitudes towards or their 
valuation of money. Finally, the potential relevance of the Social Identity notion of 
‘selfliood’ for a social psychology of money will be outlined. The chapter concludes by 
di awing together the strands of argument presented throughout the different sections 
and by providing a brief summary of the research agenda behind this thesis.
1.1 M o n e y  AND R a t i o n a l  A g e n c y
1.1.1 Money in Economics
Traditionally, the topic of money has belonged to the realm of economics. 
Economists define money -  closely related to the notion of ‘money supply’ -  as 
“anything that is generally accepted in payment for goods or services or in the 
repayment of debts” (MisWdii, 1997, p. 48). From an economic standpoint, the ‘ideal’ 
kind of money should possess certain attributes such as durability, convenience, 
divisibility, uniformity or stability of value (Slonian, 1997); for that reason, our 
present-day cunency is often considered as the archetypal manifestation of this ideal, 
hi the context of the modem economy, the general conception of money encompasses a 
distinction commonly drawn between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ definitions of money, 
where items that can be spent directly (e.g. cash and money in cheque-book or debit- 
card accounts) are included in the fonner and those which are not immediately 
accessible, but can be readily converted into cash (e.g. deposit accounts), form part of 
the latter.
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However, economic definitions of money are by no means imambiguous. This 
holds especially true as regards the question of how money and its supply within a 
given economy should be measured. For instance, several methods of assessing the 
money supply in the UK have been devised in recent years alone so as to reflect the 
different types of deposit that might be considered as part of ‘money’ (Sloman, 1997). 
Often these changes in the types of measure used relate to broader teclmological 
developments.' Yet, iiTespective of the ambiguities relating to the measurement of 
money, that is concerning its various forms, unanimity exists with regard to the basic 
functions it is meant to perform witliin any type of economy and no matter what its 
physical manifestation. There has been a long-standing tripartite classification of these 
functions, whereby money is defined as a) a generalised medium of exchange (i.e. a 
means for the payment of goods and services), b) a imit of account or a standard of 
value (i.e. a measure of ‘value’ which allows for the comparison of different goods, 
services or assets) and c) a store of value (i.e. a repository of purchasing power over 
time, facilitating ciUTcnt savings for later piuchases). On the strength of these primaiy 
fimctions, money is often refen*ed to as the ‘lubricant’ that allows the economy to mn 
more smoothly tluough lowering transaction costs (i.e. time spent engaged in the 
exchange of goods and services) and thereby encouraging specialization and the 
division of labour (Mislildn, 1997).
Tliis seemingly iraiocuous description conceals three important assumptions about 
money -  especially with regard to its current foiin(s) -  to which not only economists 
but most of us appeal" to subscribe. Firstly, the origin of money is seen to lie in 
economic practices (i.e. exchange); secondly, its emergence is viewed as essential for 
the efficient functioning of an economy^; and as a corollaiy, thirdly, the kind of money 
we presently use is seen as the product of some kind of ‘natural’ progiession towards 
gi-eater economic sophistication. Wliilst we shall return to the first point shortly (see 
Section 1.2.1), it lies beyond the scope of this thesis to expand on the latter two 
assumptions in detail. Suffice it here to point out that their implications seem
* For example, the development of computer teclinology has had a considerable impact on the financial 
sector tlrroughout tire world and has led to a bhuring of the previously existing distinctions between 
different types of accoiuit (Sloman, 1997). The relative ease with which deposits fiom one type of 
accoimt can now be switched to another, has resulted in a reassessment of tlie deposits that should be 
included in measures of the money supply.
 ^ Consider, for example, Mislikin’s (1997) statement that “the need for money is so strong that almost 
every society beyond the most primitive invents it” (p. 50; emphasis added).
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considerable, as they tend to preclude critical discussions, not only of different types of 
money production (e.g. coimiiercially-produced versus community-produced money) 
and their respective socio-economic consequences, but also of alternative views as to 
the broader economic aixangement.
To summarise, whilst there is an ongoing debate about which types of measure 
should be considered appropriate for gauging tlie supply of money (i.e. which of its 
many forms ought to be included in measurements of its quantity), its essence is 
usually taken as a given within economics. In other words, the nature of money tends 
to be described simply by listing the functions it fulfils (Smelt, 1980). From an 
economic perspective, money is therefore understood as a ‘neutral’, all-purpose 
rationalising tool whose origin and puipose lie in the facilitation of trade (Belk & 
Wallendorf, 1990).
There are two main conceptual issues that arise from this particular treatment of 
money in economics. Firstly, economic theories of money are essentially focussed on 
the macroeconomic level of analysis. As a consequence, the economist’s utilitarian 
definition of maiicet money has a tendency to conceal all those instances where money, 
at a ‘micro’ level, does not fulfil its function as a generalised medium of exchange. 
Some examples of this will be considered in Section 1.2. Secondly, as Lea, Taipy and 
Webley (1987) have maintained, economic theories of money stem from a stylised, 
rational model of hiunankind and, as such, rest on ai'bitraiy psychological assumptions. 
It is this particular* model of human agency to which we will turn our attention next.
1.1.2 The Rational Actor
The foundation upon which the entire edifice of economic theorising stands is the 
claim that resources are in limited supply. Since hmnan nature is seen as essentially 
acquisitive, and scarcity as pei*vasive, choices have to be made; economics is therefore 
the study of these choices and their consequences (Mohun, 2003, p. 405).
Economic theoiy presupposes that people’s decisions are rational -  that is to say 
consistent with their goals. It thus both requires and reinforces a conceptualisation of 
human beings as rational decision-makers. On the basis of these two simple 
assumptions, inferences about the forces behind all choices are often drawn, as the 
following textbook passage shows:
Chapter /
"Combining the fact that scarcity implies costly choice with the assumption of 
rationality enables us to formulate a proposition that we shall call the Fundamental 
Premise of Econom ics: In all decision making, individuals choose the alternative 
for which they believe the net gains to be the greatest. Virtually all economic theory 
and analysis is built upon this premise." (Skaggs & Carlson, 1996, p. 8; emphases 
in original)
This, of course, is an allusion to the two primaiy forces that are assumed to govern 
human agency: self-interest and utility-maximisation. hi studies of rational decision­
making, ‘utility’ -  that is, the ainoimt of satisfaction an agent derives from an object or 
an event -  is often referred to as a purely tecluiical concept. Whenever an agent acts so 
as to maximise his/her utility, the term simply denotes whatever the agent’s behaviour 
suggests him/her to consistently desire. ‘Utility’, in other words, is an abstract means 
by which Rational Choice theorists refer to an individual’s goals and preferences. But 
there are tluee fundamental questions that remain unanswered in this particular model 
of luunan action: how do actors pui'sue their goals, what are these goals and who, in 
turn, ai e these actors? We will retiiin to these issues in just a moment.
Before doing so, a few more words on the notion of ‘utility’ are due. Since its 
inauguration by William Stanley Jevons in 1871, utility theoiy has not been, exactly, 
unproblematic for economists. Lewin (1996) provides an interesting historical analysis 
of the numerous crises and reincarnations utility theory has undergone within its native 
discipline.^ Economic debates suiToimding ‘utility’ have focused not only on its 
scientific validity but also on its actual usefulness as a theoretical tool for economics. 
Yet, rather miraculously, the concept has siuwived and with it the notion of utility 
maximisation/optimisation. Its continued smwival has often been attributed to Milton 
Friedman’s “declaration o f independence fiom psychology” (Lewin, 1996, p. 1318), 
that is, his contention that behavioural assumptions about individuals need not be 
accurate (and may even be implausible) as long as aggi*egate data such as prices and 
quantities behave as if  these assmnptions were tme (Friedman, 1953 cited in Lewin, 
1996)."' The value of a theory then, according to Friedman, does not lie in the realism 
of its assumptions but in the relative acciuacy of its predictions. As Fimi (1992) points
Lewiii’s (1996) fascinating historical account also reveals the extent to wliich economics, despite its 
protestations to the contrary, has always been reliant both on psychological assumptions as such and on 
psychology as a discipline. In fact, utility was originally conceived o f as a psychological (and 
physiological) magnitude that was supposed to measure an individual’s inner happiness or pleasure 
(Lewin, 1996).
For additional obseiwations as to tlie possible reasons for the tlieory’s persistence see Fimi (1992).
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out, Friedman’s claim that utility theory -  though devoid of a ‘scientific’ basis -  can be 
retained heuristically as an aid in generating testable hypotheses, has made it 
respectable to talk about utility theory whilst, at the same time, aclmowledging its lack 
of psychological realism. However, according to Fimi (1992) “this solution, of course, 
leaves totally unexplained [...] the fact that most economists really do believe in the 
utility theory as a model of human choice” (p. 664). hi other words, notwithstanding its 
long and troubled liistoiy -  and despite Jevons’ eaidy caution that it could not possibly 
account for all choices (Jevons, 1931 cited in Fimi, 1996) -  the maximising model of 
individual decision-making has prevailed in economic theory and with it ‘Homo 
Economicus’, the rational agent.
This particular model of human agency is, of course, not without its critics. For 
instance, Aniitai Etzioni -  often refeixed to as the founding father of socio-economics 
and the American communitarian movement -  has been actively campaigning against 
the model’s underlying premises as well as its wider moral implications (e.g. Etzioni, 
1988; 1999). hi doing so, he has emphasised the significance of morality, emotion and 
social bonds for human agents and their choices. Economists, too, have voiced their 
doubts regarding iiairow conceptions of rational choice, albeit on rather different, less 
overtly ideological grounds. Richard Thaler’s work (e.g. 1999; 2000; Tversky & 
Thaler, 1990), for example, highlights the model’s psychological inaccuracies by 
delineating the ‘cognitive biases’ or ‘anomalies’ tliat can affect people’s decision­
making processes. Yet, despite the critics, this particular model of human agency does 
not inhabit the sphere of economics alone. The economic or rational choice approach to 
human action “has literally colonised all of the social sciences as grist for [its] 
analytical mill” (Lie, 1997, p. 343). Many writers have actively campaigned for this 
type of ‘colonisation’, as the following comment by the economist Jack Hirshleifer 
illustrates:
“There is oniy one social science. What gives economics its imperialist invasive 
power Is that our analytical categories -  scarcity, cost, preferences, opportunities, 
etc. -  are truly universal in applicability. Even more important is our structured 
organization of these concepts into the distinct yet intertwined processes of 
optimisation on the individual decision level and equilibrium on the social level of 
analysis. Thus economics does constitute the universal grammar of social 
science.” (Hirshleifer, 1985, p. 53; emphasis in original)
Yet, as indicated above, there are three fundamental issues that the Rational Choice 
model of human action does not address — even within the naiTow confines of its own
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discipline — which renders its supposed applicability to all social sciences rather 
problematic. These issues will be demarcated in the following section.
1.1.2.1 ‘Goals’ and the Individual Agent
To begin with, let us consider the question of the types of ‘utility’ or ‘goal’ rational 
agents are thought to pursue. The means by which these goals aie supposedly attained 
have generally been treated as given a priori. As already pointed out, the theoretical 
presupposition of Rational Choice theoiy is that people are -  or, indeed, ‘ought to’ be -  
profit-seekers or utility-optimisers (Zafirovski, 2000). hi other words, people are 
deemed to act rationally and, in doing so, are thought of as ‘optimising’. Optimisation, 
in turn, is conceived of as maximising benefits or minimising costs. It is commonly 
presumed that actors’ primaiy concern lies with their own welfare and that their goals 
and preferences are self-interested. Self-interest is the engine that powers rational 
action and thus the means by which goals are being realised. What this approach 
ignores, however, is the fact that people’s actions do not take place in a social vacuum, 
that is to say, outside their social relationships. Even if the claim that our goals are 
naiTOwly self-interested were true, the pursuit of such goals would still require that we 
take the behaviour of other, also self-interested, agents into account. In other words, 
given a particulai* goal, the rational choice approach tends to overlook the fact that, in 
order to attain it, individuals need to possess an understanding of the social world in 
which they live. Rationalism thus presupposes the existence of a meaningful world, but 
remains silent with regard to how this world has been created (Ringmar, 1996).
This leads to another, closely related problem. Besides the exclusion of social 
laiowledge in descriptions of goal-directed behaviour, rational agency models face 
great difficulties when attempting to account for the supposed ends of rational action. 
If utility is what we derive from the pursuit of certain goals, then what determines these 
goals? What are the ‘goods’ we piusiie with our actions? Most Rational Choice 
theorists seem remarkably unconcerned with the nature of human goals, a state of 
affairs that Zafirovski (2000) has temied their “teleological agnosticism” (p. 185). In a 
similar* vein, Ringmar (1996) has argued that, when the rationalistic ideal constitutes 
the yardstick by which all human behaviour is measured, we can only ever account for 
what occurs to pre-existing, exogenously given preferences as these are being 
processed by the individual’s decision-making mechanism, hi other words, interest
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(and as such ^eZ/'-interest) becomes an empty and exogenous variable; whilst Rational 
Choice theory infoiins us that people seek to maximise utility, what this means in terms 
of their concrete actions or goals is left unspecified (Ringmar, 1996). Yet, as various 
writers (e.g. Reicher, in preparation; Taylor, 1985) have pointed out, an accurate 
explanation of behaviour requires that we also account for the goals it aims to pursue.
In the context of economics, the solution to the problem of goal-specification has 
simply been to take the objectives that human agents pursue for granted. Economic 
theory as such does not possess an independent measure of its dependent variable 
‘utility’. However, market economics holds that money, due to the commodities it 
buys, is the primary source of utility (Lane, 1991) and, accordingly, counts as the 
primary ‘good’. Since monetary value constitutes the principal measure of utility, and 
seeing as utility maximisation is one o f the two forces that supposedly propel rational 
action, monetary concerns become fundamental to economic conceptions of human 
agency. Money, in other words, is the “substitute for all substantive goals” (Ringmar, 
1996, p. 39).
This brings us to the final issue that arises from the conception of the human being as 
‘Homo Economicus’. Not only are goals and the utilities derived from them regarded 
as given a priori. Rational Choice models also presuppose who the recipients of that 
‘utility’ are. As already indicated, the approach is deeply steeped in the tradition of 
utilitarian individualism; it assumes that agents are egoistic or ‘self-interested. In other 
words, it is the individual self that constitutes the centre of rational choice or action and 
to whom utility, or a ‘good’, is seen to accrue. Actions that do not increase utility to 
this individual self are viewed either as inational or merely as present sacrifices in 
order to obtain future gains. Yet, this pre-supposition leaves unspecified what Idnd o f  
‘self this recipient of utility is.
1.1.2.2 ‘Selfhood’ and Its Relationship to Human Action
T h e  ‘C o r e * S e l f
The two fundamental postulates of Rational Choice theory, utility maximisation 
(optimisation) and the individual agent as its recipient, are founded on -  and, indeed, 
can only be sustained by -  a particular* notion of ‘selfliood’ or identity. In rational 
choice models selfliood is depicted as unitary, as possessing an indivisible core or* 
‘essence’. The self is treated as an entity whose attributes, at least in principle,
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resemble those of other natural physical objects. Identity is thus not only defined in 
individualistic teiins, but it is also viewed as relatively stable over time and across 
contexts. As already indicated above, the economic actor or ‘self is located within a 
social vacuum; s/he, by definition, has to exist outside social relations and, as Sen 
(1990) put it, this “purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron” (p. 
37). Without the premise of such an ‘essential’, de-contextualised self, the 
presupposition of an agent’s self-interest would appear tautological at best and, at 
worst, rather misleading.
However, the notion of the self as an integial, unified entity is deeply problematic 
and, despite its pre-eminence in the social sciences (including social psychology), has 
been challenged by numerous social theorists -  both indirectly and directly. Post­
modern writers, like Baudrillard, Derrida or Foucault, for instance, reject essentialism 
of any kind. As regards the more overt critiques of a unitary conception of selfliood, 
these tend to hail fiom distinctive, but neighbouring, intellectual camps. On the one 
hand, it has been ai'gued that certain understandings of identity should be treated as 
historically contingent versions of what it means to be a human agent. According; to 
Taylor (1985; 1989), for instance, the notion of the individual self is a typically modern 
phenomenon which has become woven into a host of modem practices -  including 
economic and scientific ones. This version of selfliood, he argues, has its origins in the 
Enlightenment's ideal of ‘disengagement’ and the associated principles of efficacy, 
power and fieedom:
“The liberation through objectification wrought by the cosmological revolution of the 
seventeenth century has become for many the model of the agent’s relation to the 
world, and hence sets the very definition of what it is to be an agent.” (Taylor, 1985, 
p. 5)
Hence the birth of ‘the individual’, or the modem ‘disengaged identity’ (Taylor, 1985), 
as metaphysically independent of society can be traced back to a particular historical 
epoch. Other social theorists, such as Giddens (1991), have dealt with siniilai* issues, 
albeit from a different vantage point, by examining the impact of modemity on the 
definition and expression of selfliood. On the other hand, writers have stressed the 
social embeddedness of oiu* ‘selves’ and thus the extent to which our identities are 
constituted by “the intricate inteiweaving of history, narrativity, social knowledge and 
relationality, as well as institutional and cultural practices” (Somers, 1994, p. 634). As
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a result, identity should not be viewed as static or invariable but as something that is 
“always project, not settled accomplishment” (Calhoim, 1994, p. 27).
The notion of identity as socially constituted or constructed, and therefore as 
fundamentally variable, has also found its advocates in psychology. For instance, social 
constructionism, an approach that originally emerged as an alternative to the positivist 
epistemological foundations of the discipline (e.g. Gergen, 1973; 1985; 1989; Parker, 
1998; Shotter & Gergen, 1989) disputes the notion of an intégral, unified self. Social 
constructionists stress the inter-relatedness between social practice(s) and particular 
understandings of identity (e.g. Gergen, 1991), drawing attention to the fact that human 
experience is mediated not only historically and culturally but also linguistically:
“The self, as the singularity we each feel ourselves to be, is not an entity. Rather it 
is a site, a site from which a person perceives the world and a place form which to 
act. There are only persons. Selves are grammatical fictions, necessary 
, characteristics of person-oriented discourses." (Harré 1998, p. 3-4)
The social constructionist approach is closely related to the ‘discursive turn’ in social 
psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and its ensuing focus 
on people’s = discursive practices. Discourse analysts not only regard particular 
understandings of the self but the very possibility of a self-concept as such as 
inextricably linked with the linguistic practices people engage in throughout their 
everyday lives. More recently, a distinction has been drawn between Discursive 
Psychology and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (see Willig, 2001). Whilst the 
emphasis of discursive psychologists like Edwards and Potter (1992) or Edwards, 
Potter and Middleton (1992) lies primarily on how people use discursive resources in 
order to achieve interpersonal objectives in social interaction, Foucauldian discoiuse 
analysts such as Parker (1994) focus on the ways in which different discourses 
construct different ‘ways-of-being’ or subjectivity (Willig, 2001).
Wliat all these critics have in common is their claim that there is no such thing as an 
integral, individual self -  that “[it] cannot even heuristically exist” (Somers, 1994, p. 
633) -  and therefore their treatment of identity as inlierently variable and contextually 
determined. This view of selfliood is also sharped by adherents to the Social Identity 
tradition within social psychology (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher & Wetherell 1987). Social Identity theorists uphold that the ‘self or identity 
should be conceived of as existing on various levels of abstractions and, therefore, as 
contingent on context. It is this particular tradition and the model of selfliood it offers
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that we will draw on tliroughout this thesis, hi Section 1.4 a more detailed description 
of the Social Identity concept of the self will be provided. For now, let ns briefly return 
to our discussion of self-interest and utility maximisation.
I d e n t i t y  a n d  A c t i o n
So far we have encountered tlnee fundamental questions that remain unanswered 
within Rational Choice models of human agency: 1) How do people reach for and 
achieve their goals (‘goods’, ‘utilities’)? For example, what foiin of social Imowledge 
is used for their attainment? 2) What is the nature of these goals? hi other words, what 
constitutes a ‘good’ and when does it become a ‘good’ for us? 3) And to whom is a 
‘good’ seen to accrue? Who are the recipients of the utility that is derived frani the 
pursuit of certain goals? Our argument here is that a consideration of identity is crucial 
for dealing with these questions.
Several writers have claimed that it is impossible to have goals, interests or to act 
rationally to attain them without certain self-understandings in the first place (e.g. 
Reicher, in prep.; Ringniar, 1996; Taylor, 1985). Consider, for example. Sen’s (1973 
cited in Lewin, 1996) contention that rationality is a nonsensical concept if it is not 
regarded as motive-related, but only as behavioinal. Rationality, by its very nature, is a 
psychological interpretation we place on the behaviours we observe (Lewin, 1996). 
Yet, a broadening of the rationality concept so as to encompass an agent’s motives or 
goals, necessitates a tmii to identity since “[...] calculations of utility gains and utility 
losses can make no sense until they can be attached to a certain person” (Ringmar, 
1996, p. 3).^ This is not to deny that situations exist in which people can best be 
described as acting in a rational and utility-maximising manner. What this does imply, 
though, is that a ‘utility calculus’ camiot exist in the abstract but has to be grounded m 
something — or rather someone. Neither our actions nor interests can exist outside of 
the context of who we are as people. As Reicher (in prep.) put it:
“[...] the human capacity for planned action depends upon the psychological 
processes of identity. This is true in a triple sense: identity is a basis for specifying 
ends; it provides the motivation for reaching those ends; it frames the strategic 
processes by which ends are met.” (Reicher, in prep.)
 ^ In fact, Ringniar (1996) considers actions luidertaken to establish this particular ‘person’ or self as 
more basic than -  and qualitatively different from -  ‘rational action’. He argues that acts aimed to either 
defend or establish certain conceptions of selfliood cannot be re-described in rationalistic terms.
15
Chapter f
Accordingly, Reicher (in prep.) calls attention to the fact that the model of the human 
being as ‘utility maximiser’ negates not only the possibility that social values and 
norms might deteiinine utilities, but also that the values and norms on which people act 
-  and hence what counts as utility -  might change, for instance in collective contexts. 
In other words, here human motives or goals are not only seen as tied to notions of 
selfliood (and the norms and values associated with it), but also as a malleable function 
of the different identities that may be salient in different contexts. The conception of 
identity that is implied here, of course, requires that we view the self not as unitary or 
stable but as context-dependent and, consequently, vaiiable -  a view to which, as 
already indicated, the Social Identity model of the self corresponds.
But what has all this to do with money? The case we wish to put forward here is as 
follows: If a notion of who we are (i.e. identity) is Rmdamental for our beliefs about 
the world and our actions within it, this should also apply to our economic attitudes and 
behaviours. As we have seen above, money -  due to its treatment as the primary source 
of utility or ‘goal’ -  occupies a central place in economic models of human agency. We 
therefore suggest that identity concerns should be particularly relevant for people’s 
imderstanding(s) of money. The examination of a potential linlc between identity 
concerns and money matters proposed here not only implies a move away from static 
notions of selfliood towards a treatment of identity as variable, but also requires a focus 
on subjective understandings, both of identity and the economic world as such. The 
fundamental problem Ringmar (1996), for instance, ascribes to models of human 
agency based on rationality is that:
“[...] the entire causal relationship between material factors and human actions is 
misconstrued. We do not, as these theories imply, live in a material world which 
‘presents* us with various more or less constraining options; instead we live in a 
material world which we interpret, and It is on the basis of these interpretations that 
we present various options to ourselves. Hence it follows that a mere description of 
material factors will never tell us much about what actions a person will undertake.
What an outside observer should study are not material factors, but instead the 
interpretations given to material factors; the way in which human beings make 
sense of their world.” (Ringmar, 1996, p. 37; emphases in original)
Money, of course, is one of those material factors and this thesis seeks to contribute to 
a fuller understanding of the subjective interpretations related to it. Yet, despite the 
predominance of Rational Choice models and the “original sin of [...] the definition of 
rationality as ipso facto  an economic, utilitarian or optimising rationality” (Zafirovski, 
2000), interpretative or meaning-based accounts of economic phenomena are certainly
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not altogether absent in the social sciences. It is these accounts that pose a considerable 
challenge for the economic definition of money and to which we will turn next.
1 .2  T h e  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e  C r i t i q u e : A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l  a n d  
S o c i o l o g i c a l  A c c o u n t s  o f  M o n e y
The synopsis provided in Section 1.1.1 indicates the degree to which money, 
according to its economic conceptualisation, has been stripped of its historical and 
social-cultural roots. Such an act of abstraction may (or may not) be regarded as an 
analytic necessity for the scientific agenda of economics^, but this does not, by any 
means, reflect the ways in which money is understood by many anthropologists or 
sociologists. Writers from both disciplines recognise money as a socio-cultural 
construct or institution that camiot possibly exist outside the sphere of social 
relationships (Weatherford, 19;97). This also implies that its current manifestation as 
hiiarket money’ is not regarded as given a priori.
The pertinent literature in these domains is too vast to be given adequate coverage 
here. However, a number of relevant points deserve to be highlighted, the first of which 
relates to the supposition of the ‘economic’ or exchange origins of money mentioned 
earlier (see Section 1.1.1).
1.2.1 ‘Prim itive’ Money
Mauss (1970) alluded to the mystical, talismanic beginnings of money in his 
seminal treatise on the natme of gift-giving in archaic societies, by pointing out its 
initial manifestation tlnough objects that were considered to be “magical and precious” 
(pp. 93-94). Smelt’s (1980) discussion of etlinogiapliic evidence also points to the 
origin of money in mystical fomis and practices. He states that:
“These objects, the predecessors of money, act as a fulcrum for dealing with the 
less securely socialized interactions and with the material world. They create a 
foothold for man in materiality, a partial conquest of it. Money extends that 
conquest.’’(Smeit, 1980 p. 207)
 ^ Economics is fiiinly grounded in the positivist tradition. However, alternative approaches to its 
epistemological framework also exist (e.g. see Peter, 2001 for a review of the debate on ‘rhetoric’ and 
‘realism’ in economic methodology) which may well become less marginalized with time.
17
Chapter I
A related notion is echoed in Weatherford’s (1997) description of money as an 
invention whose puipose was “to bring order to the phenomenological flow of 
existence” and which thus plays a “focal role in the organization of meaning in life” (p. 
43). Such conceptions, with their emphasis on meaning and money’s non-commercial 
begimiings, are in stark contrast to the traditional economic version of money as a mere 
‘convenience’ that evolved in the context, and for the sole purpose, of exchange. 
Antlnopological findings also bear testimony to the enomious cultural variation that 
exists in temis of the fomis that money can take and the diversity of its usage across 
cultures (see e.g. Parry & Bloch, 1989b). The various functions performed by money 
are frequently regarded as the determinants of the differences foimd relating to its 
meaning(s); meaning, in turn, is seen as profoundly shaped by culture. For example. 
Pan y and Bloch’s (1989a) discussion of antlnopological evidence indicates that 
systems of exchange or transaction, alongside other economic concepts associated with 
it, are both rooted in culture and detennined by it. As such, monetary exchange is 
deeply symbolic:
The symbolism of m oney is only one aspect of a more general symbolic world 
of transactions which must always come to terms with som e absolutely 
fundamental human problems. One of these is the relationship between the 
individual life and a symbolically constructed image of the enduring social and 
cosmic order within which that life is lived.” (Parry & Bloch, 1989a p. 28)
In summary, a consideration of antlnopological studies (for general reviews from 
an economic psychological standpoint see Lea, Tarpy & Web ley, 1987 or Lewis, 
Webley & Furnham, 1995) suggests that money and its usage are dependent on the 
traditional transactional modes of a given cultuie (Lewis et ah, 1995) and therefore do 
not bear much resemblance to the utilitarian ideal of a generalised medium of 
exchange. It is presumably for this reason that Mauss (1970) declared that “it is only 
our Western societies that quite recently turned man into an economic animal” and, as 
a result, “Homo Economicus is not behind us, but [still] before [us]” (p. 74).
This, in itself, does not appear to be too problematic for economic theory; after all, 
the antlnopological critique is based on conclusions drawn fr om studies concerned with 
‘primitive’ fomis of money. However, the issue becomes rather more complicated 
when we view our modem market money -  which is frequently treated as the apogee in 
monetaiy development -  through a sociological lens.
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1.2.2 ‘M odern’ Money
Even in the context of modem culture, with its ‘sophisticated’ market money, '"not 
all dollars are equaF (Zelizer, 1989, p. 343). Social scientists have maintained that 
even our modem version of money, frequently regarded as the key ‘rational’ tool of the 
market, does exist outside the sphere of that market and is profoundly shaped by social 
structural as well as historical factors (e.g. Carruthers & Espeland, 1998; Helleiner, 
1998; Siegel, 1998). Carruthers and Espeland (1998), for instance, argue that modem 
money transfomis, transports and possesses meaning by virtue of how it is used and the 
sources from which it is obtained, a notion reminiscent of antlnopological findings 
concerning its foiiner, more ‘primitive’ manifestations. For Helleiner (1998) money, 
especially in the form of national cuiTency, is a common medium for social 
connnunication and, as such, is tied to issues of identity (particularly national identity). 
Zelizer’s work (1989; 1996; 1997) has been especially significant in demonstrating just 
how far removed ‘modern’ money can be -  when considered from a sociological 
perspective -  fr om the general means-of-exchange conceptualisation. For instance, she 
points towards the existence of different categories of monetaiy payments (i.e. gift, 
entitlement and compensation), where each corresponds to a considerably different set 
of social relations and, as such, also defines the quality of the relationship between the 
parties involved (Zelizer, 1996). Zelizer illustrates the extent to which people use 
‘eaiinarking’ tecliniques when making such payments; the purpose of eamiarking is to 
distinguish between these different categories of social relations and their associated 
meanings. This process, in turn, leads to the creation of partly separate cunencies -  
even when the medium involved is our cuiTent legal tender (Zelizer, 1996). These 
“special monies” (Zelizer, 1989) indicate that in Western society, too, we have not yet 
realised the economist’s ideal form of ‘neutral’, all-puipose money^ and that “people 
are differentiating just as energetically and ingeniously as ever” (Zelizer, 1996, p. 494). 
In other words. Western money is like ‘primitive’ money in that there are taboos on its 
use (Lewis et al., 1985). Zelizer (1989; 1997) has also shown how the study of 
domestic money, for instance, can provide an empirical indicator o f a complex social 
economy that remains hidden within the dominant economic paradigm of a single, 
quality-less and rationalising market money.
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The degree to which the ‘rationalising’ force of money is taken for gianted varies 
considerably, both within antlnopological and sociological accounts; consequently, the 
question of how money and monetary exchange should be evaluated in teiins of then- 
broader impact on society is a topic of debate. For some, money is an erosive force that 
gradually wears down the social fabric of life as it “supplants [...] the traditional bonds 
based on family, tiibe, connnunity and nation” (Weatherford, 1997, p. 27). Others, 
however, do not subscribe to the notion of money as undermining social relations (e.g. 
PaiTy & Bloch, 1989; Zelizer, 1989; 1996; 1997). Parry and Bloch, for example, argue 
that existing worldviews bring about particular ways of representing money and that 
monetary exchange is therefore imbued with moral value. Zelizer regards her special 
monies and the eamiarking practices tlnough which they are defined, if  perhaps not as 
a sign of the prevalence of social over purely utilitarian forces, at least as an indication 
of their coexistence. But whatever the stance that has been taken by various critics of 
orthodox economics, the link ■ between social and economic phenomena is 
acknowledged in virtually all their accounts.
hi summary, antlnopological and sociological critiques of the utilitarian conception 
of market money reveal a number of interesting points. Firstly, they dispute the 
suggested emergence of money for exchange purposes only and thus challenge the 
rather de-socialised descriptions provided by economics. Secondly, sociological 
critiques in particular demonstrate that, even where oin current niaiket money is 
concerned, the economist’s criteria for money (e.g. as a generalised medium of 
exchange) are far from being met. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly for our 
present piuposes, these alternative approaches stress the importance o f meaning and 
therefore of subjectivity in explanations of economic phenomena. This then brings us to 
psychology and to a consideration of the various approaches to money that can be 
found within our own discipline.
 ^ Some economists, such as Melitz (1970), also reject the view of modem market money as an all­
purpose medium, although their grounds for doing so are somewhat different.
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1 . 3  P s y c h o l o g i c a l  A p p r o a c h e s  t o  M o n e y
Despite its description as our “dominant piece of social teclmology” (Smelt, 1980, 
p. 209) and its significance not only in economic but also in social life, money has in 
the past received veiy little attention within psychology. Only few of the main 
psychological traditions have explicitly addressed the phenomenon of money. 
Psychoanalysis, the operant behaviourism of B.F. Skinner (see Lea et al., 1987 for 
general oveiwiew) and Piagetian developmental theories (see Lewis et al., 1995 for 
general review) figure amongst those few. Yet, on the whole, research within these 
traditions has not been forthcoming in temis of offering a social psychological 
perspective on money and its usage.^ Nevertheless, some observations regarding the 
psychoanalytic perspective on money seem to be in order here, as these relate -  albeit 
tacitly — to some of the issues that will be raised later on.
1.3.1 The Psychoanalytic Perspective
According to Freudian theory, particular character traits -  including those 
seemingly related to money -  have then* origin in the repression of certain ‘primitive’ 
instinctual tendencies. For instance, Freud (1908/1924) related ‘anal’ characteristics -  
such as orderliness, parsimony and obstinacy -  to umesolved conflicts or ‘fixations’ at 
the anal stage of psychosexual development. He also associated adult attitudes towards 
money with this particular developmental period and, as such, regarded them as a 
product of ‘anal erotism’. Freud claimed that all children experience pleasure in the 
elimination of fæces and that these are the child’s first ‘gift’, “the first sacrifice of his 
affection, a portion of his own body which he is ready to part with, but only for the 
sake of some one he loves” (1918/1925, p. 559). As the child is obliged to relinquish 
his/her original erotic interest in defæcation in the com*se of development, due to 
reasons of social respectability, this interest becomes projected onto money:
“One of the most important manifestations of the transformed eroticism derived 
from this source is to be found in the treatment of money; for in the course of life 
this precious material attracts on to itself the psychical interest which was originally 
proper to fæ ces, the product of the anal zone. We have accustomed ourselves to
* Skimierians referred to money as a symbol of reinforcement. The behaviomist approach to money -  
which found its expression in the "token economy" -  took a wholly instrumental view in that money was 
regarded as a conditioned reinforcer, as an object witli the capacity to induce either pleasure or pain (Lea 
et al., 1987). Research on money within the Piagetian paradigm has usually concentrated on how 
children come to understand and make use of money. With tlieir main focus on cognitive development, 
these studies have tended to take the economists' conception of money for granted (Lea et al., 1987).
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trace back interest In money, In so far as it is of a libidinal and not of a rational 
character, to excremental pleasure, and to require a normal man to keep his 
relations to money entirely free from libidinal Influences and to regulate them 
according to the demands of reality.” (Freud, 1918/1925 p. 548)
In Freudian theory -  by postulating the unconscious equivalence of fæces and money 
(and via the supposedly traumatic process of toilet training) -  a miserly, hoarding 
attitude towards money in adulthood is therefore associated with the pleasure 
experienced during childhood in retaining bowel contents (e.g. with the refusal to 
eliminate fæces in the face of parental demands); the adult free-spender, on the other 
hand, supposedly seeks the approval and affection that once resulted from submission 
to parental authority to ‘produce’ (see Lewis et al., 1995). As Lewis et al. (1995) have 
pointed out, within a psychoanalytic framework, attitudes to money are therefore 
regarded as bimodal; that is, they are viewed as either extremely positive or extremely 
negative.
Freudian theory claimed support for its tenets not only from idioms, myths, folklore 
and legends but also from the expressions for money and money-related matters found 
within everyday language (e.g. ‘filthy lucre’, ‘stinking rich’). Ferenczi (1926/1976 
cited in Burgoyne, 1991) developed Freud’s thinlcing and traced the tiansfbnnation of 
the child’s love for its first possession through various stages of sanitisation -  from 
mud, through sand, stones and buttons to money, hi the psychoanalytic approach of 
Klein (1957, in Burgoyne, 1991), attitudes towards money were linked to the oral stage 
of psychosexual development. She suggested that trauma at the nurturance, tmsting 
phase of development may lead, in later life, to money becoming a substitute for the 
breast as a source of giatification.^ Wliilst, for Klein, money symbolised the breast, 
Adler (1964) saw money as a means of reducing feelings of inferiority.
From the vantage point of contemporary academic psychology, it seems as though 
the psychoanalytic position -  beyond acknowledging the symbolic quality of money 
and, in doing so, rising above its conceptualisation as a neutral medium of exchange -  
has had little to contribute to our understanding of the social psychological 
complexities associated with money and its usage. However, the legacy of this 
perspective is, in many ways, still with us. Some of its features -  such as its focus on
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‘personality’ or character traits at the expense of discussing broader social 
psychological processes, and its concomitant emphasis on individual psychopathology 
-  also iiiliere in some of the ‘modern’ approaches to money. These will be considered 
in the following section. At this juncture, a final observation worth mentioning is that, 
so far, the psychoanalytic approach has remained the only psychological paradigm 
which has attempted to provide a general theojy of money.
During the last two or tliree decades, economic phenomena -  and thus the issue of 
money -  have become established as ‘proper’ subject matter for psychological inquiry 
within academia. A new field of research has emerged -  economic psychology -  and 
with it a concerted effort to counterbalance the lack of psychological realism that 
afflicts economic accounts o f human behaviour by providing a description of economic 
phenomena firom a psychological perspective. It is a consideration of that effort to 
which we will turn next.
1.3.2 T he E conom ic Psychology of M oney '
The inception of economic psychology as an independent disciplme was not only 
prompted by a general dissatisfaction with the lack of psychological realism in 
economic descriptions of behaviour, as already indicated, but also by an increasing 
awareness of the inseparability of the social and psychological realm from the 
economic sphere. Economic theories of money, in particular, began to be criticised for 
their preoccupation with the macroeconomic level of analysis and for the arbitrary 
psychological assumptions they made about the nature of human behaviour (see Lea et 
al., 1987). So how, then, have economic psychologists attempted to remedy the 
shortcomings they identified in economic accounts of money?
Researchers began to focus on the psychological significance of money as well as 
the psychological factors affecting its usage. Within economic psychology a substantial 
literature has started to emerge which covers a diverse range of money-related topics: 
from broad issues such as consumption (e.g. Belk, Wallendorf & Sherry, 1989; Elliott 
& Wattanasuwan, 1998; Lunt & Livingstone, 1992), economic socialisation (e.g Belk,
^Klein theorised that in the face of the inevitable frustration of gratification that arises because of the 
breast not always being available, the child divides the world into ‘good breast’ and ‘bad breast’. An 
unconscious wish for the inexhaustible breast may appear in adulthood as the desire to accumulate 
wealth in order to allay fears of insecurity (in Burgoyne, 1991).
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1982; Berti & Bombi, 1988; Burgard, Cheyiie & Jalioda, 1989; Cummings & Taebel, 
1978; Emler & Dickinson, 1985; Furnham, 1987; 1996; Leahy, 1981; Leiser, 1983; 
Leiser, Sevon & Levy, 1990; Webley & Lea, 1993) and even considerations of the 
psychological correlates of income or economic growth (Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz & 
Diener, 1993; Diener & Diener, 1995; Diener, Diener & Diener, 1995; Lynn, 1991; 
Veenhoven, 1994) to more specific questions relating to the psychology of saving (e.g. 
Furnham, 1999; Limt & Livingstone, 1991; Thaler, 1990), excessive/compulsive 
spending (e.g. Dittmar & Drury, 2000; Hanley & Wilhelm, 1992) gambling (e.g. 
Furnham, 1995), debt (e.g. Lea, Webley & Levine, 1993; Lea, Webley & Walker, 
1995; Lunt & Livingstone, 1992; Tokunaga, 1993) or poverty (e.g Olsen & Schober, 
1993). Some researchers have been concerned witli the symbolism of money by 
focussing on either particular financial practices, such as gift-giving (e.g. Belk, 1993; 
Burgoyne & Routh, 1991; Webley, Lea & Portalska, 1983; Webley & Wilson, 1989), 
or its usage in specific context, for example within marriage (e.g. Burgoyne, 1990; 
Burgoyne & Lewis, 1994). There has also been an increasing interest in the social 
psychological conelates of materialism in general (e.g. Belk, 1985; Clnistopher & 
Schlenlcer, 2000; Dittmar & Pepper, 1994; Kasser & Grow Kasser, 2001; Richins & 
Dawson, 1992; Richins & Rudmin, 1994) and the meaning or symbolism of material 
possessions in particular (e.g. Belk, 1988; 1995; Dittmar, 1989, 1992; 1994; Dittmar, 
Beattie & Friese, 1995; 1996; Prentice, 1987; Richins, 1994a; 1994b; 1995; Sclii'oeder 
& Dugal, 1995; Wallendorf & Amould, 1988).
Whilst there is often a considerable degree of overlap between these different areas of 
research in terms of actual subject matter, each encompasses a variety of theoretical 
and empirical approaches. The one consistent theme running tlirough the literature, 
however, is that money does not merely constitute a convenient medium of exchange, 
but is a highly complex phenomenon, richly imbued with both concrete and abstract 
meanings. Yet, despite the accumulation of findings, there is no coherent psychological 
theory of money as such.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed review of all the money- 
related topics mentioned above. Instead, we will focus on the domains of research 
which are directly concerned with money and the subjective meaning(s) or value 
attached to it (e.g. attitude measurement approaches to money), hi this sense, the 
cuiTent emphasis lies on the more conceptual aspects associated with the supposed
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function of money as the principal source of utility (i.e. valuation and ‘meaning’). 
However, even studies that deal with concrete monetary practices (e.g. ‘spending’) 
depend on certain conceptions of what money actually means to people. Whilst these 
imderstandings frequently remain implicit, om* present aim is to examine -  and to 
contribute to -  those approaches that target the meaning(s) and subjective valuation of 
money explicitly.
Psychological inferences about the subjective meaning(s) and value of money have 
been drawn on the basis of a diverse series of studies. Yet, even in psychology, the 
‘value’ of money is sometimes equated with its economic worth or its meaning limited 
to the demarcation of its conceptual boundaries. Experimental studies involving the 
perception of coins and notes (Funiliam, 1983; Lea, 1981) and the proto-typicality of 
various forms of money (Snelders, Hussein, Lea & Webley, 1992) fall into this 
particular' category. Most psychological research, however, aims to transcend narrowly 
conceived notions of ‘value’ or ‘meaning’ by focusing on the non-economic, 
psychological aspects associated with the concept ' of money. In these instances, 
infererrces about money’s value of rneaning(s) are predominantly derived from stirdies 
concerned with people’s attitudes towards money and the relationship between 
personality variables and monetary beliefs. These types of approach (see Benner, 1996; 
Furnliarn & Ar*gyle, 1998 for general overviews) will be considered in detail 
tliroughout the following section.
1.3.2.1 The ‘M eaning’ and Subjective Valuation of Money
T h e  P s y c h o m e t r i c s  o f  ‘M e a n i n g '
There has been a general trend among psychologists towards taxonornising 
attitudes towards money, either theoretically (see next sub-section) or empirically. 
Amongst the earliest empirical attempts was Wernimont and Fitzpatrick’s (1972) 
semantic differential approach towards the construction of a rneanings-of-rnoney 
taxonomy. When factor analysing the responses they obtained fr om various groups of 
respondents (college students, unemployed people and respondents in various types of 
employment, all selected on the basis of their diverse life experiences), a number of 
factors or ‘meanings’ emerged which they interpreted as Shameful Failure (i.e. lack of 
money as an indication of failure, embarrassment and degradation). Social 
Acceptability, "Pooh-Pooh" attitude (i.e. money as something to be looked down
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upon), Moral Evil, Comfortable Security), Social Unacceptability and Conservative 
Business Values. Wernimont and Fitzpatrick found that perceptions of money varied 
according to gender, socio-economic and employment status and also in line v/ith type 
o f work experience. Employed respondents, for example, viewed money in a positive 
light, as desirable, important and useful. Unemployed respondents and college 
students, on the other hand, perceived money in a more tense, wonisome and unhappy 
manner. Given the marked dissimilarities with regard to the endorsement of different 
money meanings within and between the groups represented in their study, Wernimont 
and Fitzpati'ick concluded that it may be unfeasible to attempt to draw general 
inferences about the meaning or the role of money for the population as a whole. They 
also remarked -  albeit by the by — that, in some cases, monetary values seem to be 
influential in leading individuals to join particular professional gioups, while in other 
instances certain values concerning money appear to develop after joining the group. 
Lau (1998), too, made use of the semantic differential foiinat in order to discern 
different , meanings ascribed to money. He obtained four perception indices of money, 
which he labelled Goodness, Honesty, PoM)er and Interest, and found that scores on 
these four dimensions differed significantly between professional groups (i.e. school 
teachers, business people and high school students). Lau concurs with Wernimont and 
Fitzpatrick in his suggestion that attitudes towards money are a function of a person’s 
professional role and experience.
Another eaiiy psychometric effort towards establishing the nieaning(s) of money, 
which subsequently came to provide the empirical underpimiing for many others (see 
below), was launched by Yamauchi and Templer (1982). On the basis of the clinical 
and theoretical -  that is, largely psychoanalytic -  literature, Yamauchi and Templer set 
out to develop a fully psychometrised Money Attitude Scale (MAS). Factor analysis of 
their original item collection exposed a scale structure comprising five factors which 
they teiined Power-Prestige, Retention-Time, Distrust, Quality and Anxiety. The 
Power-Prestige dimension comprised the attitudinal or meaning aspects of money 
related to status seeking, competitiveness and need for external recognition, whilst 
Retention-Time designated those aspects that were associated with budgeting and 
financial planning for the future. The factors Distrust and Anxiety summarised 
hesitancy with regard to spending and a generally anxious attitude towards money
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respectively, whereas Quality referred to the importance attached to purchasing high 
quality or brand products. A partial validation (i.e. correlations with other established 
measures such as Machiavellianism, status concern, time-competence, obsessionality, 
paranoia and anxiety) revealed these factors to be related to measures of other similar 
theoretical constructs. Yamauchi and Templer suggested that their results are consistent 
with psychoanalytic theories and that a relationship between money retention and the 
obsessive-anal character structure can, indeed, be found.
The two points of interest here are that Yamauchi and Tempter’s (1982) approach was 
both greatly reliant on psychoanalytic ideas and also explicitly concerned with the 
question of the relationsliip between attitudes towards money and symptoms of 
psychopathology. For instance, they reported that the Distrust (i.e. a hesitant, 
suspicious and doubtful attitude to money) and Anxiety (i.e. the perception of money as 
both a soiu'ce of and protection from anxiety) dimensions of money meaning con elated 
with various . clinical syndromes. Other researchers have taken this focus on 
psychopathology one step further by suggestmg that certain money attitudes aie the 
result of general neurotic tendencies, such as anxiety, neuroticism and introversion 
(e.g. McClure, 1984) and some have even claimed that “most financial problems are a 
result of underlying mental health problems and should be seen as a symptom of such” 
(Milligan, 1998). The potential implications of statements of this latter kind -  for social 
policy issues, for instance -  are rather disconcerting. Yet, the tendency toward 
pathologising particular attitudes towards money, with its concomitant emphasis on 
personality attributes or character traits, is rather widespread, both within the 
psychological literature on money in general and the psychometric approach 
pai'ticularly. We shall revisit this point later; for the moment, let us return to our 
discussion of the psychometrics of ‘meaning’.
Yamauchi and Tempter’s MAS was subsequently modified by Gresham and Fontenot 
(1989) who found gender differences for tlnee out of the foiu* ‘attitudes’ or dimensions 
of m eaning^w ith  men scoring significantly higher than women. Medina, Saegert and 
Gresham (1996) used the modified MAS in order to examine the relationship between 
cultural background variables (i.e. ethnic group and minority status) and money 
attitudes. They compared a Mexican-American with an Anglo-American sample and
Gresham and Fontenot (1989) treat the original two factors Anxietyf and Distrust as one dimension 
(Distnist/Auxiety).
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found that Mexican-Americans scored significantly lower on Retention-Time and 
Quality than Anglo-Americans. Medina et al. (1996) concluded that etlmic group 
membership has an impact on the ways in which money is viewed.
Fumliam’s (1984) widely used Money Beliefs and Behaviour Scale (MBBS) 
provides another taxonomy for the assessment of money meanings or attitudes. 
Originally, Funiliam pooled 60 items from tlnee different sources, namely Goldberg 
and Lewis’ (1978) theoretical attempt to classify different money ‘types’, Yamauchi 
and Templer’s (1982) study outlined above (both of which were psychoanalytically 
oriented) as well as a suiwey study earned out by Rubenstein (1980; 1981) for 
Psychology) Today^  Factor analysis of the original item pool resulted in 47 items 
loading on six distinct factors which Furnham defined as Obsession, Power/Spending 
(i.e. money as a means of power). Retention (defined as a “careful” attitude towards 
money), Security)/Conservative (described as a “somewhat old-fashioned approach to 
money”), Inadequacy (i.e. feeling that one has hot got enough money) and 
Effort/Ability) (referred to as “how one gets money”ji Furnham’s factor descriptions 
seem, at times, rather cryptic and the coiTespondence between items and factor labels is 
often far from obvious. For instance, people scoring highly on the 18 items loading on 
the first factor. Obsession, were simply defined as “obsessed by all aspects of money” 
(Furnham, 1984, p. 503). Closer inspection of the corresponding attitude statements, 
however, renders this interpretation somewhat unconvincing. The reason for 
highlighting this issue here is that a number of wide-ranging conclusions have been 
drawn on the basis of the MBBS, especially the Obsession factor. For example, in 
search of the psychological ‘detenninants’ of economic success, several items loading 
on this factor have been employed as a general measure of the subjective valuation of 
m o n e y ( e .g .  Fimiliam, Kirkcaldy & Lynn, 1994; Lymi, 1991). Differences in the 
economic growth indices of various countries have then simply been accounted for by 
reference to national differences in the importance attached to money; in other words, 
the degiee to which people value money has been inteipreted as “a determinant of 
economic growth rates at all levels of economic development” (Lynn, 1991, p. 69; 
emphasis added). Again, the potential implications of taking this claim to its logical 
conclusion are somewhat disquieting, not only because of the measure on which it is
It is perhaps worthy of note that all three of Funiliam’s (1984) sources were American.
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based but -  perhaps more importantly -  on account of its disregai'd for the socio­
economic or structural issues (e.g. distribution of resources) that affect differences in 
economic growth.
Originally, Funiliam (1984) used his MBBS to examine the relationship between 
various demographic variables (i.e. gender, age, education, political affiliation and 
income), social or work beliefs (i.e. alienation, conservatism and endorsement of the 
Protestant Work Ethic) and monetary beliefs and behaviours. Funiliam found men to be 
more ‘obsessed’ with money than women, a finding later echoed by Lyiui’s (1991) 
conclusion that men, in most countries, attach significantly greater value to money than 
women. Women, on the other hand, appeared more security conscious with regard to 
money. Fimiliam also found that younger people regarded money as a means of power, 
appeared less careful and ‘retentive’ with money and less security-minded than older 
people. Older people, in turn, believed the amount of money a person earns or 
possesses to be a function of their effort or ability. Fumliam concluded that less well- 
educated people are more ‘obsessed’ with money than the better educated. The more 
educated group of respondents tended to believe that a person's wealth v/as less under 
his/her control -  or a fimction of their effort or ability -  than the less well educated 
groups. People who strongly endorsed the Protestant Work Ethic were found to be 
more ‘obsessed’ by money, more ‘retentive’, more security-minded and believed a 
person's wealth to be due to effort and ability. The same seemed to be true for 
respondents with conseiwative social attitudes, hi summary, Furnliam found that 
various money meanings (or factors) were associated with certain demogiaphic or 
group characteristics and social belief variables. Statistical analysis revealed a pattern 
of results in which gender, education, age and Protestant Work Ethic values were found 
as discriminating variables with regard to people's beliefs and behaviours (Furnham, 
1984).
Hanley and Wilhelm (1992) employed the MBBS to compare the money beliefs of 
‘noiinal’ consumers with those of compulsive spenders. They found differences 
between the two groups that appeared to reflect the symbolic ability of money to 
enhance self-esteem. Bailey, Johnson, Adams, Lawson, Williams and Lown (1994) 
used the MBBS to assess attitudes towards money across tlnee national groups, namely
Achievement motivation and competitiveness constituted two of the other psychological measures.
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Americans, Canadians and Australians. They reported that the factorial structure of the 
MBBS varied in accordance with respondents’ nationality and interpreted this finding 
as suggestive evidence for the existence of national differences with regard to monetary 
attitudes. Hayhoe, Leach and Turner (1999) distinguished between different respondent 
groups (i.e. those who held credit car ds and those without) on the basis of scores on the 
MBBS’s and Obsession factors.
On the basis of 50 original items -  most of which were derived from the pre­
existing scales described above -  Tang (1992) developed the six factor Money Ethic 
Scale (MES), intended primarily for use in organisational settings. He labelled his 
factors Good, Evil, Achievement, Respect (self-esteem). Budget and Freedom and 
found that age and gender correlated with scores on the Budget dimension of money 
meanings. Tang concluded that people on higher incomes tend to think that money 
revealed one’s achievement and was less evil, whereas respondents endorsing the 
Protestant Work Ethic tend to see money as evil. In addition, Tang showed that 
economic and political values are positively associated with achievement, hi a 
subsequent study, Tang (1993) found differences in factor scores between his original 
American sample (Tang, 1992) and a Chinese sample, hi the Chinese sample, gender 
was significantly correlated with money attitudes; men scored significantly higher than 
women on Achievement and Respect. Using a shorted version of his original MES, 
Tang (1995) later replicated these gender differences with American participants.
At this stage, some interim reflections on the above-depicted psychometric 
approach to money seem due. Tlnee main issues, in temis of our present purposes, 
arise from the use of this type of methodology; these relate to the pre-supposition of 
‘meaning’ (or value) and of the relevant dimensions of identity. First of all, the use of 
psychometi'ic instrmiients implies that monetaiy nieaning(s) are, to a considerable 
extent, imposed a priori, hiitial item selections either tend to be guided by theoretical 
interests or occur on the basis of previously established measures. For instance, as we 
have already seen, psychoanalytically derived meanings aie still relatively prevalent in 
the money attitude scales cunently used. Another corollaiy of presupposing the 
dimensions of meaning that are thought to be of importance is that the endorsement of 
particular meanings (i.e. the subjective valuation of money) is viewed to exist along a 
continuum. Consider, for example, Furnham’s (1984) Obsession factor or the
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dimension Tang (1992) referred to as Good: a person at one end of the continuum, with 
a low factor score, is viewed to attach no value to money at all, whereas for a person at 
the other end, money is supposedly of great value. However, the questions why (or why 
not) people value money and what it may be valued fo r  have to remain unanswered. 
Secondly, a problem related to this linear conception of ‘value’, which is inherent in 
the psychometric approach, is that it precludes the possibility of intra-individual 
variation, hi other words, the value a person attaches to money is regarded as relatively 
independent of context and practices. This point, of course, diaws on wider criticisms 
that have been raised regarding the use of experimental or questionnaire designs in 
social psychology and the associated “suppression of account variability” (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, p. 39). As Potter and Wetherell (1987) have argued, the response 
fonnats traditionally employed in social psychological research require both 
participants and their responses to fit into pre-categorised entities. This, in turn, 
precludes the expression of flexible or ‘inconsistent’ opinions that may be tailored to 
the given context. The inlierent emphasis, on. attitudinal and behavioural consistency 
within these approaches means that variability is fiequently treated as ‘eiTor’.
This, in turn, leads us to the third issue that arises in connection with the psychometric 
studies outlined above, namely the pre-supposition of the identity dimensions that are 
considered to be relevant in teiins of people’s attitudes towards or subjective valuation 
of money. Whilst psychometric approaches do not usually refer to identity explicitly, 
identity issues have been addressed implicitly by a focus on people’s membership in 
particular socio-demographic groups and their concomitant money attitudes. For 
instance, the above-reviewed studies suggest that a number of key socio-demographic 
variables -  such as age, nationality, etlmic group, occupation, education, political 
affiliation as well as work-related beliefs (e.g. Protestant Work Ethic) -  show 
discernible relationships to monetary attitudes or meanings. Again, however, these 
identity dimensions are imposed a priori and it remains uncertain whether, and if so in 
what sense, these are subjectively meaningful to people when expressing their attitudes 
towards money. Economic psychological research of this kind attributes greater 
significance to sociological group membership than to processes of subjective 
identification. In other words, group membership per se is treated as an ‘objective’ 
attribute of the person which, in turn, both pre-supposes and reinforces the notion of 
identity as given and therefore as fairly static. We will return to this issue shortly.
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To summarise, the above-described psychometric discussions of money indicate 
that the relationship between money and self has rarely been addressed explicitly. 
Instead, researchers concerned with the meanings or subjective valuation of money 
have dealt with the notion of identity implicitly by focusing on the relationship 
between socio-demographic group membership and attitudes towards money. There 
are, however, some approaches in which the relationship between money matters and 
issues around identity is addressed more explicitly, hi conceptual temis, these 
endeavours closely relate to the psychometric approach, with the only difference being 
that their focus is not so much on taxononiising ‘meaning’ but on devising taxonomies 
of people. The following section will provide a brief oveiwiew of the nature of this 
effort whose main focus lies on establishing a liiilc between monetary issues and the 
‘personality’ constnict.
‘M o n e y  T y p e s ’
One common approach to identity-related matters that can be found within the 
psychological literature on money is exemplified by the attempt to distinguish between 
different ‘money types’. The first such typology was proposed by Goldberg and Lewis 
(1978) who stated that the principal symbolic factors or meanings associated with 
money are security, power, love and freedom. Drawing on these basic meanings, 
Goldberg and Lewis described four broad clinical ‘types’, each of which encompassed 
various sub-categories: Security Collectors (‘the compulsive saver’, ‘the self denier’, 
‘the compulsive bargain hunter’, ‘the fanatic collector’), Power Grabbers ( ‘the 
manipulator’, ‘the empire builder’, ‘the godfather’). Love Dealers (‘the love buyer’, 
‘the love seller’, ‘the love stealer’) and Autonomy Worshippers (‘the freedom buyer’, 
‘the freedom fighter’).
More recently, Tatzel (2002) has suggested that attitudes towards money, alongside 
material values and economic behaviours, comprise what she refers to as a person’s 
‘money world’:
"Some people inhabit a world of plentitude, others of scarcity. In some worlds, 
money flows freely and in others it is held onto tightly. In some worlds, possessions 
are the central focus, in others possessions are peripheral."(p. 104)
On the basis of the psychometric dimensions identified by Yamauchi and Templer 
(1982) and Medina et al. (1996), Tatzel claims that Power, Prestige and Quality denote 
a ‘money disposition’ which is associated with spending and “being loose with
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money”, whilst Distrust/Anxiety and Retention-Time indicate a dispositional tendency 
towards caution and “being tight with money” (Tatzel, 2002, pp. 105-106). She then 
integrates these two general positions on money with findings derived from other 
domains (i.e. materialism and price-related behaviom) and proposes a typology 
according to which a person can be classified as a Value Seeker, Big Spender, Non- 
Spender or as an Experiencer. For Tatzel, these types provide a description of people’s 
‘money worlds’ and, whilst aclmowledging that there may be “situational influences 
that sway us”, she states that they are essentially dispositional, “from within the 
person” (Tatzel, 2002, p. 116). Tatzel then proceeds to discuss the implications of this 
typology for issues concerning well-being and general psychological adjustment. 
Another example of the typology-based approach to identity-related matters in the 
psychological study of money is provided by Doyle’s (1992; 1999) work. Doyle (1992) 
proposes a “new conceptual framework for understanding and expanding on what 
money means to different kinds of people in different circumstances at different times 
in their life” (p. 708). Whilst this may sound like a pledge for a consideration of 
identity processes in the context of studying money attitudes and meanings, Doyle’s 
approach is nonetheless steeped within a neo-analytic tradition -  drawing on the 
writings of Jung, Adler, Fromm as well as Maslow -  and, as such, is committed to a 
particular notion of selfliood. On the basis of various four-part schemata -  ostensibly 
traced tliroughout the history of philosophy and psychology and to which he refers as 
the "fundamental dimensions o f human personality” (Doyle, 1992 p. 716; emphases in 
original) -  Doyle distinguishes between Expressives, Drivers, Amiables and 
Analyticals as basic ‘personality types’. For Doyle, this particular system of 
classification offers a fr amework for “defining the domain of a ‘psychology of money’, 
[for] guiding the development of measuring instruments for empirical investigation of 
that domain and [for] framing research questions” (p. 708). He, too, emphasises the 
relevance of his typology for understanding various ‘money psychopathologies’. This 
personality-based approach to money is then not only applied to explanations of 
individual differences but also extended to encompass cultural or ‘continental’ types 
(African, American, Asian and European) and their associated understandings of 
money and property (Doyle, 1999). Doyle (1999) proclaims the existence of four 
“archetypal propensities” (p. 17), namely acquisitiveness/accumulation (‘Europe’), 
frugality (‘Asia’), kinship/community (‘America’) and expansiveness/social
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extravagance (‘Africa’). These propensities, in turn, are understood as predominantly 
the result of natural selection pressures and therefore as the basic dimensions of 
personality which “describe to this day the essential character of individuals, families 
and cultures” (Doyle, 1999, p. 17; emphasis added).
Whilst the above-outlined approaches towards establishing money-related 
typologies have remained at a theoretical level, some empirical studies have also 
incorporated typological descriptions. For instance, Funiliam (1996) and Funiliam and 
Okaniura (1999), in their search for the demographic and behavioural predictors of 
‘money pathology’, refer to the Miser, Spendthrift, Tycoon, Bargain Hunter and the 
Gambler^^ which are employed as tlie components of a five-part ‘money pathology 
typology’. Some of the more general personality variables that have been used in 
psychological studies of money and its meanings are: extraversion/introversion 
(Brandstatter & Brandstatter, 1996; Kirkcaldy, Funiliam & Martin, 1998; McClure, 
1984; Rim 1982, cited in Lewis et al., 1995), Type-A behaviour patterns and locus of 
comrol (e.g. Tang, 1995) as well as selTesteem (e.g. Hanley & Wilhelm, 1992).
The noteworthy point about the above-outlined studies, as far as the overall 
objective of this thesis is concerned, is that the ‘self here is regarded as synonymous 
with 'personality'; that is, there is a conflation of identity and personality which, in turn, 
leads to an analytic focus on individual differences and psychopathology. Moreover, 
the money-related personality traits or dispositions refened to above are -  by definition 
-  viewed as fairly stable across contexts and over time. As a consequence, economic 
beliefs or attitudes are also considered as relatively consistent. For instance, 
Brandstatter (1993), in his general appeal for a gi'eater emphasis on personality issues 
in economic psychology, refers to attitudes not only as being rooted in ‘personality 
structme’ but also as "endwing subject-object relations developed tlnough prior direct 
or indirect experience of a person with that object” (p. 478; emphasis added). The 
notion of attitudinal consistency as regards economic or monetary phenomena is also 
made explicit by Kirkcaldy and Fumliam’s (1993) claim that “money beliefs and 
behaviours are established fairly early in childhood and maintained during adult life” 
(p.1079).
This is based on a classification system proposed by Forman (1987, in Furnliam & Okamura, 1999).
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Yet, even in accounts where trait or disposition-based conceptions of identity are 
circumvented and explicit references to the ‘self aie made, notions of consistency are 
ever-present. Consider, for instance. Lea and Webley’s (1997) contention that “a 
person, a self, is what ties together a whole series of economic decisions” (p. 336) and 
that economic analysis therefore “needs to take more account of the selfliood of 
economic agents” (p. 323). The specific background to Lea and Webley’s argument 
lies in their suggestion that economic psychology in general should take into account 
the issue of pride; according to them, pride is associated with self-esteem and positive 
self-image and, as such, has a significant impact on economic behaviour. Lea and 
Webley not only regard feelings of pride as closely linlced to the concept of the self but 
also as “a pervasive tendency for the consistency of choice” (p. 336) since “pride 
involves maintaining an image of the self (for oneself and for others) over the long 
term”, (p. 337). They therefore deduce that what may be at stake in certain economic 
decisions is “a desire for the consistency of selfliood” (Lea & Webley, 1997, p. 333).
Ill the more specific context of monetary attitudes and meanings -  the focal point of 
our cuiTent argument -  explicit attempts at integrating the ‘se lf into empirical studies 
of money have also been made. For instance. Prince (1993) examines the relationship 
between attitudes towards money and certain aspects of the ‘self. Here, the self- 
concept is generally regarded as a system of thoughts and feelings relating to one’s 
identity and, more specifically, is defined as a set of self-perceived traits (see p. 161). 
On the basis of his empirical findings. Prince depicts ‘achievement’, ‘personal 
competence’ and ‘asceticism’ as aspects of people’s self-concepts, in other words as 
‘money traits’. Prince’s approach to monetary attitudes not only assumes consistency 
between the ‘self and the beliefs expressed but also relies on the premise that the 
“maintenance of an integrated self-concept is a general human motive” and that 
“people will stmcture infomiation about the self in a way that will maximise coherence 
and consistency of the total self'’ (Prince, 1993, p. 162; emphases added).
The kind of selfliood that is espoused in these accounts is characterised by its 
inlierent essentialisni. The ‘self is not only viewed as a unitary entity that is relatively 
consistent across contexts, but also as essentially individualistic. Whilst this conception 
of selfliood may differ in temis of its contents from the ‘self advocated by economic
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theoiy, there are some striking parallels in terms of its perceived structure, hi other 
words, the anatomy of ‘Homo Economicus’ is not unlike that of ‘Homo Psicologicus’.
1.3.2.2 ‘Identity’ in the Psychology of Money
Identity concerns have frequently played a central explanatory role in accounts of 
consumption (e.g. Belk et al., 1998; Lunt & Livingstone, 1992) or material possessions 
(e.g Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1989, 1992, 1994). hi the context of consumption, for 
instance, Lunt and Livingstone (1992) show that economic practices are more than 
decision-based economic behaviours and that “being involved in material culture is a 
way of locating oneself in a changing social and moral order” (p. 166). hi the more 
specific context of material possessions, Dittmar (1992) asserts that “possessions and 
one’s sense of identity are closely linked by way of consensually shared notions about 
material objects constituting symbols for a person’s social position, conceptions, 
attitudes and personal qualities” (p. 125). These accomits are notable for their social 
constructiopist orientation and hence for providing a direct challenge to “the cultural 
conception of autonomous individuality” (Dittmar, 1992, p. 193). In other words, these 
approaches defy the concept of an individualistic self and, instead, view identity as 
intimately tied to broader societal issues. Yet, in the context of the psychological 
literatme on monetary meanings and attitudes with which we are concerned here, in- 
depth reflections on the nature of identity and its potential relevance for monetary 
beliefs and behaviours seem peculiarly absent. It is now time to pull together the 
different strands of argument presented thus far so as to lay the foundation for the work 
presented in this thesis.
The foregoing discussion suggests that there are a number of problems with 
psychological studies of economic phenomena generally and the 
psychometric/personality approach to money attitudes and meanings in particular. As 
already indicated, economic psychological research on money has largely remained 
descriptive and a-theoretical'"^. In fact, the data-driven, ‘bottom-up’ approach 
prevailing in economic psychology has often been regarded as one of its major
36
Chapter /
strengths (e.g. Lea et al., 1987). The question of whether a truly a-theoretical, wholly 
empirical or ‘objective’ approach to any kind of phenomenon is indeed possible has, of 
course, been the subject of a long-standing philosophical debate (e.g. Chalmers, 1978) 
and has also been raised within psychology (e.g. Gergen, 1973; 1985).
It is our position here that remaining theoretically agnostic is not always without its 
risks. The previous consideration of the psychological literature on money 
demonstrates that, whilst the majority of studies have, at least on the surface, eschewed 
any commitment to broader theoretical frameworks, they have frequently drawn on 
clinical, especially psychoanalytic, ideas. We argue that a lack of theoretical 
commitment within this particular area, at best, reinforces the divide between 
‘rationality’ (as presumed in economics) and ‘iiTationality’ (as exposed by the 
psychological focus on ‘money pathology’) and, at worst, perpetuates the notion of an 
individualistic, de-contextualised ‘self. In the latter case, psychological accounts 
concur with some assumptions about human agency found in economic models; they 
thus contribute to a certain extent -  and Somewhat paradoxically -  to the lack of 
psychological realism which economic psychology set out to challenge in the first 
place. A truly alternative, social psychological account of monetary attitudes and 
meanings is provided in neither case.
In fact, the interdisciplinary relationship between economics and psychology has 
been the cause of concern for some writers. For instance, Lunt (1996) argues that, until 
now, economic psychology’s contribution to its interdisciplinary endeavour has 
fr equently been to facilitate the appropriation of psychological ideas by economics. 
With their general emphasis on individual differences and their focus on cognitive 
heuristics or biases in particular, psychologists have often unwittingly contributed to an 
elaboration, rather than a contestation, of the rationality assumptions prevalent in neo­
classical economics. Consequently, Lunt (1996) voices a concern that attention to the 
social aspects of economic behaviour will decline. This concern seems wananted, 
especially in light of the general stance expressed by some reviewers of the 
interdisciplinaiy findings gathered so far-. Rabin (1998), for instance, states the need to
111 their seminal inti'oduction to economic psychology. Lea et al. (1987) actually propose a so-called 
‘new’ theory of money (pp. 335-339), suggesting that money is a multiple symbol that operates at 
different levels o f measurement (i.e. nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio). Yet, Lea et al.’s ‘theory’ has 
not received any further attention. In fact, it simply seems to delineate a detailed classification system for 
various monetary forms rather than provide a ftill-blowii psychological theory of money as such.
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make the assumptions underlying rational choice theory ‘more realistic’ and suggests 
“some important psychological findings seem tractable and parsimonious enough that 
we should begin the process of integrating them into economics” (p. 13; emphasis 
added). Psychology, in other words, ought to be subservient to economics, a notion 
which is also echoed by Earl (1990) who states tliat “the likely benefits of a foray into 
psychology need to be expected to exceed the costs of doing so” (p.718). Lunt’s (1996) 
argument, on the other hand, points to the importance of retaining some psychological 
autonomy, as it were, lest attention to the social aspects of economic attitudes and 
behavioiu's further declines.
Yet, in the context of the literatuie with which we are concerned here, the only 
seemingly social variable referred to is ‘group membership’. But, in fact, group 
membership is treated more as a sociological than a psychological variable. That is, 
‘the,group’ is taken as an objective and enduring description of tlie social position of 
the. individual. No account is taken of the ways in which people subjectively construe 
their group membership or of how group identities may change according to context. 
As Calhoun (1994) argues, “ to see identities only as reflections of ‘objective’ social 
positions or circumstances is to see them always retrospectively [which] does not make 
sense of the dynamic potential implicit -  for better or worse -  in the tensions within 
persons [...]” (p. 28). This objectivist approach to group membership has given rise to 
all-encompassing statements such as “females, older people, those from lower socio­
demographic groups [...] are more concerned about money” (Furnham & Ai'gyle, 1998, 
p. 53). There is an underlying assumption here that the differences found between 
various groups with regard to attitudes towards (or meanings ascribed to) money reside 
within these group ascriptions as such, rather than being an expression of the structural 
and context-dependent relations between different groups within a given system. To 
put this point more directly, are attitudes towaids money a function of whether we are 
objectively male or female, for instance, or do they depend on the kinds of situation in 
which we find ourselves thinking or acting in terms of our gender?
The notion that attitudes and behaviour may be governed by the contextual salience 
of a given group membership takes us into the Social Identity tradition. This tradition 
will be outlined in the following section, hi doing so, we also aim to address Lewis et 
al.’s (1995) call for hirther integrated theoretical development in economic psychology
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which, according to them, needs to focus on the nature of the self in economic 
psychology.
1 . 4  T o w a r d s  a  S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y  O f  M o n e y  a n d  i t s  U s a g e : T h e
S o c i a l  I d e n t i t y  C o n t r i b u t i o n
This section delineates those features of the Social Identity tradition that are 
relevant for the suggested alternative, identity-based approach to economic 
psychological phenomena in general and money issues in particular. The rationale 
behind the present focus on the Social Identity model -  at the expense of a more 
detailed consideration of social constructionist approaches, for instance -  lies not only 
in the tradition’s prevalence within social psychology but relates, more concretely, to 
its contribution of testable hypotheses to the theoretical concerns of this thesis. Yet, 
social constructionist and social identity approaches are by no means regarded as 
mutually exclusive here, but rather as complementaiy. Whilst constructionist models 
stress issues that are pertinent for identity construction — for ‘doing identity’ so to 
speak -  Social Identity theorists, as we shall see, have emphasised the social 
psychological consequences of adopting particular identities, hr doing so, they have 
offered an account of the specific mechanisms underlying identification as such.
What so far has been refened to as the Social Identity tradition comprises, in fact, 
two distinct social psychological theories, namely Social Identity Theory (SIT) and 
Self-Categorization Theoiy (SCT). Whilst SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986) and SCT 
(Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) are closely related 
and rest on many conunon assumptions, each theory also encompasses its own 
par ticular set of core ideas horn which specific, testable prediction can be derived (see 
Haslam, 2001 for a concise srunmary of similarities and differences). One of the main 
differences between the two theories relates to the kinds of social psychological 
phenomena which they regard as their specific focal points: SIT is predominantly 
concerned with the psychological foundations of intergroup relations and social 
conflict, whereas the emphasis of SCT lies more generally on the social categorisation 
processes which underpin group formation and action and, as such, on the 
understanding of ‘the group’ as a psychological phenomenon. The latter theory is 
particularly pertinent for our present purposes as it assigns a central role to the self­
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concept (i.e. its structure and functioning) and to the cognitive aspects associated with 
that concept within explanations of gi'oup processes. The SCT version of selflrood will 
be considered in greater detail in just a moment; before doing so, however, the 
following synopsis of SIT and SCT will provide the background to the historical and 
theoretical context out of which this particular conceptualisation of identity has arisen. 
This outline is not intended as an exhaustive review of the two theories, but rather as a 
general sketch of their broader underlying assumptions, particularly those germane to 
our present pmposes.
1.4.1 Social Identity Theory (SIT)
SIT was developed dming the 1970’s (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986; 
Turner, 1975) and initially arose out of the debate over the conditions thought to trigger 
discrimination between groups. As the theory matured, SIT came to provide an 
alternative to the hitherto customaiy attempts to account for intergroup phenomena -  
specifically discrimination between groups -  either by reference to individuals’ 
inlierent diives or dispositions (e.g. Allport, 1924) or by invoking notions of realistic 
conflict over ‘objective’ resources (e.g. Sherif, 1966). hi other words, SIT developed 
into a non-reductionist, social psychological account of intergroup relations and their 
associated psychological processes.
The actual origins of SIT can be traced to a series of experiments generally 
subsumed under the so-called ‘minimal group’ paradigm. Prior to these experiments, 
Sherif (1966) had argued -  against Allport’s (1924) understanding of the group as a 
mere collection of individuals -  that conflicts over ‘real’ resources (e.g. material or 
economic) led to intergroup competition and thus to discrimination. For Sherif, the key 
to negative stereotyping and intergioup discrimination was to be found in social 
competition. On the basis of Sherif s work, the minimal group studies (e.g. Billig & 
Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971) sought to identify the minimal 
conditions under which intergioup discrimination would occur. Participants in these 
experiments were divided into groups -  on the basis of tiivial or even explicitly 
random criteria -  and required to distribute resources (‘points’ representing money) 
between an unspecified member of their own group {ingroup) and an anonymous 
member of another gioup {outgroup). The findings revealed a general tendency 
towards discrimination in the distiibution of these ‘resources’ and, more specifically, a
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trend towards maximum differentiation between gi'oups; that is, respondents sacrificed 
gains to their own group in order to maximise differences between the ingroup and the 
outgroup. These experiments seemingly demonstrated that the mere categorisation of 
people into different gi'oups -  even in the absence of the ‘real’ conflicts of interest or 
goals suggested by S herif- was a sufficient condition for ingroup favouritism, and thus 
outgroup discrimination, to take place. This seemed true regardless of whether 
respondents were assigned to groups on the basis of apparently trivial, but nevertheless 
random, criteria (Tajfel et al., 1971) or on account of explicitly random allocation 
procedures (Billig & Tajfel, 1973).
Tajfel et al.’s (1971) initial account of these findings in temis of ‘generic norms’, 
whereby adherence to a general nonn of competitiveness was thought to lead to 
discrimination, was soon replaced by a more comprehensive explanation based on 
identity processes. Tajfel (.1972) suggested that categorisation as a gi'oup member 
confeiTed a distinct meaning oh an individual’s behaviour. He fomiulated die concept 
of ‘social identity’ to account for this behavioin; social identity, in turn, was defined a s . 
“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives-from his or her knowledge'of 
his or her membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978b, p. 63). Put in a 
slightly different way, “social identity is part of a person’s sense of ‘who they are’ 
associated with any internalised group membership''' (Haslam, 2001, p. 31, italics in 
original) and can be contrasted with the notion of ‘personal identity’ which 
encompasses a person’s self-laiowledge of his/her imique attributes as an individual. 
Tajfel and Turner (1979; 1986) then elaborated the notion of social identity and put 
foiward the SIT of intergroup behaviour
On the basis of the findings diawn from the minimal gi'Oup studies, Tajfel (1978) 
proposed that behaviour should be regarded as vaiying along a continuum. At the 
‘inteipersonal’ end of the continuum, people’s interactions are deteiinined by their 
personal relationships and their individual characteristics; whilst, at the other 
‘intergioup’ extreme, behaviour relates to a person’s gimip niembership(s). Tajfel not 
only regarded intergioup and inteipersonal behaviour as qualitatively distinct but also 
suggested that shifts from one extreme to the other were contingent upon shifts in 
identification: namely, fi*om personal to social identity. At the intergioup end of the 
continuum, social identity processes were thus seen to provide the basis for intergroup
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behaviour. The definition o f one’s identity in terms of social group membership(s), in 
turn, was viewed to depend on comparative processes occurring on a social level, 
whereby a person’s membership in a particular group (ingroup) acquires significance 
or ‘salience’ in comparison to a relevant gioup of others (outgroup), hi other words, 
people define themselves in temis of their gioup niembership(s) when the context in 
which they are located is characterized along group-based lines. SIT also suggests that 
when a particular gioup membership becomes significant or salient for self-definition, 
people strive for positive distinctiveness of their own gioup (ingioup) from a relevant 
group of others (outgioup) on some valued dimension of comparison. That is, social 
differentiation or discrimination -  in the broad sense of establishing gioup 
distinctiveness -  is seen to arise out of a general need for positive self-esteem (or a 
‘positive social identity’).
hi sum, social identity locates an agent within a broader system of social relations. 
It renders the social world meaningful and thus makes collective action possible. For 
Tajfel and Turner (1979), social .identification processes and therefore intergroup 
behaviour could not be reduced to purely intra-psychic phenomena, as Allport (1924) 
had previously claimed, histead, they stressed the importance of the broader social 
context (which included the conditions identified earlier by Sherif) and argued that the 
psychological processes undeipiiming intergioup behaviour could not be understood 
without reference to the structural and ideological settings in which such behaviour is 
invariably embedded.
For our present purposes, three core SIT principles are of particular relevance. 
Firstly, SIT indicates that there are different levels of identification (personal versus 
social) and, therefore, several ways of defining the ‘self. Secondly, identity -  
especially as a member of a particular group -  is understood as contextually defined by 
means of social comparison processes, hi other words, social identity processes both 
operate within and as a frinction of social context. Thirdly, as an implication of this 
latter point, the behaviours that result from social identification depend upon the 
meaning or content of a particular identity which, in turn, is also determined by 
context. All of these key issues were, in fact, elaborated by Self-Categorization Theory, 
which we will turn to next.
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1.4.2 Self-Categorizatioii Theory (SCT)
During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s SCT was developed (Turner, 1982; 1985; 
Turner et ah, 1987) on the basis of the earlier SIT accounts of intergroup behaviour. 
SCT’s main efforts were directed at providing a more detailed explanation of the 
cognitive processes associated with social identity salience, hideed, despite the 
centrality of its explanatory role, the concept of social identity had remained somewhat 
under-explored in SIT. As Haslam (2001) has pointed out, a number of important 
issues had not yet been tackled -  such as the nature of the relationship between 
personal and social identity, the question of what makes people define themselves in 
terms of one gioup membership rather than another and how social identification 
produces consensus and transforms a person’s psychology. It was these kinds of 
question that SCT set out to examine and, in doing so, the self-concept and its 
elaboration became a crucial focus, hi particular, SCT provided a re-definition of the 
‘group’ as a cognitive phenomenon, by re-conceptualising the relationship between the 
individual and the social categories to which s/he belongs.
So how,- then, are we to understand this concept of the self? SCT upholds that 
selfliood or identity should be conceived of as existing on various levels of abstractions 
-  the personal, the social as well as the universal level. In other words, people can 
define themselves and others in a variety of ways. At one level of abstraction, we find 
the personal: ‘7’ versus ‘yow’; how do 7, as an individual, differ from you as an 
individual? On this sub-ordinate level of self-definition, the self is understood as 
unique and distinct fi'oni others. At the intermediate or social level, on the other hand, 
self-definition is based on the person’s (subjectively perceived) membership in various 
social groups. At this level of abstraction we encounter the ‘we’ versus ‘//?ey’; how do 
we as group members differ fi*om them, the members of the other gioup? hi contrast, on 
the super-ordinate or imiversal level of abstraction, the individual categorises 
him/herself in terms of his/her humanity, thus ‘being human’ becomes part of his/her 
self-concept. The self-concept is therefore to be understood as a set of cognitive 
representations about self rather than an integral, imitaiy entity:
“The self concept comprises many different components. Any individual p ossesses  
multiple concepts of self. If there is unity at all, it is only in so far as the different 
cognitive representations form a cognitive system, but the parts are highly 
differentiated and can function relatively independently.” (Turner et al., 1987, p.44)
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The Social Identity tradition has, of course, been primarily concerned with the 
intermediate or gioup level of self-definition. Turner (1982) argued that social identity 
provides the imderlying cognitive mechanism which allows gioup behaviour to occur. 
However, even on the social categorical level, identity can be defined in many different 
ways, for example in terms of gender, occupation, etlmic group, nationality or religion. 
Which of these different categories becomes salient for self-definition varies as a 
function of the social context in which a person finds him/herself.
According to SCT, self-definition as a member of a particular social category is 
accomplished via a psychological process referred to as depersonalisation (Turner et 
ah, 1987). Depersonalisation, in turn, occurs by means o f a self-stereotyping process, 
whereby the ‘self is categorised as not only as a member of a particular categoiy but 
also as interchangeable with other members of the same class or gioup. Self- 
categorisa^tion on the intemiediate, social level of identity also entails that the norms or 
contents a,ssociated with the category under consideration become assimilated into the 
‘self. Tills process has ; also. been refeixed to as Ref^yent Informational Influence 
(Turner, .1985; 1991). To put is slightly differently. Referent hifoimational hifiuehce 
denotes the idea that under conditions of social identity salience, specific gioup norms 
(the group prototype) become salient which then provide the basis for perception, 
evaluation and action. When a person defines him/herself as a member of a particular 
gioup, the stereotypical content of that identity -  including the gioup norms as to the 
attitudes and behaviours considered to be appropriate -  provides the lens through 
which the world is viewed as well as an anchoring point for social action.
So what, then, makes a particular social identity salient? hi the vein of its 
theoretical precursor SIT, SCT contends that we do not adopt different social identities 
at random, but that identity shifts are tied to social context, hi SCT, social identity 
salience is understood as a product of the ‘accessibility’ and ‘fit’ of the specific social 
category/categories mider consideration (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991; 
Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). Accessibility -  also refeixed to as 
‘perceiver readiness’ (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994) — denotes the readiness of the 
perceiver to apply a social category to him/herself. This readiness, in turn, is seen as 
contingent on the person’s cunent expectations and past experience, as well as their 
broader goals, needs or values. Fit, on the other hand, refers to the correspondence 
between the categoiy/categories in question and the external social ‘reality’. The
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concept of category fit is further sub-divided into ‘comparative’ and ‘normative’ fit, by 
which two related notions of social category salience are described. Comparative fit is 
linked to the SCT principle of ‘meta-contrast’ (or Meta Contrast Ratio) which specifies 
that the particular social category that will become salient in a given context is the one 
through which m/e/'-group differences -  along a relevant dimensions of comparison -  
will be maximised, whilst m/ra-gi'oup variation is kept to a minimum (Turner, 1985; 
Turner et ah, 1987). The stipulation that the between-gioup differences and within- 
group similarities conespond to the stereotypical attributes associated with these 
categories is, in turn, expressed by reference to the notion of nomiative fit. hi other 
words, for a social category to become salient, its contents or meaning must match the 
stereotypical expectations the perceiver has of that category.
1.4.2.1 Key Concepts and Research Implications
Whilst these latter SCT principles outline the cognitive mechanisms by wliich 
social identity salience is defined, and thus the meaning one’s identity acquires in a 
given context, these ideas also point towards some of the potential pitfalls that can be 
encountered within the Social Identity approach. These will be briefly considered in a 
moment. First, let us summarise the core assumptions that we regard as particularly 
pertinent for the pmposes of this thesis:
(1) Multiple Selves: The self is neither a imitaiy, integral entity nor can it be 
dissociated or abstracted from its social context. S elf definition can occur at different 
levels of abstraction (personal, social, human). There is no single level at which self­
categorisations can be said to be more ‘real’ or ‘true’ and hence in any sense more 
fundamental to who or what a person is (Haslam, 2001). The nature of selfliood is 
therefore multiple; that is, identity should be conceived of as relational, comparative, 
fluid and contingent on context. The notion of ‘ se lf categorisation ’ also entails a shift 
of focus fr om ‘objective’ gioup memberships to subjective identification processes.
(2) Identitv as a nonnative resource: The Social Identity approach conceptualises 
people’s values, beliefs, attitudes or behaviours as a function of their social identity (or 
identities), hi other words, social identity supplies the norms and values according to 
which we behave; it provides us with ‘meaning’. Different social identities or self- 
categorisations, in turn, correspond to different sets of nonns and values.
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(3) Context: At the social level of self-categorisation, shifts in identity salience are seen 
as contextually detemiined. Such shifts produce noiinative changes; tliat is, since 
values, attitudes and behaviours aie conceptualised as a fimction of identity, they vaiy 
according to which identity is salient in a given context. For example, the attitudes or 
values we might derive from and express when defining ourselves in terms of our 
gender may be different from what we regard as important when identifying ourselves 
in teiins of our occupation or political group membership. However, social context not 
only detennines which of many different identities might become salient but also 
shapes what a given identity may represent. The meaning a specific identity acqufres, 
and thus the attitiidinal or behavioural nonns and values associated with it, depend on 
the comparative context in which it is salient, hi other words, the attitudes a person 
might express as a member of a particular social category can vary according to the 
outgroup (s) to which s/he comp ai es hèr/hiiiiself. .
Wliilst the above outlined theories (SIT and SCT) were primarily developed to 
account for the behavioural and cognitive processes associated with (inter)gTOUp 
phenoniena, we suggest that an extrapolation of these assumptions into research on 
money may turn out to be a theoretically enriching exercise. It is proposed that the 
conception of the ‘self afforded by the Social Identity tradition may offer a useful 
framework for examining economic psychological phenoniena -  especially those 
related to the subjective valuation of money -  in a more systematic and theoretical 
fashion. As outlined above, the Social Identity approach suggests that self-definition 
changes as a function of context and that values, attitudes and behavioius vary as a 
function of identity. Consequently, what we value not only depends on the context we 
find ourselves in but also changes as a function of our varying identities. The specific 
proposal put foiward here is that this may include the value or meanings we attach to 
money. (See Section 1.5 for an outline of the research questions derived from the 
Social Identity approach.)
At the outset of this section (see p. 39) it was indicated that one of the reasons for 
the present emphasis on the Social Identity tradition lies in its usefulness as a 
framework for examining the consequences of identity for attitudes and behaviour (by 
means of its key concept ‘social identity’). That is, the approach allows for the 
fonmilation of testable hypotheses since its main focus has been on specifying the
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actual mechanisms related to (social) identification as such. In fact, herein also lie the 
potential pitfalls alluded to earlier. Even though the principal thrust behind the Social 
Identity approach has been to draw attention to the interdependence of cognition and 
social context, its reliance on traditional experimental methods has often been criticised 
for leading to an over-emphasis on the consequences of identification, at the expense of 
considering the processes underlying category construction. As a result, SCT in 
particular has been described as having become overly cognitive (Reicher, Spears & 
Postmes, 1995, p. 191).
Experimental designs require that the social categories under consideration be viewed 
as ‘stable’ for the duration of the study (Antaki, Condor & Levine, 1996); this also 
presumes that these categories are defined by a particular set of attributes which is 
readily available to respondents. Yet, this implies that people passively read the 
relevant self-categorisations from a given ‘reahty’; there is thus an ensuing risk of 
taking the natme of social context for gianted. hi other words, the limitations of the 
methodological framework traditionally adopted by the Social Identity approach mean 
that the dynamic aspects associated with human cognition and action have been imder- 
emphasised. There are, however, notable exceptions in which the aspects of identity 
construction, rather than its consequences, are emphasised. For instance, Reicher 
(1984; 1996) and Reicher and Hopkins (1996a; 1996b; 2001) have repeatedly argued 
that identities and their contents are both actively construed and that they accomplish 
strategic aims (e.g. the mobilisation of people). Accordingly, identities are seen as 
ideological constmctions whose meanings and categorical boundaiies as such are often 
debated, hi other words, “neither the individual nor the gioup is static [...] what ‘we’ 
means is negotiable” (Haslam, 2001, p. 85).
The reasons for emphasising these issues here is that they have methodological 
implications. Wliilst, as already mentioned, experimental designs allow for an 
examination of the attitiidinal or behavioinal consequences of identification, an 
alternative metliodological approach, namely a qualitative one, is required when 
focusing on the active aspects of identity construction. The studies presented 
tlnoughout this thesis will therefore draw on both quantitative and qualitative 
tecliniques.
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1 . 5  O v e r a l l  R e s e a r c h  A i m s  «& A g e n d a
The studies presented in this thesis seek to provide a first step towards an identity- 
based approach to understanding money and its role in our lives, hi particular, we aim 
to relate our understanding of social identity processes to the subjectively perceived 
value of money. On the basis of the psychological literature reviewed above, we would 
like to suggest that attempts to understand the psychological dimensions of money and 
money usage remain incomplete if the existence of a variable or ‘social’ self is not 
taken into account. Our first and foremost research objective is, therefore, to enrich the 
discussion of the subjective understandings of money by shifting it out of the domain 
of attitude or personality research -  with its emphasis on psychopathology -  into a 
broader social psychological context, hi doing so, we also hope to gain some general 
insights into the notions of selfliood that are associated with the importance attributed 
to money.
The proposed relevance of identity for monej/rrelated matters will be examined 
along various avenues and by means of different methods.
First, we would like to openly explore the question of whether money and the 
subjective meanings ascribed to it relate to identity in the context of everyday life. This 
calls for a qualitative approach to money meanings as well as for a focus on the active 
construction of identity (see above).
Second, we aim to examine whether it is possible to systematically manipulate identity 
and, in doing so, bring about changes in the subjective value attached to money. Here, 
the emphasis is on the consequences of identification which, in turn, requires the use of 
quantitative techniques (see above). A series of experimental studies is therefore* 
presented in which the following specific research questions are addressed: 1) Are 
attitudes towards money a fimction of identity processes? 2) Do the ways in which 
people value money vaiy when different identities are salient? hi other words, does the 
subjectively perceived value of money change when self-definition changes? 3) What 
aie the meanings ascribed to a given identity and how do these relate to attitudes 
towards money? 4) Do attitudes towards money vary as a function of the comparative 
context within which the same identity is salient?
Third, we aim to address the link between money and identity in a broader behavioural 
context in which relatively large amounts of money are at stake. This, again, entails a
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qualitative stance and a focus on the decision-making processes that underpin people’s 
choices within that particular context.
On a final note, a point to bear in mind is that the present approach might be 
regarded as exploratory in so far as, until now, the nature of the relationship between 
the self and the perceived value of money has remained uncharted teiiitory. As pointed 
out earlier, research on money thus far has put little emphasis on theory or on broader 
meta-theoretical concerns; here, on the other hand, the focus is on introducing specific 
theoretical notions to the psychology of money, hi this respect the following studies -  
be it by way of the hypothesis-testing nature of some or the qualitative stance promoted 
in others -  seek to move beyond the purely exploratory and to further the development 
of both tlieoiy and method within this particular domain o f research.
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II. M o n e y  a n d  Id e n t it y  In  E v e r y d a y  L if e
2 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The philosopher Jacob Needleman stated that “the problem of money has to be 
faced as a problem of consciousness, as a problem of the being of man in the universal 
world” (Needleman, 1991; p. 4). According to Needleman, understanding money and 
our relationship to it, is a key to the question of who we are. Whilst, for him, tackling 
the issue of money is part and parcel of a larger -  for want of a better phrase -  
‘spiritual quest’ for meaning, we need not resort to, or even endorse, any notions of 
‘the spiritual’ to appreciate the potential relevance of his claim for an understanding of 
money on a more immediate, social psychological level. The most basic reading of the 
above statement simply points towards a comiection between money matters and issues 
of identity. But has this assumed relationship between money and self any empirical 
validity? Aie our attitudes towards money, the meanings we ascribe to it, experientially 
related to our sense of who we are and, if  so, how? This is the key question the study 
described below set out to explore.
As was argued in the preceding chapter, certain psychological approaches to money 
have tended to presuppose both the dimensions of meaning and of identity that are 
regarded to be of significance to people as far as monetary issues are concerned. Let us 
briefly recap om- previous line of reasoning. We showed that the meanings people 
attribute to money have, to a large extent, been detemiined on the basis of attitude 
scales. Due to the use of this particular assessment method, the value ascribed to 
money has often been infened from psychometric scores. We contended that there are 
a nmnber of problems with inferences of meaning or value of this kind. Firstly, as 
already mentioned, they take for granted the kinds of meaning that are supposedly of 
relevance for people. Secondly, the degiee to which money is valued is implied to vaiy 
along an inter-personal continuum, where an individual at one of its poles purportedly 
attaches no value at all to money, whereas for a person at the other end, money 
seemingly has gieat value. This paiticular conception of subjective valuation or 
monetary meanings leaves a number of questions unanswered (e.g. why do people 
value money and what is it valued for?) and also rules out the possibility of intra­
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individual variation. In other words, the value a person ascribes to money is regarded 
as relatively unaffected by her/liis social context and financial practices.
This treatment of context and practices as given or static con*esponds to the way in 
which identity issues have been approached, hi so far as questions of identity have not 
been circumvented altogether, tlieir relationsliip to money matters has either been 
addressed at the level of sociological gioup membership (e.g. gender, social class, 
nationality or etlmic group) or in temis of individual personality differences. As far as 
tlie foimer approach is concemed -  and again as a result o f the particular research 
methods employed -  the identity dimensions considered to be of importance have been 
imposed a priori', therefore the question of their .sw6yec/zve/y-perceived relevance as 
regaids the role of money in people’s lives remains unexplored. Both the demogiaphic 
and the personality-based approaches to money have inadvertently reinforced tlie 
conception of the self as integral or imitary, and therefore as relatively static; this is due 
to an underlying assumption of the primacy of sociological gioup membership over 
processes of subjective identification in the former case and, in the latter instance, the 
implicit understanding of ‘personality’ (i.e. personal identity) as the most authentic 
level or expression of the ‘self.
2.1.1 Research Aims & Questions
On the basis of the considerations simmiarised above, the rationale behind this 
study was twofold. Firstly, it aimed to provide a ‘bottom up’ accoimt of the subjective 
meanings attached to money. Rather than relying on indirect inferences of meaning, 
here the emphasis was on the individual’s own construction of the meaning(s) that 
money evoked for him/her.
The second objective of this study was to explore whether the meanings people ascribe 
to money are related to subjective notions of ‘selfliood’. histead of pre-supposing the 
identity dimensions of importance, the aim here was to shed some light on the question 
of whether money meanings ai e, on an experiential level, linlced with identity issues.
To suimnarise then, the more specific research questions that guided this enquiry were 
as follows:
1) What are the subjective meanings of money? How do people understand money 
and its role in their eveiyday lives? To what extent is money valued and what is 
it valued fo r i
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2) Aie the meanings attached to money associated with subjective notions of 
identity or ‘selfliood’? hi other words, is there a relationship between people’s 
perception of themselves and their understandings of money? If so, in what 
ways are the subjective meanings of money related to people’s imderstanding of 
who they are?
To engage with these kinds of question clearly demands that a qualitative 
methodological stance be taken. Dittniar and Drury (2000) have drawn attention to the 
relative dearth and therefore undervalued role of qualitative research in economic 
psychology. They have pointed towards the potential benefits that are to be gained 
fi'oiii employing certain types of qualitative method as these can provide a means to 
critically examining the concepts or definitions used (and often taken for granted) 
within a quantitative paradigm. This is, of course, precisely what is at issue here. In 
adopting a qualitative perspective on everyday understandings of money, we also hope 
to make a small contribution to what Billig (1992) has called a “populated social 
psychology”, that is a psychology which can provide “a sense of individual people, 
living their lives, voicing their desires and their discontents” (p.24).
2 . 2  M e t h o d
2 . 2 . 1  Research Design & Materials
hi order to addiess the above research objectives, an interview study was earned 
out. The fonnat used was semi-structured, with each inteiwiew session ananged around 
a number of broad themes or questions (see Appendix II.a). These were primarily 
intended to introduce and facilitate general talk on the subject of money. That is, the 
interview questions as such were regarded as secondary and, in an attempt to render the 
interview situation as comfortable and natural as possible for participants, no particulai' 
sequence in posing them was adhered to. However, the same central issues (i.e. “What 
does money mean to you in the context of yoiu* evei*yday life?”, “How important is 
money to you?” “Why or why not?”) were broached in all interviews and respondents 
were encomaged to speak as liberally as they desired to on these matters.
The internews were earned out at a location of respondents’ own choosing. This 
tended to be their home, but also included (in tlnee instances) the interviewer’s office. 
As a result of employing a relatively flexible fonnat, the duration of the interviews
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varied, with individual sessions ranging from 45 minutes to IV2 hours. All interviews 
were audio-taped.
2.2.2 Sample
The rationale underlying this study was to collect data from a diversity of 
individuals -  rather than from a controlled population sample -  so as to be able to 
glean the different constructions of money that are current. The aim was therefore to 
include respondents who varied in age, occupation as well as their family background. 
In order to ensure diversity, different recruitment methods were employed; participants 
were obtained through posters (see Appendix Il.b), which had been placed in various 
public spaces (e.g. local library, community centre), as well as by ‘snowballing’. The 
initial sample comprised 15 respondents. However, due to technical difficulties with 
the audio-recordings of two sessions^ the analysis presented below included the 
responses of 13 participants only. Of these, six respondents were male and seven were 
female. Table 2.1 provides an overview of respondents’ age, marital and occupational 
status as well as education.
Table 2.1 Overview of Interview Participants
Participant^ Age Marital Status (No. of Children)
Current Employment Status & 
Occupation Education
A n g u s 58 Divorced (1) Long-term disabled Not known
A n n e 45 Single (N/A) Employed (p/t) Clerical Work University Degree
B e v e r l y 53 Divorced (2) Employed (p/t) Clerical -  (p/t) Voluntary Work University Degree
B r i a n 57 Married (2) Employed (f/t) Cleaner O-Levels
G e o r g e 47 Married (1) Employed (f/t) Television Engineer 0 - Levels
J a n e 51 Married (3) Employed (f/t) School Teacher University Degree
J e s s i c a 21 Single (N/A) Undergraduate Student < -  see
K a r e n 33 Single (N/A) Unemployed -  (p/t) Voluntary Work University Degree
M a r g a r e t 54 Widowed (2) Employed (p/t) Clerical -  (p/t) Voluntary Work University Degree
N e i l 33 Single (N/A) Unemployed O-Levels / NVQ’s
R o g e r 42 Divorced (4) Employed (f/t) Paper Recycling Manager A-Levels
S a r a 28 Single (N/A) Postgraduate Student <— see
W i l l i a m 47 Single (I) Self-employed (f/t) Forester & Gardener A-Levels
' The poor quality of the recordings rendered transcription unfeasible, 
 ^Participants’ names were changed to ensure anonymity.
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2.2.3 Analytic Approach and Procedure
The audio-recordings of the interviews were fully transcribed using a word- 
processing package. Certain features of talk, such as emphases or pauses, were 
included in the transcription so as to preserve some of the ‘qualitative aspects’ of the 
responses (see Appendix II.c for transcription conventions), hi addition, the text also 
comprised references to significant gestures or facial expressions. The text was 
repeatedly compared with the audio-recordings to ensure accuracy of transcription.
The methodological approach to the interview material was broadly within the 
framework of thematic analysis as outlined by Kellehear (1993). Whilst this inductive 
approach does not rely on the existence of an a priori theory or set of hypotheses, it 
does provide a method for tackling textual data with a particular topic or set of issues 
in mind. In doing so, thematic analysis seeks to identify the themes -  or the “smaller 
bits of meaning” (Kellehear, 1993; p. 39) -  as these emerge in the narrative or text 
under scmtiny.
The analysis as such was an iterative process which entailed repeated readings of each 
interview transcript as well as the categorisation and interpretation of individual pieces 
of text. As previous writers have observed, in this particular fomi of analysis, the 
themes for which the data are examined are inevitably linlced to the specific conceptual 
concerns under investigation (e.g. Dmiy & Reicher, 2000). Accordingly, the interview 
material was examined in relation to the two overall theoretical questions or ‘themes’ 
posed above (see Research Aims & Question), namely 1) meanings of money and 2) 
the relationship between money and identity. All segments of text that were pertinent 
to our theoretical concerns were noted, coimnented on, ‘coded’ (according to their 
underlying theme) and finally brought together into one large ‘Word’ document, 
which, in turn, then formed the basis for another iterative analytical cycle. In canying 
out the above procedures, we adhered to some of the “tactics for generating meaning” 
outlined by Miles and Hubeiman (1994; pp. 245-262), which provide a general aid for 
the discernment of themes in linguistic data, and also made use of the suggested 
distinction between ‘basic’, ‘organising’ or ‘global themes’ (see e.g. Attride-Stirling, 
2001). The final version of the ‘Word’ document refeiTed to above served as an 
‘indexed’ copy of the inteiwiews and provided the bluepiint for the write-up of the 
findings. However, an impoi-tant point made by Dmiy and Reicher (2000) should be
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born in mind, namely that the presentation of a qualitative analysis is in itself an 
analytic process which involves interpretation and judgement.
2 . 3  A n a l y s i s
Before launching into analytic details, one observation with regard to the inteiwiew 
sessions is worthy of mention here, as it provides a general backdrop to the findings 
and thus puts them into their broader context. The feiwom* with which participants 
expressed their views was a striking featine of the majority of interviews. Talking 
about money seemed to elicit not only strongly held beliefs but, in some cases, also 
passionate emotional responses -  both positive and negative.
The following presentation of the qualitative findings drawn fr om the interviews will 
be organised around four over-arching themes (or categories): 1) the meanings of 
money, 2) the relationship between money and identity, 3) the role of values in the 
money-identity linlc and 4) the different levels of identity abstraction related to money. 
Whilst the findings peitaming to the initial research question are dealt with under the. 
first heading, the remaining analytic sections are dedicated to the second research 
objective. The foiu* general analytic categories, in turn, encompass several sub-themes 
which will be dealt with under the corresponding headings.
2.3.1 The Meanings of Money
The initial purpose the interviews meant to serve was to provide a qualitative 
account of the subjective meanings attached to money. Therefore, the first analytic 
category, which will be considered here, comprised respondents’ constmctions of 
money meariing(s). The following examples of these subjective meanings will be 
arranged according to tliree organising themes that emerged tlnoughout the analysis, 
namely a) the means-to-an-end conception of money, b) the imderstanding of money in 
terms offreedom and a) its association with the notion of power.
2.3.1.1 ‘A means to an end’
Talking about money in the context of everyday life elicited a diversity of money 
meanings. One recurring theme related to the conception of money as a means to an 
end. As one respondent put it:
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(1) [...] Well you, you know how the person, fo r  example, is worldng and the, 
and the jo b ’s not very well paid or, you Jatow, they ’re just doing the hours 
and you, you use the, the term "think o f  the money”. But at the end o f the 
day, I  mean, fo r  example, to give you an example: a house can be a home, 
but then again it can be just a house. It depends on the people fin it. And I  
think i t ’s, i t ’s the people themselves really that determine what kind o f use 
money’s gonna go to and how they perceive money. [...] Because all
money is a means to an end. That’s all it is. [ . . . ]  ( B r i a n ,  5 7 )
Here, the person’s understanding of money is predominantly instrumental. As a 
consequence, the more specific meanings money might acquire are viewed as 
contingent on its usage; in other words, financial practices are regarded as the 
determinants o f ‘meaning’ as such. As shall become clearer in the course of tliis 
analysis, financial practices were pivotal not only as regards respondents’ subjective 
understandings of money per se but also in temis of their notions of selfliood and the 
inter-relationship between money and identity. However, returning to the means-to-an- 
end understanding of money, the following question must eventually be posed: If
money is a means to an end, what then are the ends it is seen to accomplish? One
answer to this question can be foiuid in the association of money with the notion of 
‘freedom’.
2.3.1.2 ‘Freedom ’
(2) [...] It opens doors. Erin without it those doors wouldn ’t be open. So, yeah.
It does give me a freedom. And it gives me foptions erm (.) Yeah (..) It (.) it 
takes away fmisery. Without that money, life would be not so (.) 
fcontented. (M a r g a r e t , 5 4 )
(3) [ . . . ]  I t ’s [money] something ver\> practical. Things-, something I  think o f as 
necessaiy and essential. Something that is never too fa r  from my fmind.
But i f  I  was to use one word fo r  it, I  would use freedom. (S a r a , 2 8 )
hi conipaiison to exceipt (1), here money has acquired a somewhat more abstract 
significance as the ends it is thought to achieve relate to the concept of freedom. Wliilst 
money is seen to provide freedom, again, this freedom is intimately linked with its 
usage, as the continuation of extract (3) shows:
(4) To fine (..) money means, having money, means an ability to do whatever 
you want. So, (.) fo r  me, (.) I  have an idea o f how I  want to live my life and 
the things that I  want to do. But it seems to get back to requiring cash (.) to 
fund this way o f  life. So, i t ’s a fsecondary thing, i t ’s the flife that I  am 
interested in, i t ’s the things like (.) holidays, skiing, travelling, ehm, you 
Imow, those things. But those things require money. [ . . . ]  ( S a r a ,  2 8 )
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111 this case, the use of money for specific puiposes (j'the things like holidays, siding, 
travelling") is almost synonymous with its conceptualisation as a means for attaining 
freedom, especially given that the participant’s subjective understanding here relates to 
the pursuit of a particular kind of life (“f/ze life that I  am interested in"). This resembles 
the frequently made association between money and ‘lifestyle’:
(5) [...] Erm, but it [money] is symbolic to me in terms o f I  hiow that I ’ve got 
sufficient to live on and I ’ve got quite a fnice sty- err style o f life. I f  I  want 
to go out fo r  a meal I  can ajford it. I f  I  do want to go out and buy some 
clothes I  can afford it. I f  I  fneed to go up and see my parents, you Imow, I  
can afford that. [ . . . ]  ( B e v e r l y ,  53)
Again, the implication here is that money enables one (i.e. provides the freedom) to 
maintain a certain lifestyle and is therefore related to the perceived quality of one’s life 
(see also: “7 suppose the amount o f money that I ’ve got, leads me to sort o f  have a 
treasonable, you Imow, quality o f  life. I  can basically do what I  want to do." B e v e r l y ,  
53).
The above examples provide a first glimpse of the bond that exists between the 
meanings of money and identity. As is especially transparent in quote (4), the 
respondent’s notion of how she wants to live her life is intrinsically linlced with her 
sense of agency in the world (i.e. the "ability to do whatever you want", "the things 
that I  want to do"), which, in turn, is one of the most fimdamental aspects of selfliood. 
But here we are moving ahead of ourselves. For now, let us retimi to the issue of 
‘freedom’.
The manner in wliich money is seen to relate to the pmsuit of fr eedom is by no means 
unambiguous. Wliilst some people, as we have just seen, consider money as offering 
them freedom, others regard it as potentially undemiining theirs:
(6) [...] And (.) actually (..) I, part o f me is afraid o f me being encumbered 
with what I  might have i f I  had lots o f  money. [...] (A n n e , 4 5 )
Ultimately, this gives rise to a profound ambivalence regarding the notion of fr'eedom, 
where money becomes equated with both its attainment and a sense of imprisomiient at 
the same time:
(7) And having said that, I  mean, I  could, I  could imagine i f  i f  you were to say 
‘right (.) you have as much money in the world as you want’ — the problem 
is, it would never be enough. But I  could see things like, I  mean, a 
computer (.) so I  don’t have to go to the libraiy (.) and access to the 
Internet. AM I, I  mean, what I  really want- I  think the thing that money
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really does offer people ()  sometimes in an, in an illusory way but i t ’s also 
(inaudible) anyway, it offers ffreedom (.) but it also traps you. So you 
think yo u ’re getting freedom but y o u ’re actually (..) em trapped by it (.), 
imprisoned. (A n n e , 4 5 )
The above-quoted extracts combine to herald a more global theme that will be 
encountered at virtually all stages of this analysis and which relates to the various 
dilemmas found to exist aromid money. In the present context, this global theme 
manifests itself in tlie dileniniatic constmction of the kinds of ‘freedom’ associated 
with money: money can be understood as a source of fr eedom or as the opposite, its 
negation, and in the case of extract (7) as both at the same time.
This dileniniatic aspect suiTOimding the construction of a particulai' monetary meaning 
(‘freedom’) is reminiscent of what Billig (1991) calls the “rhetorical complexity of 
opinion-giving” (p. 16). hi general, Billig’s work has pointed towards the significance 
of rhetoric and argumentation in numerous areas of social life. For instance, his study 
of everyday talk about the British Royal Family (Billig, 1992) illustrates that certain 
views, as well as their corresponding counter-views, ought to be understood in the 
context of argimientation, where the expression of an opinion can often become a topic 
for debate in itself. In particular', however, Billig has maintained that ‘thiiilciiig’ per se 
is characterised by an essentially rhetorical and ai'gumentative dimension (Billig, 
1996); that is, “to deliberate upon an issue is to argue with oneself, even to persuade 
oneself’ (Billig, 1991, p. 17). This rhetorical conception of thought stresses the 
dialogic character of our deliberations, our own ‘internal debate’, hr other words 
common sense or ‘everyday’ thinking is regarded as frmdamentally argumentative and 
hence frequently comprises contrai'y or dilemmatic themes (Billig, 1996), the 
begiimings of which we might, in fact, be seeing here. The construction of the 
meaning(s) of money as dilemmatic can also be observed aroimd other themes, as the 
examples in the following section show.
2.3.1.3 ‘Pow er’
Another organising theme in respondents’ talk about the meanings of money in 
their everyday lives referred to the conceptualisation of money as a foiin of power. As 
with the notion of ‘freedom’, the ways in which monetary issues were linlced to 
‘power’ were multifaceted and their association occmred at different levels of
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complexity. At the most basic level, money was regarded as a symbolic expression of 
power:
(8) [...] Those that don’t have money say ‘‘yes, those that have it, have power 
and control” and those that don’t have it also are saying ‘7 want it 
because I  fwantpower and control”. ( G e o r g e , 4 7 )
It is interesting to note that -  like in some of the examples refening to ‘freedom’ -  here 
the meaning ascribed to money is associated with a specific life domain, namely the 
‘‘material and physical worlcC' (e.g. " it’s [money] w  connected with the material and 
physical world [...] o f  which money is a veiy, veiy strong symbgf', G e o r g e , 4 7 ) .  This 
particular respondent drew a marked distinction between the material realm and what 
he refeired to as the "spiritual world”. For him, talking about money thus raised a 
number of spiritual issues, as the continuation of the above quote illustrates:
(9) Even i f  you ’re not saying it consciouslv. part o f  you wants power and 
fcontrol. But that, fagain, spiritually, from fmy point o f  view, is (.) that 
i t ’s because you ffeel weak, because you ’re not fconnected to yourself 
you ’re not connected to yourself spiritually.. Your true personal power is in 
your spiritual nature, in your true inner nature. [...] (G e o r g e , 4 7 )
Again, there is a dilemma here. Money is seen as a provider of power and control, yet 
when its power is sought after, this is seen to occur on account of some fomi of 
spiritual wealmess. "True” power is believed to reside somewhere else, namely in the 
spiritual realm; it is therefore the lack of "true personal power” in the spiritual sphere 
that drives the search for it in the material world. The use of the word ‘true’ here not 
only resolves the dilenmia posed by the juxtaposition of material and spiritual notions 
of power by removing the physical realm from ‘reality’ (see also "Nothing in the 
physical world really fmatters.” "Money symbolises power and control. And (..) that in 
itself is an fillusion.” G e o r g e , 4 7 )  but, in doing so, also offers a particular definition of 
the ‘self. This issue will be taken up again briefly in Section 2.3.5.3. For now, let us 
resume our discussion of the association between money and ‘power’.
Respondents were also found to express a general fear  regarding the power of 
money:
(10) [...] But I ’m scared o f  what it can fdo though. (.) You know. Money’s veiy 
poweifid! ( B r i a n , 5 7 )
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The fear of the power money was thought to possess was not only mentioned in an 
abstract sense but was also tangibly related to financial practices:
(11) [...] I ’m a bit erm I ’m a bit fscared o f money. So I ’m, I ’m sort o f like quite 
careful with money. [...] I  think it can run away with you very easily. And I  
think, you lmoM>, there’s sort o f  never enough in the pot fo r  what you want 
to do and therefore you ’ve got to keep a very close eye on it. I ’m not very 
good at doing that. So therefore I  have to be quite disciplined fm yself you 
knoM>. ( B e v e r l y , 5 3 )
hi these instances, the expressed fears refened to the potential power that money was 
believed to have over the person, hi other words, there seemed to be an apprehension 
about the underlying ‘temptation’ or ‘seduction’ of money, owing to its powerful role 
in the creation of needs and desires {(‘there’s sort o f  never enough in the pot fo r  what 
you want to do”), hi fact, the notion of seduction was not only an implicit, over-arching 
theme in the context of respondents’ constructions of monetaiy meaning(s) but, as will 
become evident later on, particulaiiy related to the issue of identity and its relationship 
to money matters (see Section 1.3.2).
Whilst the power attributed to money was not always described in evaluative temis, 
some participants certainly perceived it as a destructive force:
(12) [...] Money is power. And i t ’s a bad power. It corrupt- Money is a
corruption. Totally, utterly destructive. [...] (A n g u s , 5 8 )
The subjective imderstanding of money as "corruption” was particularly interesting in 
this participant’s case, as it appealed to serve a specific discinsive function. We will 
return to this point in a moment.
As was the case in the association of money with the notion of fi eedom, there was 
often a gi'eat ambivalence regarding the money-power link. As one respondent put it:
(13) [...] fMoney is power in some senses. (.) You can get almost- you can 
probably get anything you wanted done (.) i f  you had money. But I  actually 
think i f  you could get things done without money (.) then that’s finore 
powerful. You Imow, i f  you coidd get the same things done and not need 
money, then that’s actually fa r  more powerful. [...] (K a r e n , 3 3 )
Whilst the subjective understanding of money is still related to the issue of power, here
the meaning of power as such is called into question. As a result, an attempt is made to
re-negotiate the actual significance of the temi ‘powerful’ and, according to this
respondent, the ability to achieve one’s ends without the use of money becomes the
hallmark of being truly powerful. This re-negotiation of the meaning of power fomis
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part and parcel of what, essentially, is a questioning of the legitimacy of the power that 
money appears to command:
(14) [...] I  make money fa r  too big. I t ’s actually just another ‘thing’ in the 
world. And we have -  what’s happened is it, i t ’s become a mega (..) 
monster. It has much more power in this earth than it has any right to 
have. I t ’s a small factor, a, a small (.) thing by M>hich we em (.) re­
exchange goods and services. And i t ’s become much bigger than the goods 
and services. [...] And so i t ’s become a sort o f em huge monster god.
(A n n e , 4 5 )
Here a distinction is made between what, in the participant’s view, money has become 
(i.e. a fonn of power) and what it should be, namely a "small factor”, a tool. The 
question of what money ‘should be’, of course, relates to the broader issue of morality 
and the question of what, exactly, we should consider as being of ‘value’. This topic 
will be discussed in detail tlnoughout Section 2.3.3. The above quote, however, takes 
us back to our point of depai-ture, where we were concerned with the means-to-an-end 
conception of money. For this respondent, money has turned into a "huge monster god ' 
whose power is not only viewed as illegitimate but whose significance has also gone 
beyond its original meaning and use as a facilitator of exchange, hiterestingly, whilst 
suggesting that money should be a tool, at a different stage of the interview, the same 
participant -  somewhat paradoxically -  appears to reject the understanding of money as 
a means to an end altogether. Consider the following extract where she discusses a 
movie called “Waking Ned” in which one of the protagonists came close to wiiming 
seven million poimds but who, eventually, ended up with a much smaller sum:
(15) [ . . . ]  And there was a great film  called ‘Waldng N ed’ (..) and in that film  at 
the end, the mother o f  the little boy who (.) should have won seven million 
pounds said, something like ‘sure (.) three hundred thousand pounds is 
good enough ’. (.) You hiow, you can live- you Imow, what the hell do you 
need seven million pounds for? I t ’s an fobscenity. It doesn ’t exist. You 
know, i f  you were shovm seven million pounds (.) all it is, is bits o f  dirty 
paper. That’s what it is. I t ’s bits o f  fdirty paper. You hiow (.) it means 
nothin.2 . And even in terms o f what people say it could buy fo r  you (.) i t ’s 
all illusion. [ . . . ]  ( A n n e ,  4 5 )
The "bits o f  dirty paper” refened to here are reminiscent of the traditional Freudian 
ideas regarding money’s symbolism. More importantly, though, in this extract the 
significance of money even at its most basic, functional level as a means for exchange 
(“m terms o f what people say it cotdd buy fo r  you”) is challenged. This ‘anti­
pragmatist’ theme recurs in a number of interviews and also seems related to the denial
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of material reality that was encoimtered in quote (9). Put slightly differently, here the 
veiy notion of money as possessing any meaning at all ((‘I t ’s all illusion. (.) And that’s 
another good word to do Mnth money. (.) I t ’s a huse illusion factoiy. ” A n n e , 4 5 )  is 
refuted.
So if money does not possess any meaning, what doesl This then appears to be om* first 
encounter with an allusion to the possibility -  albeit implicitly -  that ‘meaning’ might 
reside somewhere else. This issue will be explored in gieater detail tliroughout Section
2.3.3 where the relationship between money, identity and values is considered.
Let us now, for a moment, retimi to the participant who was quoted in extract (12) 
and to his description of money as a ‘‘bad power” (see above). It is interesting to note 
that this respondent’s understanding of money as a generally destructive force went 
hand in hand with his concept of it as ‘‘the root o f  all evil” ( "Yeah. Money is the root o f  
all evil. And that is true. ” A n g u s , 5 8 ) .  This particular notion of money is undoubtedly 
a familiar one and frequently constitutes one of the underlying factors of the 
psychometric measures employed to assess attitudes towards money (e.g. the factor 
labelled ‘Evil’ by Tang, 1992; 1993; 1995). However, in this particular interview, one 
feature that seemed of great significance was that the participant did not merely appear 
to express Iris attitude towards money, but clearly attempted to achieve a specific aim 
with his constmction of money as an evil, destructive power. It lies beyond the scope 
of the present analysis to demonstrate, in detail, how he pursued this aim, especially 
since this requires a look at the material through a different analytical lens -  a 
discourse analytic one to be precise. At this juncture, however, a brief detour into 
discursive terrain shall suffice to illustrate a nimiber of points that are relevant for 
placing the current analysis into its broader context.
At the outset o f the interview, even before the rationale underlying the study had 
been intr oduced to him, this respondent stated:
(16) Yeah. I  mean I  have nothing to hide. (.) Err, I ’m not ashamed and I ’m not 
proud o f what I ’ve done in my life. And how I ’ve earned my money. But 
I ’ve done it! I t ’s my life. [...] And as I  said, I ’m not ashamed. I ’m not 
proud. I ’ve had- I ’ve lived my life. I ’m a sixty year old man. (..) I  can’t 
change it. (A n g u s , 5 8 )
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During his twenties, this respondent had spent a number of years in Africa as a member 
of the French Foreign Legion (“/  was a mercenaiy. (.) That’s who I  am. I  vms a 
mercenaiy.”). He spoke with great passion on the topic of money and yet, after his 
above-quoted initial statement, he never again referred to how he had "earned [his] 
money”. As an ex-legionnaire, talking about money would have been profoundly 
dilemmatic for this respondent as ‘being a mercenary’ is generally regarded as 
requiring a willingness -  at least theoretically -  to Idll for money. This, in turn, would 
have had obvious implications for the respondent’s discursive approach to the subject 
under consideration. Consequently, a great deal of effort was spent on discursive 
constructions through which he could be rendered as a loving, sensitive man for whom 
money meant absolutely nothing (see also quotes 35 and 42 below), hr doing so, the 
respondent dissociated himself not only from the ‘evil power’ of money as such but 
also from his own background, hr other words, the corrstructioir of morrey as a 
destructive power, iir this particular coirtext, was aiirred at achievirrg a particular goal; 
rederrrptiorr frorrr the past.
So why are these discursive frrrdirrgs of signifrcarrce for the preserrt arralysis? 
Whilst this resporrderrt’s past experierrces were certairrly out of the ordirrary -  aird, as a 
result, there appeared to be rrrore ‘at stake’ for him, discursively speaking, tharr in other 
participants’ cases -, the irrterwiew with hirrr exerrrplifies two irrrportarrt poirrts which 
also apply to the rernairrirrg irrterviews, albeit perhaps less corrspicuously so. Firstly, the 
expression of a certairr ‘attitude’ towards morrey, or the ascription of a particular 
rrrearrirrg to morrey, fr equerrtly appeared to perform a specific function, that is had a 
discursive purpose, witlrirr a giverr interwiew (or passage of text). This firrdmg raises 
sorrre pertiirerrt questiorrs regardirrg the coircept of ‘rrrorretary attitudes’ as such, 
especially wherr these attitudes are corrceived of hr sorrrewhat static terms. The 
irrrplication is that, whilst sorrre of the rrrorrey mearrings drawn from the curreirt 
interviews seerrrirrgly overlap with the money diirreirsiorrs tapped by established 
psychometric scales (e.g. ‘fi'eedom’, ‘power’), their errrergerrce here should not simply 
be read as a confirmation of certain attitude dirrrerrsions but, irrstead, ought to be 
urrderstood within their particular- (discursive) corrtexts.
Secorrdly, aird as a corollary of the first poirrt, the case of this pardicipairt illustrates that 
the meanings attached to rrroney carr be irrtirnately lirrlced with identity concerns (in this 
case the atterrrpt to re-rregotiate his previous identity so as not to be regarded as
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‘mercenary’) without such an association necessarily becoming obvious in any 
par ticular passage of text, hi other words, an interview may require to be treated as a 
whole (i.e. discursively) to make the relationship between meaning and identity 
evident. We will return to this issue in the discussion. For the time being, however, the 
point to keep in mind is that the subjective meanings of money established here (and 
their relationships to ‘selfliood’) are more complex than originally anticipated and their 
subtlety cannot always be adequately reflected by a thematic analytic approach alone.
At this particular juncture, let us summarise some of the main points that can be 
drawn from the present focus on respondents’ subjective understandings of money. 
One of the interesting findings so far relates to the seeming overlap between the themes 
that emerged in participants’ talk about money in their eveiyday lives and certain 
underlying factors frequently refeired to in psychometric enquiries into money 
meanings. However, at a closer range, this overlap becomes far less evident than, it 
seems to be at first sight. Whilst people may use identical terms to the ones employed 
in descriptions of psychometric scale structure -  such as ‘freedom’ and ‘power’ -  the 
meaning of these teiins in relationsliip to money camiot be taken for granted, hi other 
words, people do not necessarily occupy fixed positions with regard to particular 
meanings but often refer to these in dilemmatic terms. For instance, as we have seen in 
the examples where money is associated with the notion of ‘freedom’, this association 
can be understood in a number of different ways: money can be seen as the provider of 
fr eedom or as its antithesis and sometimes as both at the same time. There were also 
instances -  as illustrated in quote (1 2 ) where the notion of ‘being powerful’ was 
discussed -  in which the actual terms per se (i.e. the ‘meaning of meaning’) were 
contested. Examples like this show that money meanings such as ‘power’ and 
‘freedom’ are not as unambiguous as their psychometric usage might imply; they are 
often contested and re-negotiated and, as exemplified by one respondent’s case 
(A n g u s ) ,  their ailiculation in talk can also serve the puipose of allowing the speaker to 
position him/herself with reference to these meanings, hi other words, the expression 
of money meanings does not tend to occur in a vacuum but is related to issues of 
selfliood. It is this relationship between money and identity that formed the second 
major analytic category and which provides the focal point of the subsequent sections.
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In summary, the subjective meanings of money are dilemmatic, both between and 
within individual cases. This is not only reflected in the ways in which participants use 
concrete terms such as ‘power’ or ‘freedom’, but also links to a broader set of issues 
that are implicitly contradictory. These ‘second order’ dilemmas concern, for instance, 
the association of money with ‘freedom’ on the one hand and a fear of its seductive 
powers on the other hand, as well as the juxtaposition of its ‘materiality’ with the 
individual’s search for the ‘spiritual’.
2.3.2 The Relationship between Money and Identity
[...] I  think em (.) my sense o f myself does link (.) or my understanding o f  
what money means does link directly into (.) my own self-value and sense 
o f (.) my place in the world. (A n n e , 45)
As already indicated, one of the most striking features of the interviews was the 
richness of ‘identity talk’ they contained. As a matter of fact (due to the constraints 
imposed by the primary purpose of this study), the analytic findings reported below 
only reflect a fraction of this wealth and of the subtlety with which money issues were 
linked to subjective notions of selfhood. However, the following extracts should 
provide both ample material in response to the initial research questions and in support 
of the claim that talking about money and talking about identity are intimately related 
and, at times, virtually indistinguishable.
Identity issues were not only found to be central to subjective understandings of 
money but were also clearly associated with participants’ broader values, as already 
indicated above. Moreover, as a corollary of their connection with values, money 
matters proved to be profoundly dilemmatic for respondents’ understanding of their 
identity. Finally, the revealed link between money and subjective notions of selfhood 
existed along various identity dimensions as well as at different levels o f  abstraction of 
identity.
The dimensions of identity relevant to money included the ‘self, the ‘other’ and also 
the general realm of social relations. In other words, money matters were not only 
related to participants’ definitions of their own selves, but also to how they constructed 
other people’s identities and social relationships on the whole. In addition, in line with 
se lf categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987), money was associated with various 
levels of identity, namely the personal (sub-ordinate), social (intermediate) and human
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(super-ordinate) levels of abstraction. This analytic distinction between identity 
dimensions and levels of abstiaction constitute two of the organising principles around 
which tlie results presented in some of the following sections are ananged. However, 
first of all, let us take a general look at the centiality of identity for respondents’ 
subjective understandings of money.
2.3.2.1 The Centrality of Money for Identity
As already indicated, notions of identity were found to be intrinsically linlced with 
the subjective meanings ascribed to money (and vice versa). Money related to various 
dimensions of identity: it was fundamental not only in temis of the ways in which 
respondents defined themselves, but also with regard to how they viewed others and 
social relations in general. In this section, each of these identity dimensions -  ‘self, 
‘other’ and social relations -  will be dealt with respectively.
D e f i n i n g  T h e  ‘S e l f ’ ' '
Associations between money and identity were often established at quite a 
profound level, where monetary concerns directly related to self-definition -  in other 
words, to the question of ‘who am F. Consider, for instance, the following exchange 
with a respondent who, earlier in the interview, had claimed that he had never learnt 
the “vcz/ne o f moiieÿ^ and therefore felt at a disadvantage in the world, which -  as he 
seemed to imply -  demanded of him a certain degiee of ruthlessness to be able to 
survive. The material circumstances of this participant were quite noticeably 
impoverished, which was one of the reasons why the inteiwiewer sought to flirther 
pursue his previous statement regarding his perceived failure to adopt a particular 
approach towards money:
(17) intemeweiv So do yoli wish sometimes that you, you had ( )  learnt, or you had 
had maybe a little bit o f  a different attitude, so you could [...] //...
Respondent: No, Jiot really. No. Becaiise I  wouldn V be -  I f  I  had, I  wouldn’t be 
the person I  am now. And H ike (.) not being bigheaded, but H ike me. [...]
(A n g u s , 5 8 )
Declarations such as this were remarkable in tenns of the clarity with which they 
exposed the extent to which money and selfliood can be related on an experiential 
level. Here, the respondent’s monetaiy attitudes foim an integial part of his self- 
definition. In other words, the person he perceives himself as is determined by his
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approach to money; for him, adopting a different attitude towards money would imply 
becoming a different ‘me’.
Whilst the above case presents an example of an explicit and, to a certain extent, 
absolute link between money and the person’s sense of self, in other instances this 
relationship was found to be somewhat subtler. Other participants were also concerned 
with the question of “who am I”, however their attempts at self-definition tended to 
occur in more relative tenns. In these cases, the relationship between money matters 
and descriptions of selfliood was fr equently approached fr om different perspectives on 
the ‘self.
One such perspective that was of relevance with regard to the general association 
between money and selfliood refened to the person’s understanding of him/herself in 
her/his own eyes. For example, consider the response of the following participant who, 
when asked whether she played the lottery, declared:
(18) No f l  don’t. [...] I  don’t Imow how people woidd decide where I  come 
from, but (. ) I  ju st assume these people that, that win these millions o f 
pounds- (..) Well obviously I  don’t do the lottery because I  don’t want to be 
one o f those people. [ . . . ]  ( M a r g a r e t ,  5 4 )
As with some of the earlier examples relating to different money meanings, financial 
practices constituted an indispensable aspect of the money-identity link, hi this 
instance, subjective self-understanding not only revolved around a particular kind of 
money usage (i.e. playing the lottery) but it also occuned relative to those who might 
engage in a specific practice (“/  don’t want to be one o f those people’^ ). Here, the issue 
of self-definition is expanded upon to address the question of who one does or does not 
want to be, fr om the vantage point of one’s own self.
hi addition, from the perspective of a person’s own self, the manner in which 
monetary issues were brought to bear on questions of identity often touched upon 
themes of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’, hi the following extract, for instance, modesty in 
financial matters was linked to a sense of ‘goodness’:
(19) [...] And I  don’t know, there’s- I t ’s funny, perhaps (.) in fsome w>ays I  
think that this, the idea o f always having had a, a modest (.) degree o f  want 
fo r  money. I ’ve fnot ever (.) had-1 mean at this stage in my life I  actually 
probably want more money that I  ever have done before. But in the past I  
never particularly wanted to have more than what I ’ve fneeded. (.) And 
something about that has made me feel fgood about myself, i t ’s kind o f  
made me feel that I ’m fnot sreedv and (..) that i t ’s a responsible way to be
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in terms o f the world and what there is to go round and (.) fthese sorts o f
things. [...] (W il l i a m , 47)
Again, the person’s ‘attitude’ towards money, Iris ""modest degree o f want fo r  moneÿ' 
directly corresponded to his own self-perception (^Hhat has made me feel good about 
myself i t ’s land o f made me feel that I ’m not greedÿ'). There are two observations 
worth mentioning here which also foreshadow some of the arguments that will be 
presented fmther on. The first refers to the passage’s allusion to the importance of 
values. The relationship between money and self-perception here does not solely relate 
to the ‘self on an idiosyncratic, personal level but also alludes to a wider notion of 
human identity, to being a certain kind of person. Consider, for instance, Taylor’s 
(1985) claim that our power to evaluate oiu own desires -  that is, to view some of them 
as desirable and others as undesirable -  is what nialces us distinctively human. On the 
basis of Frankfiirf s (1971) distinction between first and second-order desires^, Taylor 
refers to this capacity as ‘strong evaluation’ which, in turn, “is not just a condition of 
articulacy about preferences, but also about the qual ity of life, the kind o f beings we are 
or want to be” (Taylor, 1985, p. 26, emphases added). For Taylor, strong evaluations 
are a basic ingi*edient of human agency on account of their inextricable ties to the 
notion of ‘self, hi the present context therefore, the respondent’s reference to his 
""modest degree o f want fo r  money” can be read as a sign, albeit hesitant, of strong 
evaluation. It is not simply shorthand for a ‘negative attitude’ or low valuation of 
money per se; instead, modesty here stands for a desire to not want more money than is 
needed. ‘Goodness’, and thus what it means to be a certain kind of agent, is bom out of 
being ""responsible” and ""not greedy”. The notion of ‘goodness’ implied here clearly 
reveals what is important to the respondent (i.e. not being greedy) and thus provides 
another glimpse of values as fimdamental constituents of the money-identity linlc. 
Wliilst this key finding will be finther illustrated and discussed in Section 2.3.3, it is 
undoubtedly of relevance for many of the quotes presented tliroughout this analysis.
The second noteworthy point regarding the above-cited passage lies in the respondent’s 
acknowledgement -  albeit tangential in this context -  of having imdergone a change 
with regard to his outlook on money (“/  mean at this stage in my life I  actually
 ^ Frankfort (1971) defines a second-order desire as a desire whose object is to have, or not to have, a 
specific desire of the first order. According to Frankflut, tliis capacity for second-order desires, drat is 
the faculty for reflective self-evaluation, is an essential quality for the characterisation of a person.
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probably want more money that I  ever have done before”), which indicates that people 
themselves do not consider their attitudes towards money as static but recognise them 
as variable. Wliilst, in this case, an explicit reference to this variability is made, in other 
instances intra-personal variability in attitudes remains implicit, although it could 
eventually be exposed by a more discourse analytic focus on respondent’s talk. For 
now, however, let us return to the relationship between money and the question of self­
definition.
Wliereas the link between money and self was found to revolve around an implicit 
theme of ‘goodness’ in quote (19), in other cases, the notion of ‘badness’ came to the 
fore. Consider, for instance, the following extract:
(20) [...] And I, I  think about it [money], (,) a flot, and I  worry that I  think 
about it a lot. I  think about it (.). I  think, you hiow, am I- (..) I  think o f  
"material ’ as a bad word almost. And yet I  tty and tell myself ""don’t be 
ridicidous”, it can’t be a bad woi'd iti a \vorld which frequires it, a wotid 
which has set itself up m such a way that you ideally (.) can’t do without it.
I f  you had fno money at all, you ’d be dead pretty fast. So everybody has to 
get fsome, even i f  i t ’s only a few  pounds a day to get a cup o f  tea and some 
food. So 0  yeah, I  worty that I ’m somehow a hotaible materialistic land o f  
person, to think about it all the time. ( . )  ( S a r a ,  2 8 )
And a little bit further on in the inteiwiew she adds:
(21) [...] I  mean I  fcertainly don’t need the seven pairs o f  fspectacles that I  
own. But (.) fthat was a conscious decision that I  made, you hiow, "I want 
them ’. (.) And I ’m not a bad fperson fo r wanting more than one pair. I  do 
wear them every day ( ) [ . . . ]  ( S a r a ,  2 8 )
Once more, an intrinsic comiection is made between money and the ‘material world’. 
Yet, whilst some respondents reject the material sphere as merely ‘illusory’, m this 
particular case the facticity of its existence is aclaiowledged, alongside the inevitability 
o f money in such a world {""if you had no money at all, y o u ’d be dead pretty fast”). In 
other words, the power of money in the material realm is fully endorsed. However, the 
above quotes also reveal the respondent’s profoimd sense o f ambivalence (“/  think o f  
"material’ as a bad M^ ord almost”) as regards the effect of financial issues on her own 
se lf  understanding (“/  worry that I ’m somehow a horrible materialistic kind o f  
person”, ""I’m not a bad person”). Again, it seems that the tlu*eat of seduction -  in this 
case the fear of being seduced by money’s power into becoming a bad person -  is 
there, just below the surface, hi extract (2 1 ), however, there is a resolution to this
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potential tlireat by claiming the power of money for oneself in making ""a conscious 
decision” about its usage and one’s wants. Thus the tlueat of seduction abates because 
it caimot exist where conscious choices are being made. This is a first indication that 
subjective imderstandings o f monetary meanings are not alone in being constmcted as 
dilemmatic; their relationship to issues around identity can be perceived as dilemmatic, 
too. This idea will be resumed in Section 2.3.4.
A second facet of self-definition that played a role in the overall relationship 
between money and selfliood refened to the question o f how a person believed 
her/himself to be viewed from the vantage point of others. Yet again, financial 
practices were crucial with regard to looking at one’s own identity through the eyes of 
another. Consider, for example, the following passage where a participant was talking 
about his past money management practices:
(22) fEvervthins would be kept track of, yeah. Income and outgoings. And it 
would all be (.) fwritten , down and I  would he, I  would have been veiy (.) 
finicky about it. (..) [...] It was also qidte important fo r  me to meant to be 
(...) em (..) to look like I  was doing well. [...] So (.) even within my (.) 
twork situation, colleagues'I used to work with, where we knew we were 
virtually all on the same wase, it always looked like I  wa.s' better to ff  than 
them. I  actually owned more expensive properties and (.) I, it looked like I  
didn’t strussle financially like they did. And part o f that sort o f  this 
control I  had a bit. And I  was very? careful with it and (.) You Icnow, I, I  
haven’t used the word ‘mean’ vet (.) But I  fw asn’t really mean with it, I  
was just very 'Icarefid, right. [ . . . ]  ( G e o r g e ,  4 7 )
Here, the respondent openly acknowledged the imporfance he used to attach to being 
regar ded as somebody who was ""doing well”. The management of his financial affairs 
— the ‘camfiiT handling o f money and ""being veryfinicl<y about it” — therefore formed 
part and parcel of his effort to appear* ""better o ff then them”. This example not only 
demonstrates how money matters are often inter*woven with people’s specific attempts 
to define Irim/herself vis-à-vis others, but also alerts us to the relevance of a 
comparative context for self-definition in general.
The question of what kind of person one is perceived to be not only constituted a 
theme in par*ticipants’ talk about money as such but was also raised during the actual 
interviewing process. For instance, consider the comment below which was made by a 
participant during the debriefing phase (the tape recorder was still running). At the 
begimriirg of the inter*view, the respondent had been asked what she would do if  she
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were given a million pounds, to which she had offered only a reluctant and somewhat 
evasive reply, hiterestingly, at the debriefing stage, whilst reflecting on the interview 
process as a whole, the usefulness of this par ticular question (("what would you do i f  
you were given a million pounds?”) was discussed and the interviewee suddenly 
remarked:
(23) I  mean I, I, my thoughts were that I  would have a breakdown. I  think I  
would 0  pass out in shock. (.) But I  wouldn’t- I  didn’t feel I  wanted to 
fsay that to you. I  thought [...] yo u ’d probably think I  was floopy. 
Because / /  because [...] because everybody out, out there in the world, 
would think you were loopy. Because eveiybody out there in the world, 
wants a million pounds. Or at least the people f l  laiow. [...]
(M a r g a r e t , 5 4 )
This passage is intriguing for two reasorrs. Firstly, the relevant ‘other’ in relatiorr to 
whom the question of “who am I” is defined was, in this case, the interviewer. The 
participant modified her initial response and indicated that her previous reluctance to 
answer the question openly was (fue to not wanting to seem abnormal or “loopy” in the 
interviewer’s eyes. Secondly, this afterthought provides an illustration not only of the 
normative constraints that may operate within an interview situation as such, but also 
of the perceived norms aroruid money and its acquisition. The participant’s initial 
hesitation in responding to the question seemed, in part, due to what she felt was an 
expression of a universal norm, namely that ""eveiybody [including the interviewer] out 
there in the world, wants a million pounds”, hr other words, money is viewed as an 
indisputable good and therefore its acquisition should, by definition, be desirable. This 
issue will be taken up again in Section 2.3.3.1. hr this particular case, however, tire 
respondent neither seerrred to warrt to starrd out by openly opposing the iroim geirerally 
perceived to exist, rror did she feel able to eirrbrace it -  herrce her post-hoc reflectiorrs 
oir the initial interview questioir.
D e f i n i n g  T h e  ‘O t h e r ’
Besides the ‘self, a fiirther dimerrsioir of ideirtity that was found to be central to 
participairf s imderstarrdiirgs of nroirey related to their subjective defiiritiorrs of others. 
For irrstance, consider the case of the followirrg participant who, at the tirrre of the 
interview, was officially imemployed aird lived on fifty pounds per week. She set out to 
state that the fiirancial circrmrstarrces of her fiierrds aird acquaintances tended to 
resemble her own, but suddeirly realised that there appeared to be one exceptiorr:
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(24) [...] I  mean, like I  mix, I  ‘spose I  mix with people- I  mean Carl [friend] 
earns seventeen grand a year I But because he’s only just started earning 
that money, he hasn’t got the mentality o f  someone that I  imagine ()  
fmight have the mentality^, i f  they were earning seventeen grand a year, i f  
you see what I  mean. [ . . . ]  ( K a r e n ,  3 3 )
The suggestion here is that earning a certam amount of money per year goes hand in 
hand with the development of a specific Idnd of ""mentality”, that is, with becoming a 
certain kind of person. Regardless of whether this type of mentality is meant to possess 
positive or negative connotations, such a belief has obvious implications for the 
perception of other people’s identities, hr the case of this particular respoirdent, the 
supposed consequerrces of eaririirg a giveir nroirey amouirt were viewed iregatively aird 
thus, at a later stage of the iirterview, she openly corrceded to her stereotyped views 
conceririirg ""people with lots o f money” (see quote below). However, at this specific 
juircture, the reference to a close frieird with an iircoirre of ""seventeen grand a year” 
produced a certain degree of ambivalence for the respoirdent; how could she reconcile 
the existence of such a ffieird with her stereotyped ideas about others? A provisional 
resolution was achieved by the justificatiorr that ""he’s only just started earning that 
money” and, via the insiiruation of a time lag regardiirg the developmeirt of the 
“nreirtality” of the wealthy, it is suggested that her friend has irot yet becoirre ‘one of 
tlreirr’. As already irrdicated, tlris justification seemed irecessary here oir account of the 
specific type of relationship the responderrt perceived to exist between nroirey matters 
and other people’s iderrtities. So how, exactly, did she construct this relationship? 
Consider, first of all, the followhrg general staterrrent:
(25) Hm. I  fdo, I  do definitely judge people i f  I  think they’ve got money I
(K a r e n , 3 3 )
Aird when asked to elaborate on this statement, the respoirdent replied:
(26) fBecause I  think it [money] can sort of- I  think it- (sighs) Q  Possibly (.) 
again- because I  don’t really like judging, but it can stop you maybe 
appreciating small things and can- (.) But then you land o f get mixed up 
between money and class as well and- [...] And there’s always people- I  
think you can always tar people (.) to some degree. For me I  tar some 
people with the same brush to some degree. But I ’m aÏM>ays hopeful that 
there are going to be lots o f  people that break the rule as well. So (.) let me 
think about (.) people with lots o f  money- (..) Oh, I  just think of- I  dunno, 
people with lots o f  money and having private jets or private boats that go 
really fast and (.) pollute eveiything and- You Imow, there’s just, I  can 
have that really stereotyped idea o f people being very-1 think I ’ve got a bit 
o f a thing about waste actually. So, I  imagine people with lots o f money to
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be more wasteful ‘cos they can just get out and buy another one tomorrow. 
Whereas I ’m really into recycling and re-using things and maldng them 
last forever i f  I  can. (K a r e n , 3 3 )
Here, money is related to a diminished appreciation of the ""small things” in life. This 
lack of appreciation is thought to engender a generally ""wasteful” attitude which, in 
turn, is regarded as typical for ""people with lots o f money”. Note also how this 
stereotyped view of ‘the wealthy’, their perceived wastefulness, is expressed in 
juxtaposition to the respondent’s definition of her own ‘self (("whereas I ’m really into 
recycling and re-using things and maldng them last forever”). This comparison does 
not simply allude to an alternative lifestyle (which, in turn, implies a different type of 
identity), but it also carries moral connotations, as being less wasteful and ""making 
things last forever” is obviously regarded as the more ethical stance to talce towards 
one’s resoiu'ces.
Furtheiiiiore, the above quote contains an interesting reference, albeit fleeting, to social 
class and its association with money. Again, for this particular respondent, ‘class’ 
implies a certain type of ‘mentality’ (i.e. certain type of person) which, in turn, is 
determined by money-related matters:
(27) [...] I  ‘spose I  feel that I ’m a, sort o f from a sort o f middle class 
background. (.) I ’m definitely not worldng class. I  could never describe 
myself as worldng class ‘cos I  ju st haven’t come- Even though I ’m not (.) 
earning any money, fo r  me working class is a whole sort o f fmentality 
really as well. Coming from people who are worldng, but on the low, 
perhaps a low wage or something. And I ’m not from -you hiow, my parents 
were teachers and quite well off. [...] (K a r e n , 3 3 )
Whilst the conceptualisation of the linlc between money and other people’s 
identities conveyed in the above examples was, at least to some extent, aclaiowledged 
to rely on certain stereotypes and was therefore regarded as somewhat relative (e.g. 
""but I ’m always hopeful that there are going to be lots o f  people that break the rule as 
M>elV\ quote 26), there were also instances in which this linlc seemed to be considered 
as absolute. For example, even before an overall introduction to the study had taken 
place, the following respondent spontaneously stated:
(28) Actually I ’ve always found that in this, in the European countries (.) people 
don’t care enough. About anything. [...] They are, I  think (.) the white 
European is a veiy cold, negative person. [...] They have very little- (.) 
they- (.) this is why I ’m interested as well, because they seem to place 
money more important than human feelings, the care, the love, the touch.
[ . . . ]  ( A n g u s ,  5 8 )
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Here, it is not just a specific type of ‘other’ (such as the ""people with lots o f  money” 
referred to earlier), but an entire, super-national category, the ""white European”, that is 
portrayed on the basis of supposed attitudes towards money ("they seem to place 
money more important than human feelings”). And, again, the ostensible attributes of 
this particular category of ‘others’ are viewed in negative terms (“verp cold, negative”) 
-  its members as seen as somewhat inliuman -  which, of course, presents somewhat of 
a paradox given that the participant himself is one of its number. However, again this 
apparent inconsistency becomes more comprehensible when the above remark is 
considered within its broader context and consequently fi*om a more discoinse analytic 
angle. We have already encountered this particular respondent, notably in quotes (12) 
and (16) where the subjective meanings he attributed to money were elucidated in 
terms of his past as a Foreign Legionnaire in Africa. Here a similar point to the one 
raised in connection with these earlier quotes seems to apply: his attempt to 
discursively distance himself from the ""white European” category -  by using the 
pronoun ‘they’ rather than ‘we’ -  appears to be a reflection of his general endeavour to 
distance himselffrom himself (i.e. his past). '
hi other words, whilst the participant’s negative construction of a category of ‘others’ 
seems rather contradictory when viewed in isolation and seeing that he himself is a 
member of that category, when regarded as a discursive act, it appears to be consistent 
with the overall project of disassociating himself fr om his past.
The above examples not only demonstrate the ways in which money matters were 
linlced with respondents’ perceptions of other people’s identities, but also provide 
another indication of the extent to which the money-identity linlc hinges on a person’s 
values. For instance, the respondent’s conception of wealthy people as “wasteful” and 
her own positioning in relation to this particular understanding ("whereas I ’m really 
into recycling and re-using things”) as obseiwed in quote (26), is also suggestive of 
what she regards as important in her life. Likewise, some of the notions expressed in 
quote (28) (e.g. ""they seem to place money more important than human feelings, the 
care, the love, the touch”) point towards this participant’s values, namely the 
importance of social relations or relationships. The question of values will be dealt 
with in detail shortly. However, before doing so, the following section will briefly
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discuss social relations as one of several identity dimensions to which money matters 
were found to be gennane.
D e f i n i n g  S o c i a l  R e l a t i o n s
As already indicated, money issues were not only central to identity in temis of 
participants’ definitions of their own selves and the attribution of specific 
characteristics to other people, but also in terms of a broader understanding of social 
relations. For instance, consider the following comment, which was made at the outset 
of one interview in response to a general opening question asking whether anything 
money-related had stiaick the participant as significant during the previous week, hi 
reply to this question, the participant recounted an incident involving one of her male 
friends who had recently met a woman he liked. This friend had presented the daughter 
of his new acquaintance with a twenty-pound note for her birthday, a gesture that the 
interviewee did not appear to approve of:
(29) [ .  :.] And he gave her twenty pounds, you Iq i o w ! And I  thought to myself, 
“well, my God! ”, you hiow. I  mean (.) I  would give iny daughter twenty 
pounds fo r  her birthday, you Imow. Erm but I  woiddn't give sort o f  almost 
a total stranser’s daughter a twenty pound — I  don’t hiow, I  just sort, you 
hiow what I  mean?! That to me err is a reflection o f my, o f  (laughs) of, not 
mean or anything like that, but I  just sort o f  think that’s, it wasn’t a waste 
o f money but i t ’s ju st sort o f an fabuse o f money, in a sense. I  don’t Imow.
(B e v e r l y , 5 3 )
And a little bit fiuther on she added:
(30) [...] As a- almost a total stranger giving her twenty pounds. What, what 
woj: that? I  mean I  read into it all “what were you trying to get fo r  that 
twenty pounds ”, you Imow. (B e v e r l y ,  5 3 )
These examples imply that there are tacit rules which govern the use of money in
specific social settings or relationships, hi particular, the ways in which money is used
within a given set of social relations is ti eated as a reflection of the type of relationship
that exists between two people, just as the relationship as such deteiiiiines the monetary
behaviours considered to be appropriate (see also '‘"And if, i f  a guy insists on paying fo r
me, i f  i t ’s the right land o f  relationship, I  think 'oh, isn’t that nice! (.) he paid fo r  m e’.”,
B e v e r l y , 53). This echoes the findings that have been reported in the economic
psychological literature on the use of money as a gift (e.g. Burgoyne & Routh, 1991;
Webley, Lea & Portalska, 1983; Webley & Wilson 1989). Any seeming deviation from
these implicit behavioural iiomis, as in the case of the participant’s friend, presents a
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challenge since the relationship as such becomes open to a whole new range of 
inteipretations. hi this specific instance, presenting money as a gift was regarded as a 
measure of the degree of intimacy between giver and receiver (“/  would give my 
daughter twenty pounds fo r her birthday, you h m w ”, “but I  wouldn't give sort o f  
almost a total stranger’s daughter a twenty pound [note]”); therefore, the friend’s 
gesture was not only deemed an ""abuse o f  money” but also laid his relationship with 
the new acquaintance and her daughter open to the interpretation of liis intentions as 
dubious ("what were you trying to get fo r  that twenty> pounds”). Note, again, the 
parallels between this and the ‘seduction’ issue refened to earlier in oiu discussion of 
the subjective meanings of money. The implication here is that, in the context of 
certain social relations, money can potentially seduce a person into a type of 
relationsliip s/he does not necessarily wish for, just as it may indicate an attempt at 
seduction on the part o f another.
Wliilst the above examples illustrate 'fife association between money (and its usage) 
and relationships on a more personal level, a similai' comiection was also found with 
reference to more global conceptions of social relations.
(31) [...] I t ’s all part o f  the, the spread, the, the [...] fragmentation o f  
community. [...] Because (.) you Imow, like people wanting, people 
wanting tmoney, people wanting more money 'cos they don’t earn- And 
the whole multinational scale o f  things, you Imow. You don’t do that in a 
little village, you go to some city and you work in the city and then you 
want more money, so then you move from your village, you move to the city 
and erm (..) get a better job and- So it means that people then commute 
every day and don’t talk to their f  neighbours. [...] (K a r e n , 3 3 )
Here, money is seen to affect social relations not only as far as close personal 
relationships are concerned, but also on a wider societal scale (e.g. ""community^, ""your 
village”, ""the cit}>”). hi particular, money-related matters are regaided to constitute a 
factor in the decline of certain ‘localised’ forms of relating ("don’t talk to their 
neighbours”) and, as such, to contribute to a wealcening of social bonds in general (i.e. 
""the fragmentation o f community”). This latter notion of money undemiining social 
relations anticipates some of the issues raised in Section 2.3.4 where it will be argued 
that the nature of the association between money and identity can be described as 
profoundly dilenunatic. At this point, suffice it to note that money and its usage are not 
only related to different types of personal relationship -  which, in turn, either sanction 
or veto certain financial practices -  but aie also implicated in subjective understandings
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of the wider web of social relations in which both individuals and their monetary 
exchanges are embedded.
Before proceeding to consider the next analytic category, an interim summary of 
the findings thus far appears to be in order. Om* second overall research objective 
concerned the question of whether the meaning a person ascribes to money is linlced to 
subjective notions of his/her identity or ‘selfliood’. Therefore, in this section various 
interview passages were considered which illustrated how cmcial identity concerns are 
to people’s imderstanding of money (and vice versa). Identity was not only found to be 
central to the meanings attached to money, but the relationship between identity and 
money also existed across various dimensions of identity. Money was intiinsically 
linlced with matters of self-definition -  with the question of “who am I” -  which, in 
turn, refened to respondents’ perception of themselves as well as to how they believed 
themselves to be viewed by others, hi addition, money issues appeai*ed to play an 
important role in temis of how participants defined other people and with regard to 
their understanding of relationships. Both of these dimensions form crucial aspects of 
identity, as definitions of ‘selfliood’ arise relative to the ‘other’ and in accordance with 
the context of social relations in which a person is positioned.
So why does identity seem so central to our understanding of money? One answer 
to this question may be found in the following section where the role of values in the 
relationship between money and identity is considered. We have already encountered 
instances where talking about the nieaniiig(s) of money touched upon fundamental 
questions concerning morality and human values (e.g. ‘being good’). Talking about 
money, in other words, appears to be linked with talking about what is (and what is 
not) of value for us and, as Taylor (1985) has pointed out, our values, in turn, 
detemime who we are as people -  hence their significance for subjective notions of 
identity. Let us look at some of these values in greater detail now.
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2.3.3 The Role of Values in the Money-ident ity Link
[...] I  could (.) I  could go down to the beach and I  mean, this may sound, I  
kind o f sometimes think people probably think I ’m just like a complete 
crappy fool but (.) I  could go down to the beach and find a stone (.) which 
would be worth a thousand pounds to me. Maybe that’s -  in fact, it 
wouldn’t be worth a thousand pounds, because it would be worth -  But I  
would find  something, I  could see it, I  mean I could stand and look at a 
fsunset (..) em. And i t ’s interesting because I  remember sort o f  em (..) my 
sense o f myself em (..) you know, in terms ofpeople say how much they are 
fworth. Well, you know. I ’m worth (.) millions (.) millions and millions and 
millions. [ . . . ]  ( A n n e ,  45)
The third overall category established in the course of the analytic process 
encompassed interview excerpts that illustrated the observed inter-relationship between 
money (meanings), identity and values. As already noted, besides the wealth of 
‘identity talk’ contained within participants’ general discourses on the role of money in 
their lives, another striking finding concerned the extent to which talking about money 
matters was interlaced with critical reflections on the issue of what people considered 
to be of ‘value’ to them. In fact, the attempt to analytically distinguish between 
discussions of money as such and expressions of values seemed somewhat artificial. 
Also, no clear analytic distinction was drawn between ‘identity’ on the one hand and 
‘values’ on the other hand. As pointed out above, our values determine who we are as 
people; yet who we are as people also determines what we value. As Taylor (1985) has 
put it, “the notion of identity refers us to certain evaluations which are essential 
because they are the indispensable horizon or foundation out of which we reflect and 
evaluate as persons [...] a self decides and acts out of certain fundamental evaluations” 
(p. 35). Here, the notions of ‘identity’ and ‘value’ were therefore regarded as 
inextricably intertwined.
Throughout the interviewing process, questions were raised by many respondents 
with reference to broader conceptions of economic rationality and specifically with 
regard to the idea of ‘making money’. This type of questioning eventually led to the 
contestation of money as a value per se. We will look at each of these issues in turn 
throughout the subsequent sections.
Before doing so, however, the case of one participant -  an exception to the rule, as 
it were -  deserves attention here. At the outset of the interview, when asked what
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money represented for him in the context of his everyday life, this participant 
immediately refeiTed to the notion of Tack’ and the financial practices he associated 
with that lack ("fMoney. Um (.) flack o f obviously! (laughs) Erm but (.) I  fd o n ’t 
really (.) on a daily basis wo/7 7  cibout it. Um I  fdon’t normally overspend.” N e il ,  33). 
For this respondent, ‘money’ appeared to be synonymous with ‘work’ and hence much 
of his talk revolved around work-related issues. Towards the end of the inteiwiew this 
participant declared that he had learnt the value of money early in life ("So from, from  
a fvery early age, we earn- learnt, learnt how to earn money and the value o f  money.” 
N e il , 33).  When encomaged to expand on what he meant by the ""value o f money”, the 
respondent — visibly bewildered by such a seemingly ‘silly’ request -  stated:
(32) fErm (..) it, i t ’s just (laughs) the value o f  money, isn’t it! I t ’s, i t ’s the value 
o f money. Value- money isn’t, isn ’t (.) a fendless supply. That yo u ’ve only 
got- (.) The money yo u ’ve, yo u ’ve got in your pocket is the money- is what 
yo u ’ve got. [...] (N eil , 33)
Again, money is associated with the idea of ‘lack’. Its value is simply seen to lie in its 
scarcity and is therefore an unquestioned, taken-for-granted ‘economic’ fact. This, of 
course, resembles the economic tenet of the scarcity of resources. The most striking 
feature concerning this interview was the comparative absence of ‘identity talk’, where 
identity issues were only ever touched upon peripherally. On one of these rare 
occasions, when the respondent refened to the impact of a hypothetical lottery win on 
inter-personal relationships and was prompted to elaborate on why he believed tlris to 
be the case, he simply explained this by saying: ""It’s human fnatureU  This is 
intiiguing in so far* as it raises the question of whether the adoption of an economic 
definition of value might, in this case, have precluded the possibility of reflecting on 
personal values and, therefore, have remained detached from issues of identity (i.e. 
issues about what kind of person one wants to be). This, in turn, may have been due to 
taking for granted a particular (economic) notion of what it is to be a human agent -  
hence the reference to ‘himian nature’.
For the majority of participants, however, the value of money was not simply ‘the 
value of money’. The conception of money as a measiue of value -  in other words, the
In fact, tliis intei-view was distinguishable from the others by the respondent’s use of economic terms, 
such as ‘optimising’ for instance, when referring to certain financial practices. In general, he seemed to 
adopt an ‘economic discourse’ when talking about financial issues,
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notion of money as a ‘good’ -  was frequently contested and it is to those accounts that 
we will turn next.
2.3.3.1 Contesting Economic Rationality; ‘Making Money’ or Money as a 
Measure of ‘Value’
For most respondents, talking about money brought up the topic of work^ and, as a 
result, issues concerning the necessity of ‘making money’. Consider, for instance, the 
following example:
(33) [...] I  can’t imagine how someone would want to w^ ork, even five days a 
week fid l time ()  ju st to get tmoney. (.) I  just don’t- I ’d rather work (.) i f  I  
coidd- Well, I ’m sure everybody would rather work three days a week. [...]
I  think erm (.) fa r  too many people get ill because o f stress and because o f  
feeling like they should work this much. Because that’s what society says. 
There’s so much about what society says is the norm. And having two point 
five Idds and worldng nine to five  and, you hiow. I  can’t bear the thought 
o f that really. Makes me feel tsick. ( K a r e n ,  33)
For this respondent, ‘making money’ is part of ""what society says is the norm” or,, in 
other words, one of the corollaries of endorsing a conventional (perhaps economic or 
‘rational’) approach towards life. Adlrerence to such a norm is regarded as conformist 
and, therefore, as undermining personal agency. As a result, the notion of ‘making 
money’ as an end in itself is called into question. Another participant who had been 
running a successful engineering business for a nimrber of years but who was later- 
forced to declare banla uptcy, conveyed a somewhat similar point of view:
(34) [ . . . ]  And I  lost money because o f  people going banlmupt, you see. And I  
began to realise that, you hiow, you worried about money. I  worried that I  
wasn’t going to get this job. I  worried “how am I  going to pay the bills? ”
But I, I  fthen began to realise “hey, look (.) why work thirteen hours a 
day, why (.) woriy about” erm, you hiow, “paying this bill and that bill?” 
When in freality, (.) i f  we cut our cloth accordingly, as it were, and we 
lived the life (.) a flittle bit more frugally in a sense- And you hiow (.) you, 
y-. I ’m happier now [ . . . ]  fnot earning so much. (.) [ . . . ]  ( B r ia n ,  57)
Whilst no over-t reference to received societal norms was made here, this passage 
nevertheless conveys the respondent’s growing reser-vations about endorsing a more 
conventional approach towards work and ‘making money’ ("why work thirteen hours a
 ^Note tliat die manner in which the respondent quoted in extract (32) talked about work-related matters 
also seemed notably different from the participants cited below. For instance, he did not critically 
examine the necessity of work.
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day”) where the preservation (or even increase) of one’s earnings is regarded as the 
goal and thus as being o f value in itself. The sudden realisation of the existence of an 
alternative approach ("when in reality, i f  we cut our cloth accordingly”) along with its 
pursuit provide a first glimpse of the participant’s underlying values as he states to be 
""happier now not earning so much”.
We shall return to the theme of ‘happiness’ in a moment. For the time being, however, 
let us pursue the different ways in which participants openly contested what they 
perceived as the standard imposed by conventional economic ideas. Consider for 
example the following passages:
(35) [...] Money has never brought me anything. Not personally. I t ’s never ever 
brought me anything wortlm>hile. ( A n g u s ,  58)
(36) [...] Money doesn ’t ever come up with the goods. Em (.) people (.) yeah, 
money doesn’t make people happy. And it never, ever will. (..) And it
: doesn’t make them fsecure. (.) I  mean there, there’s some o f the richest 
people in the fworld (.) are still out there, day in, day out, making money 
C) 'fW]hl7 ' . ■ ' ( A n n e ,  45)
One of the traditional economic definitions of nioney refers to its function as a store of 
value. However, here the conception of money as a ineasme of value or, in other 
words, as an unquestionable ‘good’ is openly refuted. Many respondents regarded 
money not only as devoid of any intrinsic worth but almost as an antithesis of what 
they viewed to be worthwhile ("it’s never ever brought me anything worthwhile”, 
""money doesn ’t ever come up with the goods”). Such contestations of the notion that 
money constitutes a ‘good’ in and of itself frequently coincided with references to 
alternative forms of economic organisation, as the following quote illustrates:
(37) [...] Money has no value. M oney’s only (..) I  think (.) the likes o f  barter (.) 
is a better system than money. ‘Cause you get value then. Whereas, what is 
the value o f money? (.) I  mean whether you ’ve got ten pounds, a hundred 
pounds or a thousand pounds, right (.) somebody could charge you ten 
pounds fo r  this thing, a hundred pounds fo r the same thing and a thousand 
pounds fo r the- There, there is no real value in money. ( A n g u s ,  58)
As already indicated, many participants expressed the belief that one of the ‘goods’ that 
""money doesn’t ever come up with” was happiness:
(38) fWell (.) erm I  dp have friends who have money. fVeiy nice friends and- 
(...) But I ’m not sure they’re necessarily haopv. You Imow, I ’ve always 
been curious about money maldng you happy but they would be an example
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in my life o f  o f  money doesn’t make you happy. Erm and so therefore I  
don’t need more money to make me happier. [ . . . ]  ( M a r g a r e t ,  54)
(39) [...] I  mean (.) you can’t buy happiness. You just can’t buy that. Happiness 
comes (.) without a cost. But people put a cost unto things now. Well, argh! 
[gestiu'es angrily] Makes me ang- it gets me angry actually. [...]
(An g u s , 58)
Happiness was undoubtedly important and therefore of value for participants, hi 
addition, as quote (39) illustrates, there was an underlying assmnption that happiness is 
-  or should be -  free, that it ""comes without a cost”. This notion, in turn, suggested that 
money and happiness were, at least to a certain degree, seen as being at variance with 
each other. Consequently, the perceived attempt at commercialisation of that which 
should be free ("but people put a cost unto things now”) — in other words, the 
‘rationalisation’ of what is seen to lie outside the economic realm -  provoked an 
expression of resentment ("it gets me angiy actually”).
Whilst in the latter quote a general resistance towards the application of economic 
principles to ostensibly non-economic areas is conveyed, in other cases the actual logic 
of economic rationality as such is contested. Consider, for instance, the following 
exfract which not only refers to monetaiy behaviour but also touches upon a related 
subject, namely the issue of ‘possessions’;
(40) I  think w e’ve been, w e’ve been seduced into totally irrational behaviour 
relating to (.) possessions and stu ff You look at Maries & fSpencers (.) I  
mean, I  was looking em (.) I  mean, yesterday I  was passing through (.) and 
the things that they are dying to get people to buy, which people will buy 
(.) which are probably worth maybe seventy-jive pence, and they are gonna 
pay five pounds fo r them. That is not utilitarian. I t ’s not rational. [...]
(An n e , 45)
Once more, the ‘seduction’ theme plays a role in tliis context. However, this passage is
particularly interesting because of its overt refutation of the supply and demand logic
("probably worth maybe seventy-five pence, and they are gonna pay five pounds”) that
is fundamental to economic theorising, hi other words, what appears to be questioned
here is the type of rationality propagated by a traditional economic outlook together
with the rationality of the kind of behaviour it puiportedly explains. The respondent’s
depiction of particular economic behaviours -  which seem perfectly sensible when
viewed from within a certain perspective -  as irrational ("that is not utilitarian, i t ’s not
rational”) not only provides an example o f how the notion of rationality is contested
but also reveals the degree to which any such notion must inevitably be linlced to the
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‘end’ or goal that a given behaviour is supposed to achieve. The implication of this is 
that what is seen as ‘utilitarian’ or ‘rational’ depends on what the individual regards to 
be o f value. So what, then, did participants consider to be important? What were the 
values they expressed?
2.3.3.2 What is of value?
One o f the reciuTing themes in participants’ talk about the role o f money in their 
everyday lives related to the importance o f love and relationships, as the following 
quotes illustrate:
(41) [...] You Imow, you can go to Argos, you can go, you Iq io w , you can buy 
this and that and the other, “ fisn't that nice, w e’ve got something”. After 
huh (laughs)- It becomes rather meaningless in the end. But, you see, your 
ffriendships (.) your relationships with err your fwife, you, your fields 
and whatever have you, that is much more important. [,..] ( B r ia n ,  57)
(42) .And I  think that [love] is the most important thing in any human 
being’s life. I t ’s not money. Because you can’t buy love. [...] I  mean, I  
think everybody, i f  they’d only realise love (.) is more important than
‘ money. And I  mean (.) it really is! [:..] ( A n g u s ,  58)
Just as in participants’ discussions of ‘happiness’, a distinction was frequently drawn 
between money or its perceived meaninglessness and the significance of relationships 
in a person’s life, hr some instances, the importance attributed to family relations in 
particular was explicitly contrasted with the notion of ""economic sense” as the 
continuation of the initial extract (quote 1) shows:
(43) [...] Erm fmy wife erm is incredibly gen- generous. And when my 
daughters needed anvthins. she, she’d just- because she’s earning a little 
bit o f money, my wife, hei'self she’s got a job, she immediately dips into 
her money. And it doesn’t fmean anything to her. Because all money is a 
means to an end. That’s all it is. But her family matters more than that. So 
she, she would happily sacrifice err things that she’s earned fo r  example. I  
mean, to fus it doesn’t make economic sense, fo r  example (.) err fo r  my 
wife and I, to go and erm (.) what do you call it when- (.) My daughter 
needed a, a mortsase. She had fno chance o f getting it. So we had to go 
guarantors fo r  that, you see. But i t ’s because o f the ffamily! Erm to fine it 
wouldn’t make much economic sense, because i f  she, i f  she did not or 
defaulted on the mortgage, w e’d end up paying fo r  the mortgage. [...]
(B r i a n , 57)
In this example, the respondent’s means-to-an-end understanding of money tliat we 
already encountered in Section 2.3.1.1 is brought to bear on the importance of family
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relationships for his wife. This description of his wife’s values ("her family matters 
more than that”, ""she would happily sacrifice things that she’s earned’), which are 
also implied to be his own, arose at the same time as his reference to ""economic sense”. 
Whilst becoming a guarantor for a mortgage may not seem particularly ‘rational’ given 
the associated risk of financial loss, tlie behaviour does ""make sense” when viewed as 
an endeavour to maintain or stiengthen family ties.
The notion of ‘commimity’, already encountered in Section 2.3.2.1, also emerged 
in the context of participant’s references to what they regarded to be of value:
(44) [...] And my perfect world would be where there would be no such thing as 
money. We woiddn’t, we would maybe barter for- [...] we woidd barter our 
skills. We woidd, would do fcommunity work so that things that need to be 
done in the community would be done. We’d, we woidd be creative (.) em 
(..) bit futopian but I, but that’s hoM> I  would like to work. [...] (A n n e ,  45)
This is an implicit appeal to the importance of maintaining the social ties within a 
given community and as such, once \  again, alludes to the intrinsic value of 
relationships. In addition, this passage provides an example of the rather frequently, 
expressed desire to live in a different type of economic system, namely a bartering one 
“ where there would be no such thing as money”. The wish to inliabit a different or 
""perfect world' was voiced surprisingly often and this alleged preference for bartering 
or ‘swapping’ (e.g. ""I’d fmuch rather swap things”, “I ’d rather not have to deal with 
'Imoney really ”, “because it is, i t ’s like a personal thing, I  think i t ’s, the, the coldness 
o f money actually”, K a r e n , 3 3 )  over monetary exchange could, on the one hand, 
simply be read as another instance of the perceived importance of social relationships. 
On the other hand, however, the frequency with which references to the supposed 
superiority of a bartering system occurred, combined with the imfeasibility of such a 
system (at least on a larger societal scale, given the contemporary complexity of 
economic relations), seemed indicative of a general desire to escape not only money 
per se but, perhaps more importantly, the dileimna it appeals to pose for one’s identity. 
We will turn to this issue shortly.
The importance attiibuted to social relations in general and personal or family 
relationships in particular are examples of the more explicit values expressed by 
participants. Other values that played a role in terms of the linlc between money and 
identity referred to seemingly less definable aspirations, such as the development of
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creativity (see above ""we would be creative”) or the wish to simply be ""alive”. 
Consider for instance the following extract:
(45) [...] Never. I ’ve never wanted lots o f money. Never. I, I  can’t imagine, I  
can’t remember a single moment in my life ever when I  have wanted a lot 
o f money. (.) Nope. I, I  have wanted enough fo r  security^ but deep inside I  
Imow there’s no such thing as enough fo r  security. So I  think I ’m much 
freer. (.) [...] Most people in our society seem to be living way fo r  the 
future and their fears are fo r  when they grow old. Em (.) I  want to live 
now. I  want to be alive now. And I  want to find  the blessinss o f  life fnow. I  
don’t want to wait till I ’m ninety or fifty! or (.) a hundred or whatever.
(A n n e , 45)
The sense of temporality conveyed here — that is, the emphasis on the ‘here and now’ -  
poses a direct challenge for the means-to-an-end conception of money as it draws 
attention to the fact that ‘ends’, by definition, always have to be deferred to the future. 
However, what is of value for this respondent (e.g. fieedom, fearlessness) resides in the 
present, as it relates to the experience of life or ‘being human’ as such ("I want to find  
the blessings o f life”), and thus cannot be postponed until the future.
The examples considered in this section have served to illustrate the extent to 
which talking about money gave rise to articulations of non-economic values. 
However, as was the case for monetary meanings, respondents’ references to their 
personal values -  and, by implication, the value they attached to money -  were not 
always unambiguous. Consider, for instance, the following remarks (the first of which 
occmxed right at the outset of the interview in question):
(46) Well I  dp. I  attach fimportance to it [money] because i t ’s, i t ’s there in 
everyday life. But I  have perhaps erm — I  fdon’t Imow whether my attitude 
towards it differs to other fpeople in the sense that (.) I ’m n o t, I ’m not-1  
don’t desire a lot o f  money particularly. I  fdo, huh, i t ’s really, it is really 
interesting because I  dp and I  don’t. And I ’m gonna be. I ’m- you ’re gonna 
find  what I  say fu ll o f  contradictions or fapparent contradictions. [...]
(Ro g e r , 42)
(47) [...] I, I, I  think I ’d be a fhypocrite i f  I, i f  I  err fd idn’t sort o f err dream 
once or twice on (laughs) on having a little bit o f  money and saying "ah, 
woiddn’t it be nice i f  err we could go on a Caribbean cruise ” or someth ing 
like this, you hiow. [...] I  would love to have a pool table. [...] And it 
would be lovely to have a fbigger house. But you see, that means that you 
want bigger fthings. You’ve got to pay a lot, lot more money fo r  fthis kind 
o f thing, you see. So in other words, i t ’s, I  think, to me, a natural thing that 
obviously is there. But I  think really what it is, i t ’s a little bit o f a battle 
you've got within yourself, f is n ’t it? [ . . . ]  ( B r i a n ,  5 7 )
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Here, a profound uncertainty as regards the importance or value of money is expressed, 
hi the first case, this is conveyed by the participant’s introspective awareness of his 
‘contradictory attitude’ towards money and, in the latter instance, by reference to the 
‘inner battle’ money matters can evoke.^ So why should people’s attitudes towards 
money be so ""full o f  contradictions”, why the ‘imier straggle’? One possible answer to 
this question may, again, be found within Taylor’s (1985) concept of ‘strong 
evaluation’. For instance, the want for ""bigger things”, which is seen as ""a natural 
thing that is obviously there”, goes hand in hand with an evaluation of that want (i.e. a 
second-order desire) as not especially desirable; hence, there is a battle between wants 
and their simultaneous denial, between desiring and not desiring money (“/  do and I  
don’t”), which accounts for the existence of the self-confessed contradictions 
mentioned above. Just as with the subjective meanings of money, participants’ values 
around money as well as their subjective valuation of money were found to be 
dilemmatic, too. This, in turn, had implications for their constructions of the 
relationship between money matters and issues concerning the ‘self. In other words, as 
money gave rise to a dilemma with, regard to what respondents considered to be of 
value to them and since values, in turn, determined how they saw themselves as people, 
this dilemma became transfeixed onto their understanding of money’s impact on their 
identities. The frequently expressed desire to live in a ""perfect world?' where there is 
""no such thing as money” (e.g. see quote 44) may well be indicative of a wish to escape 
this dilemma, the nature of which will be the focus of the next section.
2.3.4 The Dilemmatic Relationship between Money & Identity
Talking about money raised a great dilemma for respondents with regard to their 
notions of ‘selfliood’ and its expression. This dilemma became apparent when 
comparing different respondents’ constructions of the money-identity link but -  more 
often than not -  was also evident within particular cases. The relationship between 
money and subjective notions of identity was not str'aightforward, since money issues 
were seen to impact on selfhood in a nimiber of different ways: money could be
In fact, tJie ‘attitudes’ o f the majority of respondents seemed rather contradictory. However, tliese 
apparent inconsistencies remained mostly implicit and their uncovering would have required a more 
discursively oriented approach.
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regarded to enhance or validate the ‘se lf  or, conversely, to undermine it -  often both at 
the same time. Let us consider these notions in turn.
2.3.4.1 M oney E nhances / V alidates the ‘Self’
One o f the ways in which the relationship between money and ‘selfliood’ was 
conceptualised related to the perception o f nioney as a validation o f the ‘se lf . At the 
most fundamental level o f this particular understanding o f the money-identity linlc, 
notions such as ""empowerment” or ""confidence” were found to play a role, as the 
following quote demonstiates:
(48) [...] What it [money] does bring is, it brings you a land o f respect from  
other people. [.,.] Erm so I  think it brings that. And I  think it also- it brings 
a kind o f empowerment that- you have a confidence that you have got 
money behind you [...]. (Jane ,  51 )
The sense o f confidence expressed here seems, in some measure, related to the 
conception of money as ‘freedom’ (see above); In addition, as in some o f the earlier 
examples, where self-perception from the vantage point o f another was considered as 
one o f the Various identity dimensions associated with money, here the enhancement o f  
identity also refers to the stance that the ‘other’ might take with regard to one’s self ("it 
brings you a kind o f  respect from other people”).
Financial practices also played a role regarding the ways in which nioney was 
perceived to support identity and its expression. Here, notions o f ‘giving’ were 
particularly central:
(49) I  suppose, like I  suppose I  think what I  woidd do i f  I ’d won the lotteiy and 
stuff like that. Erm, like the other day, erm a woman at work, she lives in 
[names town] and she’s got like two children and stu ff and she was saying 
how her car’s broken and how she can’t afford to fix  it. And I  was thinking, 
well like i f  I  won the lotteiy then I  could buy her a car and how nice that 
would be. ( J e s s i c a ,  21)
And further on the inteiwiewee adds:
(50) [...] I  think i t ’s so nice giving money to people and things they want. So 
giving like a million pounds to a charity, I  just think would be amazing.
(Je s s i c a , 21)
Whilst these passages do not include direct references to selfliood as such, they are
clearly linked to the participant’s values, namely the importance she ascribes to helping
or supporting others ("it’s so nice giving money to people”). Therefore, the implication
is that nioney -  or in this case the hypothetical lottery gain -  allows for a concrete
8 7
Chapter II
expression of these values and thereby for an articulation of ‘self. ‘Giving’ (or 
generosity) can also be conceived of as an economic practice that serves to strengthen 
social bonds; and social relationships, as already discussed, ar e a crucial dimension of a 
person’s sense of identity.
In other instances where money was seen as supporting identity, notions o f selfliood 
were refened to more explicitly:
(51) [ . . . ]  I f  I  can reach out to another person than the love that I  want to offer 
them M’ill flow  fthrough me. Em and i f  that’s about giving somebody 
money, i f  that’s about giving somebody a listening ear em (.) then (.) that’s 
0  i t ’s, you Imow, i t ’s, i t ’s, it comes through me. [ . . . ]  ( A n n e ,  4 5 )
Here, giving nioney to other people is understood as a means by which a person can 
express her/his love ("the love that I  M>ant to offer them will flow  through me”, ""it 
comes through me”) and, therefore, as an expression of the self.
. ' X ; : . . .
. hi, order to fully appreciate the ways in which money can be regarded as an 
eiihfoicemeiit of one’s identity, a look at the Interview material tlirough a more 
discursive lens again proves to .be useflil Recall exceipts (3) and (4) in which the 
participant associated money with the attahmient of fl-eedom. This association occurred 
around her description of the kind of life she wanted to lead and of the various things 
she hoped to do in life. Whilst fiirtlier elaborating on her subjective understanding of 
money as ‘freedom’, the respondent also asserted:
(52) I  need millions. I ’m going to need, I  intend fully (.) to have millions (.) at 
my disposal (.) which I  don’t feel Tbad about. [ . . . ]  ( S a r a ,  28 )
And then proceeded to state:
(53) I t ’s definitely about wants and desires. I  mean (...) fover and above. I  want 
to go traveling and I  want to do this and all the rest. I  see money as rep­
as, i t ’s a powerful means, fo r  me, to (.) challenge other people’s 
conceptions. I- (.) fantasy -iright, I  would love to have enough money to 
buy all the advertising billboard space in [names home city], where I ’m 
from, (.) fo r  a week or two weeks or a month. I  don’t Imow i f  you ’d even get 
the Ad agencies- I ’d love to have enough money to offer them five times 
their going rates, so they ’d have to give it to me, and leave it blank.
(Sa r a , 2 8 )
As has already been pointed out, a sense of one’s own agency constitutes a 
fundamental aspect of identity, of what it means to be a certain kind of person. The 
same holds true with regal'd to one’s wants and desires. Money can be viewed to
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provide the means for self-expression, for a demonstration of one’s agency in the 
world. In tliis particular case, money is thought to validate the ‘self in two ways: 
firstly, by facilitating the realisation of the person’s wants and desires -  thus enliancing 
her possibilities of doing things (“/  want to do this and all the rest”) -  and, secondly, 
by making possible the expression of her uniqueness as a person (i.e. personal 
identity). The latter fomi of se lf  enliancement is, again, achieved tlnough engagement 
in particular financial practices -  in tliis case, practices which aim to ""challenge other 
people’s conceptions”, hi other words, it is the idiosyncrasy of her purported use of 
nioney -  such as renting advertising billboard space for the sole purpose of leaving it 
blanlc -  that points to Üie respondent’s distinctiveness from other people’s practices or 
""conceptions” of nioney and by which the self is allowed its unique personal 
expression (see also ""Iwant to be mischievous with money”, S a r a ,  28) .
2.3.4.2 Money Changes / Undermines the ‘Self’
Howeverj-Amoney, was not only seen to provide a means of enliancing the 
’articulation of one’s identity, but was also'associated with its very opposite, namely as 
an obstacle to articulating who one is. At the most basic level, a concern was expressed 
that changes in certain practices related to money might challenge one’s self-definition. 
Consider, for example, the following respondent who had previously stated that she 
would not be able to handle a million-pound lottery win. She then proceeded to explain 
why:
(54) [...] Because it- (.) whatever, whichever way I  chose to deal with this 
million pounds, I  would be a different person from what I  was yesterday. 
Woiddn’t I? (..) Erm ()  I, I  coiddn ’t comprehend it actually! Ed have to get 
my he- head round it because it is a lot o f money. I  mean I  coidd say I  
could move house and (.) and fpay somebody to cut my grass instead o f  
doing it myself and- But fwhat fulfillment woidd that give me? I  like to cut 
my grass, you Imow, I  like cleaning my house. (.) Maybe I  could get 
somebody to run this house fo r  me while I ’m doing the tour o f the fworld 
but- (.) That was never in my life fplans though. I  would have to adjust a 
lot. ( M a r g a r e t ,  54)
Here, nioney is seen to directly affect the respondent’s ""life plans” and, in doing so, the 
kind of person or agent she perceives herself to be (“/  would be a different person from
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what I  was yesterdaÿ')? Whilst this respondent expresses a resistance to the prospect 
o f changing who she is (i.e. her identity), for others, money appeared to pose an even 
more profound danger, namely a tlneat to ‘selfhood’ per se. Consider the following 
example:
(55) Wl^at money ()  money really represents em a hassle fo r  me. I  would like to 
live in a world where there was no money (..) em where I  coidd simply live 
and work and be creative and have what I  need to live without even having 
to think about money. The fact o f  having to get money to live is a hassle.
[...] So (.) so in everytday life now, money is a hassle. At the minute I ’m 
trying to get Housing Benefit, I ’m tiying to sign on. I  don’t want to do 
those things, but I  have to try to do that in the meantime. I  have to get a 
job. But I  am very clear now that I ’m not willing to make money (.) em (..) 
under, and lose my soul, I  suppose you could say. (Anne, 45)
hi complete contrast to exceipt (52), here the respondent’s personal agency -  her desire 
to simply live and work and be creative” -  is effectively seen as being undennined by 
the need for money and equated with a loss o f self {^lose my soul”). Such a perceived 
loss o f identity need not exclusively take place on a personal level but can be seen to 
occur across different levels of abstraction simultaneously, as the following example 
shows:
(56) M oney’s- (sighs^ (..) Money really frustrates me. Because (.) I  like to think 
I  can do fwithout it. And every now and again I  think '‘yeah I  don’t really 
need ()  I  don’t need i t” and- i f  I  fcould, you Imow, I  would love, really (.) 
actually deep down I ’d reallv love to live and just- I ’d fquite like to live in 
a community and not have to fworry about money. Because I  just (.) I ju s t  
associate money with fstress. I  ju st associate money with stress (.) fo r  ine, 
but also as regards (.) our countiy and the fplanet really, and the univ- not 
the universe! ( lau gh sj  see it as (.) I  see money as stress. That’s what 
it means for me actually. (Ka ren ,33)
Here, money represents stress on all levels. In other words, selfliood is imdennined not 
only with regard to its personal expression Ç^for me”) but also on a social level in tenns 
o f one’s social group memberslhp ("owr country” i.e. as a British person) and, 
eventually, on a super-ordinate level o f identification (f'our planet” i.e. as a human 
being). This latter notion o f money as a challenge to one’s identity on a universal 
human level is echoed and taken even one step further by the statement th a t ...
(57) Money in my mind is a, an imvediment to life. [ . . . ]  (A n n e ,  45)
 ^Note that Taylor (1985) also refers to tire capacity of adopting ‘life-plans’ as a fondamental aspect of 
personliood (see p. 97).
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Here, money is seen as the complete annihilation of ‘self on all possible levels, as a 
negation of life per se.
The above passages do not only exemplify the different levels of selfliood 
associated with money (a subject which will be further discussed in Section 2.3.5), but 
also demonstrate how money can affect identity and its expression in diametrically 
opposed ways. The conflict or paradox associated with these two opposing forces (i.e. 
the validation of identity versus its undermining) frequently emerged within individual 
cases, as the following examples will show. Again, in order to observe the dilemmatic 
relationship between money and identity within specific instances, some text passages 
need to be considered in their entirety. For example, in the following extract the 
respondent reflected on what she thought might happen if she acquired a million 
pounds. At this particular- stage of the interview, a palpable sense of the pai ticipanf s 
struggle for some kind of coherence ip  the expression of her ideas was imparted:
■(58)/...7 L d o n ’t (..) I  don’t feôl l.woidd become a different land o f person (.) 
right now thinJdng about it. Err (...) but I  think maybe it Twould, you hiow. 
Maybe- But then, actually, I  think maybe it would affect, it woidd affect me 
(.) definitely, you Imow, to have a million pounds. I ’m sure- (.) I ’d like to 
fthink it woiddn’t. I ’d like to think that I  woidd stay Just the same but- (.)
I ’m sure I  woidd- (.) Just to feel extravagant and not care so much. I ’d 
probably get o ff on that, fo r  a bit at least. (.) And you Imow, perhaps, 
perhaps be- I  don’t Imow i f  I ’d be more wastefid. Well it w’oidd feel 
wastefid, ‘cos it woidd feel like I  had loads o f  money, it wouldn’t matter so 
much, I  could waste some, (laughs^ (.) But um (..) err (.) I  don’t feel that I  
would fundamentally change that much. [...] (..) But I  ()  I  don’t think my 
fundamental values would change. (.) I  think I ’d go a bit mad fo r  a while.
(.) And get in to it, (.) I  mean, you Imow, i f  I  had that sort o f money and 
then i f  I  wanted to live in a community, I  could buy a community^ and ()  get 
lots o f  nice people to live in it, (..) tOon ’t hiow. I  mean, I  M>as just thinking 
then about power. (.) I  think there’s a lot of- (.) Money can be very 
powerful. (.) ‘Cos I  was just thinking then if- Well, I  could buy my own 
commun- you Imow, place, you Imow, and have it as a community. And then 
(.) i f  I  had money (.) I  could (.) choose who came to the community. And I  
could choose, i f  it didn’t work out, I  could kick them out! But fthen I  just 
thought “oh well, actually, i f  i t ’s a community, then (.) we would share the 
power”. So i t ’s interesting that, just then thinking about having that, that 
money ju st made me feel (.) land o f 4poM^erful. (..) (K a r e n ,  33)
Several noteworthy points can be made with regard to this passage. Firstly, this passage 
reveals a number of interesting ‘inconsistencies’ when considered in its overall context. 
Previously, this respondent had openly acknowledged her stereotypically negative
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views on “people with money” (see quote 26) and declaied that the acquisition of 
money created a particular “mentality” (see quote 24). Here, however, the initial 
response is a clear reluctance to apply the same land of reasoning to herself (‘7  don’t 
feel I  would become a different kind o f person”). Nonetheless, this reluctance is soon 
followed by the recognition that acquiring one million poimds would almost certainly 
have an impact on her life, although this is also accompanied by a great sense of 
ambivalence ( f l ‘d like to think it wouldn ’t”\ “I  don’t think my fundamental values 
woidd change”), hiterestingly, the possible changes in the “land o f person” she 
considers herself to be now are also associated with an adoption of behavioinal 
practices ^ju st to feel extravagant and not care so much”', “it woiddn’t matter so much, 
I  could waste some”) that previously -  and with reference to others -  were regarded in 
a rather negative light (“/  think I ’ve got a bit o f a thing about waste actually”, see quote 
26).
Secondly, the above quote shows that these apparent contradictions essentially stem 
from money’s dilemmatic nature in relation to the self and its expression. For instance, 
one of the reasons why the respondent, at the beginning of the passage, vacillates in her 
evaluation of the impact of one million pounds on her life might be found in the latter 
part of the quote, where the ambivalent relationship between money and the expression 
of her values emerges rather clearly. At various stages tlnoughout the inteiview, the 
participant expressed her desire to live in a community (see also quote 56). Here she 
apprehends that, on the one hand, money would enable her to put into practice what is 
valuable to her (‘7  could buy a community and get lots o f nice people to live in it”) and 
it thus becomes an instnmrent of self-expression. On the other hand, the respondent is 
conscious of the possibility that the realisation of her dream tlrrough money would also 
confer a power upon her (“money just made me feel land o f  powerfid”) which seems 
diametrically opposed to the community ethos (fand I  coidd choose, i f  it didn’t work 
out, I  coidd kick them out”) and its associated ideal of sharing, hi other words, in this 
case money might undemiine the veiy values it usage is meant to implement in the first 
place. This then provides an explicit example of the kind of dilemma money can pose 
in tenns of one’s values and their articulation and, by implication, for one’s sense of 
identity.
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Whilst, ill the above instance, the dilemma remains on a somewhat abstract level as 
the respondent contemplates the impact o f a hypothetical million pounds on her life, 
for other participants this ‘imier struggle’ suiTOunding money (e.g. see quote 47) 
appeared to be a very ‘real’ part o f everyday life. In some o f these cases, deliberate 
efforts were made -  at least discursively speaking -  to transcend the dilenmia created 
by money. Consider, for example, the following participant who at the outset o f the 
interview stated:
(59) [...] fSome, several things have happened to me, you see, in my life 
concernins money that I ’ve made, that have altered my attitudes and 
commitments and treatments about it a ll And erm (..) fhelped me to 
realize and aspire to ()  a feeling where I  don’t care so much about it, you 
laioMK (R o g e r ,  42 )
He then proceeded to tell a number of ‘stories’ describing the events in his life that had 
“helped [him] to realise and aspire to” a more detached attitude towaids money. The 
following passages present his nanative account one'thing that had a particular (.) 
that -was a particularly significant thing that happénéd' ( R o g e r , 4 2 ) ,  namely an 
encounter with a gypsy woman a few years ago; this account provides an illustrative 
summary of the various analytic points that have been raised so far and thus merits to 
be cited in its entirety:
(60) Ipa iked  in the car park in [place name]. And there’s an old fgypsy who 
kinda pi'eys on people around [place name] [...]. She sells people heather 
when she’s at work. And err she got me erm by the fticket machine and 
said [...] do I  wanna buy some 'Iheather. And I  said “I  was just getting my 
ticket but I ’ll ju st ()  I ’ll look at what change I ’ve g o t”. And she said “yeah 
ok” and followed me back to the Landrover. [.,.] And she stained her 
patter. [...] And she said err err (.) “I ’ll tell you your fortune”, you Imow,
“I  can tell you, I, I, I, I ’ll read your hand”. [...] She said “I ’ll read your 
hand and erm (.) and fyou can have three wishes ”. (.) As- and I  said 
“hum”. (.) And I  was trying to- and Idnda my instincts were just sort o f  to 
palm her off. And, and I  woidd have- I  was quite happy to buy some 
heather because ok, well, I  quite like gypsies. But she must have Imown I  
WÆS hesitating and wondering and land o f  wanting a bit more. And she said 
err (.) “I, I ’ll fgrant you these three wishes”, she said, “but have a look 
and see however much money yo u ’ve go t”. She said erm “put the three, the 
ffour largest notes yo u ’ve got on you, in my hand”. (.) And, and I ’d fbeen 
to the fcash machine and I  got some money out fo r  something that I, I, you 
hiow, I  needed to pay fo r  somebody some money. I  fhad about seventy 
quid on me, and I  Imew that. [...] And I  had four ftenners, you laiow. And 
so I  thought “humm So I  got out these four tenners (.) strangely. And erm 
(.) I  bet that made her eyes light up but-! (laughs) And I  said err- (.) she
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said (.) she said “hold them in your hand”. And she said “now erm (.) 
you can have three wishes ”. (.) And I  said “ fwell, I  don’t reallv know what 
to wish for, so- because I  don’t really M’ant that much particularly. And I  
thousht about it fo r  a little while. And I  said “well I  don’t really - fwhat do 
I  wish for? I ’m kinda all fright I  suppose”. And err she said “no, no, think 
hard! You can- there are three things”. [...] And I  thought- she said “yeah 
think, think! you should have a ”- she said “fd o n ’t wish fo r  money” she 
said, “you ’II alv^avs have jnoney! don’t wish fo r it, don’t do that”. I  mean 
and that’s (.) - She’d fobviously run through this patter before. [...] But 
anyway, the first one [wish] was to (..) to have, to stay fhealthy. And to 
stay in the, in the 2 ame fo r  quite a long time. I  wanted to take part like. 
’Cause it feels like, ’cause it fis a game [life], the fwhole thing’s a game.
And I  just wanna sit-1  M^anna be at the board for quite a long time. I  don’t 
want to be sat out, you ]mow. I  wanna actually take part and play. So I  
wanna be healthy and f i t  enough to do that. And err, and the fsecond one I  
said, was I  want to actually ImoMf what real love is like. I  want to feel and 
experience (.) real love from another person, that I  hadn’t. [...] I  really, I  
said, I  wanna, I  reallv want to taste real love. ’Cause I  have the feeling, I  
hiow what i t ’s -1  know there’s something. [,..] And then I  said, the fthird 
one, I  want to have fsome inkling, not that I  think it matters much, but I  
just want some idea (.) o f  what i t ’s all about [life], w hat’s going on. [...]
( R o g e r ,  42)
The sh'uctiu'e of the respondent’s tale thus fai' depicts his passage from a condition 
where his values are not yet articulated (fwell, I  don’t really Imow what to wish fo r”), 
tlirough a stage o f rejecting money as a measure o f value by following the gypsy 
woman’s advice ((''don’t wish fo r  it, don’t do that”), on to the final realisation o f what 
actually counts for him: namely health to guarantee that he can “stay in the game fo r  
quite a long time” (note the similarity to the notion o f ‘being alive’ expressed in quote 
45) love (“/  really want to taste real love”) and understanding (“/  want to have some 
inkling [...] o f  what i t ’s all about, what’s going on”). So what happens once the 
articulation of his values has taken place? The above extract continues:
(61) And I  gave her [the foin ‘temiers’], and I  looked in, and I  looked into her 
eyes, you Imow. She had a- this gypsy had a reallv leathery face. She was 
reallv kind o f weather-beaten and brown and- (.) and I  looked into her eyes 
and they were like (.) pure and clear and true and- (.) And [...] we gave 
each other a fldss. And it w>as very clear. And I- and then it was over and 
I, I  went. She gave me a bit o f heather. And I  walked down the street [...].
And the, the ffirst instinct was “yo u ’ve been ripped off, haven’t you? ” Erm 
“yo u ’ve been taken fo r  a mug! ” And fthat lasted like a fleeting second.
The second one was feuphoria! It was really fantastic! Because I  actually 
(.) hiew that it wouldn’t- money would never have the hold on me again.
And it didn’t! [...J I  actually thought, “I  don’t- i t ’s beautifid to give it 
away! ” And i t ’s, i t ’s lovely. And what does it-1  mean she’s got a family to
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feed, she’s just doing her own thing, it doesn’t fmatter who has it, who 
actually owns it all, fo r  me. And it won’t own me. you know. And I, I- she- 
I ’ve fthought about it since then and I, I  think i f  i t ’d been four hundt'ed (.) 
maybe even four thousand, it woidd have still been cheap fo r  what she 
taught me that J^day. ( R o g e r ,  42)
The narrative format in general and this passage in particular convey a strong sense of 
his ‘deliverance’ h'om money and its perceived hold on him (“money would never have 
the hold on me again”). Thus, after a transitory moment of uncertamty ((you’ve been 
taken fo r a mug!”), the respondent’s narrative account ends with what he experiences 
as a profound insight, namely that money will never own him, that he is free (see also 
“I  think that was part o f  my, it feels like part o f my liberation”, R o g e r ,  4 2 ) .  The 
encoiuiter with the gypsy woman taught him that money is immaterial for what he 
regards to be of value and, therefore, in terms of who he is. Since his ‘real’ values have 
nothing to do with money, a liberation of the self from money is achieved -  at least in 
rhetorical tenns. The result of such a dissociation of money from identity is a 
transcendence, albeit tempofaiy, of the dilemmas it poses for the ‘self.
It should be noted that the above-quoted respondent made no claims as to having 
achieved a pennanent state of detachment firom money as such, hi fact, he seemed 
rather lucid about the constant struggle and the contradictions that persisted for him 
around monetaiy issues (see also quote 46). However, the above stoiy, alongside the 
other nanative accounts that were embedded within his talk, did attest to the theme of 
‘liberation’ as one o f his persisting aspirations; again, this seemed related to Taylor’s 
(1985) notion of ‘strong evaluation’. In other words, this respondent constantly seemed 
to strive towards achieving a greater degree of disassociation between his sense o f self 
and money. This ongoing process is further illustrated by the following description of 
an occuiTence where the respondent had been expecting to inlierit tlnee himdrod 
thousand pounds, only to find that the deceased had changed his will shortly before his 
death and left his entire estate to chaiity:
(62) [...] But (.) the fstrange thing was, when I  found out, there was this 
amazing relief (.) in a way. And (.) I  fshould have been feeling Idnd o f  
devastated and I  wasn’t. And erm (.) I  was ttying to [...] fground myself 
again and find  out what was going on. And you flatow what I  thought of?!
I, I  thought o f  the fgypsy. And I  thought o f the three wishes. And I  took 
them font again and looked at them. And not one o f them had anything to 
do with whether I  fhad that money or not. I  looked at eveiy one. fWhich 
one- how it would relate to me i f  I  fhad, you know, an arbitrary figure o f
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three hundred thousand pound. And the first one w&s' to stay healthy. And 
money doesn’t buy your health. [...] So fthat one didn’t make any 
difference. I ’ll be healthy, or not, fwhether I ’ve got any money that’s 
nothing to do- [...] And monev isn’t going to buy me the love (.) that I  want 
to feel. And money isn’t going to show me what i t ’s all about. ( R o g e r ,  42)
This analysis has now nearly reached its end. One final analytical point remains to 
be made which, in many respects, does not present an entirely new argument, but 
nonetheless deserves to be stressed, given its significance for the overall puiposes of 
this thesis. Tliis final point relates to money and its relationship to identity on different 
levels of abstraction and will be discussed in the following section.
2.3.5 Levels of Abstraction: Money and Its Relationship to Personal, 
Social and Human Identity
As already described in Chapter I, within the Social Identity tradition, ‘selfliood’ is 
conceived of as existing on different levels of abstractions -  personal, social and 
himiaii. hi the course of this analysis we have encountered numerous examples that 
have illustrated tlie extent to which money matters and issues of identity are related. 
The different levels of identity abshaction have been ever-present in all these instances, 
but thus far they have largely remained implicit within the analysis. This final section 
aims to provide an explicit demonstration of the relationship between money and 
identity on the personal, social as well as human level of abstraction, hi doing so, some 
new examples will be introduced but previous passages will also be drawn upon.
2.3.5.1 Personal Identity
Perhaps the most apparent association between money and subjective 
understandings of selfliood tended to occur at the personal level of abstraction. 
Examples of this type of liiilc could be found in statements where money issues were 
liidced to notions such as ‘self-esteem’.
(63) [...] But (.) but I  dp get erm concerned about it [money] and, and (.) erm 
(.) I  think at times i f  ()  when money is short that (.) erm (...) I  have a 
personal response to it. I t ’s tied in with my self-esteem and (.) with all 
sorts of- it seems to be a hu8:e thing then. Yeah, you get a preoccupation (.) 
o f self-worth ( . . )  wasted life or ( . )  you hiow just- ( . )  ( W i l l i a m ,  4 7 )
Here, what happens to the individual in the financial domain (f'when money is short”) 
has immediate repercussions on a personal level (“/  have a personal i^esponse to it”). A
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decrease in financial resources goes hand in hand with a lowered sense of personal 
worthiness, hi other words, the ‘personal’ sphere acts as a mirror onto which money 
matters become projected. As already pointed out in Section 2.3.2.1 where the different 
identity dimensions related to selfliood were considered, the vantage point of another 
also played a role in participants’ imderstandiiig of their personal identity. In these 
cases, money was sometimes linked to the notion of ‘attractiveness’ (“/  think that in 
some ways i t ’s [money] bound up wnth erm what I  would consider as my overall 
attractiveness to a partner”, W i l l i a m ,  47 ) .
Many of the examples that have been cited in the analysis thus far have related to 
identity on tliis personal, sub-ordinate level of abstraction. This seems largely due to 
the fact that the interview situation as such contained an intrinsic bias towards 
emphasising personal identity concerns; the interview questions were fi*equently 
plirased in personal tenns, which would have rendered the sub-ordinate level identity 
more salient. Yet, associations between money and identity also occurred at the social 
level of abstraction, where monetary matters were found to relate to different aspects of 
social category memberslhp. These instances will be discussed in the following section. 
Before doing so, however, it is worth pointing out that money matters were also linlced 
with a speaker’s awareness of how s/he was positioned by others, in other words, 
his/her social ‘role’. Consider for example the following extract where monetary 
concerns are seen to have a direct bearing on the respondent’s social position as a 
‘father’:
(64) [...] I  do (..) I  mean remind myself that I  haven’t got much money. And erm 
I  sometimes say to my own fldds, you Imow, my older Idds (.) you Imow 
[names eldest son]- (.) that’s sometimes come up wnth them. [...] 
Sometimes we ’re out together and we go and buy lunch and I  pay and I ’ll 
say “wellyou Imow, that’s, that’s a couple o f qiddyou owe m e”, you know.
And I  feel mean, ‘cause a ffather, the general thing is that fathers give 
their kids money and (.) they’ve got it to fgive, because they, they’re 
wealthier. But basically, I  said to [son’s name], “basically w e’re in the 
same boat”you biow.[...] (R o g e r ,  42)
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2.3.5.2 Social Identity
As was already intimated by previous examples, social identity issues also played a 
role in the money-identity linlc, where financial issues were brought to bear on various 
aspects of social category membership. This applied both to the social category 
membership of the ‘self and the ‘other’.
For instance, recall the respondent who in the begimiing of the interview stated:
(65) I  was a mercenary). (.) That’s who I  am. Iw>as a mercenary. ( A n g u s ,  58)
Tliroughout this respondent’s talk, a particular social category -  the ‘mercenary’ -  was 
implicitly tied to a specific attitude towaids money. Social identification with this 
particular category and adoption of the monetaiy ‘attitude’ associated with it, demands 
that money is put before all else, including human life. Unlike with examples of the 
relationship between money and the human level of identity (see Section 2.3.5.2 
below), in this instance money is not believed to generically subvert what is human 
but, instead, the suggestions is that there exists a particular category of people who are 
defined by their inliimianity. Again, we have to bear in mind the ‘discursive project’ 
this particular respondent seemed to be engaged in, namely that of disowning his past 
(see also pp. 13-14). This is also relevant for another example in which he alludes to an 
ostensible link between money and certain ‘national characteristics’, ‘Scottish-ness’ to 
be precise:
(66) [...] When I  think err, I  mean (..) I, I  look at where I  am now. (..) And I  
think where I  could have been (.) i f  I ’d made it. I f  I ’d [...] yeah, i f  I ’d been 
crueller, more vicious like your average (.) Scotsman. I  wouldn’t be sittin ’ 
where I  am now. I  mean, this house isn’t mine. (A n g u s ,  58)
(The respondent is referring to his rather impoverished material circumstances.)
Here, the participant attributes his appaient lack of success in ‘making it’ financially 
{“M)here I  could have been i f  I ’d made it”) to his deliberate reflisal to fully endorse his 
social identity as a Scotsman and thus to his unwillingness to accept the perceived 
nouns around money which he associates with that category, hi other words, he 
explains his current material circmnstances by his professed a-typicality as a member 
of tliis particular national category. Again, a temporaiy disengagement firom his past -  
a ‘distancing himself firom himself -  is achieved here.
hi the above examples, membership in a particular social category is considered to 
define a person’s position on (or attitude towards) money. There were, however, also 
instances in which the reverse seemed to occur, namely where a given position on
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money became defined in tenns of a particular social categoiy. Evidence for this kind 
of reversal could be found m examples where particular financial practices were 
ascribed to a certain categoiy or group of people (e.g. see quote 18 “Well obviously I  
don't do the lottery? because I  don't want to he one o f those people.” M a r g a r e t ,  5 4 ) .  
hi these instances, the existence of certain ‘types’ of people was evoked, sometimes by 
reference to particular category attributes such as ‘materialistic’ (e.g. see quote 20 “I  
worry that I ’m somehow a horrible materialistic kind o f  person to think about it 
[money] all the time.” S a r a ,  2 8 ;  also “I ’d have to ask the question I  am, am l a  very 
materialistic personal” B r ia n ,  57) ,  wliich neither applied to personal (sub-ordinate) nor 
human (super-ordinate) levels of identity, but related to the intemiediate level -  social 
identity — instead.
Furthennore, quote (24) illustrated how groups of people were also be defined on the 
basis of their income fB u t  because [friend] ’s only just started earning that money, he 
hasn’t got the mentality o f  someone that I  imagine might have the mentality, i f  they 
were earning seventeen grand a year”. K a r e n ,  33).  Wliilst the suggestion here was 
that people in a particular social position (i.e. those earning well) are likely to express 
certain attitudes towards money, those defined by money (e.g. see quote 26 “people 
with lots o f money”, K a r e n ,  3 3 )  were also seen as holding certain positions concerning 
non-monetary issues, such as ‘being wastefiil’ (see quote 26 “So, I  imagine people with 
lots o f money to be more \\?asteful ‘cos they can just get out and buy another one 
tomorrow.” 33) .
The contention that belonging to a particular social categoiy implied the endorsement 
of certain monetary attitudes did not only refer to ‘types of people’ but was also 
applied to more inclusive social categories such as social class (e.g. see quote 27) or 
even the nation. We have just encountered an example of the latter (see quote 66), 
where the respondent attempted to distance himself ftroni “your average Scotsman”. 
However, as already pointed out, the social category membership of the ‘other’ was 
also di'awn upon to account for monetary phenomena; in this context, too, national 
categories were invoked:
(67) [...] OK i f  I  think o f  Israel, I  found that a lot o f the Israelis were very 
money conscious and wanted- and very American and (..) and veiy 
arrogant. And when I  met the fPalestinians, I  found them to be quite 
humble and (..) err considerate and you laiow. And, fo r  me, in that (.) that 
had something to do with fmoney, I  think. [...] ( K a r e n ,  33)
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2.3.5.3 Human Identity
Finally, for many respondents, talking about money matters gave rise to issues of 
agency and thus lead to a profound questioning of what it means to be hiunan. 
Tliroughout this analysis, we have already encountered numerous examples in which 
money issues were linlced to questions of human identity. For instance, recall the 
passages where respondents touched upon moral concerns (e.g. quote 14) or engaged in 
‘strong evaluation’ (e.g. see quote 19, 47 or 60), that is, in reflective evaluations of 
their own desires. As already mentioned, such evaluations -  according to Taylor (1985) 
-  relate to questions about the ‘kind of beings’ we are or want to be and they are 
therefore inextricably linlced to our notions of agency and of what malces us human; in 
other words, “a reflection on the Icind of beings we are takes to the centie of our 
existence as agents” (Taylor, 1985, p. 26). It could thus also be argued that many of the 
response extiacts cited in Section 2.3.3, where the role of values in the money-identity 
linlc was discussed, attest to the significance of money matters for people’s 
vmderstandmg of their identity on a human level.
Whilst, in the examples mentioned above references to hmnan identity often 
remained somewhat implicit, there were also cases where issues relating to ‘being 
hmnan’ were discussed more explicitly. Consider, for instance, the following extract:
(68) [...] Attd so, actually I  think money is a myth. Is a mythological monster.
I t ’s like some (.) monster which devours people’s (..) bravery and their 
souls and their hopes and their dreams. (.) Or they give it, they give 
themselves to. There’s actually like lots o f the, the, the, the false gods in 
our society money, religion whatever (.) em (.) they, they (.) they, they 
require votir soul. [ . . . ]  ( A n n e ,  4 5 )
Here, as in many of the passages cited in Section 2.3.4.2, money is seen as potentially 
subverting what makes us human -  oin “bravery and [our] soids and [our] hopes and 
[our] dreams” -  by seducing us into accepting false promises and into believing what is 
not real or has no meaning f  money is a myth”, “like lots o f the false gods in our 
society”).
But how, then, does one cope with this danger of subversion? hi some instances, like in 
this respondent’s case, the tlneat money is seen to pose to one’s humanity is 
transcended -  at least rhetorically -  by denying that money possesses any meaning, or 
even reality, at all:
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(69) [ . . . ]  I  am (..) a fundamental part o f  the fabric o f creation. I  am (.) 
absolutely (.) fundamentally necessary? to this universe. And without fine 
(.) this universe woidd not be what it fis. (.) And that goes fo r  everybody. It 
also goes fo r  probably every little mote o f dust and plant. It, that, but, but 
the fact is (.) I  am aware. I  am aware o f fthat. And so how can money 
fpossiblv. in any? way, ever reflect (.) in its (...) meaning, I  mean i t ’s hard 
to, I  mean what, I  dp have a great deal o f  (.) o f (.) I  think it is such a (.) em 
(.) what’s that word, I  come to it, fatuous ’ -  i t ’s fatuous. Money doesn’t -  
i t ’s not real. fCompared to ()  the fabulousness o f  mp (.) and this universe 
(.) it should be a tool (.) i f  fanything but i t ’s become a (.) i t ’s become (.) 
chains, a ball o f chains fo r  people. Much worse than that, i t ’s become a big 
dark cage. And I  think i t ’s a significant cause fo r deep unhappiness (.) 
amongst people throughout the fworld. Em but to a certain extent they? buy 
finto it. I  mean, there is choice being made. Em (.) because you can buy 
into it and give away?your fsoul. [ . . . ]  ( A n n e ,  4 5 )
Here, the ‘realness’ of money is refuted ( f i t ’s fatuous”, “i t ’s not real”) by a comparison 
to what is seen to be of genuine value ( f compared to the fabulousness o f  me and this 
universe”). In this maimer, a particulai' fonnulation of what it is to be human is reached 
and its assertion becomes dissociated from monetary concerns (“/  am a fimdamental 
part o f  the fabric o f creation”). But again, as in many earlier examples, the tlneat to 
one’s humanity seems ever-present (“you can buy into it and give away your soul”) and 
thus requires vigilance over one’s choices (('there is choice being made”', see also quote 
21).
A similai' -  but perhaps more radical -  attempt to offset the potential danger of 
subversion that is posed by money, relates to the distinction between ‘materiality’ and 
‘spirituality’ refeired to earlier (see Section 2.3.1.3). As already indicated, in some 
instances, the ‘reality’ or importance of the material sphere -  with money as its 
symbolic manifestation -  was simply denied:
(70) [...] The illusion is that we think it [money] provides us with what we need.
But that’s because w e’re really caught up in the focus being on the 
physical world, the material world, instead o f our spiritual natures. That, 
that’s where our lives need faddressing. We need to address ourselves 
spiritually and emotionally. And the physical world is a fplay-out o f where 
we are spiritually and emotionally, and where our beliefs are. So (.) our 
fbeliefs are being reflected in the physical world. And that’s the 
opportunity? to fsee ourselves. But instead o f  looking at ourselves, we are 
looldng at money and what it provides and the physical and material world 
and saying ‘that will dp that will provide for me, I  will have this comfort 
zone o f  money ’. [...] (G e o r  g e , 4 7 )
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Here, money is associated with a focus on the material world and thus with being 
“caught up” in “illusion”, hi other words, the physical world is reduced to a mere 
mirror image of the spiritual realm. The interesting point to note here is that, for this 
respondent, talldng about money not only raised spiritual issues but, in doing so, also 
brought forth an entire ‘theory’ of selfliood. His references to “our spiritual natures” as 
well as his earlier assertion tliat “your true personal power is in your spiritual nature, 
in your true inner nature” (see quote 9) offer a particular definition of the ‘self. Here, 
‘selfliood’ is dissociated firom any material conditions and exclusively located within 
the ‘spiritual realm’, hi the process of doing so -  somewhat paradoxically -  yet another 
notion of the ‘core se lf is bom.
2 . 4  D i s c u s s i o n
The key issue this study set out to explore was whether or not, on an experiential 
level, attitudes towards money and the meanmgs attached to it relate to notions of 
‘selfliood’. With this objective in mind, two specific research questions were posed, 
namely 1) what are the subjective meanings of money and 2) are these meanings 
associated with subjective notions of identity -  and, if  so, in what ways.
A qualitative analysis of the interview materials demonstrated that there was 
considerable variation with regard to what money meant to different respondents; in 
addition, the monetary meanings that emerged were often tied to discussions of 
particular financial practices, hi their talk about the financial issues affecting their 
everyday lives, participants frequently described money as a ‘means to an end’ and also 
associated it with the notions o f ‘firoedom’ and ‘power’. Whilst respondents’ use of the 
latter tenns seemingly overlapped with the dimensions of meaning firoquently refened 
to in psychometiic enquiries (e.g. Fimiliam 1984; Tang, 1992; 1993), the present 
findings indicate that these meanings, as well as the degiee to which they aie endorsed, 
cannot always be taken for granted. Participants did not hold fixed positions -  or 
‘attitudes’ -  with regard to these particular constructions of money, histead, subjective 
understandings of money were often construed in dilemmatic tenus. For instance, 
whilst money was seen to gi*ant power and heedom by some, others regarded it as a 
threat to their liberty. More often than not, however, both these notions were found to 
co-exist; in other words, the subjective meanings attached to money not only differed
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between participants but were also found to vary within individual responses and, in 
some cases, were evoked for distinctly discmsive pui*poses.
As pointed out earlier, Billig (1996) has maintained that the nature of ‘thinldng’ is 
dialogic and thus comprises contrary or dilemmatic themes. It could be argued that the 
examples of the subjective meanings of money cited in the above analysis provide a 
glimpse of this kind of thought. As thinking -  and thus talking -  about money in terms 
of ‘freedom’ or ‘power’ generated various dilemmas for respondents, money could be 
viewed to provide a platfonn for rehearsing rhetorical thought.
Furthennore, the present analysis demonstrated the degree to which the subjective 
meanings attached to money were linlced to participants’ imderstandiiig of themselves. 
Notions of identity were central in respondents’ constructions of money’s role in their 
everyday lives. Money matters, in turn, related to subjective notions of ‘selfhood’ in 
different ways. Money and identity were linked across different dimensions of identity 
(‘self, ‘other’ and ‘social relations’) as well as at different levels of identity abstraction 
(personal, social and human). One explanation for the obseiwed riclmess of ‘identity 
talk’ within the interviews related to the finding that respondents’ reflections on 
financial issues inevitably gave rise to considerations of what they regarded to be of 
importance in their lives. In other words, talldng about money was inextricably linlced 
to the expression of personal values and notions of moral agency.
Yet, the relationship between money matters and participants’ values seemed 
profoimdly dilemmatic wliich, in turn, was also miiTored by people’s understandings of 
how money was thought to impinge upon their identities. Money was seen to provide a 
possibility for ‘self-enhancement as well as constituting a potential tlneat to selfliood 
and its expression, hi many instances, both these notions were articulated 
simultaneously. As was the case with different constructions of money meanings, 
participants’ positions with regard to their understandings of the relationship between 
money and identity were often deeply ambivalent.
The findings drawn from this qualitative analysis raise a number of pertinent 
questions with the regard to the issues discussed in Chapter I and thus for the overall 
objective of this thesis. For instance, whilst there was a degree of overlap between the 
identity dimensions refened to here and those typically involved in economic 
psychological research (e.g. social class), the analysis of respondents’ talk suggests the
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existence of a far more complex and subtle link between issues of selfhood and money 
than is possible to capture by references to demographic group membership alone. As 
was argued earlier, when social categories or demographic groups are included in 
psychometric studies of attitudes towards money, the use of this particular 
methodological approach necessitates that identity is imposed a priori and therefore 
‘freezes ’ people in terms of their social positioning. As a consequence, the ways in 
which people actively engage in constructing their identities -  as well as the variability 
that can be fomid within these constiuctions -  is overlooked.
Another issue that would have gone umioticed within a quantitative approach to 
monetary meanings or attitudes -  but which seemed crucial in the present context -  
was that references to identity not simply involved an individual’s social positioning 
but also constituted a moral category. A striking feature of the majority of interviews 
was the degree to which participants’ discussions of monetaiy matters were linlced to 
questions of what ‘kind of person’ -  or quality of agent -  they were or wanted to be. hi 
other words, talking about the role of money in everyday life gave rise to issues of a 
moral nature.
However, this is not to suggest that the present qualitative approach is without its 
shortcomings. For instance, the sample size of this study was comparatively small and 
there was also a considerable age imbalance, given that the majority of respondents fell 
into an age bracket between 40 and 60 years. This may have led to an over-emphasis of 
particular constmctions of money meanings at the expense of others. As is often the 
case with qualitative work, no claims as to the generalisability of the present findings 
can be made. We will retiun to discuss this issue in gi'eater detail in Chapter VII (see 
Section 7.1.1).
2.4.1 Summary
This intei*view study has illustrated the ambivalence and variability that 
chai'acterises people’s attitudes towaids money and the meanings they ascribe to it. 
This qualitative analysis has also pointed towards the existence of a close linlc between 
money matters and questions of identity, thus indicating that a person’s ‘position’ on 
money can only be imderstood in conjunction with the particular identity concerns that 
are pertinent at the time. The identity issues that were raised in people’s discussions
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around money matters related to ‘selfliood’ in different ways and thus were also found 
to be variable -  both between and within cases.
The following chapters will concentrate on this notion of variability by focusing on 
the ‘se lf at the intemiediate level of abstraction, namely social identity, hi doing so, 
we aim to explore the question of whether it is possible to systematically vary social 
identification and, in doing so, bring about changes in attitudes towai'ds money. To this 
end, a series of studies is presented in which we a) manipulate the identity that is 
salient in a given context (Chapter III), b) explore the valions meanings ascribed to a 
paiticular social category (Chapter IV) and c) vary the comparative context in which a 
given identity is salient (Chapter V). Since the interview findings bear witness to the 
existence of a Ihik between money and identity, it is now time to examine whether 
changes in self-definition lead to changes in the perceived value of money.
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III. So c ia l  Id e n t it y  a n d  M o n e y : Id e n t it y  Sa l ie n c e  
AND M o n e t a r y  A t t it u d e s
3 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The study outlined in this chapter aimed to addiess the first two research questions 
that were put foiward at the end of Chapter I (see Section 1.5): Are attitudes towards 
money a fimction of identity processes? And do the ways in wliich people value money 
vaiy when different identities are salient? hi posing these questions, we set out to 
explore two key theoretical issues:
1) Can we manipulate subjective identification? And if so, does this have an effect 
on the value people attribute to money?
2) Does social identification -  as opposed to sociological group membership -  
play a role in the subjective valuation of money?
In order to address these questions, social identities had to be chosen that were 
meaningfully related to beliefs concerning money. As indicated previously, some 
studies have foimd significant gender differences in attitudes towards money. Furnliam 
(1984), for example, foiuid gender differences on tlnee of his six factors {Obsession, 
Security and Effort/Ability), with men scoring significantly higher than women on 
these. Lymi (1991), using Fimiliam’s five highest loading Obsession items as a 
Valuation o f Money scale, foimd similai- gender differences in his sample. Tang (1995) 
also concluded that men were more likely than women to endorse what he refers to as 
the Money Ethic', that is, men appeared to attribute greater subjective value to money. 
On the basis of these findings, gender was chosen to provide one of the identity 
dimensions in the present experimental fr amework.
As already discussed, gender differences in the meanings or value ascribed to 
money have usually been regarded as a relatively stable function o f an individual’s 
‘objective’ group membership. The Social Identity tradition, however, argues that a 
person’s social (or group) identity also possesses a psychological, subjective dimension 
and, as such, it is seen as context dependent. As described in Chapter I, within this 
tradition, the attitudes and values endorsed by an individual aie regarded as a function 
of identity processes; that is, they are thought to vaiy according to which identity is
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salient. In keeping with this logic, it is theoretically possible that differences between 
gi'oups with regard to certain attitudes or values may only be expressed -  or even exist 
-  when particular gioup identities are salient; yet, when another, perhaps common 
identity becomes relevant for group members’ self-definitions, such between-gioup 
distinctions may disappear.
Given that a student sample could be accessed with relative ease, identification with 
‘being a student’ (student identity) was selected to provide the second identity 
dimension for the purposes of this study. It was assmiied that ‘being a student’ 
provided the two sub-groups in the present sample (i.e. men and women) with a 
common category for self-identification and would thus allow for the above-mentioned 
theoretical issues to be tackled.
The overall design of the present study thus entailed two experimental conditions, 
in which either gender or student identity was emphasised. Following Social Identity 
tenets, differences in the perceived value of money between male and female 
participants were expected imder conditions in which their contiasting group identities 
were salient (‘women’ versus ‘men’), but not under conditions in which self-definition 
could be derived from membership in the same social category (‘student’).
3.1.1 Research Hypotheses
On this basis of previous research findings and theoretical predictions drawn fr om 
the Social Identity tradition, oui' overall hypotheses were therefore as follows:
Hvpothesis 1: Overall, men will value money more highly than women. {Main Effect)
Hvpothesis 2 : Wlien gender identity is rendered salient, men will attribute greater 
subjective value to money than women. However, when student identity 
is salient, these gender differences in the valuation of money will 
disappear. {Interaction)
To recap the present argimient, it is suggested that seemingly ‘objective’ differences 
between groups only exist under certain conditions of identity salience, hr other words, 
we expect an overall main effect for gender to be qualified by the interaction predicted 
above.
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3 . 2  M e t h o d
3.2.1 Design and Materials
hi order to addiess the reseaich hypotheses, a questionnaire was designed. The 
questionnaire encompassed an identity manipulation in the form of a cover sheet (see 
Appendix III.a), a money attitude scale as well as a social identification measure (see 
Appendix in.b). Participants’ gender was also noted as it constituted one of the 
experimental factors.
The overall design of this study was a 2 x 2 between-subjects Anova; the first factor 
was provided by respondents’ actual Gender (male / female), whilst the second factor, 
Condition, comprised two experimental salience manipulations {Gender Condition and 
Student Condition, for description see below).
3.2.1.1 The Money Attitude Scale
As aheady indicated, there has been a trend within economic psychology towards 
taxonomising attitudes towards money; as a consequence, great emphasis has been 
placed on the exploration of the factorial, multidimensional nature of different money 
attitude scales. Yet, there are disparities in findings with regard to the factorial 
dimensions believed to be involved in measuring money attitudes. These disparities 
can persist even when the same attitude scale is used with different samples (see e.g. 
Bailey et al., 1994).
For the present piuposes, the aim was to develop a relatively short and accessible 
instmnent that would provide a gauge of the extent to which people value money. 
Here, the main emphasis lay on the importance attached to money in general and the 
perceived significance of accumulating money in particular, hi other words, we were 
not concerned with the multidhnensionality of symbolic meanings; instead, the focus 
was on one particular aspect of meaning, namely the subjectively perceived value of 
having or accumulating money\
A pool of 50 attitude statements was generated on the basis of the psychological 
literature on money and on account of several infoimal interviews. All of these 
statements invoked aspects of the subjectively perceived value or importance of 
money. A number of these items had been adapted from previous scales: Items 6, 8 and
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12 in the final scale were modified versions of statements used by Fumliam (1984) and 
Items 7, 9 and 13 were adapted from Tang’s (1992) Money Ethic Scale (see Appendix 
Ill.b). All items had been re-pluased several times before they were presented to a 
small sample of judges to be assessed for their suitability as measures of the perceived 
value of money. On the basis of these judgements, out of the original item pool, 20 
attitude statements were retained for preliminary testing with a pilot sample (N = 30). 
As a result of this piloting procedme, a fiu'ther two items were excluded because of 
their low item-to-total correlations^. The standardised reliability coefficient for the 
remaining 18 statements which were chosen for inclusion in the final questiomiaire was 
a  = .758.
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the attitude statements on a 7- 
point Likert-type scale (where 1 = “stirongly disagree”, 2 = “disagree”, 3 = “somewhat 
disagree”, 4 = “undecided”, 5 = “somewhat agree”, 6 = “agiee” and 7 = “strongly 
agi'ee”). Care was taken to cormterbalance the attitude statements: nine items expressed 
a viewpoint in which money was valued highly and the remaining nine statements 
reflected a perception o f money as relatively insignificant. A point worth noting here is 
that with many previous measuies there have been no attempts to counterbalance items. 
The possible range of scores for the whole scale was 18 (representing a low valuation 
of money) to 126 (indicating a high value attached to money), with the scores of the 9 
negative items reversed, hi the final statistical analysis, the mean of the scores for the 
whole scale was computed to represent the degree to which paificipants valued money 
{money attitude). This rendered a possible range of scores between 1 and 7 (with ‘7’ 
indicating high subjective valuation of money) for each respondent.
3.2.1.2 Identity Manipulations
This study comprised two experimental -  or ‘identity salience’ -  conditions, hi the 
first condition {Gender Condition), gender was rendered salient as a categoiy for self­
definition; that is, participants were induced to approach the attitude statements fiom 
their perspective as women or men. In the second condition {Student Condition),
‘ The notion of money we tried to capture here corresponded, in certain aspects, to Furnliam’s (1984) 
factor Obsession or Tang’s (1992, 1993, 1995) factors Good and Freedom (Power).
" It should, however, be noted tliat some items were retained (given the relatively small size of the pilot 
sample) despite their low item-to-total correlations as they seemed to address theoretically important 
aspects of the subjective value of money.
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Student identity was invoked as a conimon category for the self-understanding of these 
men and women; that is, participants were prompted to respond from their point of 
view as ‘students’. To this end, different coversheets were designed for each condition 
(see Appendix III.a and Ill.b). hi both conditions, the coversheet contained the 
following introduction;
“Money plays a peivasive role in all our lives. Yet, people differ greatly 
with regard to what money means to them. The degree to which we value 
money, the importance we attach to it, seems to depend on who we are. ”
hi the Gender Condition, this introduction was then followed by a more detailed 
description of the puipose of the study:
“This study is about people’s attitudes towards money. We are particularly 
interested in the relationship between gender and money. Do men and 
women think about money in the same ways? Do they value money 
differently? ”
In the Student Condition, this description read as follows:
“This study is about young people’s attitudes towards money. We are 
particularly interested in the relationship betw?een people’s occupation and 
money. Currently, we are comparing young people infidl-time employment 
with students. Do young people who opt fo r  full-time employment rather 
than going to university think about money in the same ways as students?
Do they value money differently? ”
Since social identity salience is regarded as an outcome of inter-group coniparison(s) 
(see Chapter I), “young people in full-time employment” were introduced as a 
comparison out-gioup here. This was to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of 
intra-gi'oup compaiisons among students which, in timi, could have led to an emphasis 
on personal identity rather than social category membership.
hi addition to these variations in the introductory text according to condition, 
giaphic illustrations, such as different logos representing the comparisons between men 
and women or between students and young employed persons, were used both on the 
coversheet and throughout the questionnaire to support the manipulations of identity 
salience (see Appendix Ill.b). However, the money attitude scale as well as the 
identification scale used (see below) were identical for both conditions.
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3.2.1.3 Identification Scale
111 order to be able to assess whether or not the identity manipulations were 
successful, the questiomiaire also included an identification scale. Respondents were 
asked to indicate on a 7-point scale a) how important both their gender and their degree 
course / studies were in terms of their self-perception (where 1 = “not important at all” 
and 7 = “very important”) and b) how firoquently they thought of themselves in terms 
of their gender or their studies / degree course (where 1 = “never”, 3 = “sometimes” 
and 7 = “always”).  ^ hi the Gender Condition, the plnase “your studies” was used, 
whilst the expression employed in the Student Condition was “your degiroe course”. 
These plirases were chosen to reflect the fact that, depending on the comparison 
outgi'oups, slightly varying linguistic expressions are often used to describe the same 
ingroup identity. For the pmpose of measuring identification with ‘being a student’, 
“yoin studies” and “yom degree course” were regarded as synonymous.
For each respondent, the mean score on these items was computed to represent the 
degiroe of identification with their gender {gender identity) and with ‘being a student’ 
{stiident identity?). The possible range of these two indices of identification was 1 
(indicating no identification) to 7 (representative of a very high degiroe of 
identification).
3.2.2 Participants
A total of 160 luidergi'aduate students attending a Scottish university took part in 
this study: 34 participants were male and 125 were female (gender data for one 
respondent was missing). Respondents’ ages ranged firom 17 to 45 years, with a mean 
age of 19.5 years. Participants were recruited during first and second-year modules on 
psychological research methods."^ Due to multiple missing data, four respondents were 
excluded before analysis commenced, thus reducing the initial sample size to 156.
3.2.3 Procedure
The questionnaires were filled in either at the beginning or at the end of class 
sessions. As already indicated, there were two different conditions, hi the first
’ A number of additional items ( ‘nationality’, ‘religion’ and ‘politics’) were included as filler items; 
these were omitted from flirtlier analyses.
I l l
Chapter U!
condition, gender was rendered salient whereas in the second condition student identity 
was emphasised, hi the first condition, the study was introduced as a comparison 
between men and women with regard to their attitudes towards money. The 
investigator explained her general interest in money-related issues (e.g. “How much do 
people value money?” ”Hom> important is money to us?”) and emphasised her 
particular concern with the question of gender and its association with the perceived 
value of money. Before the conesponding questiomiaires were handed out, it was 
stressed that participation was not obligatory and that respondents were fi*ee to opt out 
at any time. Participants were then instructed to caiefiilly read the cover sheet before 
completing the questiomiaire. The identical procedure applied in the second condition; 
here, the only crucial difference was that the study was introduced as a comparison of 
young adults in full-time employment with university students as regards then- 
respective attitudes towards money.
Participants were encouraged to comment on the questionnaire. They were also 
given a full debriefing with regard to the puipose of the study. Questions that arose 
during and after the testing were answered, hi addition, a handout providing an 
explanation of the study’s imderlying rationale was disti'ibuted at the end of each 
session.
3.3 R esults
3.3.1 Questionnaire Items & Scale Reliability
Reliability for the 18 attitude statements addressing the subjectively perceived 
importance of money was high, with a Cronbach’s standardised reliability coefficient 
of a  = .806. However, Item 8 (“/  often feel inferior to others who have more money 
than I  have ....”) and Item 14 (“Otte doesn’t have to be clever to make a lot o f money”) 
were characterised by relatively low conelations with the overall scale (r = .238 and r 
= .143 respectively)^. These two items were consequently excluded from further 
analysis. Cronbach’s standardised reliability coefficient for the remaining 16 items was 
a  = .813, allowing for the treatment of the attitude statements as a scale. The reliability 
coefficient obtained indicated that the scale was measuring a homogeneous construct.
Given the stiuctiue of the Scottish degree programme, respondents were not necessarily Honours 
students in psychology but came from a wider background of academic disciplines.
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Thus, for each participant a money attitude score was computed by calculating the 
mean of his/her scores on these 16 items. As already indicated, a mean score of ‘ 1 ’ was 
indicative of a very low level of subjective valuation, whereas a mean score o f ‘7’ 
represented a very high degree of importance attributed to money.
For the two items assessing the significance of gender for self-perception, 
Cronbach’s standardised reliability coefficient was a  = .748. The mean score on these 
items rendered a single index, the gender identity score, which allowed for the 
assessment of participants’ identification with their gender (where ‘1 ’ represented no 
identification with gender and ‘7’ a very high degree of gender identification).
The two items evaluating the role of participants’ studies (or degree course) in terms of 
their understandings of themselves rendered a standardised reliability coefficient of a  = 
.759. By computing the mean score on these two items an overall indicator for a 
respondent’s degree of identification with ‘being a student’, the student identity score, 
was obtained (again with ‘1’ indicating a lack of identification and ‘7’ a high degree of 
identification),
3.3.2 M anipulation C heck
I d e n t i t y  S a l i e n c e
Table 3.1 shows the mean identification scores for in each experimental condition. 
Table 3.1 Means (Standard Deviations) for Gender Identity and Student Identity Scores by Condition
I d e n t if ic a t io n
S c o r e s
Gender Identity 
Student Identity
C o n d i t i o n  
Salient Identity
G ender Student
5.061 4.523
(1.161) (1.450)
4.811 5.455
(1.306)_________ (.976)
Respondents’ student identity scores were significantly higher in the student condition 
than in the gender condition {tis4 = -3.371, p < .001). Conversely, participants in the 
gender condition scored higher on the gender identity measure than did their 
counterparts in the student condition. The difference in gender identity scores between 
the two experimental conditions also reached statistical significance (f/54 = 2.574, p < 
.05).
The criterion value for exclusion was r < .25.
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At first glance, the overall directions of the mean identification scores seem to indicate 
that the identity manipulations employed in this study were relatively successful. It is 
interesting to note, however, that whilst respondents in the student condition scored 
significantly higher on the student identity? index than on the gender identity? measure 
{tô5 = -4.284, p < .001), there was no significant difference between gender identity? and 
student identity? scores in the gender condition {tsg = 1.703 n.s.). In other words, gender 
did not become a significantly more salient categoiy for self-definition than student 
identity. On the basis of these findings, the effectiveness of the identity manipulations 
seems somewhat less clear, which, in turn, has implications with regard to the analyses 
presented in the following sections.
3.3.3 Identity and the Subjective Utility of Money
hi order to examine whether the subjective value attributed to money varies as a 
fimction of identity salience, the data were analysed by a 2 x 2 between-subj ects 
Analysis of Vaiiance. Gender (men and women) and Condition (student condition and 
gender condition) were entered as factors, with money? attitude as the dependent 
variable. The first hypothesis specified a main effect for Gender, proposing that men, 
overall, value money more highly than women. On the basis of our second hypothesis 
-  namely that a) men attribute greater subjective value to money than women when 
gender identity is salient and that b) gender differences in the valuation of money 
disappear when student identity is emphasised -  we predicted a significant interaction 
between Gender and Condition, hi other words, we expected tlie Gender main effect to 
be qualified by an interaction between Gender and Condition.
No statistical evidence for a Gender main effect was foimd (F(ij52)= .949 n.s.). The 
difference between men (3.947) and women’s (3.804) money? attitude scores was 
statistically negligible. There was also no significant main effect for Condition 
(F(ri52)= .998 U.S.). Respondents whose gender identity was rendered salient did not 
significantly differ firom respondents for whom student identity was emphasised with 
regard to tlie subjective value they attached to money (3.842 and 3.824 for the gender 
and student condition respectively).
Finally, the predicted interaction between Gender and Condition was not statistically 
significant (F(i,i52) = 2.010, p = .158). However, as Table 3.2 shows the mean money? 
attitude scores for men and women in both conditions went in the predicted direction.
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Table 3.2 Means (Standard Deviations) for Money Attitude Scores by Gender and Condition
Salient G e n d e r
c Identity Male FemaleI “ a
(.979) (.752)
There was a trend towards greater disparity between men and women’s scores under 
conditions in which identification with gender was rendered salient {tgs = 1.854, p = 
.067), than under conditions where participants’ common identity as students was 
emphasised {t64 = -.283, n.s.).
Whilst these results do not lend statistical support to our research hypotheses, the 
above analysis must be treated with caution as it fails to meet two principal 
assumptions underlying the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) procedure, namely 
homogeneity of variance (see Table 3.2) and equal group size (see Section 3.3.3.1 
below).
On account of the early ‘Monte Carlo’ simulations (e.g. Norton, 1952 cited in Boneau, 
1971) ANOVA has become viewed as remarkably robust with respect to departures 
from its fundamental assumptions. Yet, although unequal cell sizes or differences in 
group variability do not present problems for statistical analysis per se, more recent 
simulations suggest that their concurrence can seriously undermine the reliability of 
ANOVA results, both in terms of increased Type I and Type II error rates (e.g. Boneau, 
1971; Mycroft, Mitchell & Kay, 2002). In other words, ANOVA is robust with regard 
to violations of its underlying assumptions provided that group sizes are kept constant 
(Mitchell, 2003; Mycroft, Mitchell & Kay, 2002). Thus far, the importance of equal 
cell sizes when group differences in variability exist has been demonstrated for main 
effects only. The question of how, exactly, interaction results might be affected by the 
concurrence of heterogeneity of variance and differences in group size has remained 
unexplored; their reliability, however, it is likely to prove even more problematic than 
for main effects (Mitchell, 2003; personal communication).
These considerations led to the analytical adjustments outlined in the following sub­
section and to a re-run of the original test for our research hypotheses.
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3.3 .3 .1  A n a ly t ic a l  A d ju s tm e n t
S a m p l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
The majority of respondents (78.8%) were female; male respondents constituted 
less than a quarter of the sample (21.2%). Although an unequal gender distribution is 
characteristic of undergraduate psychology courses, as indicated above, this disparity 
posed a potential difficulty in so far as it resulted in an uneven number of male and 
female respondents in each experimental condition (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Condition and Gender Crosstabulation
a Salient G e n d e r
Z Identity Male Female
Se Gender 16 74oU Student 17 49
The unequal gender distribution across experimental cells was also due to the fact that 
this study was carried out during class sessions rather than in a laboratory setting.
To circumvent the statistical problems posed by this unbalanced distribution in 
conjunction with the problem of heterogeneity, we opted for a random deletion of cases 
in order to match cell sizes (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, p. 48). Several such 
random deletions were carried out so as to avoid drawing chance conclusions. The 
statistical findings derived from these sub-samples showed a high degree of overlap 
(see Appendix III.c) and did not substantially differ from the results presented below, 
which were derived from the first random deletion of cases^. Table 3.4 depicts the 
distribution of respondents across experimental cells on which the subsequent 
statistical analyses were based.
Table 3.4 Condition and Gender Crosstabulation after Random Deletion of Cases
s Salient G e n d e r
Identity M ale Female
■oB Gender 16 17OU Student 17 17
R e - A n a l y s i s
This reduced data set was used to examine whether the subjective valuation of 
money changes as a function of identity salience. We re-ran the above-described 2 x 2
 ^ In addition, the pattern of results reported in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 was replicated with the sub­
sample of respondents.
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between-subjects Analysis of Variance, with Gender (men and women) and Condition 
(student condition and gender condition) as factors and money attitude as the 
dependent variable.
As previously, no statistical evidence for any main effects was found, neither for 
Gender (F(i,63)= 157 n.s.) nor for Condition (F(i,63)= 141 n.s.). The difference between 
men (3.947) and women’s (3.877) money attitude scores was statistically negligible, as 
was the difference between respondents whose gender identity was rendered salient 
and participants for whom student identity was emphasised (3.871 and 3.950 for the 
gender and student condition respectively).
The predicted interaction between Gender and Condition, however, was significant 
(F(i,63)= 4.960, p < .050). Table 3.5 shows the mean money attitude scores for men and 
women in both conditions.
Table 3.5  Means (Standard Deviations) for Money’Attitude Scores by Gender and Condition
Salient G e n d e r
0 Identity M ale Fem ale1 s %
As hypothesised, we found a significant difference between men and women’s scores 
when their gender identity was rendered salient (G/ = 2.097, p < .05) but not under 
conditions in which their common student identity was emphasised {ts2 = -1.180 n.s.). 
This interaction provided evidence in support of our second hypothesis and, therefore, 
of the notion that the subjective value ascribed to money can vary as a function of 
identity processes.
Yet, whilst male respondents attached greater value to money in the gender condition 
than in the student condition, the reverse was true for female participants. Women’s 
money attitude scores were, in fact, significantly higher in the student condition than in 
the gender condition (O2 = -2.033, p = .05) whereas, for male participants, this 
difference between conditions was not significant (Gy = 1.199 n.s.). This latter finding 
accounted for the absence of an overall effect for gender. It was also indicative of a 
more complex relationship than had originally been anticipated between gender, 
student identity salience and attitudes towards money.
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3.3.4 Post-hoc Exploratory Analyses
The gender identity and student identity indices used in this study were primarily 
intended to gauge whether or not the experimental salience manipulations had 
succeeded. As already pointed out, the findings concerning the actual effectiveness of 
the manipulations remained somewhat ambiguous, especially in view of the fact that 
participants’ student identity scores were relatively high across both experimental 
conditions.
However, in addition to then function as manipulation checks, scores on the gender 
identity} and student identity} scales also provided some measure of respondents’ 
subjective identification with ‘objectively’ defined groups (i.e. men / women, 
students). It therefore seemed appropriate to draw on participants’ gender identity and 
student identity scores in a post-hoc analysis, as they allowed us to further explore the 
relationship between social identity processes and the subjective valuation of money. 
The following post-hoc tests focus on the overall role these social identification 
measures played within this paiticulaf experimental design.
3.3.4.1 Social Identification, Gender and Attitudes Towards Money
There were no significant differences between women and men concerning the 
extent to which they endorsed their gender identity {tes -  -1.248 n.s.). However, there 
was a significant difference between male and female respondents with regard to the 
degiee to which they identified as students {tes = -2.477, p < .05); women’s student 
identity scores were significantly higher (5.490) than men’s (4.788). 
hi addition, a median split on the student identity index, which allowed each participant 
to be classified as either a Tow student identifier’ or ‘high student identifier’, revealed 
that there was a difference between high student identifiers (4.280) and low student 
identifiers (3.627) with regard to the importance they attached to money. Respondents 
who strongly identified with ‘being a student’ valued money significantly more than 
respondents for whom their student identity was less important (G? = -3.201, p < .01). 
Again, this post-hoc finding was in line with the general claim that subjective 
identification processes are involved in the valuation of money.
The post-hoc gender difference on the student identity measure, alongside the
differences found between high and low student identifiers on the money attitude
index, suggested that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables
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was more complex than had initially been anticipated. These post-hoc results also 
hinted towards an alternative statistical approach to the research hypotheses.
3.3 .4 .2  A n a ly s is  o f  C o v a r ia n c e
In order to tease out any effect this unanticipated gender difference in student 
identification may have had on the subjective valuation of money, a post-hoc 2 x 2  
between-subjects Analysis of Covariance was carried out. As in the previous analysis. 
Gender and Condition were entered as factors, whilst student identity scores were 
treated as a covariate; respondents’ mean money attitude provided the dependent 
variable.
As before, no main effects for Condition (F(i,62)= -133 n.s.) or Gender (F(i,62)=  1.640 
n.s.) were found. There was a significant effect for the covariate student identity (F(i,62) 
= 8.214, p = .01), as was expected on the basis of the post-hoc results described above. 
When student identity scores were controlled for, the significance level for the 
predicted interaction between Gender and Condition increased. This interaction (F(iy,2) 
= 6.459, p < .05) is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Estimated Marginal Means for Money Attitude Scores
"Female
Gender C ondition
( S a lie n t  Id en tity )
Student
(C o n tr o l)
Table 3.6 shows the estimated marginal means for money attitude when the covariate 
student identity’ was held constant across Gender and Condition.
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Table 3.6 Estimated Marginal Means (Standard EiTor) for Money’Attitude Scores by Gender and Condition**
C o n d it io n G e n d e r
Salient Identity M ale Fem ale TOTAL
G ender 4.303 3.600 3.951(1 9 5 1 (.180) (.131)
Student 3.774 3.991 1.883
(Control) (.179) (.185) (. 129)
TOTAL 4.039(.132)
3.796
(.130)
**Evaluated at covariate student identity = 5.142.
With Student identity scores held constant, there was an overall tendency (although not 
significant) for male participants to attribute greater value to money than female 
respondents. When identification with one’s own gender was emphasised, again with 
student identity being held constant, there was a significant difference between women 
and men’s money attitude scores; this difference, however, disappeared when ‘being a 
student’ became the salient category for se lf  definition.
3 . 4  D i s c u s s i o n
This study tackled two closely related theoretical questions; 1) Can identity be 
manipulated and, if so, does it affect the valuation of money? 2) Is there a link between 
the value people attribute to money and their subjective sense of identity (as opposed to 
their sociological group membership)? To address these broader issues, two specific 
hypotheses were proposed -  with gender and student identity providing their 
theoretical framework -  which explored this link between identity and attitudes 
towards money.
Whilst the present findings cannot be treated as altogether unequivocal (see Section
3.3.3 above), there was some evidence in support of the hypothesis that the disparity in 
men and women’s attitudes towards money is greater when they are defined in terms of 
their gender than when a common social category (being a student) provides the basis 
for self-definition. In the modified sample, male respondents attached greater value to 
money when their gender identity was salient than when their identity as students was 
emphasised. The converse was true for female respondents who attached less value to 
money when they were defined in terms of their gender than when their identity as 
students was drawn attention to.
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Interestingly, and contrary to predictions, there was no significant overall difference 
between men and women with regard to the subjective valuation of money. The 
absence of a gender main effect was indicative of an actual reversal of the mean 
differences found imder the gender salience condition for respondents prompted to self- 
categorise as ‘students’. In the student condition, women’s money attitude scores 
exceeded the scores of their male counteiparts, although this difference was not 
statistically significant. This reversal in the direction of scores was, to some extent, 
accounted for by one of the post-hoc findings involving the student identity measure, 
which revealed a significant gender difference on student identity scores. Women’s 
endorsement of their identity as students was significantly greater than men’s. When 
these unexpected gender differences in subjective identification with ‘being a student’ 
were controlled for, the level of significance for the predicted interaction increased, as 
did the F-value for the predicted main effect for gender, although this effect remained 
non-significant.
On the whole, these results provide some suggestive evidence for the notion that 
identity can be manipulated experimentally and that, in doing so, changes in the 
subjective valuation of money can be effected.
A series of post-hoc tests showed that social identification processes and attitudes 
towards money were intimately linked. Participants who strongly identified with the 
social categoiy ‘student’ valued money significantly more than respondents for whom 
their student identity was less important. This finding demonstrates that a diversity of 
values may be revealed beneath seemingly homogeneous attitudes towaids money, 
once the more psychological aspects of gi'oup membership are talcen into account. 
Within-gi'oup differences -  such as those found between high and low student 
identifiers -  will go luuioticed if  group membership is luiderstood solely in objectivist 
temis.
3.4.1 Methodological Limitations
The findings of tins study raise a niunber of methodological questions as regards
the manipulation of social identity salience and the procediual issues related to it.
Mean scores on the social identification measures indicated that both gender and
student identity represented relatively important aspects of participants’ self-definition.
Student identity was endorsed to a significantly greater degiee in the student condition
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than when gender was rendered salient. Conversely, under the gender salience 
condition, respondents reported greater endorsement of their gender identity than in the 
student condition, although this difference did not reach statistical significance.
Whilst these overall differences on the two subjective identification indices 
suggested that the identity manipulations had produced the desired effects, a closer 
examination of the mean scores on these measures within experimental conditions 
revealed an unforeseen pattern, hi the student condition, respondents scored 
significantly higher on the student identity} index than on the gender identity} measure. 
However, there was no such difference between gender identity and student identity 
scores within the gender condition. This means that gender never became a 
significantly more salient category for self-definition than student identity, even imder 
conditions where gender identity was emphasised.
These results pose an interesting question with regaid to when a given identity should 
be considered ‘salient’. On the one hand, identity salience could be regarded as 
absolute, where mean identification scores are expected to exceed a certain tlireshold; 
on the other hand, salience could also be seen as relative, in which case multiple 
identities may be important at any given time, but one paiticular identity becomes 
relatively more salient than the others. With reference to the current results concerning 
identity salience, the manipulations employed in this study appear to be fairly 
successfiil when viewed in absolute terms; their effectiveness in relative temis, 
however, remains more ambiguous. The fact that gender never became a significantly 
more salient category for self-definition than student identity might well have 
contributed to the absence of an overall gender main effect.
Nevertheless, the manipulation check cleaiiy showed that identification with ‘being 
a student’ played a significant role in participants’ self-understandings. Given that 
student identity scores were relatively high in both experimental conditions, it seemed 
plausible that the degiee of identification with ‘being a student’ was, at least in part, 
independent of the experimental manipulations; this, in timi, leads us to a consideration 
of some procedural issues.
One explanation for the apparent salience of student identity across both experimental 
conditions relates to the actual setting in which the study was earned out. With 
hindsight, the physical siuToundings in which the testing took place (i.e. at university, 
in the classroom) were likely to have implicitly accentuated participants’ identity as
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students. Such an implicit emphasis may have counteracted any attempts at rendering 
gender salient. In other words, gender may have failed to become a more important 
categoiy for respondents’ self-miderstandings than student identity simply because of 
the physical setting in which this study took place.
Choosing the classroom as the setting for this research also gave rise to a statistical 
issue that needs to be addiessed. The uneven gender distribution typical for 
undergraduate psychology classes resulted in very imequal nimibers of respondents in 
each experimental cell. This uneven distiibution was counteracted by means of random 
deletion of cases so as to minimise the bias its concurrence with group differences in 
vai'iability would have caused. Whilst this procedure achieved its objective of reducing 
the disparity in actual cell sizes, it also involved a considerable reduction in statistical 
power due to the loss of participants. Ideally, this study would be replicated in a more 
TieutraT environment in which gi'eater and more equal cell sizes can be ensured.
3.4*2 Summary
One of the principal objectives of.this thesis is to challenge the widespread notion 
o f the ‘self as a unitary entity by introducing the concept of social identity into attitude 
research on money. As a first step towards acliieving this goal, the present study 
examined two dimensions of selfliood, namely gender and student identity, and their 
relationship to the perceived value of money.
A modified version of the overall analysis (see Section 3.3.3) as well as post-hoc 
findings suggested that subjective identification processes were implicated in the 
valuation of money. The results provided some evidence in support of the notion that it 
is possible to manipulate identity as a contextual variable and, in doing so, to bring 
about changes in attitudes towards money. The subjective value participants attributed 
to money varied as a fimction of whether their gender or their student identity was 
salient, hi other words, the perceived importance of money changed as respondents’ 
self-definition altered.
These findings raise an interesting question with regard to the group differences foimd 
in previous research. Could these also have been moderated or produced by more 
implicit subjective identification mechanisms? This is an important issue in so far as 
some of the between gioup variations found in eailier studies -  such as the reported
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gender differences -  are by no means unambiguous, since their prevalence has often 
fluctuated from sample to sample.
Social Identity theorists have aigued that subjective identification is important 
because of the meanings particular identities acquire in a given context. We aimed to 
explore this issue in our third overall research question which addressed the 
relationship between meaning (i.e. identity content) and social identification in the 
context of attitudes towards money. Wliilst the findings o f the present study suggested 
that identity processes are, indeed, implicated in the subjective valuation of money, the 
specific ways in which they affected participants’ responses had not been anticipated. 
Contrary to expectations, student identity, rather than identification with gender, was 
closely related to attitudes towards money. We therefore decided to focus on this 
particular identity dimension (i.e. subjective identification with ‘being a student’) in 
pursuing the third reseai*ch question, which we will turn to in the following chapter.
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IV. S o c i a l  I d e n t i t y  a n d  M o n e y :  I d e n t i t y  C o n t e n t  
AND M o n e t a r y  A t t i t u d e s
4 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the previous study, we considered the general question of whether the degree to 
which people value money can be regarded as a relatively stable personal attribute -  as 
implied by eai lier work — or whether the valuation of money should, instead, be seen as 
a function of more subjective identity processes, hr particular, it was suggested that the 
perceived value of money might vaiy as a fimction of which identity is salient in a 
given context.
The results provided suggestive evidence in support of both the claim that subjective 
identification processes are associated with the valuation of money and the notion that 
identity can be treated as a contextual variable. Participants’ attitudes towards money 
changed as a function of whether they , defined themselves as men / women or whether 
they categorised themselves as ‘students’. Men attributed greater value to money than 
women when gender identity was salient, but not under conditions in which student 
identity was emphasised. In addition, a relationship was found between the degiee to 
which participants endorsed their identity as ‘students’ and attitudes towards money. 
Respondents who strongly identified as students valued money significantly more than 
participants for whom their student identity was less important.
As outlined in Chapter I, the Social Identity tradition argues that self-definition as a
member of a particular social categoiy leads to the endorsement of the stereotypic
nomis associated with that category. This, in turn, results in a process of self-
stereotyping in which these nomis become incoiporated into the ‘self, hi other words,
when a particular identity becomes salient, the content of that identity is seen to
stLTicture the individual’s worldview and thus her / his attitudes and behaviour.
Traditionally, social identity theorists have treated the content of identity, within a
specific social context, as an a priori given (see Turner et a l, 1987); that is, any
particular social identity has been regarded to acquire its own idiosyncratic meaning as
a function of the context in which it is salient (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Haslam
& Turner, 1992; Haslam, Timier, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992). According to this
position, identity salience exerts its influence on attitudes and behaviour by means of
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rendering those meanings relevant, hi other words, the relationship between identity 
(salience) and attitudes / behaviour is considered to be mediated by identity content. 
However, more recently it has been argued that identity content is frequently contested 
and therefore should not be taken for granted (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a; 1996b). 
Members identifying with the same social category may have different understandings 
of what their gi'oup membership means, even within the same context. Consequently, 
whether or not identity content affects the relationship between subjective 
identification and attitudes / behaviour largely depends on the relevance these 
meanings might have for the particular domain in question, hi other words, according 
to this perspective, identity content plays a moderating role in the relationship between 
subjective identification and attitudes / behaviour.
hi simimary then, the Social Identity tradition offers two alternative approaches 
towards conceptualising the role or function of identity content in the relationship 
between social identity salience and attitudes (or behaviour). One of the issues 
considered in this study was which of these- alternatives supplies the more accurate 
description of that functioh.
The overall purpose of the present study was to further explore the link established 
previously between subjective identification with ‘being a student’ and the valuation of 
money. More specifically, the objective was to detemiine whether the relationship 
between strength of identification with the social categoiy ‘student’ and attitudes 
towards money could be clarified by an examination of the meaning(s) attributed to 
student identity, hi doing so, the analytic focus was on identity content and the nature 
of its role in the comiection between subjective identification and the attitudes 
expressed. The following overall research questions were addiessed:
1) What is (are) the nieaning(s) ascribed to the social categoiy ‘student’?
2) Are attitudes towards money related to the degree to which student identity is 
endorsed?
3) Does student identity invoke nieaning(s) that inipinge(s) on the subjective 
valuation of money?
4) If so, what is the nature o f the role played by ‘meaning’ in the relationship 
between subjective identification and attitudes towards money? hi other words.
126
Chapter IV
how does identity content affect the link between identification with ‘being a 
student’ and the subjective valuation of money?
Whilst some of these questions were exploratory, others required a more direct 
hypothesis-testing approach. Accordingly, in order to tackle these issues, this study 
was sub-divided into two distinct phases. The first, exploratory phase aimed to 
establish the meaning(s) associated with ‘being a student’, hi the second phase, we 
sought to relate nieaning(s) d )  to the subjective valuation of money and b) to the 
relationship between the degree of endorsement of student identity and money 
attitudes, hi the following sections, the design and results of the two research stages 
will be outlined separately.
4 .2 PHASE I
Research Aims
The rationale underlying tliis; phase was to explore the content(s) ascribed to the 
social category ‘student’. Here, the aim was to establish the nieaning(s) associated with 
‘being a student’ so that these could then be used, in the second phase of the study, to 
address more specific questions concerning the relationship between identity content 
and attitudes towards money. At this stage, no predictions regarding the nieaning(s) or 
content(s) of student identity were put foiward.
4.2.1 M e t h o d
4.2.1.1 Design and Materials
The nieanhig(s) attached to student identity were elicited by means of a short 
questionnaire that comprised a series of open-ended questions. Spontaneity and 
fi eedom of expression are fiequently regarded to be the chief advantages of the open 
fomiat over a more closed design as the foiiiier encourages the generation of new 
hypotheses (Oppenheim, 1992). For these reasons, an open-ended fonnat was chosen 
to allow each participant to spontaneously express, in his/her own language, what 
being a student meant to him/her.
The study was introduced as an exploration of students’ views on education and of 
respondents’ personal experiences of being a student. The open-ended questions 
designed to give a portrayal of the meaning(s) of student identity read as follows: 1) In
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your opinion, why do people come to university? 2) ]Vhy did you come to university? 3) 
In your opinion, what are 'good' reasons fo r  coming to university}? 4) iVhat are 'bad' 
reasons fo r  coming to university? 5) Please describe what you consider the main 
purpose o f your university} education. 6) Please outline what, fo r  you, are the main 
benefits o f  having a university degree. 1) Please describe the disadvantages (if any) o f  
being a student. Respondents were also asked to indicate their age and gender. *
Here, an indirect method of priming the social category ‘student’ was chosen, taking 
into consideration the fact that information concerning identity content is often implicit 
and therefore difficult to access when appealed to directly (Condor, 2002; personal 
communication). Therefore, the above questions were intended as an indirect means for 
eliciting various descriptors o f the ‘student’ category and thus of the stereotypical 
nouns associated with it. As Condor (2002, personal communication) has pointed out 
direct requests for descriptions of a social category (e.g. in this case: "What does it 
mean to be a student?”) may be met with resistance and consequently lead to 
responses that are rather devoid of meaning. ■
4.2.1.2 Participants
A total of 42 undergraduate students took part in this phase of the study: 17 
participants were male and 25 were female. Respondents’ ages ranged from 18 to 24 
years, with a mean age of 20.5 years. Participants were recmited by using the 
snowballing technique so as to allow the gathering of responses fiom across as many 
academic disciplines as possible. As a result, the final sample included respondents 
fiom the following degiee programmes (frequency reported in brackets): Geoscience
(1), Marine and Environmental Biology (1), Biology (3), Medical Sciences (8), Maths 
and Chemistry (1), Maths (2), Maths and French (2), Economics (1), Economics and 
Management (1), Management (2), hitemational Relations with Spanish (1), English 
and Alt Histoiy (1), French and Art History (1), Medieval History (2), Modem Histoiy
(2), Modem Languages (3), French and Psychology (1), Psychology (8), Theological 
Studies and Social Antlnopology (1).
’ In addition, the questionnaire comprised a ranking task in which participants were asked to list a 
number of considerations, in order of their importance, with regard to their choice to come to university. 
However, since this task was not directly relevant for the purpose of establishing the meaning(s) related 
to student identity, the responses to this particular task were not included in tire present analysis.
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4 .2 .1 .3  P r o c e d u r e  & A n a ly t ic  A p p r o a c h
All questionnaires were self-administered and completed in private. The majority 
of respondents were provided with a printed version of the questiomiaire in their halls 
of residence, which could then be retmiied by internal mail. The remaining participants 
were contacted via email with an electronic version o f the questiomiaire, which was 
automatically sent back to the investigator upon its completion.
Since responses were open-ended in nature, their analysis required a qualitative 
approach. As already pointed out, the main aim of this pilot phase was to derive a 
number of constructions (meanings) of student identity which could then be drawn on 
during the next stage of tliis study. The systematic coding procedines provided by 
Groimded Theoiy (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) seemed the most 
appropriate tools for meeting this end. Typically, Grounded Theory involves tlnee, 
frequently overlapping, coding stages (open coding, axial coding and selective coding) 
aimed to develop an inductively derived theory which is grounded in the data. 
However, for the present pmposes, theory development went beyond what was 
required from the pilot data. As the process of integrating and refining theory tends to 
occur at the level of selective coding, the analytical focus here lay exclusively on the 
open coding and axial coding teclmiques which will be summarised in the following 
section.
4 . 2 . 2  A n a l y s i s  &  R e s u l t s
Participants’ responses were analysed line-by-line, separately for each question. 
Analysis entailed several careful readings of the written material and followed the 
‘open coding’ procedure outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998). This is a process 
tlnough which the concepts contained within the data, together with their properties 
and dimensions, are identified. Tlnoughout the open coding procedure, respondents’ 
replies to the open-ended questions regaining student identity were broken down into 
their discrete components which, in tiuii, were then compai ed for both their similarities 
and differences. The close examination of textual data in temis of overlap and 
divergence allows for relatively fine discriminations among concepts to be made 
(Sfrauss & Corbin, 1998). Table 4.1 provides an overview of the key concepts that 
were identified tlnoughout this coding process, together with a number of illustrative 
extracts from participants’ responses.
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Table 4.1 Key Concepts with Supporting Response Extracts
Concept Evidence (Quotes from  responses)
Learning / Academic 
Development
Knowledge
Acquisition / 
Development of Skills
Career
Future Employment & 
Income
The ‘Done’ Thing
Postponement
Personal Development
Experience
Awareness
Status
Academic interest / develop academically / broaden one’s intellectual 
knowledge ! continue learning / further one’s education 
I  love knowledge / /  love learning new things ! I  am fascinated by 
biology [degree subject]
Develop previously formed skills / learn more skills / to learn how to 
work in groups, on your own, to deadlines / show you are able to 
work under pressure
Get a degree to pursue a chosen career / get a CV / it [a degree] is a 
necessary’ prerequisite for many careers / want to become a doctor 
Increase your employability in higher paid or demanding jobs / it puts 
you above others in the job world / /  like the idea o f having a well- 
paid job at the end o f it all / increase in earn ing capacity / job, 
money, car, house / money!
I t’s the next logical step after completing A-levels / most people these 
days go [to university] / it’s the done thing / 1 never really considered 
not going [to university] / these days everyone has to have a degree 
To put off entering the 'real world ’ / to put off getting a job for a few 
more years / postponement o f getting a nine-to-jlve job 
Develop personally ! to become a better person / further yourself / to 
mature properly / to grow up / to become a more rounded individual / 
increase one’s self-confidence
Learn about life ! experience new environments and activities ! widen 
my experiences
To broaden my horizons / make yourself more aware o f the world ana 
the people and phenomena within it ! help me better understand the 
world around me
Prestige / want letters after your name / grades too good for non­
graduate job / recognition / people have more respect for you
It should be noted that this table does not provide an exhaustive list of all the concepts 
that were extracted from the present material (see Table 4.2 below for an inclusive list).
Following Grounded Theory principles, descriptions of student identity that were 
found to be conceptually similar or related in meaning were grouped together to form 
more abstract categories. Once a comprehensive list of the concepts contained within 
participants’ descriptions had been generated, a conceptually clustered matrix (see 
Miles & Huberman, 1994) was built. The purpose of a conceptually clustered matrix is 
to "bring together items that belong together” (Miles & Huberman, 1994; p. 127); this 
can either occur on conceptual grounds, in which case certain a priori notions exist 
with regard to the overarching theme, or it can take place on a purely empirical basis. 
In both instances, however, the basic underlying principle is conceptual coherence. The 
reason for creating a conceptually clustered matrix, in the present case, was to allow for 
the comparison of different responses across each individual question. This matrix-
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building process went hand in hand with the ‘axial coding’ procedure. The general aim 
of axial coding is to restructure the data broken up tluoughout the open coding process 
and to relate broader, existing categories to sub-categories in order to form more 
precise and complete explanations about a given phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998; p. 124). Table 4.2 provides an oveiwiew of this matrix. Within each colunui, the 
individual cell headings represent either a single concept or a group of concepts that 
have been clustered together on account of their overlap in meaning. Individual cells 
also fonn tire sub-categories contained within the broader, overall categories or 
‘themes’ which, in turn, are denoted by the different shadings. (For a detailed 
description of these overriding categories see below.) The different shades also 
highlight the overlap of categories found in the responses to the different open-ended 
questions. In addition, categories similar in content are presented adjacent to each 
other, both within and across columns.
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On the basis of this sunimaiy matrix seven categories of meaning were identified 
which, taken together, seemed to adequately capture what ‘being a student’ meant for 
respondents. These categories, alongside a brief description of their content, are listed 
below.
1. The Piusuit of Knowledge
One interpretation of student identity revolved around the theme of knowledge and its 
pursuit. Here, being or becoming a student was seen as providing a springboard for 
intellectual development, as a continuation of the learning process. ‘Being a student’ 
was defined in tenns of the opportimity to broaden one’s laiowledge and to further 
one’s education in general.
The concepts included in this category were: “Learning / Academic Development” and 
“Learning / Knowledge” (see Table 4.2).
2. Subject Interest
Interest in a given subject area was another recmring theme that emerged from the 
data. The appeal of a particular discipline was regarded as a major factor in the choice 
to pursue a university degree. Tliis interest was associated with the importance 
respondents attached to gaining the qualifications and skills needed to follow a specific 
future career path.
This categoiy of meaning, which frequently showed some overlap with the first 
category described above, comprised the following concepts: “Acquisition / 
Development of Skills”, “Skills”, “Qualifications & Career” (see Table 4.2).
3. Eninlovnient / Well-paid Career (Material Gain)
The notion of a ‘career’ also figured in another construction of student identity. 
However, here the emphasis was predominantly on the material gains that were 
associated with the improved employment prospects that ‘being a student’ entailed. 
The idea of securing a well-paid job, and the higher standard of living comiected with 
it, were central to this particular understanding of student identity.
“Future Employment & Income”, “Standard of Living”, “Money” and “Career, 
Employment & Pay” were some of the concepts subsumed under this category.
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4. Status
Another key understanding of student identity that emerged from the present material 
revolved aroimd the societal status that the possession of a university degree was hoped 
to convey. Here, what it meant to be a student was described in terms of the respect 
that other people were thought to bestow on university graduates in recognition of their 
academic achievement.
This category included the concepts “Status”, “Status & Respect” and “Status & 
Image”.
5. The ‘Done’ Thing
‘Becoming a student’ was frequently defined as a natiual progression from school that 
had not been given a great deal of thought. In addition, this understanding of student 
identity was closely linked to a sense of obligation with regard to other people’s 
expectations and comprised the notion of yielding to. either peer or family pressure.
The concepts that were summarised by this overall category of meaning were: “T he. 
next logical step / The ‘done’ thing”, “Peers”, “Pressure & Expectations”.
6. Personal Development
The theme of personal development / self-improvement was also fundamental to 
respondents’ conceptions of what ‘being a student’ meant to them. In constructions of 
student identity in personal development temis, the emphasis lay not only on becoming 
a more rounded individual by gaining a gieater awareness of the world, but also on 
achieving greater independence in life. The notion o f “life experience” foiined a central 
concept in this particulai* understanding of student identity.
The concepts included here were “Personal Development”, “Independence”, 
“Awareness” and “Exploration”.
7. Student Life
Finally, fim and enjoyment were seen as important components of student identity and 
these, in turn, were closely tied to the wish to postpone entering the ‘real world’ of 
working adults. The social aspects associated with student life, such as meeting a wide 
variety of people for example, provided another fundamental theme on the basis of 
which ‘being a student’ was defined.
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“Enjoyment”, “Postponement”, “Social aspects” and “Student Life” were the concepts 
captured by this category.
Once the above-illustrated definitions of student identity had been established, they 
could be clustered according to a number of criteria theoretically relevant for the 
current research questions. That is, these imderstandings allowed for frirther 
speculation as to their underlying dimensions with regard to the subjective valuation of 
money. The different meanings derived here appeared to be grouped along tluee broad 
dimensions, two of which seemed pertinent to monetary attitudes. Firstly, the 
definitions in terms of future employment (financial gain) and status seemed to be 
expressions of a generally materialistic (extrinsically motivated) imderstanding of the 
social category ‘student’. The definitions referring to the pursuit of knowledge and 
subject interest, on the other hand, appeared to belong to a second dimension, in which 
the knowledge-related (intrinsically motivated) aspects of student identity were 
emphasised. Whilst the. categories of meaning representing the former, materialistic 
dimension were, at least; intuitively, expected to correlate positively with the subjective 
valuation of money, it seemed reasonable to assume the reverse in the latter case; in 
other words, we anticipated a negative correlation between the dependent variable and 
tire identity contents pertaining to the laiowledge-based dimension. Finally, 
conceptualisations of student identity in temis of personal development, living a 
“student life” or as “the ‘done’ thing” seemed rather ambivalent as far as attitudes 
towaids money were concerned. These categories of meaning addressed the more 
experiential qualities associated with ‘being a student’ and it appeared unlikely that 
they were related to the subjective value ascribed to money.
4 . 2 . 3  D i s c u s s i o n
The aim of this first phase of the study was to explore the content(s) ascribed to the 
social category ‘student’. Qualitative analysis of the responses to a number of open- 
ended questions showed that, for the present sample, different understandings of 
student identity existed. Overall, seven categories of meaning were established: being a 
student was defined in tenns of the piusuit of knowledge, the appeal of a particular 
subject area, employment (financial) prospects, status, personal development and the 
attraction of living a student life or simply in terms of considering the pursuit of a
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university degree as the ‘done’ thing. The present analysis also raised a number of 
methodological and theoretical issues concerning the evaluation of identity content in 
general and, in particular, with regard to the method used here to do so. These issues 
will be discussed in the general conclusion (see Section 4.3.3).
One of the general objectives of this study was to examine whether the social 
category ‘student’ invoked meaning(s) that impinged on the subjective valuation of 
money. The types of identity content established dming this first phase suggested that 
the meanings might, indeed, be clustered aroimd various, theoretically relevant 
dimensions; the endorsement of these would, in tiun, have different implications for 
attitudes towards money. For instance, an understanding of student identity in temis of 
future employment (financial gains) or status, seemed likely to conespond to a greater 
degree of subjective valuation of money; conversely, student identity defined as the 
pursuit of knowledge or as subject interest might imply that money is valued to a lesser 
extent. Conceptualisations of student identity in terms of personal development, “the 
‘done’ thing” or student life, on the other hand, seemed unrelated to attitudes towaid 
money. Whilst, at this stage of the study, the relationship between the particular 
meanings established here and the subjective valuation of money had to remain 
speculative, the second phase focused on this association more closely (see below). In 
the second phase, we also dealt with the more specific associations between subjective 
identification with ‘being a student’, identity content and attitudes towards money.
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4.3 PHASE II
Research Aims & Hypotheses
Whilst the research goals o f Phase I  were exploratory, tire second stage of this 
study involved a more direct hypothesis-testing approach. The first prediction to be 
tested was a follows:
Hvpothesis 1: High student identifiers will attribute greater value to money than low 
student identifiers. {Replication offinding from previous study)
The rationale underlying this hypothesis was to find out whether the differences 
between liigh and low student identifiers observed in the previous study could be 
replicated here. A replication of this finding would then allow us to further explore the 
relationship between subjective identification with ‘being a student’ and attitudes 
towards money, with a paiticular focus on the role of identity content in this 
relationship.
Having established seven broad categories of meaning during Phase I, one of the 
objectives in this second stage was to statistically examine their relationship to the 
perceived value of money. Provided that such a relationship could be ascertained, the 
intention was to examine two alternative ways of modelling the role played by these 
money-related meanings in the link between subjective identification and monetary 
attitudes. These alternative models were addressed by the following hypotheses:
Hvpothesis 2 : The relationship between the strength of identification with ‘being a 
student’ and attitudes towards money will be mediated by the money- 
related meanings of student identity {Mediation Hypothesis).
Hvpothesis 3: The meaning attiibuted to student identity will have an effect on the 
subjectively perceived value of money for high student identifiers but 
not for low student identifiers. {Moderation Hypothesis)
Whilst Hypothesis 2 refeixed to the traditional Social Identity model where identity 
content is viewed as a mediator in the relationsliip between social identification and 
attitudes (see Introduction), Hypothesis 3 aimed to test a slightly different conception 
of the fimction of ‘meaning’. Hypothesis 3 implied that people could endorse a variety
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of meanings to a greater or lesser extent; however whether or not this would affect their 
attitudes towards money would be dependent on the degree of their subjective 
identification with the social category ‘student’.
4 . 3 . 1  M e t h o d
4.3.1.1 Design and Materials
The research hypotheses were tackled by means of a questionnaire. This 
questiomiaire encompassed slightly modified versions of the money attitude and 
identification scales used in the previous study (see Appendix IV.a) as well as seven 
vignettes representing different definitions of student identity (see below). In addition, 
two separate cover sheets were designed so as to allow for the appearance of the 
questionnaire as two individual studies (see Procedure and also Appendix IV.a).
The Contentfsl of Student Identity. >■ .
On the basis of the categories of ‘meaning’ identified during the initial phase of this 
study, seven short vignettes were formulated. These vignettes captured differentr'notions of student identity so as to allow for the assessment of respondents’ 
endorsement of particulai* understandings. The vignettes were constracted around the 
following themes: “The ‘Done’ Thing”, “The Pursuit of ICnowledge”, “Material Gain”, 
“Personal Development”, “Student Life”, “Subject Interest” and “Status” (for details 
see Appendix IV.a). In addition, they were presented as quotes from fellow students. 
Participants’ endorsement of these various definitions was gauged by four questions 
presented immediately after each vignette: 1) In your opinion, is this a valid reason fo r  
coming to university? 2) Is this a 'bad’ reason fo r pursuing a degree? 3) H om> 
accurately does this describe vour reasons fo r  coming to universit)>? 4) To what extent 
do you identify with this statement? These questions, in turn, were rated on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale (where 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “very much”). For the final statistical 
analysis, mean scores on these questions were calculated for each vignette, with a 
possible range of scores between 1 and 7. Tliis provided a measure of the degree to 
which each respondent agreed with the different conceptions of student identity (with 
‘7’ denoting strong agreement).
In addition, respondents were asked to list the seven vignettes in order of their 
importance with regard to the role the notions of student identity these expressed
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played in their own choice to come to university (see Appendix IV.a). Whilst the mean 
scores on the seven vignettes provided an absolute measure of the degree to wliich each 
participant endorsed the different meanings of student identity, the inclusion of a 
ranking task allowed their relative importance to be gauged.
The Money Attitude Scale
In this study, only 15 out of the original 18 attitude statements invoking the 
subjectively perceived value or importance of money (see Appendix IV.a) were 
included. The main reason for this was to keep the length of Hie overall research 
instmment to a minimum (given the addition here of the above-described vignettes), so 
as to maintain a relatively low time commitment for participation in this study. Since 
Item 14 ("One doesn’t have to be clever to make a lot o f money”) had demonstrated a 
relatively low conelation with the overall scale in the previous study, it was not 
included here.^ In addition, Item A (f I  never think about money”) and Item 12 (f Money 
could never solve all my problems”) :were excluded, regardless of their satisfactory 
item-to-total coiTelations. hi the preceding study, the descriptive statistics lor 
respondents’ mean scores on these two items had revealed ceiling and floor effects on 
these two items. This rendered an abbreviated version of the original money attitude 
scale, comprising a total of 15 attitude statements.
As before, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the attitude 
statements on a 7-point Likeif-type scale (where 1 = “strongly disagree”, 2 = 
“disagree”, 3 = “somewhat disagree”, 4 = “midecided”, 5 = “somewhat agi*ee”, 6 = 
“agree” and 7 = “strongly agree”). The mean of the scores for the whole scale was 
computed to represent the degree to which participants valued money (money attitude), 
rendering a possible range of scores between 1 and 7 (with ‘7’ indicating high 
valuation of money) for each respondent.
Identification Scale
As in the previous study, respondents were asked to indicate, on a 7-point scale, a) 
how important both ‘being a student’ and their gender were in terms of their self­
perception (where 1 = “not important at all” and 7 = “very important”) and b) how
 ^Note that Item 8 (“/  often fee l inferior to others who have more money than I  have . . .”) was retained 
despite its low item-to-total correlation as it forms part of Furnliam’s (1984) widely used Money Beliefs 
and Behaviours Scale.
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fi'equently they thought of themselves in tenus of their identity as students or in tenns 
of their gender (where 1 = “never”, 3 = “sometimes” and 7 = “always”). In comparison 
with the previous study, here a more direct approach towards assessing participants’ 
endorsement of student identity was chosen; in order to avoid the ambiguities that may 
have aiisen previously, due to the original wording of the identification items, the 
actual plu'ase used here was ‘being a student’.
For each respondent, the mean score on these items was computed to represent the 
degree of identification with their gender {gender identity) and with ‘being a student’ 
{student identity). The possible range of these two indices of identification was 1 
(indicating no identification) to 7 (representative of a very high degree of 
identification). However, it should be noted that the gender identity index was dropped 
fi'om flirther analyses, as it was not directly relevant for the present purposes.
4.3.1.2 Participants '
A sample of 301 undergraduate students was recmited during this stage of the 
study. 212 respondents (70.4%) were female and 84 (27.9%) respondents were male; 
gender data for five respondents were missing. Paiticipants’ ages ranged from 17 to 42 
years, with a mean age of 18.9 years. All participants were recruited during a first-year 
module on psychological research methods.
4.3.1.3 Procedure
The questiomiaires were filled in either at the begiiming or at the end of class 
sessions. Before questionnaires were handed out, it was stressed that participation was 
not obligatory and that respondents were fr ee to choose not to take part.
So as not to draw too much attention to the study’s focus on the relationsliip between 
‘meanings’, strength of identification and attitudes towaids money, the study was 
presented as two related, but separate research projects. This was accompanied by 
physically dividmg the overall questiomiaire into two separate siuveys, each with its 
own coversheet; the ‘first’ questiomiaire contained the seven vignettes and the related 
ranldng task, whilst the ‘second’ one comprised the money attitude and identification 
scales. Before handing out the questionnaires, the experimenter stated that one of her 
research interests lay in exploring the reasons why people choose to pursue a imiversity 
degree (e.g. "'"What does it mean to be a student?''’). She then proceeded to describe her
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interest in money-related issues and emphasised her particular concern with students’ 
attitudes towards money (e.g. ‘"How important is money to students?'"). Both 
questiomiaires were then handed out simultaneously and pai ticipants were instructed to 
carefully read tluough each of the cover sheets before completing the corresponding 
questionnaires.
4.3,2 R e s u l t s
4.3.2.1 Sample characteristics
Before any statistical analyses were canied out, mature students (over the age of 
25) were excluded from the sample. The rationale for doing so was to keep the sample 
as homogeneous as possible. Matuie students were likely to have spent a number of 
years in full-time employment, a fact that might not only have influenced their 
approach to money issues but that would have also had an impact on thefr decision to 
pursue a university degi'ee. On the basis of their previous experience, mature students’ 
self-perception as ‘student's’ might differ greatly from how younger people, attending 
university straight after school, understand their identity as students^. Being a ‘mature 
student’, in other words, is likely to constitute a separate category for self-definition. 
Therefore, five participants (aged 28, 29, 40, 41 and 42 years respectively) were 
omitted from the overall statistical analysis.
The findings reported here aie based on the remaining sample o îN =  296. It should be 
noted, however, that vignette-ranking data were missing for a number of participants. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are therefore based on slightly varying sample 
sizes.
4.3.2.2 Scale Reliability, Scale Structure & Descriptives
The Contentlsl of Student Identity
The degree to which participants endorsed the different constructions of student 
identity was assessed by their responses to four questions presented immediately after 
each vignette (see Method). Scores on one negatively phrased item (Item 2: “A this a 
‘bad’ reason fo r  pursuing a degree? ”) were reversed before any fiuflier analysis. Table
 ^ It should also be noted that the definitions of student identity (vignettes) used here were derived from 
responses provided by a sample that did not include any mature students (see Phase I).
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4.3 shows the Cronbach standardised reliability coefficients of these four items for 
each definition of student identity respectively.
Table 4.3 Cronbach’s Standardised Reliability Coefficients for Items Assessing Agreement witli Quotes 1 -7
C o n ten t  o f  R e l ia b i l i ty
  S tu d en t  Id e n t i ty  c o e f f ic ie n t  a __
Quote 1 T he‘Done’Thing .851
Quote 2 The Pursuit o f Knowledge .719
Quote 3 Material Gain .841
Quote 4 Personal Development .881
Quote 5 Student Life .882
Quote 6 Subject Interest .646
Quote 7 Status . 8 8 6
Since tlie items evaluating respondents’ agieement with the various definitions of 
student identity proved to be reasonably reliable, mean scores on these items were 
computed for each vignette. This rendered several indices, for each participant, 
representing the degi'ee to which the different ‘meanings’ (or contents) of student 
identity were endorsed 1 to quote. 7, where a mean of ‘ 1’ indicated no agreement
and of ‘7’ a very liigh level of agreement with the respective quote).
A post-hoc factor analysis (principal components with varimax rotation) on the mean 
scores for the various vignettes {quote 1 to quote 7) suggested that a tluee-factor 
structuie was imderlying these meanings. These three factors accounted for 63.342% of 
the overall vaiiance. The descriptive labels assigned to each factor, together with the 
corresponding definitions of student identity and their respective factor loadings, are 
summarised in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Principal Component Analysis (Vaiiniax Rotation) for Quotes 1 -7
Factor Label Content of Student Identity  ^Factoi___________Variance______________________________ %______ Loadings
, ,  , . . .  . Quote 1 Material Gain .7841 22.664 Materiaksm/ .7 I9
Conventionalism ri,e-Done'Vnng .611
o nncno rr i j  Quote 4 The Pursuit o f Knowledge .7812 20.528 Knowledge Subject Interest .780
3 20 150 Experience/ Quote 6 Student Life .813
Enjoyment Quote 7 Personal Development .793
The tliree definitions of student identity loading on Factor 1 (see Table 4.4) conveyed
the notion that ‘being a student’ primarily concerned the prospect of a well-paid future
career, outside recognition as well as the fulfilment of others’ expectations. The
characteristic common to the quotes loading on this factor was the depiction of student
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identity in materialistic and rather conventional terms. Factor 1 was therefore labelled 
Matehalistn / Conventionalism. Factor 2 was termed Knowledge since the two 
definitions loading on this factor expressed the view that ‘being a student’ was 
primarily about the acquisition of knowledge. The two descriptions of student identity 
loading on Factor 3 referred to broadening one’s horizons as well as to having some 
fun before entering the ‘real world’. This factor was therefore called Experience /  
Enjoyment.
A point worthy of note is that Factor 2 {Knowledge) was negatively correlated with 
Factor 1 {Materialism / Conventionalism). Also, whilst Factor 1 encompassed what 
could be described as the extrinsic motives for pursuing a degree, the definitions of 
student identity loading on Factor 2 and 3 referred to the more intrinsic benefits 
associated with studying at university. It is also interesting to note that whilst the 
factorial structure outlined here broadly corresponded to the clustering of the vignettes 
that had been proposed earlier (see Phase I), contrary to initial expectations, the 
conception of student identity as “the ‘done’ thihg” was related to its definition in 
terms of material gain and status.
In addition, respondents were asked to rank order the seven vignettes in order of 
importance for their choice to pursue a university degree. This provided a general 
indication as to the definitions of student identity that were most / least commonly 
endorsed by the present sample. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide an overview of the 
responses referring to the meanings regarded as most and as least important.
Figure 4.1 Definitions of Student Identity ranked as “Most Inqwrtanf ’
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Figure 4.2 Definitions of Student Identity ranked as “Least Important'
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
27
Definitions of Student Identity
□  The 'Done' Thing
□  Pursuit of Knowledge 
■  Material Gain
□  Personal Development
□  Student Life
□  Subject Interest
□  Status
T h e  M o n e y  A t t i t u d e  S c a l e
Reliability for the 15 attitude statements addressing the subjectively perceived 
importance of money was high, with a Cronbach standardised reliability coefficient of 
a  = .784. However, Item 7 (“7 often feel inferior to others w’ho have more money than I 
have... ”) had a relatively low correlation with the overall scale (r — .150) and was thus 
dropped from further analysis.'^ The remaining 14 items had a Cronbach’s standardised 
reliability coefficient of a  = .791, thus allowing for the treatment of these items as a 
scale.
A money attitude score was computed for each respondent by calculating the mean of 
his/her scores on these 14 items. A mean score of H ’ represented a very low level of 
subjective valuation, whereas a mean score of ‘7’ was indicative of a very high degree 
of importance attributed to money.
S o c i a l  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  S c a l e
The two items evaluating the significance of student identity for participants’ self- 
understanding rendered a standardised reliability coefficient of a  = .733. By computing 
mean scores for these two items, an overall indicator for each respondent’s degree of 
identification with ‘being a student’ -  the student identity index -  was obtained (with 
‘1’ indicating a lack of identification and ‘7’ a high degree of identification).
4.3.2.3 S o c ia l  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  th e  S u b j e c t iv e  V a lu e  o f  M o n e y
The correlation between strength of identification with ‘being a student’ and 
attitudes towards money was found to be positive and significant (r = .219, p < .001).
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The more respondents identified with the social category ‘studenf, the greater 
subjective value they attached to money. As in the previous study, a median split was 
performed on student identity scores, allowing for the classification of participants as 
Tow student identifiers’ and as ‘high student identifiers’. As predicted, there was a 
significant difference between high and low student identifiers with regard to their 
attitudes towards money {t25o = -2.853, p < .01). Respondents who strongly endorsed 
their identity as students attributed significantly greater value to money (3.990) than 
did participants for whom their student identity was less important (3.692). This 
finding supported our first hypothesis and also replicated the result fi*om the previous 
study.
4.3.2.4 The Role of Identity Content in the Relationship between Subjective 
Identification and the Valuation of Money
Identity Content and A ttitudes Towards Monev
A first step towards exploring the role played by identity content in the link 
between social identification with ‘being a student’ and monetary attitudes was to 
examine the statistical accmacy of the relationships, anticipated in Phase /, between 
different meanings and the subjective valuation of money. Table 4.5 shows the 
coiTelation coefficients for participants’ attitudes towards money and the degree to 
which they endorsed the various understandings of the social categoi-y ‘student’.
Table 4.5 Peaison Con'elatioii Coefficients for Money Attitude and Meanings of Student Identity
M eaning
K,r,ëdî “oSf DoXluT h in g
^ o n e y  208 -.132 .287 -.070 .012 -.054 .234
As had been anticipated, there were significant, positive correlations between the 
subjective value ascribed to money and the definitions of student identity in teims of 
“Material Gain” (p < .001) and “Status” (p < .001). Contrary to initial expectations, the 
same was true for the endorsement of student identity in teims of “The ‘Done’ Thing” 
(p < .001). These definitions of student identity corresponded to the Materialism f 
Conventionalism factor identified earlier (see Section 4.3.2.2) and the more
As in the previous study, the criterion value for exclusion was r < .250.
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respondents subscribed to them, the greater value they attached to money. There was a 
significant, negative correlation between “The Pursuit of Knowledge” and attitudes 
towards money (p < .05); the more participants understood their identity as students in 
terms of the acquisition of knowledge, the less value they ascribed to money. 
Surprisingly, this was not the case for the definition of student identity in terms of 
“Subject Interest” which was not associated with the subjective valuation of money. 
Finally, as expected, “Personal Development” and “Student Life” were also unrelated 
to attitudes towards money.
To recapitulate briefly, the second hypothesis stated that the relationship between 
subjective identification and attitudes towards money would be mediated by the 
money-related meanings attributed to the social category ‘student’. On account of the 
above-reported correlations, the mediation analysis outlined in the following section 
focussed on those meanings that positively correlated with the subjective valuation of 
money.
M e d i a t i o n  A n a l y s i s
A mediator is generally defined as a variable that accounts for the relationship 
between a predictor and a criterion variable. In this study, we hypothesised that the 
meaning ascribed to student identity would function as a mediator between strength of 
identification with ‘being a student’ and attitudes towards money. This mediation 
hypothesis is illustrated by the path diagram depicted below (see Figure 4.1) in which 
two causal paths feed into the criterion variable money attitude.
Figure 4.3 Mediational Model for Student Identification, Meaning and Money Attitudes
M e d i a t o r
Meaning
a> b
I V D V
strength of Identification c Money
(Attitude)
According to Judd and Kenny (1981) and Baron and Kenny (1986), a series of 
regression models provides the best test for mediation. Following these authors, three
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regi'ession equations and their corresponding coefficients should be estimated to test 
for mediation: 1) Regi'essing the mediator on the independent variable (Path rz), 2) 
regi'essing the dependent variable on the independent variable (Path c), and 3) 
regressing the dependent variable on the mediator as well as the independent variable, 
hi our case, to establish mediation the following requirements must be met: a) Strength 
o f identification (independent variable) must affect the meaning ascribed to student 
identity (mediator) in the first equation, b) strength o f identification must be shown to 
affect money attitude (dependent variable) in the second equation and c) the meaning 
ascribed to student identity must affect the dependent variable in the third equation. If 
these conditions are met, then the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable must be less in the third equation than in the second. Perfect mediation holds if 
the independent variable has no effect when the mediator is contiolled (Baron & 
Kemiy, 1986). However, as Baron and Kemiy (1986) have pointed out, psychological 
research tends to treat phenomena that have multiple causes and therefore we should 
look for mediators that significantly decrease the relationship between the independent 
and dependent vaiiable, rather than mediators that remove this pathway (Path c) 
altogether. From a theoretical point of view, a significant reduction of Path c 
demonstrates that a given mediator is effective; however, it does not follow that it 
constitutes a sufficient condition for an effect to occur in and of itself (Baron & Kemiy, 
1986). Let us now take a closer look at the thi'ee regression equations outlined above.
Originally, tliree mediation models were tested which concentrated on quote 1 
(“The ‘Done’ Thing”), quote 3 (“Material Gain”) and quote 7 (“Status”) as the 
potential mediators of the subjective identification -  monetary attitudes linlc. However, 
for quote 1 and quote 7, the first regression (Path a) was not significant; in other words, 
a mediation model did not hold for the definitions of student identity in terms of “The 
‘Done’ Thing” and “Status”. The details for the third model, in which “Material Gain” 
was treated as the mediatmg variable, are provided below.^
Regression 1: Student Identification and Meaning
Firstly, mean scores on quote 3 {^''Material Gam”) were regi'essed on student 
identity (Path a). The overall relationship between the two variables was sigiificant
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(F(i,294)= 4.319, p < .05). The degree to which respondents identified with ‘being a 
student’was found to be predictive of their scores on quote 3 (t294 = 2.078, p < .05). 
Regression 2\ Attitudes Towards Money and Student Identification
Secondly, mean money attitude scores were regressed on student identity scores 
(Path c). Again, this relationship was significant (F(i,294>= 14.844, p < .001). Strength of 
identification with ‘being a student’was a significant predictor of the subjective value 
respondents ascribed to money {t294 = 3.853, p < .001).
Regression 3: Student Identification, Meaning and Attitudes Towards Monev 
Finally, mean scores on money attitude were regressed on student identity and 
quote 3 simultaneously. The overall relationship between these variables was 
significant (F(2,293)= 19.430, p < .001). Both student identification (Z293 = 3.389, p < .01) 
and respondents’ scores on "'''Material Gain’ (^ 293 = 4.786, p < .001) remained 
significant as predictors of attitudes towards money.
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the effect of student identification on attitudes 
towards money was less in the third equation than in the second regression equation. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the regression coefficients and standard errors obtained in the 
various regression analyses.
Figure 4.4 Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Mediation Model (“Material Gain”)
M e d i a t o r  
“Material Gain”
b
B = .104/StE = .050 ® B = .209 / StE = .041
I V *B = .138 / StE = .036 D V
Strength of Identification
**B = .118 / StE = .035
Money
(Attitude)
* Regression coefficient and Standard Error obtained for student identification in Regression 2.
** Regression coefficient and Standard Error obtained for student identification in Regression 3.
Mediational analyses suffer from low statistical power since substantial correlations 
are expected to occur between the variables in the causal chain (Judd & Kenny, 1981). 
This, in turn, gives rise to the problem of multicollinearity when estimating the effects
 ^ Additional analyses, in which respondents’ combined scores on the vignettes corresponding to the 
Materialism /  Conventionalism dimension (Factor 1) were treated as the mediating variable, yielded 
results qualitatively similar to the findings reported here and were therefore not expanded on further.
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of the independent variable and the mediator on the dependent variable (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). Sobel (1982) developed an approximate significance test for the indirect 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable via the mediator, thus 
coimteracting the problem of low statistical power. In other words, the Sobel test 
assesses the reduction in the effect for the independent variable whilst contiolling for 
the mediator. For the regression coefficients obtained in the analysis described above, 
the Sobel test was significant (z = 1.958 p = .05), thus lending support to the existence 
of a mediated relationship between strength of identification and attitudes towards 
money, where meaning defined in terms of “Material Gain” constituted the mediator. 
Hence, there seemed to be tentative evidence supportive of Hypothesis 2.
Whilst the use of the multiple regression method in testing for mediation presumes 
that the mediator is not caused by the dependent variable (see Baron & Kemiy, 1986), 
any suggested mediation model itself, can be prone to confounding the mediator with 
the dependent variable (the so-called “feedback problem”) and may thus misrepresent 
the relationship between variables. This problem appeared to be of particular relevance 
in the present context where, at least theoretically, it could be argued that respondents’ 
attitudes towar ds money had a bearing on their definitions of student identity in teims 
of "'Material Gain”. The order in which var iables were presented in the questioimaire 
coiTesponded to the proposed mediational model, which -  at least on a methodological 
level -  is thought to provide a protective measure against Üiis problem of reversal (see 
e.g. Castano, Paladino, Coull & Yzerbyt, 2002). However, post-hoc analyses -  in 
which the roles of the mediator and the dependent variable were reversed -  indicated 
that a model where attitudes towards money mediated the relationship between 
identification with ‘being a student’and endorsement of the "Material Gain” definition 
of student identity provided a better fit for the data. This finding placed serious 
limitations on the conclusions that could be drawn fi'om this particular mediation 
analysis.
Moderation Analysis
As will be recalled, the imderlying assumption of the moderation hypothesis was 
that the social category ‘student’ would evoke various contents (even within the same 
context) which could then be drawn on to identify different sub-groups of people in 
accordance with their degrne of endorsement of these meanings (see Sections 4.1 and
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4.3). A number of approaches towards establishing such sub-groupings of respondents 
were possible here. For instance, one method involved the classification of participants 
according to their relative endorsement of the materialistic (extrinsic) understandings 
of student identity over and above the more intrinsic definitions. On the basis of this 
method, various new, dichotonious variables could be derived which, in turn, provided 
a measure of respondents’ degree of support for a materialistic conception of student 
identity (high versus low), once their endorsement of other definitions had been taken 
into accoimt {relative materialism index), hi statistical terms, this relative measure of 
participants’ materialist miderstanding(s), could be computed in several ways, with the 
inclusion of different variables in the actual calculations (e.g. mean scores for relevant 
quotes, factor scores on the Materialism /  Conventionalism and Knowledge dimensions 
or the ranldng of the money-related definitions). For the present purposes, several such 
indices for participants’ relative endorsement of materialistic meanings were computed.
hi order to test our final prediction, namely that the meaning attributed to student
. . . .  i !identity would have an impact on attitudes towards money for liigh student identifiers 
but not for low student identifiers, a series of 2 x 2 Analyses of Variance were cairied 
out. Degree of identification with ‘being a student’ (high versus low identifiers) and the 
extent to which respondents subscribed to the relative importance of a materialistic 
conception of student identity {relative materialism, high versus low endorsement) 
were entered as factors, whilst money attitude scores foimed the dependent variable.^ 
For each of the different analyses of variance, a significant interaction between high / 
low identification and high / low endorsement of the various relative materialism 
indices was predicted. The results are summarised m Table 4.6.
® In addition, criterion splits had been performed on the mean scores of those definitions of student 
identity that coirelated witli the subjective valuation of money, namely quote 1 CThe 'Done’ Thing"), 
quote 2 CThe Pursuit o f  Knowledge"), quote 3 ^M aterial Gain") and quote 7 {‘'Status”). Tliis allowed 
for the classification of respondents in terms of their endorsement (high versus low) of these particular 
meanings. Analyses of variance using tlrese variables (in place of the relative measures) yielded shnilar 
results to the findings reported here. They revealed significant main effects for the degree to which these 
different notions of student identity were endorsed, but no interactions with degree of social 
identification.
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Table 4.6 Analyses of Variance Simmiaiy for Higli/Low Identity * Higli/Low Relative Materialism (F-values, 
degrees of fieedom and significance level for main effects, interactions)
ANOVA M ain Effects & Interactions dPs F Sig.
Higli/Low Student Identifiers 4.136 .043
1 High/Low Relative Materialism 1, 141 15.337 .000
Higli/Low Student Identity * High/Low Rel. Mat. .556 n.s.
Higli/Low Student Identifiers 2.990 .086
2 Higli/Low Relative Materialism 1,90 28.397 .000
Higli/Low Student Identity Higli/Low Rel. Mat. 1.316 n.s.
Higli/Low Student Identifiers 4.025 .047
3 Higli/Low Relative Materialism 1,88 16.979 .000
Higli/Low Student Identity * Higli/Low Rel. Mat. .697 n.s.
The original variables from  w h ich  the different in d ices o f  relative m ateria lism  w ere derived were:
A n alysis  1: quote 3 (“M aterial G ain ”) -  quote 2 (“Pursuit o f  K n ow led ge”)
A n alysis  2 : high rank quote 3 /  low rank quote 2 versus high rank quote 2 / lo w  rank quote 3 
A nalysis  3 : Factor 1 (“M ateria lism  /  C on ven tion alism ”) - Factor 2 (“K n o w led g e”)
Each analysis showed a significant main effect or trend for strength of identification 
with ‘being a student’; high student identifiers consistently attributed greater value to 
money than low student identifiers. The main effects for the different indices o f the 
degree of endorsement of relative materialistic conceptions of student identity were 
also significant; respondents subscribing to a relatively more materialistic 
understanding of student identity reliably scored higher on the money attitude measure 
that their counteiparts. However, as Table 4.6 reveals, none of the predicted 
interactions were significant. The second hypothesis could therefore not be supported.
4.3.3 D i s c u s s i o n
The two main objectives of this second stage were to examine whether the 
meanings of student identity drawn from the first phase of the study were statistically 
associated with the subjective valuation of money and, if  so, 2) to determine their role 
in the relationship between subjective identification with ‘being a student’ and attitudes 
towards money, hr pmsuing these goals, the initial aim was to ascertain whether the 
differences between high and low student identifiers found in Chapter HI with regard to 
attitudes towards money could be replicated, hideed, in accordance with the first 
hypothesis put forward here, respondents who strongly identified with ‘being a student’ 
attributed significantly greater value to money than participants for whom their identity 
as students was less important. This finding provided the springboard for addressing 
the two research objectives referred to above.
As anticipated in Phase I, conceptions o f student identity in terms of "Material 
Gain” and "Status” were positively correlated with attitudes towards money. The more
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participants endorsed these definitions, the greater subjective value they attributed to 
money. Somewhat suiprisingly, the same was trne for respondents who simply 
regarded the pursuit of a degree as "The ‘Done' Thing”. Conversely, participants 
attached less value to money the more they luiderstood their identity as students in 
temis of "The Pursuit o f  Knowledge”. No significant relationships were found between 
attitudes towards money and the degiee to which respondents endorsed conceptions of 
student identity that revolved aroimd "Subject Interest”, "Student Life” and, rather 
unexpectedly, "Personal Development'. In smnmai-y, four out of the seven categories 
of meaning derived during the fii'st phase of this study were significantly conelated 
with respondents’ attitudes towards money. This find provided the basis fi‘om which 
the role or function of these money-related meanings in the relationship between 
subjective identification and attitudes towards money was explored.
There was only weak evidence in support of the claim that the meaning(s) of the 
social categoiy ‘student’ mediated thé linlc between subjective identification and the 
monetary attitudes expressed. Out of tlnee definitions of student identity that were 
found to be positively conelated with the subjective value attached to money, only one 
-  namely "Material Gain” -  met the criteria statistically necessary to be regarded as a 
mediator variable. Whilst this particular- mediation model appeared to be in line with 
the initial prediction, no imambiguous conclusions could be drawn on its basis, 
especially since it was susceptible to the problem of feedback. In other words, the 
results suggested that "Material Gain” could be treated as either mediator or dependent 
variable (depending on the model), which, in tiuii, cast serious doubts on the 
accrnateness of the model proposed here and, therefore, on the assumed relationships 
between the variables it included. This feedback problem seemed closely linked with 
more complex issues relating to the different definitions of student identity as such; we 
shall turn to these shortly. On the whole, there was insufficient evidence to support the 
mediational hypothesis.
There was also no evidence in corroboration of the final hypothesis which 
suggested the existence of a moderated relationship between social identification and 
attitudes towards money. Respondents who stiongly subscribed to the materialistic, 
extrinsic meanings of the social categoi*y ‘student’ -  relative to the more laiowledge- 
related, intrinsic meanings -  consistently attributed greater value to money than 
paiticipants for whom this particular imderstanding was less important. However,
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conti'ary to initial predictions, this was not only the case for respondents who strongly 
endorsed their student identity but also for those less dedicated to ‘being a student’, hi 
other words, no interaction was found between strength of identification and the degree 
to which relative materialistic conceptions of student identity were supported. At the 
same thne as degiee of identification with ‘being a student’ accentuated the impact of 
relative materialistic conceptions of student identity on attitudes towards money, it did 
so across both high and low levels of social identification.
4.3.3.1 Methodological Limitations
The absence of a moderation effect, in conjunction with tlie feedback problem 
encountered during the mediation analysis, appeared to be due to the operationalisation 
of ‘identity content’ in this study. With hindsight, it is evident that the ‘meanings’ or 
vignettes used here not only tapped into different understandings of student identity, 
but also into much broader, underlying values, hi other words, the extent to which this 
study accessed identity content remains miclear. This problem was likely to have been 
exacerbated by the manner in which the different definitions of student identity w^ ere 
established during Phase I  (see below); it may also have been affected by the actual 
wording used in the different vignettes during this stage of the study. This 
methodological wealaiess raises broader issues with regai'd to the feasibility of defining 
and controlling ‘meaning’ experimentally.
Several criticisms can be levelled against the method by which different identity 
‘contents’ were obtained here. For instance, Condor (personal coniimmication) argues 
that the meanings of a given identity aie best elicited tluough prompting accounts of 
difference rather than by focusing on essentialist descriptions -  as was the case in the 
current context. Condor also suggests that identity content be elicited via accounts of 
noimality / typicality or tluough prompting accounts of common-knowledge by 
providing a fictitious audience. However, in all cases, she asserts that the contents or 
meanings generated tlnough verbal responses tend to be qualitatively ‘richer’ than 
written descriptions since less editing occurs in verbal replies.
4.3.3.2 Summary
The overall prnpose of this study was tlmeefold: We, firstly, set out to explore the 
content(s) ascribed to the social categoiy ‘student’; secondly, we aimed to examine
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whether student identity invoked meanings that impinged on the subjective valuation of 
money. Finally, the role of these meanings in the relationship between subjective 
identification with ‘being a student’ and attitudes towards money was considered.
In Phase I  of the study, seven categories of meaning or ‘identity content’ were 
established. These meanings of student identity were described in teims of the pursuit 
of laiowledge, interest in a particular field of study, employment or financial prospects 
(material gain), status, personal development, the appeal of living a student life or 
simply in terms of considering university education as the ‘done’ thing. Of these, tlnee 
were found to relate to attitudes towards money in Phase II  of the study -  namely 
material gain, status and the pursuit of knowledge. Participants who strongly endorsed 
their identity as students were found to ascribe gi eater value to money than respondents 
for whom ‘being a student’ was less important. Yet, there was insufficient evidence to 
support the hypothesis that the meanings ascribed to this social categoiy mediated the 
relationship between social identification and monetary attitudes; there was also no 
evidence to suggest that identity content played" a moderating role within that 
relationship. ' =
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V . So c ia l  Id e n t it y  a n d  M o n e y : C o m p a r a t iv e  
C o n t e x t , M o n e t a r y  A t t it u d e s  a n d  B e h a v io u r
5.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
This chapter revisits some of the theoretical issues that were raised at the outset of 
the first study. Here, we return to the general question of whether notions of subjective 
identification -  as opposed to sociological gi'oup membership -  play a role in the 
perceived value of money. Whilst the study reported in Chapter III examined the 
impact of identity salience on the subjective valuation of money under conditions 
where different social identities were rendered salient, the present study considered the 
effect of variations in the comparative context in which the same identity is salient. 
Additionally, in extending the scope of . the previous studies, the focus here was not 
only on attitudes towards money but also on their relationship to monetary behaviour.
As already discussed in Chapter I, within the Social Identity tradition, self­
definition as a member of a particular social category is thought to prompt self- 
stereotyping processes (i.e. self-categorisation) by means of which the norms or 
contents associated with that category become assimilated into the ‘self (i.e. 
depersonalisation). More specifically, under conditions of social identity salience, 
context-specific group noims -  the so-called ‘gimip prototype’ -  are constructed on the 
basis of social comparative information. This group prototype, in turn, "describes and 
prescribes beliefs, attitudes, feelings and behaviours that optimally minimize ingroup 
differences and maximize intergroup differences (the principle o f  metacontrast)” 
(Teny, Hogg & Blackwood, 2001, p. 143); in other words, the prototype specifies the 
meaning of a salient identity. The logic of the context-dependence of the group 
prototype also implies that stereotypic group norms do not only vary as a function of 
the particular identity that is salient in a given situation (as was our focus in Chapter 
m ) but that these can change according to the comparative context within which a 
given identity is salient. That is, the meaning of a given identity is shaped by the 
comparative context; different norms might apply to the same social category 
depending on the specific intergroup comparisons that are salient at the time.
The first focus of the present study was to consider the relevance of this latter
theoretical principle for the subjective valuation of money; in other words, the aim was
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to examine whether attitudes towards money and monetary behaviour (as explicit 
manifestations of a group-specific norm) would be affected by changes in the 
comparative context in which a given social identity was salient, 
hi order to address this question, we aimed to vary the comparative context within 
which a given identity -  namely ‘being a psychology student’ -  was salient. 
Accordingly, relevant outgroups had to be chosen that would allow respondents to 
engage in meaningfiil intergroup comparisons. To this end, a pilot study was carried 
out in which students fiorn a variety of disciplines had to be rated with regard to the 
extent to which they were tliought to value money. The results of this pilot study 
revealed that psychology students were believed to attach significantly greater value to 
money than theology students; however, in comparison to economics students, 
psychologists were considered to value money significantly less. On the basis of these 
pilot ratings, it was assimied that the subjective valuation of money attributed to 
members of these social categories reflected botli the perceived importance of money 
as a dimension as well as its relevance for defining these identities. ‘Theologists’ and 
‘economists’ were therefore chosen to provide the hypothetical comparison outgroups 
for the sample of psychology students (‘psychologists’) who participated in this study. 
Variations in the comparative context in which ‘being a psychologist’ was salient were 
expected to lead to a perception of money as comparatively important when 
‘theologist’ constituted the hypothetical outgroup; yet, when outgroup comparisons 
with ‘economists’ were invoked, participants were assumed to attached less importance 
to money, hi theoretical terms then, we expected participants’ responses to reflect a 
shift in their positions on a particular dimension (i.e. ‘money’). Consequently, 
variations in the comparative context in which participants’ self-categorisations as 
‘psychologists’ were salient were expected to affect both monetary attitudes and 
behaviour, hi addition to the money attitude scale employed previously, this study thus 
also included an Ultimatum Game (see Method for detailed description), which served 
as a means of gauging monetary behaviour. The inclusion of the Ultimatum Game as a 
behavioural task not only provided a new dependent measure but also allowed us to 
expand on oin previous reseaiuh questions by considering the issue of the attitude -  
behaviour* relationship.
The relationship between monetary attitudes and money-related behaviour provided 
the second focal point for this study. Traditionally, people’s actions have been regarded
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as led by their attitudes; that is to say, the linlc between attitudes and attitudinally- 
congi'uent behaviour has usually been conceptualised as relatively straightforward and 
direct. Since evidence for such a direct attitude-behaviour linlc has remained 
notoriously illusive, recently more complex models of this relationship have been 
proposed -  such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) or the 
related Theory of Planned Behavioin (Ajzen, 1987; 1991). However, social identity 
theorists have criticised these models for treating the normative and attitudinal aspects 
associated with behaviorn as if  they were cognitively independent phenomena, thereby 
also ignoring the impact that specific, behaviourally-relevant reference groups may 
have on the formation of norms (Terry et al., 2001). These critics, in turn, contend that 
norms should play a central role in the study of the attitude-behaviour relationship. As 
Teny et al. (2001) have argued:
“On the basis of the sociocognitive processes of categorisation and 
depersonalisation, a ciear case can be made for the role of group norms in attitude- 
behaviour relations. Self-categorisation as a member of a self-inclusive and 
contextually-salient group membership means that the self is defined in terms of 
the ingroup prototype. If the prototype embodies an attitudinally-congruent group 
norm, the assimilation of self to the prototype underpins a process by which the 
person’s behaviour is brought in line with his or her attitude, presumably because 
the fact that the attitude is normative -  and hence group-defining -  renders the 
attitude accessible.” (p. 143-144)
According to this perspective, a coiTcspondence between attitudes and behaviour 
should only be expected when the attitude in question is normatively supported (i.e. 
legitimised) by a salient gioup membership. By the same token, when an attitude is not 
noimative, ingioup members would not be expected to demonstrate behavioural 
adherence to that attitude. Noims, in other words, should strengthen the relationship 
between attitudes and behaviour to the extent that a) an attitude is noimative or 
relevant (that is, the noim and attitude are congiTient) for a self-inclusive ingroup and 
b) the social identity foims a salient part of a person’s self-definition (Teny et al., 
2001). From a Social Identity perspective, tlierefore, attitude-behaviom* conginency is 
viewed as contingent on both social identity salience and the particular group nomis 
(attitudes) that this identity invokes; that is, whether or not a paiticular attitude affects 
behaviour is determined by the noimative relevance of the attitude dimension for the 
currently salient identity. The present study sought to explore whether this particular 
understanding of the attitude-behaviour linlc would apply to a) the relationship between
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monetaiy attitudes and behaviour and b) in contexts where the same identity is salient 
under different conditions of outgroup comparisons.
hi sunmiary, the two main theoretical questions this study aimed to tackle were as 
follows:
1) Does the comparative context in which a given identity is salient have an effect 
on group-specific norms about money? hi other words, do attitudes towards 
money and money-related behaviours vary as a function of the comparative 
context within which the same identity is salient?
2) Does the relationsliip between attitudes towards money and monetary behaviour 
change as a fimction of the comparative context in which a given identity is 
salient? hi other words, is the normative relevance of money for defining a 
ciUTently saheiit identity deteimined by the comparative context in which that 
identity is salient?
5.1.1 Research Hypotheses
hi order to addiess these theoretical issues, and on the basis of the pilot findings 
referred to above, the overall predictions for this study were as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Psychology students will attribute greater subjective value to money 
imder conditions in which comparisons between themselves and 
‘theologists’ are rendered salient {Theology Condition) than under 
conditions where ‘economists’ are believed to constitute their 
comparative outgroup {Economics Condition).
Hvpothesis 2: Respondents’ monetaiy behaviours (as measured by the Ultimatum 
Game) will reflect the greater significance attached to money under 
conditions where outgioup comparisons with ‘theologists’ are salient 
than under conditions in which ‘economists’ comprise the comparative 
outgroup. (For detailed predictions concerning the actual scores on the 
behavioinal measure see Section 5.3.3.)
Hvpothesis 3: Conespondence between participants’ monetaiy attitudes and their 
behaviour (as measured by responses to the Ultimatum Game) will be 
gieater when comparisons with ‘theologists’ are rendered salient
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{Theologyt Condition) than under conditions in which ‘economists’ 
constitute the comparative outgi'oup {Economics Condition).
To recap the arguments outlined above, Hypothesis 1 and 2 addressed the question of 
whether variations in the comparative context in which ‘being a psychologist’ was 
salient would induce changes in the stereotypical norms associated with that identity 
and thereby in the perceived importance of money. Hypothesis 3, on the other hand, 
explored the noimative relevance of money for defining a cui'rently salient identity 
under different conditions of intergi'oup comparison; it therefore asked whether the 
relationship between psychology students’ attitudes towaids money and monetaiy 
behaviour could be viewed as moderated by the comparative context in which their 
social identity as ‘psychologists’ was salient.
5.1.2 M ethodological Adjustments
Before proceeding to outline the methodological details of the present study, a 
number of practical issues are worth pointing out here. On account of the experiences 
gained fiom the studies reported in Chapter III and IV, the present study focused on 
improving the means employed to manipulate identity salience as well as the 
assessment of identification strength (for details see Method below).
As already discussed, the results obtained fi'oni the experiment described in 
Chapter III with regard to the overall success of the experimental manipulations 
remained somewhat ambiguous. This, in turn, cast some doubt on the use of 
questionnaire coversheets as the sole experimental manipulation measure. 
Consequently, wliilst the present study included similar coversheets, a number of 
additional measiues were also made use of here in order to render identification with 
‘being a psychologist’ salient witliin different comparative contexts. Some of these 
extra measures -  details for which can be foimd under “Identity and Comparative 
Context Manipulations” in the Method section -  were specifically designed to actively 
engage participants in the suggested intergi'oup comparisons, thereby providing a better 
means of assuring the salience manipulations’ effectiveness.
Furtheimore, in the previous two studies, a two-item measure had been employed 
to assess degree of subjective identification. Here, this measure was replaced with the 
four-item identification scale developed by Doosje, Ellemers and Spears (1995). As
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Haslam (2001) has pointed out, the global and succinct nature of this scale makes it 
suitable as a measure of both social identification and social identity salience, which 
was ideal for the present puiposes. hi addition, whilst the previous measure did not 
appear to be entirely precise, in so far as no clear-cut conclusions could be drawn with 
regard to which social (sub)category the items tapped into (e.g. ‘student’ versus ‘being 
a psychology student’ / ‘psychologist’), the present study avoided this kind of 
ambiguity by ensuring that the identification items were appropriately plirased.
5 .2  M e t h o d
5.2.1 Design and Materials
Some of the materials used in the present study were identical to the measures 
employed previously. However, a niunber of important changes were incorporated in 
order to address the methodological shortcomings that had become apparent in the 
course of previous analyses. All measurements were contained within a questionnaire 
which comprised the following parts: an identity manipulation in the fonn of a cover 
sheet, a series of open-ended questions and a pre-recorded audio-tape introducing the 
study; an identification scale; a money attitude scale; a psychophysical ratio scaling 
task as well as a behaviomal measine in the fonn of an Ultimatum Game.
5.2.1.1 Identity and Comparative Context Manipulations
The present study comprised tliree experimental conditions {Theology, Economics 
and a Neutral condition), hi all conditions, participants’ social identity as 
‘psychologists’ was emphasised. However, in the first condition, intergroup 
comparisons with ‘theologists’ were also rendered salient; conversely, in the second 
experhnental condition, respondents were prompted to engage in intergroup 
comparisons with ‘economists’. The third condition was intended to operate as a 
control condition and no outgroup comparisons were introduced here.
hi order to manipulate the comparative context in which ‘being a psychologist’ was 
salient, different coversheets were employed for the questionnaires handed out in each 
condition (see Appendix V.a). The wording on the coversheets was selected carefully 
so as to call attention to respondents’ social group membersliip as ‘psychologists’ 
whilst avoiding to invoke the super-ordinate category ‘student’. The initial introduction
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to the study provided on these coversheets was identical for all conditions and read as 
follows:
"Money plays a pervasive role in all our lives. Yet, we Imow surprisingly 
little about what money really means to different groups o f  people. We are 
interested in the question o f whether or not the degree to which we value 
money depends on who we are and the groups we belong to
In the Theologyt condition, this introduction was then followed by the below description 
of the purpose of the study:
"This research is particularly concerned with the relationship between 
people's chosen field  o f  study and their beliefs and behaviours with regard 
to money. At present, we are mainly focusing on theology^ students and 
psychology^ students. Are there any differences betw^een psychologists and 
theologists and, i f  so, how are these expressed? These are the types o f  
question we are interested in and would like to explore in this study.
In the Economics condition, in turn, this description was as follows:
"This research is particularly concerned with the relationship between 
people's chosen field  o f study and their beliefs and behaviours with regard 
to money. A t present, we are mainly focusing on economics students and 
psychology students. Are there any differences between psychologists and 
economists and, i f  so, how are these expressed? These are the types o f  
question we are interested in and would like to explore in this study.
hi the Neutral Condition, this simply read:
"This research is particularly concerned with the relationship between 
people's chosen fie ld  o f  study and their beliefs and behaviours with regard 
to money. At present, we are mainly focusing on psychology students. How 
important is money to psychologists? This is the type o f  question we are 
interested in and would like to explore in this study, "
At the beginning of each questionnaire (following the coversheet), respondents 
were presented with a number of open-ended questions designed to actively engage 
them in the constmction of comparative contexts, hi the Economics condition, 
participants were asked to illustrate their general impressions regarding economists, or 
how they would define a ‘typical economist’; conversely, in the Theology condition, 
descriptions of a ‘typical theologist’ were elicited (see Appendix V.b). hi both these 
conditions, participants were also asked to describe what they saw as the main 
differences between themselves as psychologists and the members of the respective 
outgroups (theologists, economists). In the Neutral condition, participants were simply 
instructed to describe their general impressions regarding ‘psychologists’.
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Once respondents had answered the open-ended questions tapping into their 
subjective perceptions of what it means to be a ‘typical economist’ {Economics), a 
‘typical theologist’ {Theology?) or a ‘typical psychologist’ {Neutral), they were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they believed that members of the outgi'oup (i.e. 
‘theologists’ / ‘economists in general’) and members of tlieir own gioup (i.e. 
‘psychologists in general’) valued money. Responses to these questions were measured 
on a 7-point scale (where 1 = “no value at all” and 7 = “gieat value”). As well as 
fonning pait of the comparative context manipulation, this measine also provided an 
indication of the stereotypical beliefs held amongst oin sample concerning members of 
the respective outgroups.
Both on the coversheets and tlnoughout the questiomiaire, giaphic symbols (i.e. a 
bible representing theologists, a growth chart for economists and the Greek letter ‘W’ 
for psychologists) were used to facilitate the manipulation of the comparative context, 
hi addition, the questionnaire’s physical appeaiance suggested that members of the 
respective comparison outgioups participated in the study. The questiomiaires for the 
Economics and Theology? conditions comprised a number of items seemingly 
applicable to economists or theologists only: for instance, an open-ended question 
asking for the description of a ‘typical psychologist’ as well as identification scales for 
members of the respective outgroups were included. Respondents were explicitly 
instructed to focus only on the questions applicable to them as psychologists (items 
ostensibly addressing the outgroups were crossed out by hand). Fuithermore, for the 
Ultimatum Game (UG, see below), respondents were given hand-written codes which 
suggested that they were paired with another player who, in timi, was a specific 
member of the respective outgroup (e.g. “ECOIOO-PSYIOO” in Economics). This was 
to render the physical appearance of the UG part of the questiomiaire as compelling as 
possible and to ensure that respondents believed that they were actually playing the 
game against an unknown ‘other’ (see Appendix V.c).
Finally, in each experimental condition, detailed instructions for the study, 
alongside its underlying rationale, were presented on audio-tape before the actual 
questioimaires were handed out (see Procedure). Whilst the overall introduction and 
instractions recorded on the tapes were identical across conditions, as with the 
coversheets, there were also variations in the recorded text which were tailored to the
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different experimental conditions (for text details see Appendix V.d). These audio­
tapes therefore served as an additional salience manipulation measure.
5.2.1.2 Identification Scale
In this study, Doosje et al.’s (1995) four-item identification scale was used. Doosje 
et al.’s original identification items were modified slightly so as to ensure that the 
super-ordinate category ‘student’ would not be invoked. The included statements were 
rated on a 7-point scale (where 1 = “not important at all” and 7 = “very important”) and 
read as follows: “/  see myself as a psychologist”, “/  am pleased to be a psychologist”, 
“/  feel strong ties with other psychologists” and “/  identify? with other psychologists”. 
For each respondent, the mean score on these items was computed to represent their 
degree of identification with ‘being a psychologist’ {identification score). The possible 
range for this identification index was from 1 (indicating no identification) to 7 
(representative of a very high degiee of subjective identification).
5.2.1.3 The Money Attitude Scale
The present study included the same, slightly shortened version of the original 
money attitude scale that had been employed in the previous study. This version 
included 15 attitude statements rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = “strongly 
disagree and 7 = “strongly agree”). Again, for the final statistical analysis and after 
appropriate reversal of scores for the negatively phrased items, mean scores for the 
whole scale were computed to represent the degiee to which participants valued money 
{money attitude). This rendered a possible range of scores between 1 and 7 (with 7 
indicating high valuation of money).
5.2.1.4 Psychophysical Ratio Scaling
hi addition to the money attitude scale, this study also included a psychophysical
ratio scaling task which was intended to seiwe as a secondaiy measme of the subjective
value respondents attached to money, hi the psychophysical ratio scaling approach -
also refeiTcd to as tlie magnitude estimation technique -  ratios of money amounts are
equated with ratios of emotional intensities, such as joy or anger over winning or losing
money. The magnitude estimation task employed in this study was adapted from
Brandstatter and Brandstatter (1996) who used this technique to measure the subjective
utility of money. Respondents were asked to specify the sums of money that would be
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required to double their happiness or upset over winning or losing certain base 
amounts. An example of the type of item included in this task is provided below:
Obviously, £10 is exactly twice as much as £5. But if you lost £10, do you think you would 
be exactly twice as upset as if you lost £5, more than twice as upset or less than twice as 
upset? __
I jTwicc as  upset [ ^ 1  More th a n  twice as upset [ ^ 1  Less than twice as upset
How much money you would have to lose to make you exactly twice as upset as losing £5?
£ ....
The above question was posed with reference to three standard stimuli -  £5, £50 and 
£500 -  and concerning both losses and gains. With regard to the latter, participants 
were asked to imagine how happy they would feel if they won the same amounts of 
money and to specify the actual sums required to double their happiness over winning 
each of the three standard amounts. In summary, for each participant, the 
psychophysical ratio scaling task consisted of answering six questions, three of which 
were concerned with losses and three with gains, whilst £5, £50 and £500 constituted 
the base amounts in relation to which judgements had to be made.
5.2.1.5  T h e  U l t im a t u m  G a m e
Another important extension of the previous studies here was the inclusion of a 
behavioural measure in the shape of a simple ultimatum bargaining game. The 
ultimatum game (UG), frequently used as a means of assessing self-interest, 
traditionally consists of two players, an ‘allocator’ (or ‘proposer’) and a ‘receiver’ (or 
‘responder’). Giith, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) first introduced the UG into 
the experimental literature. In their original study, respondents who were assigned the 
‘allocator’ role, were asked to divide a given amount of German marks (c DM) 
between themselves and the particular ‘recipient’ they were paired with. If the offer 
(i.e. the proposed division of amount at stake) was accepted by the ‘recipient’ then the 
‘allocator’ received c -  x  (stake amount minus the sum allocated to the recipient) and 
the ‘recipient’ received x. However, if  the offer was rejected, both players received 
nothing. This relatively simple game has been modified by Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler (1986) and numerous writers have used it to assess, for instance, whether the 
behaviour of economics students differs from other students in the context of this game 
(e.g. Carter & Irons, 1991; James, Soroka & Benjafield, 2001).
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For our puiposes here, we combined and modified the procedures used by 
Kaluiemami et al. (1986), Thaler (1988), Carter and bons (1991) and James et al. 
(2001). Our study was designed to solicit participants’ responses both as ‘recipients’ 
and as ‘allocators’; the size of the stake to be divided was fixed at £10. hi other words, 
participants were required to indicate what division of the £10 represented the 
minimum acceptable to them in the role of receiver and to propose a division of the 
money fi'om the position of allocator (for instructions see Appendix V.c). Moreover, all 
participants were asked to play the UG twice. They were led to believe that their 
partner in one of the games would be an ingroup member (i.e. “another psychology 
student completing this task in a separate session”) and that, in the other game, they 
would be paired with a member of an outgroup (i.e. “economics student”, “theology 
student”, “member of another group who is not a psychologist”). The order of 
presentation of the hypothetical ingi'oup and outgioup members was counterbalanced 
within each experimental condition. In simimaiy tlien, this provided us with four 
dependent behavioural measures for om- analysis: minimum amount acceptable fiom an 
ingroup and outgroup member and the amount allocated to the ingroup and outgroup.
Respondents were not paid for their paiticipation in this study. However, they were 
infomied tliat, after completion of the study, ten participants would be selected in a 
random draw and receive payment according to what their mean contiibutions had been 
in the role of ‘allocator’ in the ultimatum task. Again, tliis was to render the 
experimental set-up of the UG as realistic as possible and to provide an incentive for 
active engagement m the game.
5.2.2 Participants
A total of 62 first-year undergraduate psychology students took part in this study: 8 
(12.9%) participants were male and 54 (87.1%) were female. All participants were 
recmited during one particular practical session (see below) on research methods which 
was held at the School of Psychology of a Southern English university.
5.2.3 Procedure
As part of a practical session on research methods in economic psychology, 
respondents were assigned to the tlu'ee experimental conditions by randomly dividing
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the class and allocating students to three different lecture rooms. This division of the 
class did not seem to raise any suspicions with regard to the experimental nature of the 
present study, especially since participants had been involved in a nimiber o f economic 
psychological tests tluoughout the session.
All tliree experimental groups were run simultaneously from their separate locations. 
As a result, in addition to the cuiTent author, two other experimenters were present, hi 
order to maintain consistency across conditions, the background to the study as well as 
detailed instructions were provided via a pre-recorded audio-tapes (see Appendix V.d 
for transcript of the text). The same male voice featured on all these instiaiction tapes 
and the speaker was not in any other way involved in the implementation of the study. 
With the exception of the actual context manipulations that had also been embedded in 
the taped instructions (see above), the content of the tapes was identical across 
conditions. The speaker also pointed out that respondents were under no obligation to 
take pai't and that they were fi'ee to withdraw horn the study at any time. Once the 
instruction tapes had been played, the experimenters reiterated that participation was 
voluntary and answered any questions that arose. After infonned consent had been 
obtained fi'om each participant, the questionnaires were distributed. Respondents were 
instructed to carefully read the cover sheet and iiistirictions before proceeding to fill in 
the questiomiaire. The questiomiaires took less than 15 minutes to complete.
As soon as all questionnaires had been filled in, respondents of all thiee experimental 
groups were brought together. As part o f the stmctured debrief, participants were asked 
about their personal impressions regarding the study and its underlying piupose. None 
of them voiced any suspicion about either the division of the class into three groups or 
the authenticity of the comparisons supposedly being made between psychologists and 
economists / theologists. Respondents were then given a full debriefing with regard to 
the aims of the study and its experimental nature. The pmpose of the comparative 
context manipulations was explained where it was sti'essed Üiat no actual comparisons 
had been or would be talcing place, hi addition, a handout summarising the study’s 
underlying rationale was distributed (see Appendix V.e).
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5 .3  R e s u l t s
As before, the majority of respondents in the present study were female and only a 
relatively small proportion was male (see Method). However, unlike in the experiment 
described in Chapter in, this uneven gender distribution did not pose a problem for 
statistical analysis here as the distribution of male participants was fairly even across 
experimental conditions {Theology 3, Neutral 2, Economics 3) and also since gender 
did not figure as a variable in the present design. The findings reported here are 
therefore drawn from the whole sample (N = 62). Table 5.1 shows the distribution of 
participants across the different experimental cells.
Table 5.1 Nimiber of Participants in Expeiiniental Conditions 
C o n d it io n
Theology Neutral Economics
24 18 20
5.3.1 Scale Reliability
Reliability for the 15 attitude statements assessing the subjectively perceived value 
of money was acceptable, with Cronbach’s standardised reliability coefficient a  = .777. 
Tluee items, however, were noticeable because of their comparatively low correlations 
with the overall scale. Item 7 (“/  often feel inferior to others who have more money 
than I  have, even w henllm ow  that they have done nothing o f worth to get i f  \  item-to- 
total correlation = -.036), Item 10 {“There comes a point when having more money 
actually means enjoying life less”, item-to-total correlation = .173) and Item 15 (“/  
woidd never feel down because o f not having enough money”, item-to-total correlation 
= .093) were consequently excluded from further analysis\ Cronbach’s standardised 
reliability coefficient for the remaining 12 items was a  = .814, thus allowing for the 
treatment of these statements as a scale. A money attitude score was computed for each 
respondent by calculating the mean of his/her scores on the individual items (with a 
mean score of ‘ 1’ representing no value and ‘7’ a veiy high value attached to money).
The foiu' items assessing the extent of participants’ identification with ‘being a 
psychologist’ rendered a Cronbach’s standardised reliability coefficient of a  = .921. By 
calculating the mean score of these four items an overall index for respondents’ degiee
As previously, the criterion value for exclusion was an item-to-total correlation r < .25.
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of identification with ‘being a psychology student’, the identification score, was 
obtained (with ‘1 ’ representing no identification and ‘7’ a high degree of identification 
with being a psychologist).
5.3.2 Manipulation Check
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  ‘ B e i n g  a P s y c h o l o g i s t ’
The mean identification score for the overall sample was 4.770 (SD = 1.310). This 
indicated that ‘being a psychologist’ played a moderately important role in 
respondents’ self-definition. Table 5.2 provides the mean identification scores for each 
condition.
Table 5.2 Means (Standard Deviations) for Identification Scores
Theology Neutral Economics
.............
There were no significant differences between the identification scores obtained in the 
three experimental conditions (F(2,s9) = .364, n.s.) and, therefore, no diffeiences in 
identity salience. In other words, ‘being a psychologist’ seemed equally important to 
all respondents, regardless of the experimental condition they were in. Whilst not 
statistically significant, the fact that identification scores were lowest in the Neutral 
condition seems worthy of note here.
S t e r e o t y p i c a l  R a t i n g s
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they believed psychologists 
and economists or theologists, in general, valued money. Table 5.3 shows the mean 
ratings and standard deviations obtained on these items.
Table 5.3 Means and Standard Deviations for Stereotypical Conparisons Groups Ratings
C ondition ITEM N Mean* Std. Dev.
E con om ics ‘‘For economists, I believe money has ... value. ” "For psychologists, I  believe money has ... value" 20
6.150
4.350
.933
.671
T h eo lo g y ‘‘For theologists, I believe money has ... value. " "For psychologists, I believe money has ... value" 24
3.435
4.542
1.080
^ 8 4
N eu tra l "For psychologists, /  believe money has ... value" 18 4.167 J 8 6
Overall "For psychologists, I believe money has ... value" 62 4.371 .794
Items were rated on a 7-point scale (where ‘1’ = “no value at all” and ‘7 ’ = “great value”)
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There were no significant differences between conditions with regard to the extent to 
which participants believed that psychologists would value money (F(2,s9)= 1.163, n.s.). 
Across conditions, respondents believed that psychologists, on the whole, would value 
money only to a moderate extent. However, economists were thought to value money 
to a high degree. Respondents in the Economics condition indicated that economists 
would generally attach far greater importance to money than would psychologists. This 
perceived difference between economists and psychologists in teiins of the subjective 
valuation of money was significant (?yp= 7.621, p < .001). Conversely, participants in 
the Theology condition believed that theologists would attach significantly less value to 
money than psychologists (?22= -4.219, p < .001). These results corresponded to the 
stereotypical ratings obtained from the pilot study and thus supported the present 
selection of outgioups for the pmpose of engaging respondents in meaningful 
intergi'oup comparisons.
5.3.3 Comparative Context and the Subjective Value of M ouey 
‘Money A ttitude’
hi order to examine whether the subjective value attributed to money varied as a 
function of the comparative context within which a given identity -  namely ‘being a 
psychologist’ -  was salient, the data were initially analysed by a One-Way Analysis of 
Variance. Money attitude foiined the dependent variable, whilst ‘Condition’ was 
entered as a factor comprising tlmee levels: Theology, Economics and the Neutral 
condition.
There was no significant main effect for ‘Condition' (F(2,59)=  1.506 n.s.). However, a 
closer look at the mean money attitude scores obtained in the different conditions 
revealed that they were in the hypothesised direction.
Table 5.4 Means (Standard Deviations) fox Money Attitude Scores
T heology N eutral E conom ics
Participants scored lower on the money attitude index in the Economics condition than 
in the Theology^ condition, whilst scores in tlie Neutral condition fell somewhere in- 
between. As the initial predictions primarily concerned the difference between 
respondents in the Theology^ and Economics conditions with regard to the subjective
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valuation of money, analysis continued with a plamied comparison between these two 
conditions/ This critical comparison between Economics and Theology showed that 
there was a significant difference between participants’ money attitude scores in these 
two conditions: psychologists who believed that they were being compared with 
economists attributed significantly less value to money than psychologists for whom a 
comparison with theology students was made salient -1.950, p = .029, one- 
tailed)^. This finding lent support to Hypothesis 1.
Although money attitude scores in the Neutral condition were not significantly 
different fiorn the scores obtained in either the Economics or the Theology conditions, 
they were in the predicted direction; that is, they fell halfway between the scores 
obtained in the other two experimental groups. The critical comparison between 
Economics and Theology showed that psychology students attributed a) gi'eater 
subjective value to money when comparing themselves to theology students and b) less, 
subjective value to money when economists formed the comparison group, thus 
coiToborating oiu initial predictions. In surmnary then, the results for the money 
attitude index provided some evidence in support of the claim that attitudes towards 
money vary as a fimction of the comparative context in which a given social identity is 
salient.
Psvchophysical Ratio Scaling
hi addition to the money attitude scale, this study also included a psychophysical 
ratio scaling task which served as a secondary measure of the subjective valuation of 
money. Following previous authors (see Galanter, 1990; Braridstatter & Brandstatter, 
1996), in the descriptive analysis, the mean multiples of the monetary amounts 
required to double joy or anger -  relative to the different base amounts (£5, £50 and 
£500) -  were used as measures of the subjective valuation of money. Figures 5.1 and
5.2 illustrate, for each experimental condition (and separately for losses and gains), the
 ^ Altlioiigli no explicit comparison group was established in tlie Neutral condition, it seems likely that 
implicit comparisons either witli imspecified outgroup members or even hz^ra-group comparisons may 
have been invoked instead. In the latter case, personal identity salience would have taken precedence 
over social identification. This notion appears to be underscored by the fact that the variability of money 
attitude scores was greatest in the Neutral condition. Therefore, the initial objective to set up a ‘conti’o l’ 
condition in which explicit comparisons with specific outgroups would be absent seemed, at least with 
hindsight, somewhat illusive.
 ^ Significance levels are reported one-tailed here as precise predictions regarding the direction of 
participants’ responses had been made.
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mean multiples deemed necessary to double respondents’ joy or anger in relation to the 
three standard stimuli.
Figure 5.1 Mean Multiples to Double Upset over Losing
□ Control 
■  Economics
1:75 □  Theology
£5 £50 £500
F igure 5.2 Mean Multiples to Double Joy over Winning 
3.5  3.30
2.15 2.16
□  Control
■  Economics
□  Theology
£5 £50 £500
The higher the multiple, the more money was necessary to double the utility of the 
respective base amounts, thus denoting a lesser degree of subjective valuation. 
Conversely, the lower the multiple, the less money was needed to double utility which, 
in turn, was indicative of a greater subjective value being attributed to money. These 
figures show that the mean multiples obtained in the Economics condition exceeded the 
ones found in Theology with regard to four out of six indices. However, the multiples 
drawn from the Neutral condition were generally lowest and in only one instance (Loss 
£5) fell midway between responses from the other two experimental groups.
In order to re-examine Hypothesis 1 with this alternative measure of the subjective 
valuation of money, a One-Way Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANGYA) was 
performed for which the psychophysical ratio scaling responses yielded six dependent
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variables: the money required to double anger over losing £5, £50 and £500 as well as 
the amounts necessary to double joy over wimiing £5, £50 and £500. ‘Condition' was 
tieated as the independent variable (with Theology^, Economics and Neutral as its 
different levels). This MANOVA was carried out on the logarithms of the actual 
monetary amounts quoted by respondents. Only with the use of Roy’s Largest Root 
criterion were the combined variables found to be significantly affected by the 
experimental condition (F(6,46) = 2.349, p < ,05).'  ^ Univariate analyses for each 
dependent variable showed that the effect of Condition was approaching significance 
solely for the logaritlim of the amoimt necessary to double anger over losing £50 (F(2,50) 
= 2.969, p = .06). Post-hoc tests (using the Scheffe adjustmerrt) showed that this effect 
was accormted for by the differences betweeir respondents in the Economics and 
Control conditions regarding this particular* rneasme.
hr summary, the findings drawn from the psychophysical ratio scaling task yielded 
little evidence in support of initial predictions, hr additiorr, post-hoc arralyses hr which 
tnoney attitude scores were correlated with each of the six rrragrritude scaling irrdices 
respectively revealed only orre signifrcarrt relationship (i.e. loss £50 arrd money 
attitude, r -  -.223, p < .05 orre-tailed). hr other words, the rrrorrey attitude scale and the 
rrragrritude estirrratiorr task were virtually uruelated, thus castirrg serious doubts on the 
use of the latter as arr altenrative measure of the subjective valuatiorr of rrrorrey. As a 
consequerrce, the psychophysical ratio scalirrg rrreasure was dropped frorrr frrr-ther 
arralysis.
5.3.4 Comparative Context and Monetary Behaviour
This study irrcluded arr Ultirrraturn Garrre (UG) as a rrreasrue of monetary 
behaviour. All par ticiparrts were asked to play the UG twice, hr orre of the games, they 
were led to believe that their fellow player was arr irrgroup rrrernber (arrother 
psychologist) whilst, hr the other garrre, they were supposedly paired with a rrrerrrber of 
arr outgroup (theologist, ecorromist or meirrber of arr urrspecified outgroup). The 
preserrtatiorr of the two garrres was counter-balanced: half the participants were 
presented with arr ingroup rrrernber as their fellow player first, whilst the other half 
rrrade their irritial allocations to arr outgr oup rrrerrrber. The order of preserrtatiorr had rro
Note that the use of tluee alternative criteria (Pillai's Trace, Wilks’ Laraba and Hotellings’ Trace) 
produced a non-significant effect and only a trend for “Condition" (withp  values around .157).
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significant effect on either the allocations made or the money amounts considered 
acceptable. The following results are therefore based on the combined data from all 
participants.
The UG responses rendered four indices of monetary behaviour for each 
participant. Table 5.5 presents the mean amounts allocated to and considered 
acceptable from the supposed ingroup and outgroup members in the UG, for each 
experimental condition separately.
Table 5.5 Means (Standard Deviations) for Amount Accepted and Amount Allocated in UG by Experimental
Condition
Theology Neutral Economics TOTAL
ACCEPTED 3.188 3.194 3.500 3.290
Outgroup (I.88I) (1.487) (1.654) (1.681)
ALLOCATED 4.521 <1889 4.700 4.686(1.281) (.323)* (.548) (.874)
ACCEPTED 3.000 3.111 3.400 3.161
Ingroup (1.894) (1.471) (1.544) (1.652)
ALLOCATED 4.646 /L889 4.800 1 4.766(1437) ' (.323)* i.497) (.777)
ACCEPTED 3.094 3.153 3.450 3326
TOTAL (1 868) (1.473) (1.591) (1.653)
ALLOCATED 4.583(1.197)
4.889
(.323)*
4.750
(.500)
4.726
(.815)
As indicated by Hypothesis 1, money was expected to be more important to 
respondents when their identity as ‘psychologists’ was rendered salient relative to 
‘theologists’ than under conditions where outgroup comparisons with ‘economists’ 
were emphasised. Accordingly, we anticipated that participants in the Theology 
condition would both accept and allocate less money in the UG than their counterparts 
in the Economics condition. This overall behavioural effect was referred to in 
Hypothesis 2. As Table 5.5 shows, the means were in the predicted direction for 
Economics and Theology. In order to examine whether monetary behaviour 
significantly varied as a function of the comparative context within which ‘being a 
psychologist’ was salient, the data were analysed by a 3-Way Analysis of Variance. 
The design employed was a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed Anova design, comprising two within- 
subjects factors and one between-subj ects factor. The first within-subjects factor 
‘Group ’ included two levels, operationalising whether the UG game was played with 
an ingroup or an outgroup member; the second within-subjects factor ‘UG’ also 
consisted of two levels, denoting ‘acceptance’ or ‘allocation’ of specific money
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amounts; the between-subj ects factor ‘Condition ’ comprised three levels, ‘Economics \  
‘TheologyC ‘Neutral’.
Contrary to predictions, no significant main effect was foimd for ‘Condition' (F(2,59) = 
.556, n.s). There was also no main effect for ‘Group' ( F ( i , 5 9 )  =  1.991, n.s).^ However, 
there was a significant main effect for ‘UG' (F(i,59) = 34.191, p < .001). Overall, the 
amount respondents allocated to a hypothetical ‘other’ was significantly higher than the 
monetary amount they regarded to be acceptable for themselves (see Table 5.5 for 
mean scores). There was also a significant interaction between ‘Group' and ‘UG' 
(F(i,59) = 5.424, p < .05). A series of paired sample Ftests revealed a significant 
difference between the sum of money allocated to an ingioup member and that offered 
to an outgroup member (see Table 5.5; t^j^ -2.197, p < .05). The overall amount 
allocated to outgioup members was significantly lower tlian the amoimt allocated to 
ingroup members. Conversely, for an offer to be considered acceptable from an 
outgroup member, the suggested sum had to be significantly liigher than the amount a 
member of the ingroup was expected to propose (see Table 5.5; tôj= 2.453, p < .05) -  a 
finding that seemed to be interesting in its own right.
On the whole, there was no statistical evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. Whilst the 
means on the behavioural indices obtained fiom participants in the Economics and 
Theology conditions were in the predicted directions, their differences were not 
statistically significant. This was also true when the above-described analysis was 
repeated without the Neutral condition ( 2 x 2 x 2  mixed Anova).
5.3.5 The Relationship Between Monetary Attitudes and Behaviour
The second theoretical issue to be addiessed by this study concerned the question 
of whether the relationship between attitudes towards money and monetary behaviour 
was detennined by the nonnative relevance of money for defining respondents’ 
identity as ‘psychologists’ and, consequently, by the comparative context in which 
‘being a psychologist’ was salient. Hypothesis 3 thus stipulated that congmency 
between participants’ monetaiy attitudes and their behaviour would be gi'eater when 
comparisons with ‘theologists’ were rendered salient than under conditions in which
 ^For the results reported here, the Greeiilrouse-Geisser criterion was used.
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‘economists’ constituted the comparative outgroup. In other words, we expeeted the 
attitude-behaviour link to be moderated by the experimental condition.
As a first step towards addressing this hypothesis, participants’ mean money 
attitude scores were correlated with the four behavioural indices obtained from the UG 
(see Table 5.6).
Table 5.6 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Money’ Attitude Scores and Monetary Behaviour Indices (N = 62)
ACCEPT ALLOCATE ACCEPT ALLOCATE Overall Overall
(O utgroup) (O utgroup) (Ingroup) (Ingroup) ACCEPT ALLOCATE
M o n e y  A tt itu d e .0 8 3 - . 4 4 1 * * .0 6 5 - .4 0 1 * * f r 7 5 ^ 4 2 8 * *
Sig. (2-tailed) .519 .0 0 0 .616 .001 ^ 6 3 .001
As Table 5.6 shows, there were no significant correlations between money attitude 
scores and the minimum amounts regarded as acceptable (from both ingroup and 
outgroup members) in the UG. However, respondents’ subjective valuation of money 
was significantly correlated with allocations they made both to members of the ingroup 
and the outgroup during the UG. The greater value participants attached to money, the 
less money they were willing to allocate to others and vice versa.
M oderation Analvsis
Having established a significant relationship between the subjective valuation of 
money and the ‘allocation’ indices of monetary behaviour derived from the UG, we 
proceeded to test the moderation hypothesis by comparing the strength of the 
correlation between participants’ money attitude scores and the amounts allocated (to 
ingroup, outgroup and overall) across the different experimental conditions. Table 5.6 
provides an overview of the correlation coefficients for each condition.
Table 5.7 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Money Attitude Scores and Monetary Behaviour {Amounts
Allocated ”) by Experimental Condition
M on ey A tt i tu d e
ALLOCATE
(Outgroup)
ALLOCATE
(Ingroup)
Overall 
ALLOC A I E
Economics T68 .240 .151
Theology -.669** -.630** ^657**
Neutral -.512* -.512* - ^ 1 2 *
**p < .001 *p < .05
Matching the overall correlations summarised in Table 5.6, there were significantly 
negative correlations between the subjective valuation of money and the different
175
Chapter V
allocation indices in the Theology and Neutral conditions. However, as can be seen 
from Table 5.7, the correlations between money attitude scores and the amounts 
allocated were non-significant for respondents in the Economics condition. At a first 
glance, the correlation coefficients shown in Table 5.7 suggest that attitude behaviour 
congruency was greater in the Theology^ and Neutral conditions than in the Economics 
condition, which would support Hypothesis 3. hi order to test for statistical differences 
in the strength of association between variables, the Fisher’s z statistic was used to 
compare the different coiTelation coefficients. The conelation obtained in the 
Economics condition for the subjective valuation of money and the amount allocated to 
the outgioup was significantly different from the correlation of the same two variables 
in the Theology condition (z = 2.66, p < .01); the difference between correlation 
coefficients in the Economics and the Neutral condition was approaching significance 
(z = 2.66, p = .078). The same pattern was found with regard to the relationship 
between attitudes towards money and the money amoimt allocated to hypothetical 
ingroup members: hi the Economics condition, this correlation was significantly 
different from the relationship between the same two variables foimd in the Theology 
condition (z = 3.02, p < .005) and in the Neutral condition (z = 2.29, p < .05). 
Unsui*prisingly, the same held also true for the coiTelations between money attitude and 
the overall amounts allocated in the UG obtained in the different experimental 
conditions: The relationship between these variables in the Economics condition was 
significantly different from their correlation in the Theology^ condition (z = 2.88, p < 
.005) as well as fr om their conelation in the Neutral condition (z = 2.03 p < .05). There 
were, however, no significant differences between the various conelation coefficients 
obtained in the Theology and the Neutral Condition.
In summaiy, significant differences in attitude-behaviour congiTiency were found 
between the experimental conditions. The conelation coefficients for money attitude 
and amounts allocated revealed significant differences with regard to comparisons 
between the Economics and the Theology conditions and also when contrasting 
Economics with Neutral. For respondents in the Theology and Neutral conditions, 
strong associations between monetaiy attitudes and the allocation indices of monetary 
behaviour were found; there were no differences between these two conditions with 
regard to the strength of the attitude-behaviour relationship. However, for participants 
in the Economics condition, the correlations between the subjective valuation of money
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and the allocation measures derived from the UG were non-significant; in other words, 
there was no correspondence between monetary attitudes and behaviour. As far as the 
allocation indices were concerned, these findings were not only in line with initial 
predictions but also suggested that money was relevant for defining participants’ 
identity as ‘psychologists’ in the context of outgroup comparisons with ‘theologists’; 
however, when comparisons with ‘economists’ were rendered salient, money had no 
relevance for identifying with ‘being a psychologist’.
5.4 D i s c u s s i o n
The present study set out to explore two main theoretical issues, namely 1) does the 
comparative context in which a given identity is salient have an impact on group- 
specific nonns around money and thus on monetary attitudes and behaviour and 2) 
does the normative relevance of money for a given identity -  and hence the 
correspondence between monetary attitudes and behaviour -  change as a function of 
the comparative context in which that identity is salient. In order to address these 
issues, tluee hypotheses were put foiward.
The first two hypotheses suggested that comparative context variations would 
induce changes in the stereotypical nonns around money in terms of identification with 
‘being a psychologist’ and, as a consequence, alter the perceived importance of money, 
hi particular, respondents were expected to attach gr eater importance to money under 
conditions in which comparisons between themselves (as ‘psychologists’) and 
‘theologists’ were rendered salient than under conditions where ‘economists’ provided 
the comparison outgroup. It was predicted that this would be reflected in the subjective 
valuation of / attitudes towards money (Hypothesis 1) as well as in monetary behaviour 
(Hypothesis 2).
There was some evidence in support of the first hypothesis as far as respondents’ 
scores on the money attitude index were concerned. Although there were no significant 
differences between the mean scores obtained in the Neutral condition and the other 
two experimental conditions, the mean money attitude scores of all experimental 
gioups were in the predicted direction. One plausible explanation for the absence of an 
overall Condition effect may be that this study failed to establish a neutral or ‘control’ 
condition to which respondents in the other two experimental groups could be
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meaningfully compaied (see Section 5.4.1). However, in line with Hypothesis 1, the 
critical comparison between Economics and Theology^ showed that participants for 
whom outgroup comparisons with ‘economists’ were salient scored significantly lower 
on the money attitude measure than respondents whose identity as ‘psychologists’ was 
defined relative to an outgroup of ‘theologists’. This finding is particularly intriguing in 
view of the fact that there were no differences between conditions with regard to 
participants’ ratings of the extent to which they believed that psychologists, in general, 
would value money (part of the experimental salience manipulation), hr other words, 
whilst respondents in these experimental groups did not differ with regard to their 
perceptions of the ‘typical’ psychologist’s valuation of money, they did differ in the 
actual expression of their attitudes towar ds money.
However, only one out of the six indices for the subjective valuation of money derived 
fiom the psychophysical ratio scaling task was affected by changes in comparative 
context. There was a marginally significant difference between participants in the 
Economics and Neutral conditions: respondents who compared themselves to 
‘economists’ required a greater sum of money to double their anger over losing £50 
than participants for whom no particular outgroup comparison was rendered salient. 
One reason that may account for the absence of an overall effect for the other two 
standard stimuli (£5 and £500) is tliat -  in the case of the present sample -  a sum of 
£50 may have been more meaningfiil psychologically than any of the other specified 
amounts. A base stimulus of £5 could have been perceived as too insignificant a sum 
so as to matter; the reverse might have been true for a smii of £500 which, in turn, 
could have represented too large a siun for the average student to meaningfully 
consider. This raises a nmnber o f issues not only concerning the actual usefulness of 
the psychophysical ratio scaling task as such but also with regard to its present purpose 
as an alternative rneasme of the subjective valuation of money. In fact, the magnitude 
scaling responses did not conelate with attitudes towards money. The lack of 
association between the two measures not only challenges the use of psychophysical 
ratio scaling task in the cuiTent context but may also account for its failure to yield 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.
hi sum, however, participants’ mean scores on the main money attitude measure were 
in line with initial predictions, suggesting that -  even for a given social identity -  
comparison with members of different outgroups can bring about changes in the
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subjective value attached to money. That is, changes in the stereotypical norms 
associated with ‘being a psychologist’ led to alterations in the monetaiy attitudes 
expressed by participants.
Whilst mean scores on the behavioural measme, which comprised four separate 
indices derived from pai'ticipants’ Ultimatum Game responses, were in the predicted 
directions both for respondents whose identity as ‘psychologists’ was rendered salient 
relative to ‘theologists’ and for those who compared themselves to ‘economists’, the 
differences m scores were not statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 could therefore not 
be supported.
As mentioned previously, Hypothesis 1 and 2 suggested that the perceived importance 
of money varied as a function of the comparative context in which ‘being a 
psychologist’ was salient, hi other words, we expected respondents’ monetary attitudes 
and behavioiu’s to shift along a given dimension (i.e. ‘money’) whose end points 
designated their actual positions on that dimension (i.e. ‘important’ versus 
‘unimportant’). The lack of an overall comparative context effect on the behavioural 
responses may, in part, be accoimted for by the possibility that monetary concerns were 
not only unimportant (which implies a position on a dimension) under conditions 
involving outgioup conipaiisons with ‘economists’, but that the dimension (i.e. 
‘money’) itself simply became iiTelevant for defining one’s identity as a ‘psychologist’, 
hi fact, the second theoretical issue addressed by this study (see above) was concerned 
with this veiy possibility. This, in turn, was suimnarised in the predictions made by 
Hypothesis 3.
The second theoretical issue was based on Teiiy et al.’s (2001) claim that “the 
nature o f the normative environment is an important factor in determining whether 
people behaviourally express their intergroup attitudes” (p. 153). We aimed to explore 
whether this idea would a) translate fr om the domain of intergmup relations to the 
study of monetary attitudes and behaviour and b) also apply under circimistances 
where the same identity is salient under different conditions of outgioup comparisons. 
Hypothesis 3 therefore examined whether the nomative relevance of money for ‘being 
a psychologist’ -  and hence the coiTespondence between monetary attitudes and 
behaviour -  changed as a function of the comparative context in which respondents’ 
identity as ‘psychologists’ was salient. More specifically, intergroup comparisons with 
‘theologists’ were predicted to render money relevant for participants’ self-
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categorisations as ‘psychologists’, thus leading to a gieater conginency between 
attitudes and behaviour; in contrast, comparisons with ‘economists’ were not expected 
to appeal to money-related group nonns, thus rendering the dimension (i.e. ‘money’) as 
such irrelevant for ‘being a psychologist’. Consequently, only a weak correspondence 
between monetary attitudes and behaviour was anticipated under conditions of 
outgroup comparison with ‘economists’.
These predictions were confimied with two out of the four behavioiual indices drawn 
from the Ultimatum Game responses. Whilst, for the sample on the whole, no 
relationship could be established between money attitude scores and the minimum 
amount deemed acceptable (both from ingroup and outgroup members), an overall 
significant association was foimd between tlie subjective value attributed to money and 
the amount allocated to the ingroup and outgroup. The more value respondents 
attributed to money, the smaller the sums they were willing to allocate to their 
supposed ‘partners’ in the game. However, when this coiTelation was examined in 
greater detail,. for each experimental gi*oup separately, no relationship was foimd 
between attitudes toward money and the two behavioural allocation indices for 
respondents in the Economics condition, hi accordance with initial predictions, 
correspondence between paifrcipants’ monetaiy attitudes and their behaviour (as 
measured by the allocation responses) was greater when comparisons with ‘theologists’ 
were rendered salient than under conditions in which ‘economists’ constituted the 
comparative outgioup. Following Teny et al.’s (2001) reasoning, this finding implies 
the comparative context manipulations used in this study created changes in the 
normative environment which, in turn, led to changes in the perceived relevance of 
money for self-categorisation as a ‘psychologist’, hi contrast to outgioup comparisons 
with ‘theologists’, when respondents compared themselves to ‘economists’, money 
simply ceased to be relevant for their self-understandings as ‘psychologists’. These 
results suggest that nouns are not only dependent upon processes of subjective 
identification but that they also play a role in the study of the relationship between 
monetaiy attitudes and behaviour.
Whilst the present findings provided some support for the initial research 
hypotheses, the study also suffered from a number of methodological limitations. 
These shall be discussed in the following sections.
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5.4.1 Methodological Limitations
Whilst mean money attitude scores were in the expected direction for all tlii'ee 
experimental conditions, no overall Condition effect was found, hi other words, 
participants’ money attitude scores in the Neutral condition did not significantly differ 
from respondents in the other two experimental conditions. Originally, the rationale 
underlying the inclusion of tlie Neutral condition was to provide a ‘control’ group -  
where intergioup comparisons would be circumvented, whilst maintaining social 
identity salience as ‘psychologists’ -  against which the other two experimental gi'oups 
could be compared.
However, it could be argued that the salience of any given group membership (i.e. 
social identification) depends to a large extent on the comparative, intergioup context; 
that is, whenever membership in a gi'oiip becomes pertinent, its salience as such is 
relative to some other dmielision of social identity, hi other words, social identity does 
not attain its significance ill a ‘comparative vacuum’, but is in itself a function of 
intergioup contrasts, hi keeping-with this notion, it seems plausible that -  despite the 
absence of an explicitly specified comparison outgioup -  respondents in the Neutral 
condition may have resorted to implicit comparisons (with unspecified outgioup 
members) in order to uphold the salience of their social identity as “psychologists”. 
This notion seems to be underscored by the similarities in the behaviour-attitude 
relationship found for respondents in the Theology and Neutral conditions.
A second reason that calls the rationale for an experimental ‘contioT gioup into 
question is that, given the lack of an explicit intergroup context for respondents in the 
Neutral condition, m(ra-group comparisons may have been invoked instead. In other 
words, in the absence of an explicit outgioup, personal identity aspects may have 
gained in importance. There are two specific observations which appear to lend some 
support to the notion personal identity salience may have taken precedence over social 
identification. Wliilst there were no significant statistical differences between the 
identification scores obtained in the tluee experimental conditions, mean scores were 
lowest in the Neutral condition; that is, social identification with ‘being a psychologist’ 
was less important to respondents in the ‘contioT group than in the other two 
experimental groups, hi addition, the likelihood of an increased relevance for personal 
identity issue appears to be underscored by the fact that the variability of money 
attitude scores was greatest in the Neutral condition. It is, in fact, possible that a
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combination of both implicit intergi'oup comparisons and a shift towards an emphasis 
on personal identity took place for the respondents in the Neutral condition. Whatever 
the case may have been, in retrospect, it seems unfeasible to have endeavoured to 
render social identity salient, whilst attempting to maintain the ‘neutrality’ of 
(comparative) context at the same time.
5.4.1.1 Assessing the Subjective Valuation / Utility of Money
The money attitude statements originally used here were identical to the items 
included in the previous study. Yet, two out of the three items that were excluded here 
on account of their low item-to-total coirelations (Item 10 “There comes a point when 
having more money actually means enjoying life less” and Item 15 “I  would never feel 
down because o f not having enough money”) had, in fact, proven to be satisfactoiy in 
the former two studies, hi other words, there was no perfect overlap between the items 
excluded from further analysis in the present context and the attitude statements 
excluded previously. This raises broader issues with regard to the measmement ■ of 
attitudes towards money in general and the use of attitude scales in particular. These 
concerns will be discussed in Chapter VII.
The present study comprised a magnitude estimation task in which respondents 
were asked to equate ratios of particular money amounts with ratios of emotional 
intensities (joy / anger over winning / losing money). Whilst the overall analysis of the 
magnitude estimation data appeared to suggest a trend towards a main effect for 
Condition, closer inspection of the coiresponding dependent measures showed that 
only one out of the six indices (loss £50) was affected by changes in comparative 
context. As already pointed out above, one of the reasons for the lack of an overall, 
stronger Condition effect may be that the base stimuli of £5 and £500 were not 
particularly meaningful in psychological terms (either being too insignificant or too 
large) and thus lead to more random responses. That is, compared to the other two 
stimuli, the present student sample may have foimd a standard amount of £50 
psychologically more ‘accessible’ or relevant and therefore more easy to relate to with 
regard to its loss. This gives rise to the question of what types of standard stimuli are 
appropriate for this particular task? How do we determine the monetary amounts that 
are psychologically meaningful for the sample under consideration? Should the base 
amounts be adjusted according to the samples used?
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What is of particular relevance here is the fact that the psychophysical ratio scaling 
measme had originally been intended to provide an alternative measure of the 
subjective valuation of money. The present findings, however, indicate that the initial 
supposition of an overlap between the constmcts measured by the money attitude scale 
and the magnitude estimation task was not warranted, hi fact, post-hoc correlation 
analyses showed that only one out of the six psychophysical ratio scaling indices was 
significantly related to attitudes towards money; interestingly, again, this relationship 
concerned participants’ responses to the imagined loss of £50 and their monetary 
attitudes.
This presents a serious challenge to the use of the psychophysical ratio scaling task as a 
secondary measme of the subjective valuation of money. More importantly, it also 
raises the question of what the underlying constructs are that the magnitude estimation 
task and, to a certain extent, the money attitude scale actually tap into. This is yet 
another issue we shall addr ess in Chapter VII.
5,4.2 Summary
The present study set out to tackle two main theoretical issues a) do attitudes 
towards money and money-related behaviours vary as a function of the compar ative 
context within which the same identity is salient and b) does the relationship between 
attitudes towards money and monetary behaviour change as a function of the 
comparative context in which a given identity is salient? hr order to address these 
issues, three specific hypotheses were presented.
Firstly, it was predicted that resporrdents would attribute greater value to money under 
conditions where their identity as ‘psychologists’ was salient relative to an outgroup of 
‘theologists’ than when ‘being a psychologist’ was defined in comparison to a 
hypothetical outgroup of ‘economists’. This prediction was supported for participants’ 
responses on one of the subjective valuation measures {money attitude scale). This 
indicates that the comparative context in which a given identity is salient may, indeed, 
have an effect on group-specific nouns related to the subjective value attached to 
money.
Secondly, the prediction that the changes in the perceived importance of money -  
produced, in turn, by variations in the comparative context in which ‘being a 
psychologist’ was salient -  would have a direct effect on behaviour was not
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corroborated statistically. This was partly accounted for by the fact that under 
conditions in which outgroup comparisons with ‘economists’ were rendered salient, 
monetary concerns seemed to be irrelevant for defining what ‘being a psychologist’ 
meant to respondents. This was, in fact, what was implied by the findings regarding the 
third hypothesis.
Finally, it was hypothesized that the strength of association between attitudes towards 
money and actual monetary behaviour would vary as a flinction of the comparative 
context in which respondents’ social identity as ‘students’ was salient. Two out of the 
four behavioural indices derived from participants’ responses in the Ultimatum Game 
showed clear evidence in support of this hypothesis. The correspondence between 
attitudes and behaviour was significantly greater for respondents who were induced to 
compare themselves to ‘theologists’ than for those evaluating their monetary attitudes 
in relation to ‘economists’. This suggested that money had no relevance for self­
categorisation as a ‘psychologist’ when that identity was defined via outgioup 
comparisons with ‘economists’; yet, relative to an outgroup of theologists, money 
provided a relevant dimension for defining respondents’ identity as ‘psychologists’.
To conclude, the results of this study lend some support to the claim that attitudes 
towards money and their relationship to monetary behaviour* coiTespond to variations 
in the meanings ascribed to a given identity. This, in turn, substantiates the broader 
argument that the subjective valuation of money may be a fimction of social identity 
processes and, as such, varies according to contextually mduced changes in its 
definition.
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V I. Id e n t it y  A n d  M o n e t a r y  D e c is io n s  / B e h a v io u r  In  
A  P r is o n e r ’s D il e m m a -t y p e  C o n t e x t
6 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the preceding chapters, we have explored the relationship between money and 
identity in the context of people’s subjective constructions of monetary meanings; we 
have also addressed this link experimentally. On the whole, the previous studies have 
provided some suggestive evidence in support of the claim that money and notions of 
selfliood are closely associated. What has remained imexplored thus fai* is the question 
of whether identity issues matter in actual decisions or behaviours that involve 
relatively large amounts of money. Until now, the monetary decisions/behavioiu's we 
have examined entailed only small, hypothetical amounts (see Chapter V). But what 
happens when comparatively large siuns are at stake?
hi this final empirical, chapter, we will consider the relationship between identity and 
money within the context of a particular Prisoner’s Dilemma-type game the stakes of 
which were substantial, hi doing so, we will revisit some of the broader issues that 
were raised at the outset of this thesis concerning the notions of ‘utility’ and ‘rational 
choice’. Let us therefore recap some of the points that were raised previously (see also 
Chapter I, Section 1.1).
As already stated. Rational Choice theorists have traditionally conceived of human 
agency as being mled by two principal forces, namely self-interest and utility- 
niaximisation. ‘Utility’ stands for whatever a person’s behaviour reveals him/her to 
consistently desire; it thus refers to the agent’s goals and preferences. As was ai'gued in 
Chapter I, even if we were to accept the claim that oiu* goals are predominantly self- 
interested, this conception of human agency tends to overlook the fact that our actions 
do not occm* in a social vacuiun. The puisuit even of naiTowly self-interested goals 
requires that we take the actions of other, also self-interested individuals into accomit. 
hi other words, given a particular goal, we need to possess an understanding of the 
social world in which we live in order to attain it. Yet, in Rational Choice descriptions 
of goal-directed behaviour, social knowledge is generally treated as exogenously given.
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Apart from the absence of reflection on social Imowledge, Rational Choice models also 
run into difficulties when it comes to specifying the supposed ends of rational action. 
As already pointed out (see Chapter I, Section 1.1.2.1), these models have remained 
mute wiüi regard to the nature of the goals that agents are thought to pursue. Wliilst 
various writers (e.g. Reicher, in prep.; Taylor, 1985) have argued that an accurate 
explanation of behaviour demands that the goals people pursue be accounted for, 
Rational Choice theorists have tended to take these for granted instead, hi the absence 
of a measure for its dependent variable ‘utility’, economics assumes that money, due to 
the commodities it buys, provides the primaiy source of utility (Lane, 1991) and, as 
such, counts as the primary ‘good’ or goal. Game theoretical research has, if  not 
explicitly, often implicitly shared this assumption. This is despite the fact that, more 
recently, some findings have been pointing towards the importance of non-economic 
goals in social dilemma-type situations (e.g. De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer & van Vugt, 
1999). For instance, previous experimental research on Ultimatum Bargaining 
behaviour and Prisoner’s Dileimiia games suggests that non-utilitarian motives such as 
fairness concerns (Kahnenian, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986), social or cultural values 
(Hulbert, Correa da Silva & Adegboyega, 2001) as well as empathy (Batson & Moran, 
1999) can have a significant impact on people’s choices within these contexts, 
hi addition to the treatment of goals and the utilities derived from them as a priori 
given. Rational Choice models also presuppose who the recipients of that ‘utility’ are. 
As already indicated, in Rational Choice approaches, with their depiction of the 
individual actor as inlierently egoistic, it is the individual self to whom utility, or a 
‘good’, is seen to accrue.
As was argued in Chapter I, the notion of utility maximisation (optimisation) with 
the individual actor as the recipient of that utility, is both contingent on and also 
sustains a particular version of selfliood. hi Rational Choice models, identity is defined 
in individualistic terms whereby the ‘self is treated as an integial, imified entity, hi 
fact, the presupposition of an agent’s self-interest requires such an ‘essential’, de- 
contextualised self, if  it is to avoid turning into an empty tautology. Throughout this 
thesis we have maintained that this particular conception of selfhood is deeply 
problematic and, in doing so, have based our critique on insights drawn fi'om the Social 
Identity model of the self. According to that model the idea of an inherently 
individualistic, ‘core’ self is both theoretically and empirically untenable.
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For our present pmposes here, let us briefly restate tluee Social Identity tenets that 
are of particular relevance. Firstly, in contexts in which social identity is salient, we use 
another person’s social category membership as a soiuce of information as to what they 
are like and as to how they may behave, hi other words, by means of stereotyping 
others, social categorical knowledge provides a basis from which we draw an 
imderstanding of both other people and ourselves. Secondly, social identity supplies us 
with a set of rules and values which guide oiu* actions in the social world. Via a process 
o f self-stereotyping, self-categorisation as a gioup member thus leads us to adopt the 
values and norms espoused by the group. A third principle implicit in the Social 
Identity approach that is pertinent here concerns the ‘imit’ (or recipient) of the benefit 
(or ‘good’) that is derived from given actions. Social Identity theorists hold that, when 
a coimnon social identity is salient, what is seen as a ‘good’ for others can also be 
viewed as a ‘good’ for oneself as a member o f the same group.
Returning to our discussion of self-interest and utility maximisation then, there are 
three cmcial issues that remam unaccoimted for within Rational Choice models of 
human agency: 1) How do people reach for and attain their goals (‘goods’, ‘utilities’)? 
In other words, what type of social Imowledge is used for their realization? 2) What is 
the nature of these goals? That is, what constitutes a ‘good’ and when does it become a 
‘good’ for us? 3) And to whom are ‘goods’ seen to accme? Who are the actual 
recipients of the utility drawn from the pursuit of certain goals?
As was argued in Chapter I, tackling these kinds of question requires a focus on 
identity. Various writers have alluded to the inconceivability of our having goals or 
interests -  and thus of rational action per se -  without particular self-understandings 
that precede these (e.g. Reicher, in prep.; Ringmar, 1996; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). 
Here, the capacity to choose or to pursue goals is seen as intimately linlced with 
identity as “to reflect upon what counts for us is a way of saying what sort of person 
we are and, conversely, saying who we are is a way of saying what counts” (Reicher, in 
prep.). According to Reicher (in prep.), identity therefore acts as a ‘map’ of the social 
world: not only does it provide us with a sense of destination, but it also giants us the 
means of reaching it. hi other words, identity contributes to social action in two 
different ways. Firstly, it offers the individual a ‘social topogiaphy’ and thus an 
understanding of his/lier position within a complex web of social relations. Without 
such an understanding o f the nature of the social world, social action would appear
187
Chapter VI
rather meaningless. Secondly, identity supplies the noims and values on which any 
social act is invariably based; as a result, it provides the individual with a sense of 
direction, a sense of where s/he wants to go. Identity thus steers us towards certain 
goals and objectives at the same time as specifying what these goals are.
The notion of identity implied here demands that we view the self not as imitary or 
stable but as context-dependent and, consequently, variable. In game theoretical 
research, however, the implications of this particular conception of identity for om* 
understanding of people’s decisions and behaviour have so far remained imexplored.
6.1.1 Research Questions
The present study aimed to explore the issues raised above within the framework of 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type situation. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a well-known 
and intensively studied problem within game theory and as such provided an ideal 
medium for addressing questions relating to the definition of goals and tlieir pursuit. 
The specific research questions with which we approached our material were as 
follows: 1) How does identity relate to the pursuit of certain goals or outcomes in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-type context? Or, put slightly differently, what social Imowledge 
do players use in order to reach their goals (‘goods’, ‘utilities’)? 2) What is the nature 
of these goals?
hi terms of its methodology, game theory has traditionally been firmly rooted in the 
quantitative domain. Both the strength and weakness o f this methodological paradigm 
lie in the fact that, in order to render any type of quantitative analysis feasible, 
participants’ social Imowledge has to be talcen for granted. However, as soon as we 
cease to treat social understandings as given a priori -  which is precisely what the 
above research questions imply -  the need for a different kind of methodology arises, 
hr order to explore people’s subjective conceptions of the social world as well as their 
own accounts of their actions and choices, a qualitative analysis is required. The 
material described below provided a miique opportunity to adopt a qualitative stance 
towards analysing interactions in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Moreover, in the different types of ‘game’ typically played in the laboratory, the 
monetaiy rewards tend to be rather small token sums. Respondents are therefore often 
faced with choices that appear somewhat inconsequential. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game outlined below, on the other hand, involved relatively laige amounts of money;
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players’ choices thus mattered, especially since contestants were not simply 
responsible for their own decisions but were also accountable to their fellow 
contestants, their opponents as well as a general audience.
6.2 A n a l y t i c  C o n t e x t  a n d  I s s u e s
6.2,1 Materials
During the autmnn 2000, Chamiel 4 broadcast a series of four progiams called 
‘Trust Me’. The series, produced by Windfall Films, was presented by the infamous 
Nicolas Bateman -  or ‘Nasty Nick’ -  whose notoriety was due to the role he had 
previously played in ‘Big Brother’, another Chamiel 4 show. ‘Trust Me’ was an 
unusual type of game show in that its set-up resembled a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Participants in the show stood a chance to win up to tlu'ee thousand pounds.
Each progiam comprised two episodes, or ‘games’, with different players. All episodes 
adhered to the following pattern: Two sets of contestants -  either single individuals or 
small groups of two -  were placed into separate, soundproof chambers, ‘Room A ’ and 
‘Room B’. The series presenter then offered the contestant(s) in ‘Room A’ one hundied 
pounds which they could choose either to keep, to split with their ‘opponents’ -  with 
both these options temiinating the game -  or to pass on to the other room. If the latter 
option was chosen, the stakes increased to two hundred pounds. The contestant(s) in 
‘Room B’ would subsequently be offered the two lumdred pounds and be confronted 
with the same choices: to take the money, to split it or to pass it back to ‘Room A ’, in 
which case the stakes would rise again. This procediue was repeated until the stalces 
reached one thousand foiu* lumdred pounds.
Wlienever contestants had to decide on how to proceed, they were presented with a 
vaiiety of ‘clues’ about who their opponent(s) were (i.e. ‘hivisibility Test’, ‘Honesty 
Test’, ‘Character Reference’ and ‘House Visit’, see Appendix VI.a). For instance, the 
following question -  the so-called ‘hivisibility Test’ -  would be put to the contestants 
in ‘Room B’: “I f  you were invisible, would you pick people’s pockets, watch people 
undress, eavesdrop on a conversation about you or fight crime?” Room B’s response 
was then passed on, via a monitor, to the contestant(s) in ‘Room A ’. Conversely, 
contestants in ‘Room A ’ would be subjected to an ‘Honesty Test’ (see Appendix VI.a) 
and their replies, in turn, conveyed to their opponents, again via a monitor. These
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‘tests’, alongside other references to participants’ identities, were ostensibly devised to 
help contestants with their choices regarding the money and thus with their decisions 
whether or not to trust their opponents. Once the stakes reached one thousand two 
liundied pounds, the presenter would reveal to one set of contestants what their 
opponents’ profession was. If they then decided to pass the money on -  and thus 
increase the stakes again -  the other set of contestants would also learn what their 
opponents did for a living. If participants were still prepared to pass the money back, 
the presenter would bring the exchange of money between the two rooms to a halt 
(freezing the stakes at one thousand four hundred pounds) and give the contestants the 
opportimity to cormnunicate wiüi each other, via the so-called ‘Open Mic’. 
Subsequently, both sets of contestants were presented with the following final decision: 
The presenter would offer them tluee thousand pounds and they had to choose either to 
split it with the other room or to take it. As before, there was no commimication 
between rooms at this stage. If both rooms voted for ‘split it’, they would get one 
thousand pounds each. If one room decided to ‘split it’, whilst the other voted for ‘take 
it’, the contestants who decided to ‘take it’ would receive the entire sum. However, if  
both rooms voted for ‘take it’, both parties would leave empty-handed. This final 
choice resembled a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma and can be illustrated as follows:
Table 6.1 Pay-Off Matrix for PD (Final Choice)
R oom  B R oom  A “Split It” “Take It”
“Split It” £1000 / £1000 £0 / £3000
“Take It” £3000 / £0 £0 / £0
With the exception of the contestants in one episode (see Table 6.2 below), all other 
players anived at this final stage of the game.
Participants were unaware of the above-outlined structure of the game. According 
to the producer of the series, David Glover, the contestants were simply told that they 
would take part in “a type of game show, with no quiz questions, involving some 
strategy, but nothing complicated” (personal communication) and that they might win 
some money. No actual money amounts were specified. As far as recruitment was 
concerned, the producer explained that he had chosen different “categories” of people 
on the basis of what he tlrought would malce an “interesting” combination of 
contestants (personal communication). Two researchers were then instructed to match
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potential respondents with these pre-defined categories; contestants were 
predominantly recmited by phone.
The ‘Trust Me’ series provided a unique opportunity to explore economic 
interactions and decision-making processes within a ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’-type 
context. As already pointed out, an analysis of the ‘Trust Me’ programs seemed 
particularly appealing because of the comparatively large amoimts of money they 
entailed, especially in comparison to the token simis typically found in laboratory 
experiments. However, before going into further analytic detail, a number of issues 
regarding the material used here need to be raised. Firstly, like all television broadcasts, 
the ‘Trust Me’ progi'ams were gi*eatly edited. Their analysis must therefore remain 
inevitably partial The editmg process, in timi, is intimately linlced with a second 
concern, namely the question of the rationale underlying the series. What was the 
producer’s agenda with regal'd to creating the programs? Wliat were the progi'ams 
meant to show us? Whilst we do possess some information regarding the producer’s 
general interest % these are important questions to beai' in mind .
6.2.2 Analytic M ethod and Procedure
‘Windfall Films’, the production company responsible for the series, provided the 
videotapes of the ‘Trust M e’ progi'ams. The video-recordings were then transcribed 
using a word-processing package (the tianscription conventions were as before; see 
Appendix ILc) and special care was talcen to include in the text not only all verbal 
exchanges but also references to significant gestmes or facial expressions. In order to 
ensiu'e the accuracy of the transcription, the written text was repeatedly compared with 
the recordings.
For the purposes of this study, the analytic focus was on five out of the eight original 
episodes. The remaining thiee games were omitted as they were played by sets of 
individual contestants, rather than by small gioups of two, which meant that verbal 
exchanges could only take place between the presenter and the respective player, hi
‘ David Glover, the producer, described hiniself as having “« bit o f  a history o f  doing psychology 
experiments on T'K'Xpersonal communication); he also mentioned his general interest in peace processes. 
He stated that liis fascination with the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) began when he realised that the 
literature exclusively focused on ‘rational agents’. However, to him it seemed that the PD, particularly 
the one-shot version, was a moral decision. He tlierefore wanted to study communication between 
players in a PD context, to find out what they would say and what would make tliem trust (personal 
communication).
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order to retain as much consistency as possible with regard to the overall background 
to the different games, these three episodes were not included in the present analysis.
The episodes under consideration here are summarised in Table 6.2, which 
provides an overview of participants’ professions^ as well as of the outcomes of the 
individual games.
Table 6.2 Summary of Partie ipants and Outcomes of PD Games
Game Participants (Gender) PD FinalChoice Outcome
Transcript
(words approx )
1 R oom  A STOCKBROKERS (m/m) V “Split I f £0 3500
R oom  B NURSES (m/f) V “Take It £3000
2
Room  A BINGO PLAYERS (f/f) V “Take It” £0 1900
Room  B BOOKMAKERS (m/m) V “Take It” £0
3 Room  A
POLICE OFFICERS (m/f) X n.a. £700
1800
Room  B PRIVATE DETECTIVES (m/f) X “Split I f £700
4 Room  A
BALLET DANCERS (m/m) V “Split It” £1000 2300
Room  B BOUNCERS (m/m) V “Split It” £1000
5
Room  A POKER PLAYERS (m/m) V “Take If £0 2600
Room  B CHESS PLAYERS (m/m) V “Take It £0
The full transcript of each game was used in the analysis. As already indicated, there 
was only one episode where contestants did not proceed to the final Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) stage (see Table 6.2). When the stakes had reached £1400 -  and once 
they had learned that their opponents were police officers -  the private detectives 
decided to split the money.
All transcripts were examined thoroughly. As Table 6.2 shows, the length of the 
stockbrokers-versus-nurses transcript exceeded the others; this will be reflected by the 
number of passages drawn from this particular episode. Of all the contestants, most 
verbal exchanges occurred between the stockbrokers and the nurses, thus rendering 
their decision-making processes the most explicit. Consequently, much of the overall 
analytic framework was established on the basis of this episode. Yet, the analytic 
categories generated from the stockbrokers-versus-nurses transcript were not unique to 
this particular game, as the systematic analysis of the remaining episodes and their use 
as illustrative examples will show (see below).
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The methodological approach to the above-described material represented a 
combination of discourse analytic as well as Groimded Theory techniques. Discourse 
analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Wetherell et al., 2001) is 
often referred to as the study of language in use. Discourse analysts recognize the 
importance of language as a means for doing things or, in other words, for achieving 
goals. Also, to imderstand what is being achieved tluough language, it becomes 
necessary to consider its situated use, within the process of an ongoing interaction 
(Wetherell et al., 2001). In these respects, discourse analysis seemed uniquely suited to 
the type of research questions that were being posed here.
However, we were also concerned with categories (such as ‘goal’, ‘good’ or ‘identity’), 
their properties and the relationship between them. Groimded Theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Cobin, 1998), with its systematic coding procedures seemed a 
more appropriate tool for exploring these issues. As a result, the approach employed 
here was neither strictly discbinse analytic nor within the tiaditional boundaries of 
Groimded Theory. Instead, oin methodological approach reflected the requirements of 
the sort of questions that were put forward.
The analysis as such comprised a number of distinct stages. The first stage 
consisted of recording all instances of ‘identity talk’ that emerged in the transcripts. 
Tluoughout this phase, attention was paid not only to general allusions to ‘identity’ per 
se, but also to the content that was ascribed to the identities mentioned and to the ways 
in which this content was negotiated amongst contestants, hr a second stage, these 
instances of ‘identity tallc’ were coded with regard to their linkage to action/behaviour. 
For example, whenever references to identity were brought to bear on contestants’ 
decisions concerning the money, or on their opponents’ choices, they were included in 
this category. The last stage of the analysis involved noting all those paits of the text 
alluding to what contestants perceived as the objective of the game, hi other words, in 
this third stage, all references to what counted as a ‘good’ were coded, with an 
emphasis on the overall role they played in contestants’ choices. Whilst these thiee 
coding stages were based on Grounded Theoiy techniques (i.e. ‘open coding’ and 
‘axial coding’), the reading and presentation of results more closely adhered to 
discourse analytic methods.
’ Whilst participants had generally been selected on account of their profession, the ‘bingo players’ were 
obviously an exception. However, both the chess players and the poker players were professionals.
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6 . 3  A n a l y s i s
The subsequent analysis of the ‘Trust Me’ material is aixanged as follows: 1) First 
of all, an outline of the general background to the various episodes under scmtiny will 
be provided. 2) We then focus on tire question of how people pursue goals, hi doing so, 
the processes underlying participants’ choices and the ways in which they attempted to 
reach their goals (or ‘goods’) are considered. Here, the main emphasis is on the social 
laiowledge that was used in the pursuit o f particular outcomes. 3) Following on from 
that, the question of what is a good will be explored. The diversity of contestants’ 
approaches to defining what counted for them within the context of this game will be 
examined here, alongside the question of what, precisely, they regarded as their goal(s). 
4) Finally, we reflect on a closely related issue: to whom do these goods accruel In 
other words, who were the actual recipients of the utility derived from the pursuit of 
certain goals?
The analysis will conclude with a detailed examination of the poker-versus-chess. 
players episode. At first glance, paiticipants’ verbal exchanges in this particular game 
could not be easily reconciled with the analytic categories that had been established on 
the basis of the oüier materials. However, the separate investigation of this episode will 
demonstrate how this apparent exception further illuminates, rather than contradicts, 
many of the conclusions drawn fr om the other games.
6.3.1 General Context
Before moving on to a more detailed analysis of contestants’ talk, it is important to 
consider the broader context in which the exchanges between participants were 
embedded. The fashion in which all the programs in the series were introduced 
provides an indication as to the kind o f setting in which these exchanges should be 
placed:
“ fw hat you are about to see is no ordinaiy game show. There's no luck or 
chance. There 're feven no quiz questions. Instead it goes right to the heart o f  
human 4nature. [...] Into two soundproof chambers we put some fcontrasting 
characters. But they have fno idea, who is in the other room. I  will act as a go- 
between. r i l  start by offering some tnoney to room A. They could take it and 
walk away. But the only way fo r  them to fincrease the stakes is i f  they pass it to 
room B. I f  room B passes it back, it goes tup again. But will they pass it back?
It Tdepends on who they are. ” (Voiceover by Nicolas Bateman, presenter)
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This introduction to the show is noteworthy for two reasons, both pertaining to the 
claims it makes about issues of identity (on a universal as well as on a social- 
categorical level). Firstly, the game is characteiised as granting the viewer a glimpse of 
what constitutes “the heart o f human nature"\ The exact meaning of this statement 
remains somewhat ambiguous. It may well imply that contestants’ behaviour in the 
game, their choices regarding the money, are expected to disclose some universalistic 
features of human conduct. This is not unlike some of the assumptions underlying 
Rational Choice theoiy, which also entail claims to imiversality. Money, in other 
words, is seen as closely linlced to a imiversal notion of human identity. At any rate, the 
suggestion here seems to be that this game and, by implication, money per se can tell 
us something about what it means to be human.
Secondly, contestants’ choices tluoughout the game are anticipated to be contingent 
upon who they are. Wlio they are, their identity, in turn, is defined in terms of their 
social category membership, their ‘contrasting characters’, hi the stockbrokers-versus- 
. nurses episode for instance, as in the majority of progi'ams in the series, social group 
membership is established by reference to participants’ profession.
“Isolated in room A, it's Nigel Richardson and Steve (inaudible). They are 
fcity traders. Wide boys from the Jold school. They like fast cars and martial 
arts. They are never happier than when having a drink. (.) And they don't Imow 
that in room ^  we have Amanda Tanner and Tony Arthur, a couple o f  nurses. 
They work nights on a surgical ward, saving lives and generally doing good. " 
(Voiceover by Nicolas Bateman, presenter)
The contestants in tins pai'ticular case are not only dressed in ways which render them 
easily identifiable as members of different professional gioups (e.g. the nurses are 
dressed in their unifomi), but their gioup identities aie also assigned very distinctive 
meanings: it’s the “wide boys" against those who aie involved in “generally doing 
good". The ascription of certain, stereotypical meanings to contestants’ identities 
features in many episodes; another obvious example is the presenter’s claim, directed 
at the camera, that “booldes are supposed to be like weasels" (boolcmakers-versus- 
bingo players game).
The progiam’s objective to compaie members of various social gioups with regard to 
their choices in a Prisoner’s-Dilemma-type situation is thus made quite explicit. What 
remains more implicit, though, is the question of the dimensions of comparison 
believed to be of significance. Is the dimension of comparison the value ascribed to
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money (i.e. the ‘utility’ of money)? Is it trust? Or is it the degree of co-operation 
displayed by members of different social gioups? In other words, what are the goals 
that people belonging to different social gioups are believed to pursue? So whilst what 
exactly we are about to learn about “human natine” remains uncertain, there is an 
umnistakable suggestion that, on a social-categorical level, people will differ -  in 
whatever ways that may be. This then is the backdrop against which the following 
extracts need to be judged.
6.3.2 The Pursuit of Goals
The analysis of the transcripts reveals that the pursuit of goals, and as such action 
itself, is intimately bound up with issues of identity. This is true not only for the 
presenter of the program (as indicated above) but also from the perspective of the 
individual respondents. The notion o f identity implied here, though, does not refer to 
the unitary or static ‘self of Rational Choice theoiy, but relates to the type of selfliood 
conceived of by Social Identity theorists. It appeal's to be social identity in particular -  
that is, the categorisation of self and ‘other’ in terms of group memberships -  that plays 
a crucial role in the pursuit of specific outcomes. Throughout the various episodes 
there are innumerable instances of contestants engaging in ‘identity talk’. (The one 
exception is the chess-versus poker players game, which will be examined later on.) 
Many of their exchanges revolve around establishing who the ‘other’ or opponent is. 
These constiuctions of the ‘other’ are, in turn, closely linked with participants’ choices 
tluoughout the game.
The social identity of the opponent -  in other words, the social-category 
membership of the ‘other’ -  has clear implications for contestants’ actions and, thus, 
for the ways in which they pursue their respective goals. The bingo players, for 
instance, leave no doubts as to what they make of their opponents, the boolanakers:
BINGO PLAYER 2: Oh fno! I  work in a bookmakers. (.) Boolanakers ey?l God.
(...) //I 'm  shaking, look!
BINGO PLAYER V. It is_ hard. It is hard.
BINGO PLAYER 2: It is very hard. They are veiy shrewd people.
BINGO PLAYER \: DevioiiS.
BINGO PLAYER 2: Devious!
BINGO PLAYER 1: Hm.
BINGO PLAYER 2; I  might work fo r  a bookmakers, but I  wouldn 't trust him as far I I
as I  could throw 'em, I  think. i
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These immediate attiibutions of negative characteristics to the other players’ 
professional gi'oup continue unchallenged for the remainder of this episode. As a result, 
they have implications for contestants’ final choice; the bingo players decide to take 
the money, which they view as the obvious -  or ‘rational’ -  option, given that they are 
dealing with a supposedly “shrewd' and “devious" opponent.
However, ascriptions of particular meanings to the social-category membership of 
the ‘other’ need not necessarily be negative. The dancers’ reaction to the disclosure of 
their opponents’ profession provides a case in point:
DANCER 1: (smiles) They are bouncei's?! / /
DANCER2: They’re bouncers.
DANCER 1 : They have a job where you- they, they have to trust. People have to 
trust them to get through the door. Secondly // . . .
DANCER 2: They just look fearsome but n o t// n o t ...
DANCER 1: ... secondly they have to judge characters who are coming in and //  
out o f the place.
DANCER 2: Although le t’s go back to the first question. They said “fight crime”.
You see? So now it fig- it figures. As bouncers, even though they look (.) 
“uuhh mean ”- They have to look mean (.) fo r  their job. It doesn’t mean 
that they ’re mean inside. (.) L e t’s hope.
(The stakes are at £1200.)
hiterestingly, the Imowledge of the other players’ professional group is immediately 
used to ‘make sense’ of the bouncers’ earlier response to the so-called ‘hivisibility 
Test’ (fit figures"). More importantly, however, whilst a stereotypical notion of them 
as ‘mean looking people’ is retained, there is an explicit attempt to account for this 
image in a more positive way: they only look mean because they “have to”, it’s their 
job. This re-evaluation o f what might be generally regarded as a negative stereotype is 
noteworthy since it occurs against the background of the presenter’s continuous effort 
to persuade the dancers of their opponents’ violence (presumably in stark contrast to 
the dancers’ character) and, by implication, of their lack of trustworthiness. The 
reconsideration of the boimcers’ supposed ‘meanness’ and the assertion of their 
‘ti'ustworthiness’ (fpeople have to trust them to get through the door") not only 
constitute an act of resistance to accepting any pre-conceived notions but also play a 
role in the dancers’ later decision to split the money, hi fact, it seems to be out of the 
question for the dancers (particularly for Dancer 2) to not opt for ‘split it’; their 
endeavour to positively evaluate the stereotype associated with their opponents may 
therefore also be read as providing a justification for their later choices.
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Whilst, in the above cases, the link between identity and the choices made by 
participants remains somewhat implicit, a more explicit example of the importance 
attributed to the opponent’s social-categoiy membership for the pursuit o f certain 
outcomes can be found in the game between the stockbrokers and the nurses. Consider, 
for instance, the following exchange among the stockbrokers:
Presenter: They are nurses.
STOCKBROKER 2: That’s a bloody good job, that! I  mean / /  they ...
STOCKBROKER 1: Yeah.
STOCKBROKER 2: ... they just don’t get paid / /  what they ’re worth. But ehin ...
STOCKBROKER 1 : Hard work! But it does change the context o f  err our trust.
Not only do the stockbrokers express a clear point of view with regard to what ‘being a 
niu'se’ means ( f bloody good job", “hard work"’, see also below “Idnd-hearted and stu ff 
like that"), but the meaning they ascribe to the social-psychological category ‘nurse’ 
also detennines their approach to the outcome of this game; that is, it “changes the 
context o f  [their] trust". However, it is interesting to note that there exists some 
ambiguity here as to the particular ways in v/hich their ‘tinst’ is being changed. Are 
they hnplying that they are going to tinst their opponents more or less because they are 
muses? This ambiguity foreshadows and reflects the ongoing debate between the two 
stockbrokers concemmg which actions should be taken and, therefore, with regard to 
what goals should be pursued.
The relationship between identity and the pursuit of goals (i.e. action) becomes 
even more apparent in the following extract:
STOCKBROKER 2: Yeah OK. I f  it was a different profession. I ’d  have (.) pressed 
‘talæ it ’.
STOCKBROKER 1 : They are going to press 'take it ’!
STOCKBROKER 2: (.) I  don’t Imow. I f  they ’re (..) kind-hearted and stu ff like that, 
they might ju st think 'OK, look we ’re all in it fo r  a laugh, had a good day 
(.) you Imow, split it all, go out and have a beer’.
The significance of the opponent’s identity here is twofold: Firstly, it accounts for the 
stockbrokers’ own actions. Secondly, it provides a basis fi'om which the behaviour of 
the ‘other’ is predicted. Again, however, there is a degree of ambiguity here. Wlrilst 
Stockbroker 2 states that he would take the money if  it were not for their opponents’ 
profession, it is precisely their profession that seems to make Stockbroker 1 more 
suspiciorrs of them.
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As with the stockbrokers, the nurses appear to have a clear idea with regard to what 
‘being a stockbroker’ is all about:
Presenter: Now, their job  (.) is stockbrokers in the city.
NURSE 2: Hnim. (...) Ruthless when it comes to money / / basically.
NURSE 1: Hm. Yeah. Ruthless. Money-makers. (.) They’re waiting till i t ’s worth 
their while, basically.
Presenter: And you think that hasn’t tempted them?
NURSE 2: A c.
NURSE V.No.
NURSE 2 :1 wouldn’t say that it has tempted them at all.
NURSE 1: No. No.
(The stakes are at £1400.)
The social category ‘stockbroker’ is thus assigned a very specific content: “ruthless 
money-makers", waiting for the kill. This characterisation of what it means to be a 
stockbroker occurs half way tluough the game and it is the ascription of this particular 
content that fuels the nurses’ conviction that their opponents will not consider sharing 
the money:
NURSE 1: Can we trust them to split it, you know?!
NURSE 2 : 1 can’t trust them to split it. They’re not gonna split it, they’re gonna 
take it.
This conviction, in turn, appears to fomi a basis for the nurses’ decision to pursue the 
‘take it’ option in the final stage of the game (see also below). The notion that the 
perceived identity of the ‘other’ detennines which actions are taken seems even more 
persuasive when we consider the nurses’ reactions, at the end of the episode, to what -  
in their eyes -  appears to be a totally unlikely outcome:
NURSE 1: Oh my God! Are they talcing the piss?
And also:
NURSE 2: Yes, yes, yes. Yes, I  can’t believe they went fo r  'split i t ’. Why did they 
go fo r  ‘split i t ’? (..) Oh no //n o  ...
NURSE 1: ... suckers //. . .
NURSE 2: ... they’re gonna be fannoyed! They’re gonna be -lannoyed! (laughs) 
NURSE 1: ... suckers!
NURSE 2: (laughsj
They receive tluee thousand pounds, whilst the stockbrokers leave empty-handed. The 
nurses’ first reaction to their good fortune is total disbelief; the stockbrokers must be
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“taking the piss". They so fimily believed that the stockbrokers would take the money 
that, at least initially, there is a genuine sense of bewilderment. In other words, the liiilc 
between the perceived identity of the other and the predictions of the other’s behaviour 
based on it was so powerful, that when the final outcome is diametrically opposed to 
the predicted action, temporaiy conflision results.
As the passages quoted above illustrate, contestants use their particular 
imderstandings of their opponents’ social categoiy membership (i.e. ‘nurses’, 
‘stockbrokers’, ‘bookmakers’, ‘bouncers’) in order to predict the others’ behaviour as 
well as to account for their own choices. Social knowledge -  based on social 
stereotypes -  thus constitutes an integral part of contestants’ decisions-making 
processes, hi other words, the decisions, respondents make tliroughout the game are 
contingent upon identity; the pursuit of certain goals cannot simply be accounted for by 
their own self-interested actions, but is also detemiined by who -  or what -  they 
perceive the ‘other’ to be.
However, participants’ self-perceptions play a role in this context, too. Consider, 
for example, the case of the private detectives who decide to split the money when the 
stakes reach £1400 (before the PD stage of the game). When the presenter of the 
program enquires after the reasons of their decision. Private Detective 1 replies:
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 1 (to the presenter): We’ve trusted them. And I  think i f  err 
we can call it a day, i t ’s fa ir  that we should fsplit it. Rather than just take it 
and run. ‘Cause I  think that would, you Imow- That’s just not moral. I ’d like 
to think that we ’re fmoral. [...]
The detective’s subjective sense of identity, his understanding of liimself as ‘moral’ has 
clear implications for his choices in this situation. It is an interesting question (though 
difficult to examine in this case) whether or not Private Detective I ’s self-perception 
here is tied in with his social category membersliip (i.e. his profession). Wliatever the 
case may be, the above passage provides a fust illustration of the fact that the 
maximisation of monetary gain may not always constitute the sole or principal 
motivation or goal for contestants’ behaviour and that non-monetaiy concerns, such as 
the adherence to moral principles, can also play a role. But here we are moving ahead 
of ourselves by pre-empting some of the points discussed in the subsequent section.
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6.3.3 The Nature of Goals
2.3.3.1 What counts as a ‘goal’ or ‘good’?
What then are these goals or ‘goods’ that are being pursued in this Prisoner’s 
Dilemma-type situation? What is it that contestants endow with ‘utility’? As pointed 
out in the introduction, the model of the human actor as a utility maximiser does not 
explicitly address the question of the precise nature of the goals from which utility is 
derived, hi other words, what counts as a ‘good’ is either regarded as self-evident or 
treated as irrelevant, hi practice, however, and especially within a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
paradigm, it is implicitly assumed that the monetary rewards available in laboratory 
experiments constitute the primary incentive for participants’ choices. People are 
believed to be motivated by money and by the possibility of making profit, which in 
the present context translates into nialdng as much money as possible. Money, in other 
words, is not only seen as a measure of utility, but also as possessing utility or value in 
and o f  itself Money thus becomes the ‘good’ that is acquired tluough economic 
actions.
This view of money as constituting the ‘good’ of economic activity or interaction is not 
only a fundamental notion of Rational Choice theory, albeit more implicitly rather than 
overtly so, but also peiineates the ‘Tmst Me’ programs. The ultimate aim -  the ‘good’ 
-  of the game, for each contestant, is believed to be the maximisation of monetaiy gain. 
This holds ti'ue at least from the presenter’s perspective whose coimnents tliroughout 
the various progi'ams reflect this particular viewpoint^. For instance, after the nurses 
have decided to pass one thousand four hundred poimds back to the stockbroker’s, an 
incredulous Nick Bateman remaiks:
“Well, blow me down with a feather! They’ve turned down one thousand four 
hundred pounds. Is the whole world going soft, or is everyone gone totally 
crazy and mad? ” (Nicolas Bateman, to Üie camera)
To retiun that kind of money to their opponents, when offered the chance to take it and 
leave, is not the rational thing to do -  at least not fr om the standpoint o f the presenter. 
It is “crazy and mad" -  especially since the muses are aware of the fact that they are 
dealing with stockbrokers, “wide boys".
 ^According to the producer of the series, the presenter had not been given a script. Therefore, the views 
he expressed seemed to be entirely his own.
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However, is the maximisation of monetaiy reward really what counts as the ‘good’ for 
the participants? What are the goals from their perspective? Do contestants express any 
subjective notions of what is o f value to them? A closer examination of the exchanges 
occuiTing between contestants reveals that what counts within the game (i.e. what is of 
value) is by no means an a priori given, histead, it is subject to considerable debate to 
which often no definitive solution is found.
M o n e t a r y  ‘G o o d s ’: W i n n i n g  a n d  L o s i n g
It would be misleading to claim that participants are entirely indifferent to the 
monetary rewards available in this particular Prisoner’s Dilenmia. Money obviously 
does constitute an incentive here. However, even if money were the primaiy soruce of 
utility, a number of important questions remain unanswered. For instance, is utility 
derived fioin a) making as much money as possible, b) making more money than the 
opponent or c) not making less money than the other player(s)? To put it slightly 
differently, since this game involves different gioups of contestants, monetaiy gain can 
be conceived of in more than one way. Simply postulating money as the main ‘good’, 
or the principal source of utility, does not by itself provide an adequate description of 
what, exactly, the nature o f this ‘good’ or of utility is.
Let us consider some examples of the ways in which monetaiy gain is defined 
throughout the different games. Before reaching their final decisions, contestants 
fiequently engage in exchanges about the meaning of ‘wimiing’ or ‘losing’. It is by 
means of these negotiations that the more subjective notions with regard to the precise 
nature of the ‘good’ can be infeiTcd. For instance:
STOCKBROKER 1 :1 like, I  mean, we don’t want to walk out with nothing!
STOCKBROKER 2: A o. Yeah.
STOCKBROKER 1 : We ’re having a fun time. We are here to, you Imow, to win the 
game. And i f  winning the game -  best way o f  winning the game might be to 
split it.
STOCKBROKER 2: Yeah. (...) Yeah, I  think y  ou’re right.
(Exchange taking place between stockbrokers in Room A)
Or:
NURSE 1: Can we trust them to split it, you latow?!
NURSE 2 : 1 can’t trust them to split it. They’re not gonna split it, they’re gonna 
take it.
NURSE 1: No.
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NURSE 2: And so are we! But we, we make it o ff with nothing. But I  think i t ’s a 
samble that.
NURSE 1: I  can’t trust them to split it. So (.) at the end o f the day, i f  w e get, i f  
we ’re gonna get nothing, then they / / .. .  (laughs)
NURSE 2: ... they’re gonna get nothing as well!
(Exchange taking place between nurses in Room B)
For the stockbrokers, this game is about having a ‘fun time’. Not only does a ‘fun time’ 
constitute an end in and of itself, but it is also related to ‘wimiing’ the game. They are 
there to ‘win’ and ‘winning’ is framed in monetary terms: it means making as much 
money as possible from participating in the game. As far as the stockbrokers are 
concerned, ‘wimiing’ may even mean having to share the money that is at stake with 
the opponents; however, as long as there is money to be gained, the stockbrokers do 
not seem to mind going halves.
The nurses, on the other hand, appear to be less concerned with wimiing -  that is with 
making as much money as possible -  than with the idea of receiving less than their 
opponents. Whilst Stockbroker I ’s suggestion to split the money seems, at least on 
some level, to express a concern with the equality of outcomes, the nurses’ thoughts 
about equal outcomes are rather different: “I f  we get nothing, then they’re gonna get 
nothing as well!" As already pointed out, according to the nurses, the idea that the 
stockbrokers might split the money is unthinkable. Thus, according to their point of 
view, the only way to ensme an equal outcome for both teams is for them to pursue the 
‘take it’ option, too. The objective of the game, in the nurses’ case, seems therefore not 
to lose and, perhaps less appaiently so, to deny the stockbrokers a share of the money, 
hi other words, ‘utility’ here is derived from not making less money than the opponent 
and, as such, it is comparative rather than absolute in nature.
There appears to be a marked difference between the nurses and the stockbrokers 
with regard to how they define the objective of this particular game and thus with 
regard to what counts as a ‘good’ for them. However, it would be mistaken to suggest 
that either the nurses or the stockbrokers held definite, clear-cut points of view with 
regard to what it means to become a ‘wimier’ in this game or as to what the best course 
of action would be. Their opinions are by no means fixed, histead, considerable 
argument exists among fellow contestants concerning what, exactly, ‘winning’ or 
‘losing’ means to them and what the ‘good’ is that is at stake.
STOCKBROKER 1 :1 think they will say ‘take it ’.
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STOCKBROKER 2: Yeah.
STOCKBROKER 1:1 think they Mnll say ‘take it ’/
STOCKBROKER 2: Yeah. I, I, I  think they probably will. Because, obviously, you 
hiow, that sort o f  money — I  mean, blimey / /  you know ...
STOCKBROKER 1: But then our only chance is fo r  us to ‘take i t ’. (..) I f  we just 
split it, we think they’re gonna take it, we lose.
STOCKBROKER 2: Hm.
Stockbroker 1 retracts from his initial suggestion that splitting the money might be the 
best way of wimiing the game. He is now convinced that the nurses will chose the ‘take 
it’ option, so he is no longer concerned witli making as much money as possible from 
the game (i.e. ‘wimiing’) but instead declares that they should make sure not to get less 
than the muses. According to Stockbroker 1, if  the muses walked away with tluee 
thousand pounds (i.e. chose the ‘take it’ option) whilst they, the stockbrokers, received 
nothing (i.e. decided to ‘split it’), they would lose. The interesting implication here is 
that if  there was not any monetary gain for either paify, this would not necessarily be 
construed, as ‘losing’. ‘Losing’ is thus defined in relative rather than in absolute tenus, 
as leaving the game with less money than the opponent. A similar notion is echoed in 
an exchange between the bookmakers that unequivocally expresses the relativity of 
‘wimiing’:
BOOKMAKER 1: Pressing the ‘take’ button was the only way we could vnn, 
yeah?! I f  w e’d have pressed the ‘split’ button, w e’d now have lost, yeah?! 
Pressing/ / the ...
BOOKMAKER 2: ... w e  d id  w in, b eca u se  w e s to p p e d  them  from  w inning, so  / / . . .
BOOKMAKER 1: ... SO we did win in a way!
(Exchange occiming outside Room B, after tlie official termination of the game.)
Tluoughout the remainder of the stockbrokers-versus-nurses program, a tension 
between Stockbroker 1 and Stockbroker 2 persists; there is considerable disparity with 
regard to how Stockbroker 1 and Stockbroker 2 define the piupose of the game, what 
they respectively regard as the best course of action and thus the best outcome:
STOCKBROKER 2: No, I, I  ju st think someone in that profession //  ...
STOCKBROKER 1: ...right i f  you wanna press ‘split i t ’, just press ‘split i t ’. I  
mean I I ...
STOCKBROKER 2 :1 do. I  mean, I  do ./ /  ...
STOCKBROKER 1: 1  th in k  th e y ’re  go n n a  take  it. / / I  th in k  th ey  w ill  take  it.
STOCKBROKER 2: Yeah O K . T h a t’s  f in e . I  m ean I ’m  q u ite  h a p p y  w ith  that, 
though .
STOCKBROKER 1: Go ahead. (.) Do it!
STOCKBROKER 2: You ’re sure?
STOCKBROKER 1: No.
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The interesting point to note here is that Stockbroker 1 and Stockbroker 2 do not come 
to a definite agieement before making their final choice. There is no resolution to the 
debate, no consensus in other words as to what they subjectively regard as the purpose 
of the game. Stockbroker 2’s argument simply prevails.
Whilst the exchanges between the private detectives may not exactly resemble the 
rather substantial debate among the stockbrokers, there exists nevertheless a similar 
sense of ambiguity with regard to what actions are considered appropriate and, by 
implication, what constitutes the ‘good’:
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 2: Why would you fsplit it with them?
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 1: Err, err I, / / / . . .
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 2: Take it!
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 1 : Take it? (appears som ew hat im com fortable)
[...]
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 2: Well, shall we take the next lot?
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 1 : (lauglis)
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 2: (laughs m isch ievou sly )
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 1 : flNo, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. TNo, no, no, no.
As we have already seen earlier, when the stakes reach £1400, the detectives choose to 
split the money, seemingly on the strengtli of Private Detective 1 ’s argument that the 
‘take it’ option “is  j u s t  n o t m ora l" . However, his assertion of the importance of ethical 
principles, does not necessarily resolve his fellow contestant’s doubts, even after the 
final decision has been reached:
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 2: We should have said “take it"!
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 1 : Do you think we should have done?
PRIVATE DETECTIVE 2: Yes. I t ’s too late. [...]
Let us retiun to the stockbrokers-versus-nurses episode for a moment. As with the 
stockbrokers, there is no final agieement among the nurses with regaid to what, 
precisely, is at stake.
NURSE 2: I ’d g o  f o r  / /  ‘ta k e  it ’.
NURSE 1 : Money doesn’t mean eveiything, though.
NURSE 2: I ’d  go fo r  ‘take i t ’! What about you?
NURSE 1 : (laughs)
NURSE 2: Well, tell me, ‘cause you know, we, we came here with nothing, we 
might as well go out with nothing. L e t’s go fo r  the gamble!
For Nurse 2, it is ‘the gamble’ that is important. For Nurse 1, however, “money doesn’t 
mean eveiything, though", hitriguingly, we do not learn more about what, exactly, is of
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importance to Nurse 1, over and above monetary gain. Again, there seems to be a 
considerable degree of ambiguity as to what really counts.
The idea that ‘money is not everything’ is even more powerfully expressed by the 
passages cited in the next section. However, before moving on, one obseiwation -  
particularly from reading the stockbrokers-versus-nurses transcript -  is worth 
mentioning here. It seems as though the debate about the more specific monetary goals 
(e.g. to ‘win’ or ‘not to lose’ the game) is -  at least to some degree -  related to identity 
issues. As we have already seen, definitions of ‘wimiing’ and ‘losing’ are relative and 
therefore could be viewed as the context-specific functions of identity and identity 
relations (i.e. stockbrokers in relationship to muses). This claim gains some support 
from the fact that, in the original text, the extracts quoted above are to be found after 
the contestants have learned what their opponents’ professions are and after they have 
expressed what these professions mean to them (f bloody good job", “ruthless money­
makers"). It therefore appeal's reasonable to assmne that the nurses’ reference to ‘them’ 
quoted earlier (f'can we trust them to split it, you htow?!") implies them as 
-stockbrokers. Stockbroker 2 provides, a more explicit illustration of how the goals of 
the game might be contingent on the opponents’ social category membership: “I  just 
think that someone in that profession ...” (see above), hi summaiy then, the monetary 
goals described here are not a priori givens and may be detemiined by the perceived 
dynamics between contestants’ own identities or selves and the identity of the ‘other’. 
Contestants’ knowledge o f their opponents’ social-category membership (i.e. their 
profession), alongside the ascription of pai'ticular contents to social identity, could be at 
the root of their subjective understandings of ‘wimiing’ and ‘losing’ and thus 
fundamental to the choices they make tluoughout the game. Wliilst, at least with regaid 
to monetai'y ‘goods’, the link between identity and goals must remain implicit, their 
comiection will become more evident in the following section.
N o n - m o n e t a r y  ‘G o o d s ’: R e ~d e f i n i n g  t h e  S e l f  & A l t e r n a t i v e  Va l u e s  
R e -d e f in in g  the S e l f
Not only might the monetai'y ‘goods’ that respondents ai'e piusuing be a fmiction of 
their own or their opponents’ social-category membership, identity per se -  or, more 
precisely, its re-definition -  can be a goal in itself. For instance, the ascription of a
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specific content to the social identity ‘nurse’ (see above) prompts the stockbrokers to 
reflect on their own choice of profession:
STOCKBROKER 2: I  mean, how can you put a price on a job like that, when 
someone does that?
STOCKBROKER 1: You can’t. I  mean you see it in (.) every time you have to go 
in there [hospital], unfortunately enough.
STOCKBROKER 2: That’s Mdiy the world’s gone mad in a way. I  mean w e’re 
pushing a load o f  buttons / /  all day.
STOCKBROKER 1: What do we do? (.) Exactly!
In comparison to the nurses, the stockbrokers see themselves as “pushing a load o f  
buttons all day". This self-perception, in turn, has implications for their subsequent 
actions -  at least as far as Stockbroker 2 is concerned, as he challenges his fellow 
contestant’s leaning towards the ‘take it’ option:
STOCKBROKER 2: But whv woldd you go fo r  the ‘take it ’ option?
STOCKBROKER 1 : Because I  think (..) //...
STOCKBROKER 2: Bearing in mind, I  mean, O K - 1  mean, I ’m looking at it from  
an aspect o f  (.) what fwe do fo r  a living and what they do fo r  a living. And 
OK, we have a little bit o f  a (inaudible) on the stock market. OK w e’re 
portrayed to be (.) wide boys, loads o f  money and all that sort o f  stuff.
What is being refened to here is a meta-stereotype, that is “an individual’s belief about 
how their own group is viewed by a particular out-group" (Vorauer, Main & 
O’Comiell, 1998). The important point to note here is that meta-stereotypes do not 
necessarily reflect an individual’s own beliefs about their gioup-membership or social 
identity. It therefore appears as though this reference to the meta-stereotype o f ‘the 
stockbroker’ fulfils a particular, more strategic fimction. Consider, for example, the 
exchange immediately following the passage quoted above:
STOCKBROKER V. I f  we press ‘split i t ’, we think they’re gonna split it, we get a 
thousand.
STOCKBROKER 2: Yeah. (.) But (.) I  mean, OK, yeah we might lose as in (.) ‘lose the 
money’, but (..) you Imow (.) you Iqiow you can say that yo u ’ve won in a 
fdifferent way because, obviously, you Imow, you could make a bit o f  a 
difference to them // . . .
STOCKBROKER 1 : ... well. I ’m fifty: fifty  at the moment / /  ...
STOCKBROKER 2 : 1 personally think we should go fo r  the ‘good guy’ approach and 
a / /  ...
Here, the ‘good’ to be obtained is expressed in entirely non-monetaiy temis; it is about 
‘making a difference’ rather than financial profit. And, by maldng a difference,
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Stockbroker 2 hopes to become one of the ‘good guys’, hideed, at the end of the 
episode, when the stockbrokers leave empty-handed, he declares rather mockingly:
STOCKBROKER 2 (to the cam era): Yeah, we are the bad boys (.) up against the 
good guys. 1/...
What is implied here is, of course, exactly the opposite: stockbrokers really are not that 
‘bad’ and, perhaps, muses are not that ‘good’. This point is closely linlced with the 
nurses’ self-perception. Like the stockbrokers, the muses speak of their own identity by 
refening to meta-stereotypes:
NURSE 1 : We are supposed to be dutifiU nurses that (.) we care about evetyone 
else. We want everybody to have an equal share.
NURSE 2: Not that dutifid!
The position of this reference within the overall text seems of significance for two 
reasons. Firstly, as in the stockbrokers’ case, this allusion to meta-stereotypes occurs 
immediately before a final decision has to be made;. Thus whilst we do not find an 
explicit comiection between identity and what the ‘goal’ is perceived to be in the text 
itself, the liiilc nevertheless exists implicitly, as the reference immediately precedes 
action. Secondly, in both instances, the decisions that follow go directly against the 
stereotype that is being expressed; and so the “wide boys, loads o f  money and all that 
sort o f stuff' chose to split the money, whilst the “dutifid nurses" who “care about 
eveiyone else" decide to talce it. Identity concerns (expressed here in the fomi of meta- 
stereotypes) do therefore not only deteimine the choices talcen, but the choices 
themselves serve to re-negotiate the meaning of identity. Such re-negotiation, then, can 
become a goal in and of itself. The nurses’ decision to go for the ‘take it’ option 
implies at least a certain degiee of opposition to the perceived meta-stereotype ((‘not 
that dutiful!") and thus functions to restore some balance:
NURSE 2 (to the camera): Nurses actually get the money fo r  once, (laughs)
NURSE 1 : (laughs) A bit o f justice.
NURSE 2: Yeah, a bit o f  justice.
It is important to note here that ‘justice’ is a question of relationship(s); it is relative to 
the stockbrokers that justice is seen to be restored and the outcome of the game is thus 
interpreted in identity teiins ((‘nimses actually get the money fo r  once").
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Before proceeding with our discussion of the non-monetary ‘goods’ pursued in the 
individual games, it should be noted that not all references to meta-stereotypes involve 
an endeavour to re-negotiate identity content. For instance, contrast the above­
described attempts to re-define the meaning of the social category ‘nurse’ or 
‘stockbroker’ with the boolanakers’ case. They, too, accoimt for their final decision 
(‘take it’) in temis of their professional identity; however, here the strategic function of 
the implied meta-stereotype is to provide a justification for the action taken. Having 
just affirmed their tmst in the bingo players (“we trust you!"', in the so-called “Open 
Mic” phase of the program) and thus indicated their willingness to split the money, the 
following exchange takes place:
BOOKMAKER 2: The bottom line is w e’re gambling whether we want the three 
grand or the grand, innit?
BOOKMAKER 1: Right.
BOOKMAKER 2: WJuch is what we said w e’d do. So then we go back on our 
M>ord. But we are booldes, so ... (laughs)
BOOKMAKER 1: Yeah,' yeah. But i t ’s, i t ’s not — I  see what yo u ’re saying, but /  
don’t think you stand fo r  that. Pressing a ‘split i t ’ could (.) well leave us 
with nothing, you hiow.
The lack of reliability or tmstworthihess (“io  then we go back on our word, but we are
booldes"', “I  don’t think you stand fo r  that") implied to be part of the meta-stereotype
provides the boolanakers with an ostensible justification for betiaying their initial
assurances: after all, they cannot help but act according to who they are!
A lte r n a t iv e  V a lu e s
Let us now resimie our discussion of the non-monetaiy goods puisued in this game. 
As already illustrated with the example of Private Detective 1, the adherence to moral 
principles can play a role in contestants’ decision-making processes. However, whilst 
in the detectives’ case ethical concerns form part of the means by which an outcome is 
reached, in other instances, the expression of non-monetary values appears to be an end 
in itself. The team of dancers provides one such example.
As indicated previously, the dancers do not even consider the possibility of taking the 
money and, imlike in other games, references to ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ remain entirely 
absent tluoughout their discussions. The following exchange occurs just after the 
dancers learn what their final options are (in the PD):
DANCER 2: I f  both rooms get- press ‘split i t ’ (.) we both get a thousand. / /  ...
DANCER l: Split it!
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DANCER 2; ... But i f  we press “split” and they press “take” (.) the take-it room 
gets three-thousand and the split-it room gets nothins.
DANCER \ : S o / / ...
DANCER 2: So we have to trust them that they ’II go split.
[ . . . ]
DANCER 2; So each room will get a thousand. (..) they fsplit it.
DANCER 1: Hm.
DANCER 2; They could say “take i t”!
DANCER 1 : Hm.
DANCER 2: We’d end up with nothing. (..) Still (.) w e 7 / be the good guys.
The notion of ‘bemg good’ -  of winding up as one of the “good guys” -  bears a 
remarkable similarity to Stockbroker 2’s concerns (see above). It also indicates that 
‘goodness’ is regarded to be of greater importance than any potential monetary gain. 
As we have seen. Stockbroker 2’s “good guy approach” is intimately boimd up with 
the perceived meta-stereotype associated with his professional gioup. Wliilst meta- 
stereotypical concerns seem to be absent in the dancers’ case, the moral dimension to 
the ‘good-guy’ notion expressed here seems nonetheless closely related to matters of 
identity. As already stated in ChapterTI, bih moral evaluations (or broader values) both 
define and are defined by tlie type of beings we are or strive to be; for some writers, the 
concept of identity itself thus constitutes a moral category (see e.g. Taylor, 1985). In 
the present case, Dancer 2’s deliberations and, eventually, his team’s final choice are 
tied to a reflexive awareness about the kind of being he wants to be, namely a “good
The value or moral principle that seems to be advocated by the dancers as an 
alternative to monetary gain is that of ‘trust’, hi other words, their understanding of 
‘goodness’ appears to be intimately linked with their own tmstworthiness as well as 
their willingness to trust others (recall, for instance, their refusal to accept the negative 
stereotypes encoruaged by the presenter). The importance the dancers place on trust is 
also underscored by their above-mentioned refusal to entertain any notions of taking 
the money and, in doing so, relying entirely on the ‘goodness’ of their opponents (fso 
we have to trust them that they ’II go split”). Wliilst the establishment of trust may not 
have been a major objective for the dancers at the outset, by the latter stages of the 
episode, it appears to have developed into an end in itself. This is not only revealed in 
the dancers’ oveijoyed response when finding out that their opponents selected the 
‘split it’ option and th a t...
DANCER 2: They were good guys! Oh my god.
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... but is also explicitly acknowledged in Dancer 2 ’s final remark:
DANCER 2 (to the cam era): It wasn’t the fmoney anymore. (.) It was veiy 
interesting (.) to frealise that. It wasn’t the tmoney. It was just to play the 
fgame (.) to the veiy fend. And hope that our trust in them will be 
reciprocated. And it f-M’as.
It has to be recognised, of course, that even with the focus on a non-monetary good 
such as trust, the outcome is inevitably money-related; it cannot be ‘money-free’ given 
the nature of the game. However, it is important to emphasise that, in the dancers’ case, 
moral concerns aie not only seen as an integial part of the game but are also given 
precedence over financial gain (i.e. monetary rewaid is a by-product). Compare this 
with instances in which tlie relevance of moral principles -  even potentially -  for 
contestants’ choices is denied:
• POLICE OFFICER 1 : T h e re ’s  a b so lu te ly  no redsOn on earth , feven  i f  y o u  ’re  the  
.n ice s t v e rso n  in the w o r ld / / . . .  ,
V0U.Œ.0WlCVyi2\ You woiddn’t split it?
'POLICE OFFICER i: ... to split the fmoney, is there?! (.) Because at the end o f  
the day, yo u ’re fcompeting.
Police Officer I ’s reading of the situation implies that debates about morality are 
inappropriate and ought not arise in the context of this game. Since the game is placed 
within the general framework of a ‘competition’ (i.e. where there can be only one 
‘winner’), moral concerns or alternative values are of no importance -  even for the 
“n ic e s t p e r so n  in the w o r ld ' .  This particular imderstanding seems to account for Police 
Officer 1 ’s genuine sense of bewildeiinent when, at the end of the episode, he reflects 
on his opponents decision to split the money:
POLICE OFFICER 1: I ’m just fucldng- oh! //(laughs) ...
POLICE OFFICER 2: (laughs)
POLICE OFFICER 1 : (seeming puzzled) Iju s t can’t work out why they fsplit it!
Seeing that it is tlie contest -  the game as such -  that has priority for Police Officer 1, 
the private detectives’ choice leaves him perplexed, presumably because it discloses 
the possibility of an alternative reading of the situation.
The importance ascribed to ‘the game’ or ‘competition’ bears much resemblance to 
the chess/poker players’ interpretations of the state of affairs, a case that will be 
discussed in gieater detail shortly. Before doing so however, we will briefly return to
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the nurses-versus-stockbrokers episode, with a focus on one particular question: who, 
exactly, receives the utility that is derived from the final choice? hi other words, whom 
does the ‘good’ accme to in the end?
6.3.4 ‘U tility’ and Its Recipients
Traditionally, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been regarded as a powerfril 
demonstration of the conflicts that can arise between individual and collective interests. 
This conflict of interests, however, only exists as such in so far as the individual and 
the collective sphere are viewed as diametrically opposed to each other and to the 
extent to which rationality is conceived of as the maximisation of utility to the 
individual self. Nevertheless, it is the notion of individual self-interest that lies at the 
heart of Rational Choice theory and tliat must be regarded as the origin of such 
‘dilemmas’.
However, even within this particular Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which a considerable 
amount of money is at stake, narrowly conceived notions of self-interested action 
cannot be entirely sustained:
STOCKBROKER 2 : 1 personally think we should go fo r  the ‘good guy’ approach 
and a / / ...
STOCKBROKER 1 : ... well, I  don’t Imow, to be completely honest about it, I  mean 
/ / . . .
STOCKBROKER 2: ... yeah, I  mean. I, I, you Imow, we could be sort o f  quite 
ruthless and say ‘sod it you Imow, ‘we want cash ’.
STOCKBROKER 1 : But yeah, but w e’ve got to think what they ’re gonna do. What 
are they gonna do?
STOCKBROKER 2: Erm, I  personally think that (.) they Mmdd take it. Then is — i f  
we take it, nobody gets bugger all. As long as, i f  say, i f  we split it, OK, we 
don’t have bugger all, but at least thev get something. (...) A t least 
someone walks away with something.
This extract provides another example of the ongoing discussions between the 
stockbrokers. Stockbroker 2 is awar e of the fact that he could pursue the self-interested 
“sod it, we want cash” approach, but asserts that his main concern lies in making sure 
that “at least someone wallcs away with something”. Whilst the objective of the game 
expressed here is related to monetary issues, this passage also reveals that what is of 
value -  or the ‘good’ of the game -  need not necessarily accrue to the individual self, 
histead, we find an explicit demonstration of how what counts as a ‘good’ can be 
associated with the ‘other’.
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At tlie end of the game, when the nurses receive their tlnee thousand pounds, while the 
stockbrokers have to content with not getting anything, the same stockbroker asserts:
STOCKBROKER 2: Oh, never mind. (..) At least somebody ended up with some 
money. [...]
This ‘somebody’ or ‘someone’ receiving the ‘goods’ is a collective rather than an 
individual self; it is not the stockbroker’s naiTowly conceived ‘self-interest’ that is 
being flilfilled here.
6.3.5 The chess versus poker players’ case
We will conclude this analysis by a closer examination of the episode in which a 
team of professional chess players faces a team of poker players, a game that so far has 
only been refened to in passing. As pointed out earlier, respondents’ interactions in this 
episode seemed qualitatively distinct from the exchanges observed in other games and, 
consequently, did not easily fit into the overall analytic categories. Upon initial 
inspection, perhaps the most striking feature of the poker-versus-chess players game 
was the comparative absence of ‘identity talk’. Unlike in the examples considered 
above, contestants’ exchanges in tliis episode were devoid of social-categorical 
inferences or any endeavours to define (or re-define) what it meant to belong to a given 
(professional) gmup. However, a more careful reading of the material suggested that 
this apparent lack of ‘identity talk’ did not imply that identity matters were inelevant 
for the contestants in this particular game. On the contrary, identity concerns -  albeit 
more implicitly so -  were crucial for their choices. Yet, the content of identity was 
simply talcen for granted, hi other words, whilst identity still mattered to players and to 
their actions, its meaning was over-determined; this, in turn, seemed to account for the 
deai'th of actual ‘identity talk’. The examples cited tliroughout the following sections 
aim to illustrate this point.
2.3.5.1 A ‘R ational A p p ro ach ’
hi tliis particular episode, both teams display a markedly ‘rational’ or logical 
approach to the ‘Trust Me’ game. Consider, for instance, their respective responses at 
the beginning of the episode (durhig their first contact with the presenter of the 
progiam), when they are supposedly receiving some clues about their opponents’ 
identity. The first of the following two passages presents the exchange occuning
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between the poker players when seeing the other team’s reply to the so-called 
‘hivisibility Test’ {“i f  you wei'e invisible, would you pick people’s pockets, watch 
people undress, eavesdrop on a conversation about you or, finally, fight crime?”); the 
second extract shows the chess players’ reactions to their opponents’ response to the 
‘Honesty Test’ {(‘have you ever taken the credit fo r  someone else’s work?”):
(Answer appearing on tlie screen: “Fight crime”)
POKER PLAYER 1: OK, so they’re either honest people and they would actually 
fight crime. Or erm they’re either kidding themselves or tiying to Idd us. 
‘Cause it doesn’t / /  have to be an honest answer, does it?
POKER PLAYER 2: Yeah. No.
POKER PLAYER 1 : We pass it back. We ’re not interested / /  in hundred quid.
(Answer appearing on the screen: “Yes”)
CHESS PLAYER 1: Yup!
Presenter: So it gives you a primaiy indication o f what these people are like?!
CHESS PLAYER 2: No. Because I  think most people have probably taken the 
credit fo r  something / /by  accident or otherwise ...
' CFIESS PLAYER 1: 1 think a lot o f  people wotdd say ‘yes ’ to this question even i f  
they haven’t, you hiow. A sort o f  self-defac..., a self effacing strategy:.
The poker players’ expressed lack of interest in £100 provides a first indication of 
what, for them, constitutes the ‘good’. Yet, these responses are intriguing in so far as 
their matter-of-factness, their emphasis on rational analysis presents a stark contrast to 
contestants’ reactions in other games. Whilst other players attempt to extract 
infonnation concerning their opponents’ identity, even at this early stage of the game 
and however mistalcenly (e.g. consider the stockbroker’s spontaneous exclamation “it ’s 
women!” when presented with the nurses reply to the ‘hivisibility Test’), here the stress 
lies more on the logical deductions that can be made on the basis of those responses. 
Poker Player 1 ’s obseiwation that their opponents’ reply “doesn’t have to be an honest 
answer”, or Chess Player 2 ’s reference to “strategy” provide the first, albeit faint, 
glimpse of their general understanding of the game as just that -  a ‘game’.
The ‘R ules’ of the Game
histead of attempting to establish their opponents’ identities (i.e. engaging in 
‘identity talk’), the participants in this episode are concerned with detemiining the 
specific rules underlying the game. This holds particularly true for the team of chess 
players, as the continuation of the above quote shows. It is worth recalling that the 
following exchange occurs right at the outset of the episode, during the first encounter
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with the presenter, just after the second question of the ‘Honesty Test’ Ç'If you found a 
cash point card with a pin number in the street, would you use it?'") has been posed:
(Answer appearing on the screen: “No”)
CHESS PLAYER 1: They said 'no’. So what, I  don’t really see what (inaudible) 
are telling the truth, or lying, or what?
CHESS PLAYER 2: Well I  think, what are the options o f what’s in that room?!
I t ’s, i t ’s either a computer (..) or//...
CHESS PLAYER 1: Who or what, you Imow? (.) Or it coidd be, it could be the 
Turins test, that’s it. We’re taldng part in the Alan Turing test. Can we 
deduce from the answers given whether or not the err (.) w e’re talking to a 
machine or some people.
CHESS PLAYER 2: That’s possible.
CHESS PLAYER 1 : That, that would be the Turing test.
Presenter: No. There is somebody in the other room. / /  There’s a person or 
persons.
CHESS PLAYER 1: What, related with a computer? //Perhaps?
Presenter: I t ’s not a computer.
CHESS PLAYER 1: You can tell us that? There’s no computer in the other room?
AIT right, there goes the Turing test. We thought we were really clever 
there.
CHESS PLAYER 2: (laughs)
This passage provides a remarkable illustration of the chess players’ concerns with 
miderstanding the type of game they are engaged in, with unveiling its rules. Again, 
their focus is on logical deduction (“c«« we deduce from the answers given whether or 
not w e’re talldng to a machine") which, together with their speculations about the 
‘Turing test’, suggest that a particular implicit assumption concerning the underlying 
pmpose of the game is being made here: the chess players respond as if they expected 
their intellectual prowess to be under scrutiny (“we thought we were really clever 
there’’), hi other words, the game is presumed to be concerned with a demonstration of 
competence (e.g. ‘rationality’) or intelligence. We will retmii to this point in a 
moment. Here, suffice it to say that their pre-occupation with ‘the rules’ or the logic of 
the game persists tlnoughout the entire episode and also manifests in Chess Player I ’s 
evident scepticism towards any information conveyed by the presenter:
Presenter: [...] These people, as a job, are professional poker players.
CHESS PLAYER 1 : fProfessional poker players ?
Presenter: Professional.
CHESS PLAYER 1 : And that is true?
Presenter: That is true.
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CHESS PLAYER 1 : You tiy on your mother’s life, yo u ’ve just told me the truth. 
Sony about your mother. No offence! (..) I f  they’re professional poker- do 
they laiow who fwe are?
Presenter: They laiow that yo u ’re professional chess players, yes.
CHESS PLAYER 1: You see the only danger we cati fsee is that the game 
radically transforms, either by you presenting them with an option, you 
hioM>, “you can either take the money now or we ’re going to machine gun 
yo u ’’ or (.) you coming back in here and telling us that you’ve changed 
them [the mles]. But ^  fa r  you have been pretty true to your word as 
(inaudible) to us at the start. And so M>e’re just gonna sit here (..) I  also 
think the speed with which we return the money w/// also affect us, so 
please go!
Again, there is not much indication of any interest in or concern with ‘the other’; 
instead, the focus is on the rules, “the game".
However, the above-quoted exchanges also reveal the degree to which identity -  rather 
than being irrelevant -  is over-deteiinined or taken for gi’anted in this particular case. 
The respondents’ emphasis on ‘being clever’, on demonstrating their intelligence, 
suggests that their social identity as chess players is implicitly salient throughout the 
duration of the episode; that is, just as in a chess match, the underlying logic of the 
moves (e.g. “I  also think the speed with which we return the money wz// also affect us") 
and adherence to what are perceived to be the mles (“fAe only danger we can see is that 
the game radically transforms") are paramoimt. hi other words, they aie approaching 
this game as chess players,
‘S trategy’
For the poker players’ team, too, their identity as poker players is presupposed and 
remains implicitly salient tlnoughout the game. Wliilst the chess players’ main concern 
appears to be the assertion of their strategic or intellectual superiority (and actual 
money amounts therefore seem to be less relevant), their opponents’ objective seems 
somewhat different -  reflecting perhaps the differences between the games of poker 
and chess as such. The poker players’ main focus is primarily on the gamble and the 
associated monetaiy gain; hi other words, as already indicated, the ‘good’ that they 
pursue is the money at stake. However, there is a considerable difference in opinion 
between the two poker players with regard to their respective notions of how to best 
achieve the objective of winning the game. Consequently, they find themselves
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engaged in, at times, quite passionate discussions about how ‘winning’ should be 
defined;
POKER PLAYER They might split it.
POKER PLAYER 2; But then we don’t win mate! (laughs)
POKER PLAYER 1: Yeah, I  like, but I ’m not bothered about that. I  Imow you are 
/ /
POKER PLAYER 2 : But, but l a m / /  ...
POKER PLAYER 1 : Yeah yeah. Marvellous!
POKER PLAYER T. I, I  am. I, I, I  hate losing.
POKER PLAYER 1: D on’t think o f it, that as being the idea o f taldng the //  most 
money as being winning or losing then. //.. .
POKER PLAYER 2: O K / / ( . . )  OK. (inaudib le)
POKER PLAYER 1: Re-define your parameters as to what’s winning. I t ’s a / / ... 
POKER PLAYER 2: fSplitting is never winning. [...]
Like in the case of Stockbroker 1, Poker Player 1 still considers the option of splitting 
the money as ‘winning’. This kind of approach, however, is in marked contrast to his 
fellow contestant’s view that “splitting is never winning" and an attempt to persuade 
Poker Player 2 to re-evaluate his understanding of ‘wimiing’ remains futile.
POKER PLAYER 2 :1just want to win, you laiow. They ’re, they ’re, they ’re //.. .
POKER PLAYER 1 (to the presenter): The concept o f taldng the twelve hundred 
quid, then means he feels that he’s won the game.
POKER PLAYER 2: Yeah, yeah. It is.
POKER PLAYER 1 : So fsplitting it would never ever / /  be an option fo r you?
POKER PLAYER 2: Splitting woidd never ever be an option, ‘cause that’s just 
ridicidous //. . .
POKER PLAYER 1: You, you think that’s, that’s the right way wussy option? //. ..  
POKER PLAYER 2 :1just don’t understand / /  that at all.
POKER PLAYER 1: OK (.) right. (...) I  wouldn ’t consider taldng the twelve 
hundred quid to be winning the fgame, because I  think a) there’s more 
money in it / /  and I  think this guy’s more than likely / /  to go on a bit more. 
POKER PLAYER 2: OK (.) OK, so define winning!
POKER PLAYER 1 : Take two grand!
(The stakes are at £1200)
Notice the qualitative difference here to other contestants’ debates around the meaning 
of ‘winning’ in which non-monetary principles such as “having a fun time" (e.g. see 
stockbrokers above) also tend to figure. As in the stockbrokers’ case, the tension 
between the poker players persists tlmoughout the remainder of the episode. However, 
unlike the stockbrokers (where Stockbroker 2’s preferred choice supports the re­
definition of identity content), they do agree on what is of value to them, that is, on the
monetary nature of ‘the good’. Nonetheless, for Poker Player 1, reaching this goal -  or
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‘winning’ -  requires their own financial reward to exceed the opponents’ gain, hi other 
words, it is the maximisation of monetary profit relative to the other players that counts 
for him, which is reminiscent of the bookmakers’ approach to the game. An equal 
outcome for both parties is not only unacceptable but also miimaginable (“/  ju st don’t 
understand that at all") for Poker Player 1. There can only be one wimier -  just as in a 
game o f poker. His fellow contestant, on the other hand, indicates that he would regard 
the attainment of a specific level of gain (i.e. £2000) as a successful outcome. Poker 
Player 2 is therefore prepared not only to push the stalces higher until this level is 
reached but also to select the “wussy option" of splitting the money.
Even though both contestants seem to approach the overall situation with a similar 
mindset (i.e. ‘identity’) — from the perspective of a ‘gambler’ -  their respective 
inteipretations about how to best ‘play’ this game aie rather different and they remain 
at odds with each other. In fact, Poker Player 2 insists on choosing the ‘take it’ option; 
however, their debate continues imtil even after the final choice is made:
POKER PLAYER 1 : We should have pressed ‘split ’!
POKER PLAYER 2: Yeah great! Then we are losers. Instead o f  having winners, 
we ve got losers. (Moves his hand across his forehead as if  to indicate that 
the word ‘loser’ is written across it.)
POKER PLAYER 1: No, instead o f  having draw (imitates Poker Player 2’s hand 
movement across forehead), no money, no one got fanything, we should 
have pressed ‘split it ’. / /Let  them take three grand!
POKER PLAYER 2: (sarcastically) Uh you ’re such a fnice human being Gaiy!
Poker Player 1 ’s sustained support o f the ‘split it’ option is noteworthy for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it resembles Stockbroker 2’s final stance towards the outcome of the 
game (see above) in so far as it suggests that the recipient of tlie ‘good’ or utility need 
not necessarily be an individual self (jlet them take three grand"). However, there is 
also an important difference to Stockbroker 2; Poker Player I ’s insistence that they 
“should have pressed split" does not appeal* to be bom out of any non-monetary 
concerns, such as the re-definition of identity or trust, but out o f more strategic 
considerations instead.
Nevertheless, even in this situation where the ‘good’ (i.e. money) is treated as an a
priori given, a traditional notion of self-interest still remains problematic as the sole
explanatoi*y principle, laigely due to its implicit assumptions concerning the nature of
‘selfhood’. With its reliance on a unitaiy and stable conception of the self, a Rational
Choice approach cannot account for Poker Player I ’s obvious regret of his team’s final
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choice which, essentially, prevented anyone from receiving the ‘good’ (“wo one got 
anything"). Whilst he is not pai'ticularly bothered by the lack of financial gain for his 
own team, he seems to imply that a complete loss of the money is not very sensible; in 
otlier words, the ‘good’ should at least have gone to the other players. This standpoint 
becomes intelligible when considered from a (social) identity perspective, which also 
takes into accoimt the implicit salience of the players’ professional identities. For Poker 
Player 1, the opponents are simply members of the same super-ordinate category as his 
own team (i.e. “players”), which allows ‘them’ to be conceived of as potential 
beneficiaries, hi other words, the recipient of the ‘good’ is understood in collective 
teiins. For Poker Player 2, on the other hand, such notions are completely 
unacceptable. Nonetheless, the meaning of his final, rather mocking remark remains 
ambiguous, especially since neither identity concerns nor issues of morality -  or 
‘niceness’ -  have before been raised by Poker Player 1, As already mentioned. Poker 
Player I ’s approach to the situation is strategic or National’; in other words, he regards 
the possible options fiom a gambler’s perspective. Poker Player 2’s closing comment 
(“uh, yo u ’re such a nice human being") may well reveal what, ultimately, could be 
different intei*pretations of what it means to be a poker player. Wliat he might be 
implying here is that his fellow contestant’s attitude caimot possibly reflect a ‘real’ 
poker player’s stance; what real poker player would want their opponents to win? 
There remains an interesting, yet unanswerable, question to ponder: did the umesolved 
debate between these two contestants as to the nature of ‘wimiing’ perhaps arise from 
their different understandings of their own implicit identities?
hi simimary, the above-quoted passages from the chess-versus-poker players 
episode illustiate a niunber of interesting points that -  despite the apparent 
distinctiveness of this pai'ticulai* game -  not only illuminate but also consolidate some 
of the findings outlined earlier in this chapter. Notwithstanding the evident lack of 
‘identity talk’, the contestants in this episode are still relying on the social loiowledge 
derived from the salience of their identities as poker players / chess players to guide 
their particulai* readings of the situation as well as their actions. The absence o f an 
overt engagement with issues of identity suggests that, in this pai ticular case, identity is 
over-deteiiiiined. hi other words, since both parties of contestants have been recruited 
on the basis of tlieir professional gi oup memberships, and given the actual set-up of the
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‘Trust Me’ show as a game, their identification as ‘players’ (or ‘gamblers’ in the poker 
players’ case) is implicitly salient throughout and therefore remains unchallenged.'^ 
However, the above extracts also demonstrate, that even if particular understandings of 
identity (i.e. social knowledge) are taken for granted, the goals or ‘goods’ in this 
context caiuiot be treated as given a priori. This point will be dealt with in greater 
detail in the following discussion.
6 . 4  D i s c u s s i o n
This study set out to examine the link between identity and money within an actual 
decision-making or behaviomal context, hi doing so, a nimiber of questions were 
explored that, due to tiie related assiuiiptions of self-interest and utility maximisation, 
have remained imaccoimted for by Rational Choice depictions of human action. These 
questions, posed within a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type framework, concerned not only the 
pursuit of goals (‘goods’, ‘utilities’) as such but also related to the problem of how to 
define their natme. In addressing these issues, the main focus was on social Icnowledge 
-  particularly in the form of social identity -  and its relationship to players’ choices.
The above-presented extracts seem problematic for traditional Rational Choice 
accoimts of behavioiu* on a number of giounds. Firstly, they have provided some 
evidence in support of the claim that action, and thus the pursuit of goals, is closely 
intertwined with identity concerns. Contestants’ decisions within this Prisoner’s 
Dilemma-type setting not only depended on their respective self-understandings, but 
were also contingent upon the specific ways in which they defined their opponents 
(‘the other’). In other words, identity was used as a source of social laiowledge that 
guided contestants’ actions in this particular situation. The pursuit of goals therefore 
cannot always be accounted for by the assumption of self-interest alone, seeing that it 
is also infoiined by the social knowledge agents possess.
Secondly, this enquiry has suggested that the nature of the pursued goals camiot 
always be taken for granted. What comits as a ‘good’ is not necessarily an a priori 
given but can be the subject of a considerable debate which may well remain
 ^ This bears some resemblance to the bingo players and the bookmakers who also appear to implicitly 
take the salience of tlie ‘gambling’ aspects associated with their respective social identities for granted 
and, consequently, automatically embrace an interpretation of Üiis particular situation as a game.
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inconclusive. This was conveyed, for instance, by the frequent discussions about the 
meaning of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’. Fellow contestants did not inevitably come to an 
agieement with regard to what they perceived as the objective of the game and, thus, 
with regard to what counted for them. Even when the monetaiy nature of the goal was 
regarded as given, as in the poker players’ case, there was no ultimate agreement as to 
the best strategy for attaining such a goal, hi other words, even if the ends were 
regarded as given, the means by which to reach them were not. The extracts cited 
throughout this analysis also illustrated the ways in which ‘goods’ or goals were both 
defined and varied as a fimction of identity, especially as a function of the perceived 
identity of the ‘other’. A particularly intiiguing finding was that goals were not always 
articulated in monetaiy terms. For instance, in Stockbroker I ’s case, the ‘utility’ to be 
derived from the game was, in part, defined in tenus of ‘making a difference’; for 
Dancer 2, on the other hand, one of the principal objectives related to ‘trust’. The 
nurses’ as well as the stockbrokers’ choices in this Prisoner’s Dilemma-type context 
also reflected at least some concerns with redressing the meta-stereotypes related to 
their professions. As such, these choices served as a means for re-negotiating what 
‘being a nurse’ or ‘being a stockbroker’ is — or perhaps should be -  all about.
Finally, the analysis of the ‘Trust Me’ materials illustrates that ‘goods’ need not 
necessarily accrue to self-interested individuals. For at least one stockbroker as well as 
one of the poker players the idea that a collective ‘someone’ received the money 
seemed, ultimately, the most important matter.
hi addition, the findings related to the analysis of one particulai* episode (i.e. poker- 
versus-chess players) raise a number of specific questions that are of direct relevance 
for the inferences about human behaviour usually drawn from more conventional 
laboratory-based Prisoner’s Dilemmas. The game between the team of poker players 
and the chess players provided an interesting example of a situation in which -  just as 
in the traditional experimental games -  identity and, consequently, social laiowledge 
seemed to be taken for granted. We have attempted to show that participants’ choices 
in this particular game were still guided by their implicitly salient identities as ‘players’ 
and by the associated inteipretation of the general context as a game. This latter point 
is rather significant: just as any notions of ‘sharing’ or co-operation would appear not 
only inappropriate but diametrically opposed to the purpose of the game in a poker or 
chess match, why should this not also be the case for conceptions of the Prisoner’s
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Dilemma as ‘just a game’? Competition is an essential ingredient of what we 
traditionally associate with games (a notion also expressed by Police Officer 1). If an 
interpretation of the overall situation as a game is taken for gianted -  like in some 
‘Trust Me’ episodes and conceivably also in many laboratoiy-based games -  it seems 
plausible that players will act in accordance with what they perceive as the implicit 
mles or nonns of the given context, thus defining themselves as players. In other 
words, rather than inevitably providing a demonstration of certain universalistic 
features of human motivation (e.g. self-interest), players’ choices may simply reflect 
their particular readings of the Prisoners’ Dilemma context as such which, in turn, lead 
to specific self-understandings. This, of course, brings us back, in a full circle, to the 
importance of social knowledge for the pursuit of goals.
Whilst these findings are undoubtedly of interest in temis of their broader 
implications for Rational Choice conceptions of human behaviour, no claims as to their 
generality can be made. This is not only due to the nature of the analytical approach 
employed here but, more crucially, relates to the type of material that was used in the 
cunent analysis. The following section will touch upon this issue. However, it should 
also be noted that, whilst generalisations are not possible, what this enquiry does 
demonstrate is an exception to the mle. Although it makes no claims regarding the 
frequency of certain events, it shows that definitions of what ‘goals’ are as well as the 
processes underlying their pursuit cannot always be taken for granted, hr doing so, this 
type of analysis enables us to subject Rational Choice models and their underlying 
assumptions to closer scmtiny.
6.4.1 Analytical Limitations
As already noted, the material used for this analysis was clearly edited. We do not 
possess any information concerning those exchanges between contestants that have 
been edited out of the program. Whilst the producer of the series affiiined that the 
editing process “did not substantially alter the ‘feel’ of what went on” (David Glover, 
personal communication), the extent to which the qualitative aspects of respondents’ 
interactions in the different games were actually reflected in their broadcast versions 
could not be independently assessed. Although this presents an obvious limitation for 
the current analysis, an inteiview with the producer of the series suggested that there
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was at least an overlap between his underlying rationale for creating the ‘Tmst Me’ 
progiams and our own research interests.
There are, however, a number of concerns regarding the present research material 
whose overall impact is difficult, if  not impossible, to assess adequately and for which 
there is no remedy. Although the analysis was predominantly conducted by using the 
written transcripts of the ‘Tmst Me’ episodes, it would be misleading to claim that 
there was only one straightfoiward text that informed our results. Given the type of 
medium (television) we were dealing with here, a niunber of ‘texts’ or discourses 
existed that, at least potentially, may all have occimed simultaneously. Tlnoughout the 
whole series, fom* separate discourses took place all at once: these were the dialogues
1)  between the producer and the audience (as also exemplified by the editing process),
2) between the contestants and the audience, 3) between the contestants and their 
opponents and 4) between contestants within teams. Whilst our analysis has focussed 
on the latter two, it seems impossible to disentangle these discourses from the foiiner. 
In other words, eveiy single utterance or exchange between contestants was embedded
y  I -i ■ ;within multiple contexts, whilst the contestants themselves were not only visible to 
each other, but also to the camera and to us as the broader audience. Although an 
improved understanding of the editing process in conjunction with a full-scale 
discomse analysis paying specific attention to these different levels of dialogue might 
go some way towards clarifying some of these issues, they appear to be far too intricate 
as to ever be resolved entirely.
6.4.2 Concluding Note
The present analysis must remain imavoidably partial for all of the above- 
mentioned reasons. Nevertheless, the material examined here is intriguing, not least 
because contestants’ decisions had considerable consequences when compared to the 
choices typically available in the Prisoner’s Dilemma games played in a more 
traditional laboratoiy setting. This is not only because of the larger sums of money 
involved here, but also because of the above-raised issues of multiple visibility and 
multiple contexts; contestants are not merely accountable to themselves, but also to 
their fellow contestants, the producers and the wider television audience. In this sense, 
perhaps some of the present study’s wealmesses can also be considered as its strengths. 
Most human action is situated within a multiplicity of contexts, given the complexities
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of our social relationships, and it is these aspects of social life that are hard -  if  not 
impossible -  to captine within a sti'ictly experimental set-up. What this analysis has 
therefore shown is that, when we allow for a degree of complexity, certain a priori 
assumptions -  such as ‘self-interest’ or ‘utility maximisation’ -  become contestable as 
well as contested.
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V II. C o n c l u s io n
The initial impetus behind this thesis derived from the relative lack of attention 
paid to identity-related processes within psychological accounts of monetaiy meanings 
and attitudes. The primary objective of this venture has therefore been to argue for an 
identity-based approach to economic attitudes and behaviours in general and towards 
understanding the subjective valuation of money in particular, hi doing so, the 
empirical work presented here has sought to provide a first exploratoiy step towards 
developing a broader, social psychological perspective on money and its usage.
The present case for greater emphasis on identity processes, in the context of 
studying the meanings or value people ascribe to money, was based on a critique of the 
traditional psychometric or personality approaches prevalent within psychology, hi 
Chapter I we contended that these ‘individual differences’ accounts -  with their 
inescapably individualistic undercurrents and their concomitant focus on ‘money, 
pathology’ -  presume the dimensions of meaning, and o f identity (i.e. socio- 
deniogiaphic gioup membership) that are thought to relate to monetaiy matters. More 
specifically, it was argued that these accounts hinge on a conception of ‘selfliood’ that 
precludes a wider consideration of social psychological processes. We suggested that 
this type of approach to monetaiy meanings and attitudes both presupposes and 
reinforces the notion of the self as an integral, ‘essential’ entity.
hi an attempt to address the existing lack of theoretical discussion and integiation.
Chapter I introduced the Social Identity model of selfliood as a potentially usefril
avenue for exploring money-related matters in general and the subjective meanhigs or
value attached to money in paiticular. As this model provides a non-reductionist
understanding of the relationship between the ‘individual’ and his/her social groups
(including socio-demogiaphic ones), it takes into account the variability and context-
dependence of the self-concept. Furthemiore, the model allows for an impact of
subjective identification processes -  and thus social context -  upon people’s attitudes
and behaviours and hence for intra-individual variation in the articulation of those. The
question of whether theoretically predicted changes in attitudes and behaviour would
translate from the Social Identity model’s original domain (i.e. intergioup relations)
into the study of economic psychological phenomena, specifically people’s subjective
valuation of money, fomied the basis for the experimental work presented in Chapters
225
Chapter VU
III to V. Chapter II and VI, on the other hand, were concerned with a somewhat 
broader notion of identity and its relationship to money issues, both in the context of 
people’s general talk about money (Chapter H) and against a specific decision-making / 
behavioural backgiound (Chapter VI).
hi this concluding chapter, the overall theoretical claim underlying this thesis 
concerning the proposed significance of identity for the subjective valuation of money 
will be re-evaluated in the light of the present research findings. Firstly, a brief review 
of the empirical studies is presented. This is followed, secondly, by an assessment of 
their limitations together with some suggestions for potential future directions, hi doing 
so, the question of how well the Social Identity model has fared within the research 
area to which it was imported is also addressed. Finally, the broader implications of the 
work presented here with regard to conceptions of human agency and their role within 
economic psychology are discussed.
7 . 1  R é s u m é  OF T h e  E m p i r i c a l  W o r k
The interview study reported in Chapter II illustrated how closely a person’s sense 
of identity and their understanding of money matters can be linked, hi the context of 
talking about money’s role in their everyday lives, people’s subjective constiuctions of 
its nieaning(s) were richly imbued with references to issues siurounding their 
‘selfliood’. This link between money and identity was found at all levels of identity 
abstraction -  that is, at the personal, social as well as human level of identification. 
Yet, both the meanings of money and their relationship to the ‘self seemed profoundly 
dilemniatic. The meanings ascribed to money were often marked by gieat ambiguity 
and varied both between and within specific instances. The same was true in ternis of 
their association with notions of selfliood; in some cases, people believed that money 
enlianced the ‘self, whilst others viewed it as undeiiiiining their identity -  often the 
same person held both views. On the whole, the inteiwiew findings suggested that 
identity concerns can be central to people’s imderstandings and valuation of money. 
The findings also indicated that the value attached to money might not necessarily be 
fixed but that it varies instead.
The notion of variability in monetary attitudes was tackled explicitly by the series 
of studies described in Chapters III to V. These studies aimed to explore, within an
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experimental setting, whether social identification processes were implicated in the 
subjective valuation of (or attitudes towards) money. To this end, a number of specific 
hypotheses were derived from the Social Identity tradition and applied to the particular 
issues in question here. Taken as a whole, these studies provided some suggestive 
evidence in support of the claim that social identification processes play a part in the 
subjective valuation of money. The experimental study described in Chapter in  
demonstrated that changes in social identity salience can lead to shifts in the value 
people ascribe to money. There was also some evidence to suggest that attitudes to 
money can vaiy as a function of the comparative context in which a given identity is 
salient, as illustrated by the experimental findings reported in Chapter V. Furthennore, 
despite the lack of evidence for an overall behavioural effect, the same study showed 
that the conespondence between monetary attitudes and behaviour can also be affected 
by changes in comparative context. In Chapter IV, we further pursued the post-hoc 
finding that respondents who ‘objectively’ belonged to the same social category 
differed in their attitudes towards money, depending on the degree to which they 
subjectively endorsed their membership within that group (see Chapter III). This 
finding was replicated, hi addition, the survey study reported in Chapter IV provided 
some evidence suggesting that the different meanings ascribed to membership in that 
particular social category affected the subjective valuation of money. Whilst no support 
for the predicted role of these meanings in the association between subjective 
identification and monetary attitudes was found, the results nevertheless strengthened 
the overall claim that subjective identification processes do, indeed, have an impact on 
the value ascribed to money, hi smmnary, the results of the empirical work presented 
in Chapters III to V not only imply that attitudes towards money are not ‘fixed’ but 
also indicate that tlieir inherent variability is, at least in paid, a function of identity 
processes.
Finally, the study described in Chapter VI represented a sliifr of focus away from 
the subjective value respondents attached to money within the somewhat naiTOW 
confines of an experimental setting to a broader consideration o f people’s decision­
making processes and behaviours around money, hi particular, this study set out to 
explore the question whether, and if  so in what ways, identity related to the pursuit of 
outcomes in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type context. A qualitative analysis of the verbal 
exchanges between different players of a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type game illustrated that
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identity -  and the social knowledge derived from it -  were intimately linlced with both 
the monetaiy and non-monetary goals players pursued in this paiticular situation. The 
analysis thus indicated that the nature of the goal was not always an a priori given; 
instead, what players regarded as the ‘good’ within the context of this game was often 
contingent upon identity concerns. Moreover, this study demonstrated that it was not 
necessarily the ‘individual’, or even a member of the same team, to whom the ‘good’ 
or the ‘utility’ to be derived from the stake money was seen to accrue; in some 
instances, the recipient of the ‘good’ was defined in terms of a collective ‘someone’.
Taken in their entirety, the results of the empirical work presented here have 
repercussions for individualistic notions of selfliood and, by implication, for the 
Rational Choice conception of the human agent. With regard to the latter, the 
qualitative findings diawn fr om the Prisoner’s Dilemma study are particularly pertinent 
as they suggest that neither the ‘self to whom utility accrues nor the nature of that 
utility can always be taken for granted; instead, goals and their pursuit aie intimately 
linlced to issues of identity. The studies described tlnoughout this thesis also raise a 
number of questions relating to what the goals of the economic psychological 
enteiprise are envisaged to be -  especially in the context of studying the subjective 
valuation of money -  and thus regaining their role in the elaboration / contestation of 
particular models of human agency. These broader issues will be discussed in Section 
7.2. Before doing so, however, let us consider some of the limitations of the cuiTent 
approach, along with some suggestions concerning possible directions for future 
reseai'ch.
7.1.1 Research Limitations & Future Directions
Despite the hypothesis-testing elements contained within the quantitative studies, 
the overall argument and resultant empirical approach of this thesis have been 
somewhat exploratory. As is unavoidably the case for an approach of this kind, the 
empirical work has not only unearthed various paths towards future improvements -  
methodologically as well as theoretically -  but it has also elucidated some potential 
blind alleys. We will consider these issues, together with some of the research 
limitations, in the following discussion of both the quantitative and qualitative studies 
of this thesis.
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7.1.1.1 The Q u an ti ta tive  A pproach
Wliilst the cumulative evidence di'awn from the empirical studies suggests that both 
identity concerns in general and social identity processes in particular are an important 
factor in the subjective valuation of money, the evidence obtained in each o f the 
individual studies (as described in the respective chapter discussions) was by no means 
flawless. For instance, in the case of the specific research hypotheses addressed within 
the quantitative studies, the statistical significance levels for some of the supported 
hypotlieses were not particulaily high, whereas other predictions (e.g. concerning the 
role of identity content in the relationsliip between social identification and monetaiy 
attitudes) remained unconfimied. Although the lack of substantiation for specific 
hypotheses does not altogether undermine the cimiulative evidence in support of the 
proposed link between social identification processes and the subjective value attached 
to money, it nevertheless points towards several methodological and conceptual 
shortcomings.
On a methodological level, the statistical analyses for the experimental studies were 
based on rather low sample sizes (see Chapter III and V), wliich may account for the 
lack of statistical support for some predictions and the somewhat low levels of 
significance for others. Ideally, future research would thus attempt to replicate these 
studies witli larger samples sizes and within a more contiolled setting so that equal cell 
sizes could be ensured (see Chapter IE, Discussion).
Another sampling-related issue concerns the ‘representativeness’ of the present 
research participants (see also Section 7.1.1.2), given that the studies described in 
Chapters III to V were entirely based on student samples. The issue of 
‘representativeness’ may not pose too gi*ave a tlneat for the overall argument put 
forward in this thesis, since our underlying rationale has simply been to challenge 
certain universalist assmnptions about the nature of ‘selfliood’ and their implications 
for om* understanding of monetaiy meanings / attitudes. That is, we did not set out to 
make specific quantitative claims about the linlc between money and social identity or 
about its variability, but only to illustrate the existence of such a relationship and that 
certam assmnptions therefore camiot be taken for granted. However, the present use of 
student samples and the resultant focus on subjective identification with ‘being a 
(psychology) student’ presents a methodological limitation is so far as it rendered the 
general aigimient reliant upon a somewhat contrived dimension o f social identity (see
229
Chapter VU
Chapter IV and V). Future experimental studies may thus consider manipulating the 
salience of more inclusive -  and arguably more ‘meaningful’ -  social identities, such 
as ‘gender’ (as in Chapter IE) for instance. That is, future reseaich might focus on the 
use of socio-demogiaphic group memberships as social psychological, rather than 
sociological vaiiables.
The present emphasis on student identity also diaws attention to another issue, both in 
methodological and in conceptual terms, hi the study described in Chapter IV, we 
explored some of the contents ascribed to a paiticular social categoiy (i.e. ‘being a 
student’), with somewhat mixed results (see Chapter IV, Discussion). However, for the 
puiposes of addiessing the specific hypotheses put forward in Chapter IE and V, the 
particular content(s) of the social identities under consideration had to be taken for 
gianted. This, of course, relates to the same criticism that was raised at the outset (see 
Chapter I, Section 1.4.2.1) concerning the under-emphasis on social identity content, 
its variability and the dynamic aspects of identity construction within traditional Social 
Identity approaches. One possibility of tackling this issue in future experimental 
research would be to place gi*eater emphasis on the meanings of particular social 
identities. For example, different understandings of the same identity (e.g. different 
constructions of what it means to ‘be a woman / man’) could be rendered salient. This 
would allow for a more explicit exploration of the impact of specific identity content(s) 
on attitudes towaids money and thus facilitate a systematic approach to the question of 
whether the meanings ascribed to a given identity can be manipulated and, in doing so, 
changes in the subjective valuation of money be effected. Another way to overcome the 
problem of treating identity content(s) as given lies, of course, in the adoption of a 
qualitative stance towards the active constmction of social identities and their 
relationship to money matters (see also Section 7.1.1.2).
Finally, the most apparent limitation of the present studies is their lack of focus on 
actual monetary behaviom*(s). The behavioural task that was included in the study 
described in Chapter V arguably constituted a measure of a veiy specific behavioural 
instance (i.e. game behaviour). Future research will therefore need to take the broader 
aspects of money-related behaviours into account.
On the whole, the Social Identity model has offered a useful framework for 
addressing some of our overall research concerns. It has not only provided a non- 
essentialist and thus non-reductionist concept of the self but more specifically -  due to
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the theoretical predictions that can be derived from it -  has lent itself as an 
experimental framework for examining the proposed linlc between money and identity. 
The quantitative work carried out here within this framework suggests that by 
exploring which social identities are salient at a given time, or by examining the 
comparative contexts in which a particular social identity is salient, we may begin to 
account for some of the variability that can be found in the meanings and value 
ascribed to money.
However, one of the questions that the Social Identity model is perhaps less equipped 
to deal with — methodologically rather than theoretically -  concerns the issue of how 
money relates to identity on both a personal and human level of abstiaction. This linlc, 
which clearly arose out of the qualitative studies presented here (see interview study 
described in Chapter II) seems much more difficult to address within a quantitative or 
experimental context. Before considering the qualitative work of this thesis, let us 
briefly ponder one final issue, which may well lead us down one of those blind alleys 
refeiTed to earlier.
One limitation of the present quantitative approach, which is not related to the 
Social Identity model as such, comprises both a methodological, measurement issue as 
well as a wider conceptual concern. As was pointed out in Chapter V (see Discussion), 
whilst the overall reliability of the attitude scale we used as our dependent measure 
proved to be satisfactoiy, there was some vaiiance with regard to the item-to-total 
correlations for individual items across the different studies. More importantly, only 
one out of the six response indices derived from an alternative measure of the 
subjective valuation of money, which was intioduced in Chapter V (i.e. the 
psychophysical ratio scaling / magnitude estimation task), was found to correlate with 
participants’ scores on the money attitude scale. This not only questioned the use of 
magnitude estimation task as a measure of the subjective valuation of money but also 
raised the broader issue of what underlying consti uct the present attitude scale actually 
tapped into, hi other words, to what extent did we succeed in operationalising our 
dependent variable?
The traditional response to measurement problems of this kind would be to call for 
gi'eater conceptual clarity and refinement of the actual instruments used by means of 
developing more reliable, more valid scales. Yet, in the present case, such a
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suggestions actually puts us into a double bind. For instance, Brandstatter and 
Brandstatter (1996), from whom the psychophysical ratio scaling task was adapted, 
regard the ‘subjective value of money’ as synonymous with the ‘marginal utility of 
money’. Their task presmnes -  as does our dependent money attitude measure -  that a 
unitary construct such as ‘utility’ or ‘valuation’ does, in fact, exist. Yet, the main tlmist 
of the argument developed tlnoughout this thesis has been to show that such unitary 
constmcts only make sense when they are assumed to apply to unitary selves. And 
herein lies the paradox: if  the implications of the present findings are that the value 
attached to money varies as a function of (social) identity and that unitary notions of 
‘utility’ and thus miitary selves (see e.g. Chapter VI) cannot be found, the development 
o f more ‘precise’ measuring instruments seems both unfeasible and at odds with the 
pui*pose of the overall enterprise. This, in fact, takes us right back to our point of 
departure and to the claim that certain methods of psychological assessment reinforce 
particular notions of selfliood.
Let us now retimi to a consideration of the empirical findings pertinent to the 
proposed link between money and identity. The work presented in this thesis has 
illustrated the relevance of identity concerns for the subjective understanding of money 
not only within an experimental domain but also in qualitative teiins.
7.1.1,2 The Qualitative Approach
The qualitative studies described in Chapters II and VI provided some evocative 
evidence for the proposed link between issues of identity and money matters, both in 
temis of the subjective meanings attached to money as well as within the broader 
context of actual decisions involving large sums of money. Yet, again a degi'ee of 
caution is due as far as claims regarding the generality of these findings aie concerned. 
The interview study described in Chapter II, for instance, was based on a relatively 
small sample and also suffered fiom an over-inclusion of participants in their 40’s and 
50’s, resulting in an imder-representation of people in their 30’s and 20’s or even in 
their teenage years. Then again, notions of ‘generalisability’ or ‘representativeness’ 
fomi part and paicel of a pai ticular conception of the kinds o f finding one should deem 
reliable or valid; in other words, they belong to a specific epistemological standpoint 
and thus to a particular version of ‘science’. The inevitable reliance on inteipretation in 
qualitative research is often seen to undeiinine the positivist’s requirements of
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reliability and validity. Our position on this matter resembles what Kellehear (1993) 
identifies as the ‘hemieneutic’ or ‘post-stiucturalisf stance according to which 
questions of reliability and validity are immaterial for approaches that are primarily 
concerned with the nature of meaning or experience. What is more, “the authority of 
concepts such as reliability and validity is spurious [...] scientific reliability says more 
about the culture of professional conformity than it does about the pursuit of 
understanding” (Kellehear, 1993, p. 42). With this proviso in mind, the qualitative 
studies presented here have not been intended for general claims concerning, for 
instance, the ‘frequency’ with which identity matters are linlced to money (Chapter II) 
or for arguing that all monetary decisions relate to identity (Chapter VI). Their puipose 
has simply been to explore whether financial issues and identity are linked in people’s 
own constructions of money and money-related behaviours; in doing so, these studies 
have, aimed to provide a methodological stance that would allow -  rather than suppress 
-  the emergence of such a linlc and also of account variability. What they have, 
therefore, shown is that neither the meanings of money nor the pursuit of monetaiy 
goals can always be taken for gianted. In other words, this qualitative stance has 
enabled us to scrutinise certain assumptions that hitherto have been treated as given a 
priori and thus remained implicit.
Yet, all this does not imply that there is no room for improvement here -  quite the 
contrary. One possible way forward, especially for an interview approach, would be to 
move on from the rather broad temis on which the relationship between identity and 
money was tackled here towards a more systematic examination of that linlc. This 
could be achieved tlirough the use of a more detailed inteiview schedule, for example, 
which specifically aimed to highlight certain identity domains (e.g. ‘consumer’, 
‘citizen’, ‘gender’). It would then become possible to systematically explore whether 
people’s subjective constructions of money in everyday talk vary with the particular 
identity domains under consideration. Another potential way forward would involve a 
shift away from an analytical focus on the ‘themes’ contained within people’s eveiyday 
talk to an emphasis on money as a discursive object. The interview analysis presented 
here has afready touched upon certain analytic practices traditionally associated with a 
discursive orientation in suggesting that the constmction of particular money meanings 
can be associated with specific discursive aims. This finding could be extended by 
means of an explicitly discursive approach to future inteiview material. The use of a
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‘Foucauldiaii’ version of discomse analysis (see Willig, 2001) could be particularly 
interesting as this would allow for an exploration of the means by which talking about 
money may create certain ‘ways-of-seeing’ or ‘ways-of-being’ in the world (see Willig, 
2001). hi other words, such a focus would allow us to examine the kinds of 
subjectivity, or agency, we create for ourselves tluough the ways in which we talk 
about money.
This, then, leads to the broader issue of what kinds of subjectivity are constructed 
through the ways in which we study money, hi other words, what are the ‘ways-of- 
being’ that are made possible -  or impossible -  by our social scientific approaches to 
and theories about money? We will address this question in the following suimnaiy of 
the overall contribution of this thesis.
7.2 O v e r a l l  C o n t r i b u t i o n : T o w a r d s  a  S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y  o f
M o n e y  a n d  I t s  U s a g e
The work presented tlnoughout this thesis has contributed to the development of a 
social psychology of money and its usage in a number of ways. Firstly, we have 
problematised the notion of selfliood which undeipins both the psychometric or 
personality approaches to money within psychology and the Rational Choice model in 
economics. As regards the latter, the present approach has illustrated that, even if  we 
take self-interest for granted, we camiot treat the self of that interest as an a priori 
given. In other words, the self to whom an interest or economic ‘good’ is seen to 
accrue to is not necessaiily defined in the individualistic tenns generally presupposed 
by Rational Choice models. As a corollaiy of tliis, what coimts as a ‘good’ or what 
affords ‘utility’ is also variable. The ‘good’, in other words, can be contested.
This leads us to the second contiibution of this research. The empirical studies 
presented tliroughout this thesis have illustrated that monetaiy issues and matters of 
identity are closely intertwined. At the social level of identity, the subjective valuation 
of money is not fixed but can vary as a fimction of social identification processes. 
However, money also relates to personal and human levels of identification where the 
meanings and value attached to it are also variable and, at times, profoundly 
dilemmatic.
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But, one may ask, why should it matter whether or not we regard monetary 
attitudes or meanings as ‘fixed’ or dispositional? Why should it matter whether or not 
we conceive of the subjective meanings and value people attach to money as related to 
their notions of who they are? In other words, what does an identity-based approach, or 
a social psychology of money, offer that we have not already got? We suggest that it 
matters for several reasons:
Firstly, whilst the underlying assumptions on which our models are based are not made 
explicit, the latter camiot be challenged. The consequence for economic psychological 
research, or even for social psychology more generally, is the reification of a certain 
form of individualism. If our analytic focus is exclusively on the individual self as the 
‘seat’ of various ‘fixed’ attitudes, then particular social structures and concerns are in 
danger of becoming enshrined in individual minds, hi other words, as economic 
phenomenon such as money become ‘individualised’, they also become problematised 
at the individual level only -  hence the focus on ‘money pathology’.
This, in turn, relates to the second reason why we believe that an identity-based 
approach matters. To the extent that economic psychology endorses the concept of the 
‘self as an integral, de-contextualised entity -  be it tluough the lack of a broader 
theoretical fi aniework or tluough the use of particular research methods -  it reifies the 
very version of selfliood that undeipins the model of the ‘rational actor’. As a result, 
this particular notion o f human agency becomes progiessively naturalised. Yet, our 
theoretical models and the assmnptions on which they rest, not simply describe but also 
create certain ‘ways-of-being’. As Taylor (1985) puts it:
“It is on the level of theory that [models of the person] are sorted out [...]. But this 
does not make them unimportant. Theoretical models with their inner coherence 
have a great impact on our thinking even where -  perhaps especially where -  they 
are not fully conscious or explicit.” (Taylor, 1985, p. 114)
Therefore, by not making certain underlying assmnptions explicit, by not questioning 
our conceptions of the self from time to time, we limit ourselves in terms of the types 
of subjectivity or agency we allow for. An a-theoretical, individualist approach to 
money remains, by default, caught up with a particular notion of human agency. It 
therefore runs the risk of recreating the status quo and, in doing so, preventing other 
worlds fiom being possible, hi the present context, this is also illustrated by the virtual 
absence of research on alternative foiiiis of money (such as the cuiTencies used in 
Local Exchange Trading networks, for instance) and the ensuing taken-fbr-giantedness
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of our cunent fomi of legal tender money. Yet, the exploration of different foiins of 
money, or money production, seems fai* fiom unimportant, given the global challenges 
concerning the unequal distiibution of economic resomces we are facing today.
The more specific ways in which an individualist psychology of money might 
reinforce particular foiins of economic arrangement or structure is, of course, yet 
another question which would merit a thesis on its own. But it is time to draw this one 
to a close. There is just one point that remains to be made.
On a final note ...
The main contribution of an identity-based approach to money lies in its 
recognition of what Zafirowski refers to as the “multiplexity of human puiposes” 
(1999a, p. 309). The research presented in this thesis has allowed for an exploration of 
such multiplexity, especially through the adoption of a qualitative stance in some parts. 
If nothing else, it has thus allowed for the articulation of voices that otheiwise would 
have remained silent and, in doing so, for the expression of people’s struggles around 
money. For many people who participated in this reseai'ch, money was profoundly 
dilenunatic, raising moral questions about their quality as agents. This, of course, takes 
us right back to our point of depai'ture and to Jacob Needlman’s (1991) assertion that 
our miderstanding of money is “continually new and every day exposes each one of us 
to the discrepancy between what we aie and what we wish to be”.
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A p p e n d ix  II.
This Appendix comprises the materials referred to in Chapter II.
Appendix II. a Interview Schedule 
Appendix Il.b Recruitment Poster 
Appendix ILc Transcription Conventions
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Appendix IIu
Interview Schedule
The following text was used as a ‘blueprint’ for introducing the inteiwiews:___________
‘‘Economic issues are often studied in an abstract, theoretical way. This seems to hold 
especially true fo r  the ways in which the topic o f  ‘money' is often approached. 
Economics, o f  course, is concerned with the study o f  money and all lands o f  issues 
related to money. However, economists tend to study money on an aggregate or 
collective level. Little is Imown about the significance money has on a more personal. 
more psychological level. For instance, how do we - as individuals - relate to money? 
Wltat role does it play in our lives? What is the value we attach to it? These are 
questions that remain largely unexplored.
The aim o f this interview is therefore to look at the more subjective or personal 
meanings that money may - or may not - have. What does money mean to us? How do 
we deal with or understand money in our everyday lives? These are the lands o f  
questions that I  am interested in and that I  would like to put to you. ”
“However, before we start, I  would like to point out that there are no right or wrong 
“attitudes ” towai'ds money, no right or wr'ong answers to any o f the issues we may talk 
about. Please feel free to express whatever comes to your mind. Please don 7 feel that 
you have to “ censor'’ yourself. I  will not be “judging” what you are saying in any way,
I  am simply interested in your point o f  view It is your personal perspective that is 
important to me. The whole purpose o f  this study is to.explore what vour perspective is 
on money. ”
“Perhaps we could start o ff with a very general question. In terms o f your everyday 
life, in the context o f how you use it on a day-to-day basis, what does money mean to 
you? What does it represent?’’
MAIN THEME: “The Meaning(s) of Money”
>  Wlrat does money mean to you? What does it represent?
> How> important (or unimportant) is money to you? W7iy (why not)?
y  Is money something that you think about a lot / sometimes /  not at all?
> What would it mean to you to have a lot o f  money /  very little money?
> Wrat do you consider to be ‘a lot o f  money ' /  ‘very little money ’?
y  Do you fantasise about money and what you could do with it? In what ways do you 
fantasize about money?
ADDITIONAL THEMES:
>  “Financial Life History” (e.g. “How would you describe your upbringing with 
regard to money? ”)
y  spending (e.g. “How do go about spending money? ”, “What would you say you 
spend most o f  your money on? ”)
>  Money Management (e.g. “How do you manage your money on a day-to-day 
basis? ”, “How would you describe yourself with regard to money? ”)
y  Work (e.g. “Could you tell me a little bit about the work you do? ”)
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What does money mean to us in our day-to-day lives? What 
are the ways in which we use it? How much value do we 
attach to it?  How would yow answer these questions?
I am looking for volunteers who can spare an hour of their 
time to take part in an interview study. My research is 
about the personal meanings that money holds for us.
What doe^the'study ivwoAve/?
The interview will last approximately 1 hour and will be 
tape-recorded. Everything you say will be kept strictly 
confidential. The location and time can be arranged to suit 
you. Some expenses (e.g. bus fares) can be reimbursed.
If you are interested, please contact
Stefanie Sonnenberg 
School of Psychology 
University of St. Andrews 
St. Andrews KYI6 9JU
Tel: 01334-462052 
e-mail: ss50@st-andrew^ac.uk
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Transcription Conventions
The transcription conventions employed in the qualitative studies of this thesis 
were adapted from Edwards and Potter (1992).
“but at least they 
get something ”
(laughs)
//
(.)
(..) (...)
[•••]
Upward and downward aiTows indicate 
noticeable rises and falls of intonation.
Underlining denotes a strong emphasis.
“and I  don V Imow, Hyphens mark an intenaiption in the general flow
there’s- I t ’s funny... ” of the nanative / train of thought.
Non-verbal signals are refened to in brackets.
The point at which overlapping or simultaneous 
speech begins is marked by double slashes.
The first symbol represents a pause that can just 
be heard, whilst the following two symbols stand 
for slightly longer pauses (up to Isec and over 
2sec respectively).
Indicates that text was omitted / edited.
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A p p e n d ix  III
This Appendix comprises the materials referred to in Chapter III.
A p p e n d ix  I IL a  Coversheets (Identity Manipulations) 
A p p en d ix  I I I , b  ‘Money Questiomiaii e’ (example) 
A p p en d ix  I I L c  Random Deletion of Cases
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Appendix IILa
<ssMen Women
Money plays a pervasive role in all our lives. Yet, people differ 
greatly with regard to what money means to them. The degree to which 
we value money, the importance we attach to it, seems to depend on who 
we are.
This study is about people’s attitudes towards money. We are 
particularly interested in the relationship between gender and money. Do 
men and women think about money in the same ways? Do they value 
money differently?
Your help in filling out this questionnaire is very much 
appreciated. It is fairly short and should take less than 10 minutes to fill 
in. All questionnaires will remain completely anonymous.
Please feel free to comment or make suggestions that might help to
improve the questionnaire!
ThcivyJk/yowvery wiouchA
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Full-time employees
Money plays a pervasive role in all our lives. Yet, people differ 
greatly with regard to what money means to them. The degree to which 
we value money, the importance we attach to it, seems to depend on who 
we are.
This study is about young people’s attitudes towards money. We 
are particularly interested in the relationship between people’s 
occupation and money. Currently, we are comparing young people in 
full-time employment with students. Do young people who opt for full­
time employment rather than going to university think about money in 
the same ways as students? Do they value money differently?
Your help in filling out this questionnaire is very much 
appreciated. It is fairly short and should take less than 10 minutes to fill 
in. All questionnaires will remain completely anonymous.
Please feel free to comment or make suggestions that might help to
improve the questionnaire!
T h c tn k /y a u /v e A y  mjuuchA
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é iPlease indicate which group you belong to by ticking the appropriate box. 
G rou p  □  Male 
□  Female
Here are some general comments men and women have made about money matters. On a 
scale from 1 to 7 (where 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = somewhat disagree; 4 = 
undecided; 5 = somewhat agree; 6 = agree and 7 = strongly agree), could you please circle 
the number (as indicated in the example) that best reflects your point of view.
Example:
1 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
Please bear in mind that there are no right or wrong answers.
1. The more money I have, the happier I am.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
2. Making lots of money does not seem a very attractive idea to me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
3. I believe that the amount of money people have is an expression of their competence and 
ability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree
4. I never think about money.
Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
5. For me, having less money than I have now would take the fun out of life.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
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6. I would do practically anything legal if I were offered enough money.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree
7. Money can’t buy you autonomy and freedom.
Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
8. I often feel inferior to others who have more money than I have, even when I know that they 
have done nothing of worth to get it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree
9. Money is the least important thing in my life.
Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
10. If I had double the amount of money I have now I would be twice as happy.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
11. There comes a point when having more money actually means enjoying life less.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree
12. Money could never solve all my problems.
Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
13. Money gives you the opportunity to be what you want to be.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
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14. One doesn’t have to be clever to make a lot of money.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
15. The quality of one’s life is directly proportionate to the amount of money one has.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree
16. Money is of no importance to me.
Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
17. The better off I were, the more contented I would feel.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
18.1 would never feel down because of not having enough money.
1___ 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
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Appendix lll.b62Finally, we would like to ask you some more personal questions.
Please indicate on the scale below how important each of the following are for the
way in which you see yourself:
Your Politics (Conservative, Left-wing, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not important at all Very! important
Your Nationality (Scottish, English, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not important at all Very important
Your Gender
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not important at all Very important
Your Religion
1 2 3 4 5 6 1
Not important at all Very important
Your Degree Course (Psychology, Business Studies, Theology, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not important at all Very important
Please indicate how often you think of yourself in the following
Your Politics (Conservative, Left-wing, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Sometimes Always
Your Nationality (Scottish, English, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Sometimes Always
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Your Religion
Your Degree Course
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Sometimes Always
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Sometimes Always
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Sometimes Always
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Random Deletion of Cases:
R e s u l t s  f o r  O v e r a l l  A n o v a  a n d  P o st -h o c  A n c o v a
Results for Overall Anova
Random
Deletion
Main Effect Main Effect Interaction
(Gender) (Condition) (Gender x Condition)
1 AS r e p o r t e d  in c h a p t e r  l i i .
2 F= .189 n.s. F= .051 n.s. F= 3.580 p = .063
3 F= 1.920 n.s F= .133 n.s F= 4.895 p = .031
4 F= .302 n.s. F= .001 n.s. F= 3.979 p = .050
5 F= .041 n.s. F= .027 n.s. F= 4.065 p = .048
6 F= 1.511 n.s. F= .176 n.s. F =5.747p = .019
Results for Overall Ancova
Random
Deletion Covariate F  (S tudent Identity)
Main Effect F Main Effect F Interaction F
(Gender) (Condition) (Gender x Condition)
1 AS r e p o r t e d  in  C h a pte r  I I I .
2 9.313 p =  .003 2.054 n.s. .234 n.s. 5.135p = .027
3 9.256 p = .003 4.826 p = .032 .028 n.s. 7.643 p = .007
4 11.015 p = .001 2.455 p = .121 .524 p = n.s. 6.011 p = .016
5 6.838 p = .011 .625 n.s. .594 n.s. 3.770 p = .057
6 10.047 p = .002 5.570 p = .021 .044 8.762 p = .004
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A p p e n d ix  IV
This Appendix comprises the materials referred to in Chapter IV.
A p p en d ix  IV ,a  Questionnaire (incl. ‘Meanings of student identity’ and ‘Money Questionnaire’)
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Being A Student
We would like to invite you to take part in this brief questionnaire 
study. We are interested in students’ views on education. In 
particular, we would like to hear more about your choice to come 
to university.
Your help is very much appreciated.
It is your personal opinions that we are interested in. So please 
remember that there are no right or wrong answers.
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Many students differ with regard to what being at university means to 
previous study, we asked students to describe their reasons for pursuing a 
university degree. The following seven quotes provide an overview of their replies. 
Please mark your responses to these excerpts on the scales below.
Quote 1. "‘Coming to university was the next logical step after sixth-form, it was a natural 
progression from school. I  was expected to go to university, it was assumed by everyone that this
was what I  would do. It was the 'done thing ' at school. I  didn 7 really think about coming to
university, it has just been a step in my life. ”
1. In your opinion, is this a valid reason for coming to university?
1
Not at all
2. Is this a ‘bad’ reason for pursuing a degree?
Very much
1
Not at all Very much
3. How accurately does this describe reasons for coming to university?
1
Not at all Very much
4, To what extent do you identify with this statement?
1
Not at all Very much
Quote 2. ‘"The purpose o f  university education is the pursuit o f  knowledge. I  came to university 
because I  love knowledge. I  always wanted to study at university. I  wanted to continue learning. 
For me, going to university is about broadening one’s knowledge and developing intellectually.'’''
1. In your opinion, is this a valid reason for coming to university?
1
Not at all
2. Is this a ‘bad’ reason for pursuing a degree?
Very much
1
Not at all Very much
3. How accurately does this describe jom/* reasons for coming to university?
1
Not at all Very much
4. To what extent do you identify with this statement?
1
Not at all Very much 268
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Quote 3. “/  like the idea o f having a well-paid career. For me, coming to university meant to 
improve my employability and my chances o f  getting a decent job  in the future. These days, 
higher education is necessary to guarantee a good standard o f living and having a degree puts 
you one step ahead in the job  world.’’
1. In your opinion, is this a valid reason for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all
2. Is this a ‘bad’ reason for pursuing a degree?
Veiy much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
3. How accurately does this describe reasons for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
4. To what extent do you identify with this statement?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
Quote 4. ""For me, studying at university is about becoming a more rounded person. Four 
years in higher education is good life experience and makes each student more mature. As a 
student you gain greater awareness o f the world, a wider outlook on life. You also become more 
independent and confident. Studying broadens your horizons and sharpens your mind. I  came to 
university in order to improve myself”
1. In your opinion, is this a valid reason for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all
2. Is this a ‘bad’ reason for pursuing a degree?
Very much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
3. How accurately does this describe reasons for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
4. To what extent do you identify with this statement?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
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Quote 5. “/  wanted to live the life o f  a student fo r  a while. I  wanted a bit o f  enjoyment before 
having to work fo r  the rest o f  my life. I  didn’t feel ready to enter the 'real world’. As a student 
you can have a great social life and you meet a wide range o f people. I  wanted to have some fun  
and figured I  would enjoy my time doing a degree.”
1. In your opinion, is this a valid reason for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all
2. Is this a ‘bad’ reason for pursuing a degree?
Ver}’ much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
3. How accurately does this d e s c r i b e r e a s o n s  for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
4. To what extent do you identify with this statement?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
Quote 6. “/  came to university to continue studying my subject at a higher level. I  wanted to 
find  out more about my subject so that I  could get the qualifications and skills needed to be able 
to follow a particular career path in the future.”
1. In your opinion, is this a valid reason for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all
2. Is this a ‘bad’ reason for pursuing a degree?
Very much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
3. How accurately does this d e s c r i b e r e a s o n s  for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
4. To what extent do you identify with this statement?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
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Quote 7. ""The benefit o f  having a university degree is that people have more respect fo r  you. 
My grades were too good fo r  a non-graduate job and a degree proves that you have attained a 
certain standard o f education. It indicates to others the level at which you can think or function 
and is therefore a reflection o f academic achievement that is recognised by other people.”
1. In your opinion, is this a valid reason for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all
2. Is this a ‘bad’ reason for pursuing a degree?
Very much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
3. How accurately does this describe joz/r reasons for coming to university?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
4. To what extent do you identify with this statement?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all Very much
Now take a few moments to think about your decision to pursue a university 
degree. -  Please rank the above quotes in order o f their importance for your 
choice to come to university (where “1” designates the most important reason, “2” 
the second most important reason, etc. and “7” the least important reason).
Rank
{most important reason)!
2
3
4
5
6
{least important reason)7
Quote Number
Q uote...............
Q uote...............
Q uote...............
Q uote...............
Q uote...............
Q uote...............
Q uote...............
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A p p e n d ix  V
This Appendix comprises the materials refened to in Chapter V.
A p p en d ix  V.a Coversheets (Identity Manipulations)
A p p en d ix  V.b ‘Money Questioimaire’ (example)
A p p en d ix  V.c Ultimatum Game (example)
A p p en d ix  V d  Transcription of Audio-Text (Introduction to study, incl. experimental manipulations) 
A p p en d ix  V.e Debriefing Handout
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Psychology
Money plays a pervasive role in all our lives. Yet, we know 
surprisingly little about what money really means to different groups of 
people. We are interested in the question of whether or not the degree to 
which we value money depends on who we are and the groups we 
belong to.
This research is particularly concerned with the relationship 
between people’s chosen field of study and their beliefs and behaviours 
with regard to money. At present, we are mainly focusing on economics 
students and psychology students. Are there any differences between 
psychologists and economists and, if so, how are these expressed? These 
are the types of questions we are interested in and would like to explore 
in this study.
Your help in filling in this questionnaire is very much 
appreciated. It is fairly short and should take less than 20 minutes to 
complete. All questionnaires will remain completely anonymous.
Please feel free to comment or make suggestions that might help to
improve the questionnaire!
XhcLvOufyow\e¥y muchA 273
Psychology
Theology
Money plays a pervasive role in all our lives. Yet, we know 
surprisingly little about what money really means to different groups of 
people. We are interested in the question of whether or not the degree to 
which we value money depends on who we are and the groups we 
belong to.
This research is particularly concerned with the relationship 
between people’s chosen field of study and their beliefs and behaviours 
with regard to money. At present, we are mainly focusing on theology 
students and psychology students. Are there any differences between 
psychologists and theologists and, if so, how are these expressed? These 
are the types of questions we are interested in and would like to explore 
in this study.
Your help in filling in this questionnaire is very much 
appreciated. It is fairly short and should take less than 20 minutes to 
complete. All questionnaires will remain completely anonymous.
Please feel free to comment or make suggestions that might help to
improve the questionnaire!
ThciYih yaw  very muchA 274
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Please indicate which group you belong to by ticking the appropriate box.
Group  □  Theology
□  Psychology
The following questions aim to explore some general ideas with regard to 
how psychologists and theologists view each other.
Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers. Feel free to 
write down anything that comes to your mind!
la ) To be completed by psychologists on ly ........
In your own words, how would you describe a ‘typical’ theologist? 
What are your general impressions regarding theologists?
lb ) To be completed by theologists on ly ........
In your own words, how would you describe a ‘typical’ psychologist? 
What are your general impressions regarding psychologists?
*** PLEASE TURN OVER ***
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2) Please describe in your own words what you see as the main differences 
between psychologists and theologists.
On the scales below, could you please indicate how much, in your 
opinion, theologists and psychologists value money:
For theologists in general, I believe that money has ....
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
No value at all
in general, I believe that money has ..
Great value
1 2 3 4 5 6 1
No value at all Great value
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Participant ID:.
The Ultimatum Game
In this final part of our study, you will be faced with a simple bargaining problem. This 
problem -  also called the ‘ultimatum game’ - involves two bargainers or ‘players’. The 
game is usually played as follows:
Imagine that a sum of £10 has been allocated for this game.
Player 1 (the ‘allocator’) proposes how much of the £10 each player is to receive.
This proposal consists of specifying both the amount that Player 1 is to obtain 
and the amount that Player 2 is to receive. The two amounts must add up to £10.
Player 2 (the ‘recipient’) responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposal 
made by Player 1.
If Player 2 accepts the proposal, the £10 will be divided and paid as specified in 
the proposal.
If Player 2 rejects the proposal, both Player 1 (the ‘allocator’) and Player 2 (the 
‘recipient’) will receive £0.
You will play this game twice; once with a theologist and once with another psychology 
student who is completing this task in a separate session.
To make sure you understand the rules, please answer the following questions before 
continuing. Imagine yourself in the role of Player 2 (the ‘recipient’).
(1) If Player 1 allocates you £3.00 and you marked that value acceptable, 
you get £ .... and Player 1 gets £ .......
(2) If Player 1 allocates you £3.00 and you marked that value unacceptable, 
you get £ .... and Player 1 gets £ .....
I. Game 1
In this particular game, you are matched at random with a student from the School of 
Theology -  call him or her theologist ‘X’. You will not get to know who X is. A sum of 
£10 has been provisionally allocated to the two of you. Because our budget does not 
permit us to pay everybody, 10 pairs of students will be chosen in a random draw and 
will be paid according to their responses (make sure to note down your participant ID on 
the top of this page!). In responding to this questionnaire you should assume that you will 
be among those who are paid.
Now imagine yourself in the role of Player 2 (the ‘recipient’). The selected theologist X 
will propose a division of the £10 between the two of you, by selecting one of the options 
listed below. You must decide now which options are acceptable to you and which, if 
any, are unacceptable.
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A. If I am selected to play as Player 2 (the ‘recipient’), then I respond to any proposal 
that Player 1 (the ‘allocator’) might make as follows.......
Player 1
(theologist X)
Player 2 
_ (you) ‘Acceptable’ ‘Unacceptable’
£9.50 £0.50 -- a
£9.00 £1.00 a
£8.50 £1.50 ..
£8.00 £2.00 O
£7.50 £2.50 a
£7.00 £3.00 a
£6.50 £3^0 a 1, I
£6.00 £4.00 a
£5.50 £4.50 a ' □
£5.00 £5.00 □
£4.50 £5.50 a -----
£4.00 £6.00 □I
£3.50 £6.50 L.1 2_
£3.00 £7.00
£2.50 £7.50
£2.00 £8.00
£1.50 £8.50
£1.00 £9.00 1 !
£0.50 £9.50 □
im selected to play as Player 1 (the ‘allocator’), then I propose the following
division of £10: 
I receive
The other player (theologist X, I D  ) receives £
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II. Game 2
Now you are matched at random with another psychologist -  call him or her 'Y \  
Again, a sum of £10 has been allocated to the two of you.
B. If I am selected to play as Player 2 (the ‘recipient’), then I respond to any proposal 
that Player 1 (the ‘allocator’) might make as follows.......
Player 1
(psychologist Y)
Player 2 
(you)
£9.50 £0.50
£9.00 £1.00
£&50 £1.50
£8.00 £2.00
£7.50 £2.50
£7.00 £3.00
£6.50 £3.50
£6.00 £4.00
£5.50 £4.50
£5.00 £5.00
£4.50 £5.50
£4.00 £6.00
£3.50 £6.50
£3.00 £7.00
£2.50 £7.50
£2.00 £8.00
£1.50 £8.50
£1.00 £9.00
£0.50 £9.50
‘Acceptable’ ‘Unacceptable’
□
□
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B. If I am selected to play as Player 1 (the ‘allocator’), then I propose the following 
division of £10:
I receive £
The other player (psychologist Y, I D  ) receives
Finally, could you please indicate whether you a re   □  Male
□  Female
What is your ag e?  Years
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Transcription of Audio-Text
Introduction to the study and experimental manipulations
Hello. In conjunction with researchers at Exeter University, we are conducting a 
program of research at St. Andrews University which is looking at the question of 
whether attitudes and behaviours relating to money are linlced with issues of identity or 
‘group membership’.
Our research can be placed within the field of economic psychology. We are 
particularly interested in the question of how different gr oups of people relate to and 
behave ar'oimd money, hi this part of the research programme, we are systematically 
looking at the monetary attitudes and behavioms of a number of different groups of 
people and at both the shnilarities and the differences with regard to what people say 
and do ar ormd money.
1) In this study, we are particularly interested in the question of whether there is 
a link between people’s chosen field of study and their beliefs and behaviours 
with regard to money. At present, we are focusing on two contrasting groups, 
psychology students and economics students. Are there any differences between 
psychologists and economists and, if so, how are these expressed? These are the 
types of questions we are interested in and would like to explore in this study.
2) In this study, we are particularly interested in the question of whether there is 
a link between people’s chosen field of study and their beliefs and behaviours 
with regard to money. At present, we are focusing on two contrasting groups, 
psychology students and theology students. Are there any differences between 
psychologists and theologists and, if so, how are these expressed? These are the 
types of questions we are interested in and would like to explore in this study.
3) In this study, we are particularly interested in the question of whether there is 
a link between people’s chosen field of study and their beliefs and behaviours 
with regard to money. At present, we are focusing on you as psychology 
students and we are also looking at a number of other subject groups. How 
important is money to psychologists and to others? How do they behave around
Text in boldface indicates the identity manipulations.
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money? These are the type of questions we are interested in and would like to 
explore in this study.
In the questionnaire, which we will give you shortly, you will first come across some 
open-ended questions about yom* general impressions concerning:
1) psychologists and economists
2) psychologists and theologists
3) psychologists
This will then be followed by a nimiber of questions with regard to your attitudes 
towards money in general and regarding your feelings about wiiming and losing money 
in p articulai".
Finally, you will be asked to play a game called the ‘ultimatimi game’. For tills game, 
each of you will be given a participant identification code. Please keep a note of this ID 
as you might actually win some money and you will need your identification code in 
order to claim it. You will play two rounds of this game in wliich you will be randomly 
matched with people who are being tested in separate sessions of this study, hi one 
round the person will be a ....
1) economist and in the other round they will be a psychologist
2) theologist and in the other round they will be a psychologist
3) psychologist and in the other round they will be from another subject group 
You will find detailed instructions for the game in the questioimaire. At the end of the 
study, 10 pairs will be selected in a random draw and paid according to their responses. 
The winners’ identification codes will be posted on your First Yeai* Notice board by 
next Monday, alongside further details about how to collect youi" money.
Please note that you are imder no obligation to take part in this study. Participation is 
voluntary and you are free to withdiaw from the study at any time. The questiomiaires 
will now be handed out and if you choose not to take part, simply leave it blank and 
return it at the end of the class. If you wish to withdraw, please just stay where you are 
imtil the end of the study so you do not disturb anyone else.
Please make sure that you read tlirough the cover sheet and all the instructions carefully. 
If you have any problems or need any help in answering the questions, please ask for 
assistance. The questionnaire is printed double-sided so make sure that you do not miss 
any questions. When you are finished, please return youi" completed questionnaire.
Thank you vei*y much for your time and help!
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‘Money and/Ide*\tCty^:
Whuxt Oi'ûiii' re^eo^cJv about?
This research is concerned with the relationship between people’s identity 
and the degree to which they value money.
Within economics, money tends to he viewed as a rather neutral, generalised 
medium of exchange. However, psychological research on money has started to 
show that different groups of people vary greatly with regard to their attitudes 
towards money. Yet, in psychological studies, group membership has often been 
understood as an objective and invariable attribute of the person (such as gender or 
socio-economic group, for instance). In doing so, many studies have ruled out the 
possibility of intra-individual variation; that is, the value a person attaches to money 
has been regarded as independent of the social context in which monetary attitudes 
are expressed.
Social Identity Theory (see e.g. Tajfel, 1982), on the other hand, argues that group 
membership is not objective but primarily psychological and thus based on 
perceptual or cognitive processes. Individuals actively structure their perception of 
themselves and others by means of abstract social categories that become 
internalised as aspects of the self-concept. This subjective self-identification in terms 
of group membership constitutes part of the individual’s social identity. 
Consequently, group membership depends on how a person subjectively views or 
categorises him / herself and this social identification, in turn, is determined by the 
social context.
In our work, we are applying these notions derived form Social Identity 
Theory concerning group membership to an understanding of economic 
psychological phenomena. Traditionally, many psychologists have believed that 
attitudes are fairly stable constructs that exist ‘in our heads’. As such, attitudes have 
been assumed to be independent of the world around us. We want to show that
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monetary attitudes might not be as stable as has generally been presumed but that 
they vaiy according to how we see ourselves and relative to whom we are comparing 
ourselves to.
In the present study, our focus was on one particular identity dimension - namely on 
“being a psychologist” -  which we tried to render salient. Before completing the 
questionnaire, some of you learned that our main interest lay in the differences 
between psychology and economics students (Condition 1) whilst others were told 
that we were going to compare psychology and theology students (Condition 2) with 
regard to their views on money. A third group acted as a control group in which no 
comparison was introduced (Condition 3). In actual fact, no comparisons with either 
economics or theology students are going to take place; we simply aimed to vary the 
comparative context in which your identity as “psychologists” was situated.
What we are trying to get at is whether the extent to which people value money 
depends on the context they find themselves in. So, for instance, if people believe 
that they are being compared to one particular group, will their responses on the 
money questionnaire differ from how they might answer if compared to another 
group? In posing questions like these, we are hoping to contribute to a greater social 
psychological understanding of what has traditionally been regarded as a purely 
economic phenomenon: money.
T 7 u t v \ k i ' y o t A T  ttmed
If you would like to know more, please feel free to contact me.
Phone: 01392 -  851589 or 01334 - 462052 (ask for Stefanie Sonnenberg) 
e-mail: ss5Q@st-andrews.ac.uk
If you are interested in further reading
Fumham, A. (1984). “Many Sides o f the Coin: The psychology of money usage.” Personality and Individual 
Differences 5(5): 501-509.
Fumliam, A. (1996). “Attitudinal correlates and demographic predictors of monetary beliefs and behaviours.” 
Journal o f Organizational Behavior 17: 375-388.
Fumham, A. and M. Argyle (1998). The Psvcholoev o f Money. London, Routledge.
Tang, T. L.-P. (1992). “The meaning o f money revisited.” Journal o f Organizational Behavior 13: 197-202. 
Tajfel, H. (1982) (Ed.). Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Appendix VI
A p p e n d ix  V I
This Appendix comprises the materials referred to in Chapter VI.
Appendix V.a ‘Tmst Me’ Procedures
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‘Trust Me’ Procedures
The presenter takes £100 to Room A. The contestants in Room B are given the 
Invisibility Test - "If you were invisible, would you pick people's pockets, watch 
people undress, eavesdrop on conversations about you or fight crime?" This is 
achieved by means of a plain text video screen, where the only information conveyed is 
the answer to the question.
The video screen of the Invisibility Test 
The presenter then takes £200 to Room B. The contestants in Room A are asked the 
Honesty Test -  a number of yes/no questions such as: "Have you ever taken the credit 
for someone else's work?", "Ifyou found a cashpoint card and PIN in the middle of the 
street, would you use it?", '‘‘Have you ever cheated on an exam or test? or even "Ifyou 
had a drug that was legal, that made anyone you wanted have sex with you, would you 
use it?”). Again, the only information conveyed are the answers to the questions, 
which are shown to the viewers and the contestants in Room B at the same time.
The Honesty Test graphic
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The Character Reference graphic 
When the stakes have reached £800, the contestants in Room A are shown a Character 
Reference, a video about one of the room B inhabitants made by one of their close 
associates (a friend, parent, workmate etc.)
When the stakes have reached £1000, contestants in Room B are shown a House Visit 
video where the presenter investigates the house of one of the contestants in Room A 
and also provides a detailed description of it.
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